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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Looking back on nearly forty years of service at the
highest levels of the British government, Lord Hankey asked
the following question:
••• whether the whole of the control of war should not be
delegated by the government to the military authority;
in other words, whether a war should be controlled by
statesmen or solely by fighting men.l
His question is deceptively simple; yet it strikes at the
very heart of any theory of civil-military relations.

Whether

it is during peace or during war, the role of the military
in policy formulation is central to the security of the state.
The question is what form that role will take.

While it is

correct to say that in democratic societies, based on civilian
control, the military performs in an advisory capacity, that
answer really only begs the question.

If the military are to

advise the civilian leadership, then what considerations
should the military officer incorporate into his thought process as he strives to fulfill that advisory function
Within any society, that.advisory function is restricted to a handful of senior military professionals who interact
with the political leadership.

In the United States, this

advisory function, since the outbreak of World War II, has
1

Lord Hankey, Government Control in War (Cambridge:
At the University Press, 1945), 11.
1

2

fallen upon the shoulders of one particular group of military
professionals, the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

By law, they·are

the "principal military advisors" to the President, the
secretary of Defense, and the National Security Council.
Organizationally, the JCS consists of the military heads of
the four services, Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines.

They

are assisted in their duties by a vast internal organization
made up of several thousand military and civilian members.
This structure not only advises the civilian leaders on the
military aspects of national security questions but it also
coordinates and implements the military aspects of the
civilian leadership's decisions.
purview is:

Residing within the Chiefs'

the development of war plans, the supplying of

military input into the defense budget process, weapon
systems acquisition decisions, foreign policy issues, and a
multitude of other tasks.

All of these have important

military and political consequences.

The magnitude of these

decisions is fully realized when one considers that for
almost

all of the period since the end of World War II, the

defense budget has been the nation's largest single expenditure.
Unfortunately, examining the statutory functions of
the Joint Chiefs reveals only the tip of the iceberg concerning their actual role within the national security policy
making system.

One problem in attempting to determine their
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role has been the secrecy that shrouds the inner workings of
the JCS.

Even governmental task forces examining the activ-

ities of the Department of Defense complain that they are not
allowed within the inner sanctum of the JCS to observe its
operations.

Despite this shortcoming, it is apparent that

the period between 1945-1960 was crucial in the development
of the organization.

Although first established during

World War II, it was during the first decade and a half after
the war that the JCS evolved structurally and defined its
relationships with other elements concerned with national
security policy.

In this regard the Truman and the Eisen-

hower administrations were the gestation period for the JCS
as well as the whole national security policy making structure.
At the outset of this period, the whole structure
was organized without any unanimity as to what the final
product should look like.

Although the National Security

Act of 1947 supplied a general framework, it went through
three major reorganizations, 1949, 1953, and 1958, as the
structure evolved to meet new requirements.

With the 1958

reforms the basic structure of the JCS as well as the other
elements within the defense community had been finalized.
Over twenty years later the nation's military forces are
still operating under this basic system.

The importance of

this gestation period is not exclusively a function of

4
structure.

By the end of the Eisenhower presidency, the

basic relationships between the Chiefs and the remainder of
the defense policy arena had solidified.

The apparent

revolutionary changes that occurred in the Defense Department
during the 1960s were merely a continuation of the basic
trends that already had begun during the 1950s.

Thus by the

end of this gestation period, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had
not only completed its organizational development, but had
clearly established its role within the defense policy making
structure.

An understanding of the events surrounding that

period is essential to comprehend how and why defense related
organizations interact today.
Thus far I have referred to the JCS as part of a
national security policy making system.

The concept of a

policy making system is not as precise a scientific phenomenon as some social scientists would like to believe.
Instead, it is merely an intellectual construct consisting
of those sub-systems (e.g. individuals, groups, or organizations) whose participation is necessary to reach a decision
and to make policy.

For the purposes of this study we are

concerned with those decisions that involve the national
security.

While the number of possible sub-systems or actors

that might be involved in a particular national security
issue are almost limitless, all of those issues ultimately
are associated in one way or another with the nation's

5

military migllt.
Since the Joint Chiefs are the political leadership's
"principal military advisors," they are an integral part of
that policy system and thus the process of policy integration.
If military power is to have any use it cannot exist within
a vacuum, but must support the nation's goals.

This requires

the development of an integrated political/military policy
that carefully considers all aspects of national power before
ascertaining the nation's political commitments.

Through

this process the policy maker guarantees that those commitments are compatible with the ability of the nation to
support them.

But merely identifying an organization as

an actor within a specific policy system tells us little
about the role it plays.

Attempting to determine, by

administrative and structural examination, an organization's
influence and manner of participation in the policy arena,
places the analyst in a position similar to Plato's cave
dwelling characters, who only see vague shadows of reality.
Part of the reason for this is that the nature of an
organization's participation or role is as much molded by
bureaucratic forces and self-perceptions as it is by formal
structural relations.

In order to more carefully define the

nature of an organization's participation, and thus the
parameters of its role, I propose a heuristic model that
consists of four interdependent variables.

Despite the

6

limitations that are associated with all social science
models, it will supply a framework within which an

effec~ive

understanding of the role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in
defense policy making may be developed.
The first of the variables is the sub-system's place
within the formal organizational and administrative structure.
This structure, along with various statutes, charters and
functions papers, identify the key participants and define
the formal relationships between them.

For the JCS, the

National Security Act of 1947 and its ensuing amendments
supply this skeleton.

An understanding of that framework

is an essential first step because the role of the JCS is
worked out within the context of that formal structure.
The second variable is the sub-system's own internal
organizational dynamics.

This consists of the nature of its

bureaucracy and its organizational goals.

These factors

determine how the sub-system will respond to outside agencies
and what kind of product it will produce as input for the
policy system.

Within the JCS, the peculiar nature of its

bureaucratic structure is instrumental in influencing the
type and content of the Chiefs' advisory input.

Furthermore,

the nature of bureaucracy impacts upon the Chiefs' relationship with other agencies.
The third variable is the perception of other actors
within the system as to what role the sub-system should play.

7

How important those perceptions are in actually molding the
sub-system's role depends-on the hierarcbical relationship
that exists between them.

Among the various agencies within

the national security policy system, the executive leadership's perception of the Joint Chiefs' role is the most
important.

That leadership appoints the Chiefs, looks to

them for advice, and is their superiors within the military
chain of command.
The fourth variable is the sub-system membership's
own perception of what their role should be.

What the Chiefs

believe their own role to be is a crucial factor, because
those beliefs will motivate them to act in whatever manner
is appropriate to that perception.

Granted, outside pres-

sures will have some impact, but it can never equal the selfgenerated beliefs of the Chiefs themselves.

In this regard,

the Chiefs' perception of themselves as military
sionals is quite· important.

profes~·

It supplies the normative basis

for their participation not only in the policy process, but
also for their relations vis-a-vis the parent society.

But

professionalism is important beyond its ability to shape the
behavior patterns of the officer corps; it also forms the
basis of much of the administration's perceptions as to the
Chiefs role.

Those perceptions are founded upon certain

historically derived assumptions as to the nature of civilian
control of the military, and of the military professional's

8

role vis-a-vis the government.

Those assumptions in turn

are inextricably connected to specific interpretations as
to the nature of mili ta·ry professionalism and what subje.cts
the professional may advise the government on·.

An integral

part of the officer's advisory function is the determination of what factors to take into consideration while
developing that advice.

The criterion by which the offi'c_er

makes that determination is based upon his own interpretation
of professionalism.

Thus the perception of what is the

proper nature of military professionalism not only affects
the officer's relationship with other institutions, but also
affects the product he inputs into the policy making system.
With this framework in mind, my study of the JCS
will proceed in the following manner.

First, I will examine

the nature of military professionalism and how it specifically developed in the United States.

This will supply the

definitional basis for the officer's interpretation of what
it means to be a professional within the American context.
Next, I will examine the formation of the Joint Chiefs as a
wartime exigency and attempt to ascertain the role it played
during that conflict.

With the end of the war, the Joint

Chiefs had institutionalized some of its basic internal
structures and developed certain patterned relationships
with outside agencies.

This pre-1947 background will form

the necessary basis to analyze in turn each of the four

9

variables in my role model:

the defense organizational struc-

ture, the JCS bureaucracy and the impact of bureaucratic'
relations on the Chiefs, the administration's perceptions of
the Chief's role, and finally the Chiefs' own perceptions of
their role.

Once this has been accomplished I will look at

the Chiefs' actual participation in the process of policy
integration.

This should supply us with enough insight and

empirical data from which I can draw some conclusions as to
the role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

CHAPTER II
MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM AND THE OFFICER CORPS'
ROLE IN POLICY FORMULATION
To understand the role the United States Joint Chiefs
of Staff play it is first necessary to comprehend the nature
and the historical background of military professionalism •.
The former supplies the basis upon which the military professional determines what his role in policy formulation
ought to be, while the latter, to a great extent, determines
exactly

wba~

his role will be.

It would be a mistake to

assume that these factors only impinged upon the American
military.

On the contrary, a·great deal of the organiza-

tional framework within which the Joint Chiefs operated was
borrowed from Europe.

With this in mind this chapter will

first proceed to examine the sociological definitions of
military professionalism, and then determine in some normative fashion what role the military professional has in the
development of national policy.

Next, it will examine the

manner in which that role has evolved historically in both
the Prussian and the American experiences.

The Prussian

experience, in particular, has a great deal to offer, because
the general staff model was designed to offer the military
a means of contributing to policy formulation.
10

How that
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staff model was transferred to the United States and how it
blended with the American approach to professionalism is the
framework within which the JCS developed.
It was during the sixteenth century that the military
first began to develop into a profession, a development that
was inextricably connected to the rise of entrepreneurial
capitalism and the Protestant Work Ethic.

2

Prior to this

period, there had been military leaders who devoted their
lives to combat service, but sociologists do not consider
them professionals because they lacked the three fundamental
characteristics that separate a professional from other
occupations within the society:
and corporateness.

expertise, responsibility,

Professional expertise is considered the

acquisition of unique knowledge or competency gained through
specialized education, training, or experience.

Responsi-

bility is the professional's obligation to the service of his
society, and the ethical utilization of his expertise.
Corporateness is the common bond and sense of unity that
exists between members of a profession, and creates the
2 Jacques van Doorn, The Soldier and Social Change:
Comparative Studies in the History and Sociology of the
Military (London: Sage Publications, 1975); Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the State: Theory and Politics of CivilMilitary Relations (New York: Vintage Press, 1964); Bengt
Abrahamsson, Military Professionalization and Political Power
(London: Sage Publications, 1972); Morris Janowitz, The
Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrai_t__
(Glencoe, Illinois: Freepress, 1960); Alfred Vagts, A History of Militarism: Civilian and Military (New York: A Free
Press Paperback, 1967); G. Teitler, The Genesis of the Professional Officer~' Corps (London: Sage Publication, 1977).
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self-perception that they are different from other social
groups.

Some of that sense of corporateness is imposed by

the profession's own regulations, but some of it is simply
a sense of uniqueness and comradery that grows out of a
.

common b ase o f exper1ence.

3

The feudal or pre-feudal concept of officership
was based more on class distinction than on individual
competency.

"Being a warrior and an officer," according

to Coates and Pelligrim, "was simply a facet of the
aristocratic feudal responsibility."

4

That responsibility

was not to the society, but to a class structure.

Further-

more, as Coates and Pelligrim point out, the "skills
required of the mass of fighting men were directly available
in the civilian populace with little if any specialized
military training."

The result was that the lack of a dis-

tinctive corpus of military expertise, plus the class
connection to responsibility and corporateness, tended to
eliminate pre-modern forms of officership from the professional category.
3

charles Coates and Roland J. Pelligrim, Military
Sociology: A Study of American Military Institutions and
Military Life (University Park, Maryland:
Social Sciences
Press, 1965), 201-203; also see Huntington, Soldier and the
State, 7-19.
4

Coates and Pelligrim, Military Sociology, 204.
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As the modern nation-state began to take form through
increased centralization, simultaneously a bureaucratic/
technocratic infrastructure came into existence, based upon
specialized expertise.

Military power was an integral part

of the state's consolidation of power and as such the managers
of that military power naturally were incorporated into the
infrastructure.

It was with this modernization process in

mind that Swedish sociologist, Bengt Abrahamsson, suggested
that one definition of professionalization should be the
"historical transition of a particular organization under the
impact of major political, economic and technological
developments."

5

The transition that Abrahamsson suggested occurred
from the sixteenth century on, but was accelerated by the
industrial and technological revolutions that went hand in
hand during the latter part of the eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries.

It led to the mass army, the division

organization with its concomitant bureaucratization, the
development of new weapons and logistics systems, and the
movement toward technical specialization.
warfare now demanded of

The nature of

the military officer skills that

were not readily available in the civilian community.

During

the early stages of this transformation the only specialized
5

Abrahamsson, Military Professionalization, 16.

14
expertise that the military officer needed, that was not
found within his own social upbringing, was in the area. of
artillery and engineering because of their extensive mathematical basis.

At first, the

milita~y

relied exclusively

upon civilian specialists, but during the eighteenth century
they began to develop their own military academies which
were essentially artillery and engineering trade schools.
As nineteenth century industrialism forced the officer to
acquire even more complex skills, especially in the area of
industrial and logistics planning, the military education
system was restructured and most Western nations established
post-graduate military schools. 6
The growth of this unique specialized military
expertise not only fostered modern military professionalism,
but also the perception on the part of the officer corps that
they were indeed professionals.

This perception caused the

military to redefine its relationship to the society,
especially in light of the fact that the officer corps
ceased to be merely military hirelings.

Now the professional

officer wanted the same kind of relationship vis-a-vis
society that other professionals enjoyed.
6

An essential

Phillip H. Stevens, Artillery Through the Ages
(New York: Franklin Watts, Inc., 1965), 15-16; also see
Theodore Ropp, War in the Modern World (Durham: Duke University Press, 1959), 16.
It was for this purpose that West
Point was originally established as an engineering and
artillery school. See Stephen Ambrose, Duty, Honor, and
Country: A History of West Point (Baltimore: John Hopkins
Press, 1966), 12.

15
aspect of the development of expertise was that the profes;....
sion took upon itself the responsibility to use that
expertise
society.

in the name of its client, in this case the
The military professional sought a doctor-patient

relationship analogue.

The specific nature of that pro-

fessional relationship is described in Allan Millet's
recent study of militaTy professionalism.
The professional, however, asks that he, and not his
client, set the conditions under which his knowledge
and skill are utilized and that the client accept the·
professional's definition of what the problem really
is.
In return for his professional authoritativeness,
the professional enters a compact with the client not
to go beyond the 'functional specificity' of the
profession.7
It is the nature and the precise definition of this "functional specificity" that has been the cause for a reoccurring
debate within the profession.

This debate has tended to

focus on two contending and prescriptively divergent institutional models.

While they have been characterized by

Arthur Larson as "radical" and "pragmatic" professionalism
and by Donald Bletz as "traditional" and "new" professionalism, they are always associated with Samuel Huntington's The
Soldier and the State and Morris Janowitz's The Professional
7

Allan Millet, Military Professionalism and Officership in America, A Mershon Briefing Paper #2 (Columbus, Ohio:
Mershon Center, 1977), 3.
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Soldier, respectively.

8

Both identify the military as a

profession, but they markedly differ in their prescription
for the professional's role and relationship vis-a-vis the
parent society, and the professional's role in an advisory
capacity.
Huntington views the professional soldier as primarily a manager of violence in the Laswellian context, i.e.,
the primary goal of the soldier is to achieve a high degree
of expertise within the narrowly defined boundaries of that
management function.

The military professional becomes the

technically proficient, politically neutral tool of the
state.

In order to achieve this goal, a divergent military,

isolated from the larger, more liberal society becomes a
necessity.

Naturally, this restricts the professional

soldier's role in policy formulation to advising on only the
military perspective of any issue.

To do otherwise would

be unprofessional, and theoretically impose a threat to
civilian control.

Implicitly, such an approach can only be

optimized when the officer views the world as a series of
easily definable compartmentalized groupings of factors,
within which one can discern the military parameter from
others.
8

A:rthur J,arson, "Military Professionalism and Civilian Control: A Comparative Analysis of Two Interpretations,"
Journal of Political and Military Sociology, Vol. II, No. 1
(Spring, 1974); Donald Bletz, The Role of the Military Professional in U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: Praeger, 1972),
67-72.
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Janowitz, on the other hand, views the military as
a sub-system of the larger society.

This leads him

to

reject

the radical professionals' isolation and to replace it by a
military more congruent with the parent society, i.e., a
pragmatic or "constabulary force."

Janowitz assumes that as

the traditional uses of military power become altered by
technological advances and a changing political environment,
so also does the traditional dichotomy between war and peace.
In its place stands the ambiguous nature of limited conflict,
where victory becomes an illusive goal.

To operate effec-

tively within such an environment, the constabulary officer
corps must be cognizant of the non-military factors which
characterize modern international conflict and incorporate
those factors into his input.
This debate between the "radical" and the "pragmatic"
positions stems from confusion as to the military's role
within the state's political structure.

"Radicalism" pre-

supposes that war is a uniquely different phenomenon from
peace, and concludes that the political and the military
aspects of the state are separate.

The "pragmatist" rejects

this bifurcation of political and military matters, believing instead that war and peace both belong on the same continuum as do other forms of the political intercourse of the
state.

If the "radical" approach is correct, then the

military, based upon the client-professional relationship,

18
should demand complete autonomy in military matters.

Further-

more, the only measure of success and competency within· the
"radical" perspective can be victory on the battlefield. Maximizing combat efficiency is just one more rationale for the
"radical's" claim to autonomy.
The key variable in both of these approaches is the
relationship of professionalism to the officer corps' proper
role in policy formulation.

That, in turn, is based upon what

factors the officer incorporates into his analysis and has
internalized into his cognitive process.

For Janowitz,the

lack of such factor incorporation results in an "absolutist"
professional, who believes that the objectives of the state
are achieved through military victory, and that the more
total the victory, the more total the achievement of those
goals.

Limited war becomes inconceivable since total victory

is the only objective worth attaining.

For Huntington, the

internalization of non-military factors violates the officer's
professionalism, and undermines "objective civilian control"
which is the only way the state can remain non-militarized.
Obviously, Huntington rejects the viability of fusionism,
which is the melding of non-military considerations and
perceptions with the military ones.
hand, demands it.

Janowitz, on the other

It is within this paradigm that all

analysis involving the professional military officers' role
in policy formulation resides.

19
Unfortunately, the radical model has focused its
attention on the issue of civilian control of the militarj,
as opposed to the more crucial issue of the development of
sound military advice.

Both contending positions agree that

military power is a necessary tool and should support the
policy goals of the state.

On this point, they differ little

from the ideas of the nineteenth century military philosopher,
Carl von Clausewitz.

While Clausewitz never addressed these

issues in terms of differing sociological models, his examination of the nature of war and the professional

soldier~s

role in policy formulation substantiates the correctness of
the pragmatic position.
Clausewitz bases his claim to pragmatism upon his
universally famous definition of war:
War is not merely a political act, but also a real
political instrument, a continuation of political commerce, a carrying out the same by other means.9
War is not only an act of political intercourse, a form of
conflict resolution, but it is also an instrument to achieve
political goals.

The use of the term "by other means" does

not mean that war is different from other forms of political
interaction.

On the contrary, war is simply one type of

political interaction that exists between states, the only
9
(London:
I, 23.

carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. by J.J. Graham
Kegan, Paul Tranch, Traubner, & Co., Ltd., 1908)
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difference is that it is "settled by bloodshed."

10

There

exists a spectrum of potential instruments at a government's
disposal, ranging from peaceful trade to war itself.

None

of these are totally separable from each other just as the
colors of a spectrum are inseparable •
.•• That war is nothing but a continuation of political
intercourse with a mixture of other means. We say mixed
with other means in order thereby to maintain at the same
time this political intercourse does not cease by the war
itself, it is not changed into something quite different,
but that in essence, it continues to exist whatever may
be the form of the means that it uses.ll
Thus in one sense the term "politics" was broadened to
include all aspects of state power.
For Clausewitz it was axiomatic that the amount of
conflict that existed between states determined how states
interacted and how war or any other tool of statecraft was
used.

The greater the importance or emotional tie to a goal

the greater the propensity to use force.

Thus the objective

will be the standard for determining the means. 12
Since war was a political act, military power should
never be divorced from its guiding political policy.
action of itself without the successful resolution of
10
11
12

Ibid., I, 121.
Ibid., III, 121; also see I, xxiii-xxiv.
Ibid.

Military
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political conflict becomes "a senseless thing without an
object." 13

If it does not have policy to guide it, military

power will establish its own calculus of success, which will
be measured in military terms, i.e., victory.

Janowitz's

theoretical model of the absolutist who strives for the
defeat of the enemy regardless of the political goals of the
state, results from the separation of military power from
policy.

While the radical theorists may attempt to discon-

nect themselves from such absolutism, their claim to professional autonomy and the rejection of fusionism is the basis
for absolutism.

In order to avoid this situation, the

rational development of foreign policy by a government must
carefully consider its military option.
The process by which a state chooses which instrument
to use is the formulation of foreign policy.

For policy to

be effective, it must conceptualize the political goals of
the state and take into consideration the power or capabilities which the state has at its disposal.

Out of necessity,

the state's military capabilities must be compatible with the
state's political goals or commitments.

14

Implicit within

this logic was the assumption that a state's policy goals
are constrained by the physical capabilities the state has at
13
14

Ibid., I, 122.
Ibid., III, 124.
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its disposal.

Obversely, a state's capabilities must be

structured and utilized in such a manner so as to fulfill
its commitments.

Only through rational guidance supplied

by the political/military decision making structure can a
nation avoid imbalancing its commitments and capabilities.
It is in the process of developing this rational
policy that the military officer's advisory role comes into
play, or as Clausewitz points out that "innermost part of
its [war's] domain, where all the other threads meet."

15

That domain is the development of war plans, or in a broader
context, the development of policy.

If war or power is to

be a useful political tool or a political act, then a well
organized policy is the key.

In many ways, it may have

been the most tragic part of Clausewitz's premature death,
that Book VIII (which dealt with the question of policy
formulation) was only in preliminary draft form.

Clausewitz

hoped to fully develop his ideas on the spectrum of war "by
which everything will be simplified," and to "iron out the
many creases in the heads of strategist and statesmen, and
at least to show the object of action and the real point to
be considered in war."

16

This chapter is critical to our

study since it is here that Clausewitz outlines the method
by which efficient policy was to be made and the role of
15
16

Ibid., III, 99.
Ibid., I, xxiv.
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the military officer in that formulation.

By doing so he

prescribed the proper nature of military professionalism.
From the above, it is easy to come to the conclusion that the crux of good policy is the identification of
those goals that the state considers important.
over simplification.

That is an

How does a state arrive at that

identification, especially if one considers that the capabilities to achieve those goals must be commensurate with
those goals?

The apparent solution to this problem is

bureaucratic interface between the military officer who
deals in capabilities and the politician who supplies the
commitments or goals.

But there is a danger of being drawn

into a chicken and egg dilemma when attempting to discern
which should be the dominating factor--the policy or the
military force to support it.

Despite all the above, this

is not as ridiculous a fear as it may appear.

While

Clausewitz emphasized it would be contrary to his whole theory
if "policy makes demands on war it cannot respond to," he
was a very practical military officer.

He fully realized

that the types of problems confronting the professional
military advisor necessitate immediate solutions, and
normally military solutions at that.

This combination

creates a situation where it may well be possible to posit
logically that capabilities guide commitments, and thus
situations ought to be analyzed from that perspective.

On

24
this point Clausewitz answered:
The subordination of the political point of view to the
military would be contrary to common sense, for policy
has declared the war; it is the intelligent faculty, War
only the instrument, and not the reverse. The subordination of the military point of view to the polifical
is, therefore, the only thing which is possible. 7
If the military point of view became dominant, it
would mean that the military goal had replaced the political
goal as the objective of the state.

But the term "subordi-

nation" contradicts our earlier conclusion that war is a
political act.

If this is true, then there can be no

"military" wars, only "political" ones.

18

In this context,

war takes on a multiplicity of meanings from actual military
conflict to military planning during peacetime, but such
planning without regard to the political environment
"becomes nothing more than a combination of a few factors of
time and space, directed toward an arbitrary goal." 19

If

military planning is to perform any function at all, it must
become another form of political planning designed to achieve
the political goals of the state.
It is the actual exercise of policy formulation that
produces the cohesive direction by which a state achieves
17 Ibid., III, 124-125.
18

Ibid., III, 126.

19
Quoted in Peter Parot, Clausewitz and the State
(London: Oxford University Press, 1976), 379.
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its goals.

If the synonymous relationship between political

and military planning is correct, then the corollary is·the
absence of any differentiation between the political and the
military points of view.

Once it is understood that there

are no military wars, only political ones; then there is no
military point of view, only varied political views with the
integration of different modes of effort.
According to this point of view, to leave a great military enterprise, or the plan for one, to a purely military judgement and the decision is a distinction which
cannot be allowed, and is even prejudicial, indeed it is
an irrational proceeding to consult professional soldiers
on the plan of war that they give a purely military
opinion upon what the Cabinet ought to do.20
To avoid this not only is bureaucratic interface
between the statesman and the soldier required, but intellectual fusion as well.

This process can only occur if the

soldier incorporates into his intellectual process an awareness of non-military factors.

For the officer to preface

his advice with the caveat "from the military point of view"
is absurd as well as dysfunctional, because "there can be no
question of a purely military evaluation of a great strategic issue, or a purely military scheme to solve it."

21

All

military considerations and all strategic plans are
political in nature.

The military officer who fails to

20 c1ausewi tz, On War, I I I, 126;
21

(emphasis added) .

Quoted in Parot, Clausewitz, 380.
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incorporate such considerations

~nto

his advice is a failure

to his profession because, in the last analysis, "none of
the principal plans which are required for a war can be made
without an insight into political relations."

22

But what of the civilian political decision maker;
what was his role in the Clausewitzian scheme of things?
Obviously, there must be an inextricable relationship between
the political and the military advisors so policy does
reflect the maxim that war is a political act.

The politi-

cian must understand the state's capabilities and work to
keep them in tune with the state's commitments.

It is the

politician who must never allow the military point of view
to become dominant by forcing commitments to conform to
capabilities:
But still more absurd is the demand of theorists that a
statement of the available means of war be laid before
the General, that he may draw out a purely military plan
for the War or for campaign in accordance with those
means.2 3
In the final analysis, any artificial distinction between
the military aspects of national power and the political
aspects undermines the totality of Clausewitz' approach to
22

clausewitz, On War, III, 126. As part of this
intellectual fusion between the soldier and the civilian,
the civilian decision maker must have an understanding of
the capabilities which his military possess. But even more
important is an understanding of the proper use of the
military instrument.
" ••• a certain knowledge of the nature
of war is essential to the management of political intercourse." Clausewitz, On War, III, 127.
23 Ibid., III, 126.
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policy making.

In order to ensure the realization of that

approach both the soldier and the statesman must reject· any
compartmentalization of political from military planning,
and with it the "radical" model of military professionalism.
Thus it is through the "pragmatic" model of professionalism that the military can exercise "responsibility"
and help pave the way for the effective integration of
political and military policy.

While Clausewitz supplied

the intellectual and theoretical framework for the development of coordinated political/military policy, he failed to
offer an organizational structure that could implement
this theory.

The closest he came was to suggest that the

head of the military should be a member of the cabinet so
"that he may take part in the councils and decisions on
.
t an t occas1ons.
.
"24
1mpor

He apparently failed to compre-

hend that modern war had become too complex for one man to
fully understand the ramifications and interrelationships of
various actions.

The policy planner needed a staff of

experts to digest that mass of material and to rationally
develop a policy after examining all the possible options.
In theory, such an organization could have been the Prussian
General Staff.

24

clausewitz, On War, III, 127; implicitly Clausewitz
is calling for civilian control of the military, but such
controls were within a fusionist environment.

28

The formation of the general staff system was sYffiptomatic of the managerial revolution that occurred in the industrial West during the nineteenth century.

Whereas earlier

staffs were merely functional specialists, usually in collateral civilian fields, 25 the general staff model oft~~ed
the managerial tool to enable the government's leadership to
control and direct its vast resources in time of war •.
Scharnhorst, who is considered the father of the modern
Prussian General Staff, realized that the successful

US€

of

the mass army, with its independent corps and divisions,
necessitated the creation of an organization that was
"capable of ensuring the effective subordination of the
26
independent units to central control."
Unfortunately,
concentrating only on controlling combat units ignored the
staff's greater potential.

By placing the General Staff at

the highest organizational levels it could effectively
subordinate and control the various elements of national
power, and become in the words of professor Frank Simonie
25

Alvin Brown, The Armor of Organization (New York:
Hibbert Print Co., 1953), 29-53; Dallas Irvine, "The Origins
of the Capital Staffs," Journal of Modern History, Vol. X,
No. 2 (June, 1938), 166-67; Walter Goerlitz; History of the
German General Staff: 1657-1945, trans. by Brian Battershaw
(New York: Praeger, 1973), Chapter 1.
26 Quoted in Herbert Rozinsky, The German Army (Washington, D.C.: Infantry Journal Press, 1944), 43.
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"the bureaucratization of supreme military power."

27

The precise nature of a general staff has become lost
in the confusion of myth and the varied national interpretations of the concept.
of the commander.

A staff officer is a primary assistant

He is a source of information and advice,

normally on a specific functional area, and it is through
him that orders related to that area are issued and followed
up on.

While the staff officer may issue orders, he does so

only in the name of the commander because a staff officer
never commands.

As war became more complex, it was necessary

to broaden some of the supervisory functions of certain staff
officers and they evolved into a managerial elite.

Spencer

Wilkinson, whose book. The Brain of an Army, greatly
influenced the formation of the British and the American
staff structures, described the Prussian General Staff in
the following way:
The duties of command are so multifarious that some-consistent distribution of functions among the officers of
a large staff is indispensable.
In Prussia this distribution is based on a thoroughly rational and practical
principle. The general's work is subdivided into
classes, according as it is concerned with the direction
of the operations against the enemy. All that belongs
to administration and discipline is put upon one side
of a dividing line, and upon the other side all that
directly affects the preparation for or the management
of the fighting--in technical language, all that falls
27 Frank Simonie, "Structure and Policy: The
Evolution of the Military Staff", (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, New York University, 1975), 176.

30

within the domain of strategy and tactics. The·off~cers
entrusted with the personal assistance of the general in
this latter group of duties are in Prussia called his
"general staff." They are specially trained in the art
of conducting operations against an enemy ••• 28
Wilkinson, as most analysts of the General

Staf~,

has focused his attention on the staff's operational mission,
i.e., guaranteeing operational integrity and unity of action.
Within this aspect of the General Staff's mission, the
"radical" approach to military professionalism

dominat.e.s~-

and operational efficiency, combat effectiveness, and the
staff officer's technical proficiency are considered paramount.

But Wilkinson, in his discussion of the Prussian:

Staff tends to ignore the staff's planning mission.

If one

considers the analogue that Wilkinson has constructed by·
titling his book The Brain of an Army, then the staff ''s
operational mission is similar to that of the human nervous
system, while the planning mission is that of the controlling
brain.

Granted planning occurs concurrently within opera-

tional organizations, but at the highest level operational
considerations become less important as political/military
planningtakesplace.

It is at this level that Clausewitz'

call for pragmatism should be implemented.

From the prac-

tical viewpoint, the Prussian General Staff implemented this
dual but interrelated staff function.

One group of staff

28 spencer Wilkinson, The Brain of an Army: A
Popular Account of the German General Staff, second edition
(Westminister: Archibald Constable & Co., 1895), 6.

31
officers (Truppengeneralstab) were distributed to the field
commands to guarantee unity of operations.

A smaller group

(Grosser Generalstab) remained in Berlin to develop war
plans and were concerned with the development of military
input into political/military planning.

Thus the general

staff model consists of military planning at the highest
level, and then the operational implementation of those
plans through the field commands.

29

The comparison of the general staff model to a
managerial tool is drawn as a result of the developmental
analogue between the growth of the state and large corporations.

Just as administering large businesses became too

complex for the individual entrepreneur to maintain
control, so governing of the state became too complex for
the individual statesman.

Managerial scientists, such as

Frederick W. Taylor, suggested that the solution was to be
found in the formation of a planning staff.

Such a plan-

ning department would not only be concerned with the effective day-to-day running of the factory, but also long-term
growth and reinvestment.

The same is true of the general

staff; it would be concerned with not only the immediate
operational aspects of war plans, but also long-range
29

Carey Brewer, "The General Staff of the German
Army: A Lesson in Military Organization,'' U.S. Naval Institute ?roceedings, Vol. 82, No. 2 (February, 1956).
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. t egra t.1on. 30
poliCY 1n
The Prussian General Staff had the potential to ·help
institutionalize the integration of political/military
policy, but its role and theoretical base became perverted
over the remainder of the century due to a narrow definition
of military professionalism.

The result was an over-concern

for its operational function at the expense of policy inteSlowl~

gration.

the military point of view became dominate.

By the end of World War I, the concept of war as an exte:nsion of politics had become reversed as a result of
Ludendorff's sophistry.

Ludendorff's rule subordinated the

political goals of the state to the military point of v.iew
as war was totalized.

Since he and the General Staff were

the true military experts, and the only means of achieving
victory in total war was to maximize military efficiency,
it was only natural that Germany should be run as a military
dictatorship.

31

In America, on the other hand, Clausewitz was not
just perverted, but totally rejected.

Instead of the

fusionism that was demanded by his theories, diplomacy was
30

Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., The Visible Hand: The
Managerial Revolution in American Business (Cambridge:
The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1977); see
also Brown, The Armor of Organization, 63.

31

Hans Speier, "Ludendorff: The German Concept of
Total War," in Makers of Modern Strategy, ed. by Edward
Mead Earle (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1941).
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compartmentalized from military planning and a professional
military ethic developed that inculcated this compartmentalization.

The reason may be found in a series of

inextrica-

bly related factors stemming from America's colonial heritage
and the nature of the military profession.
From the very beginning of the colonial experience,
Americans viewed themselves and their New World as something
quite different from the Europe they left behind.

This new

hemisphere represented a rejection of feudalism, Catholicism,
despotism, and political persecution.

Out of this particu-

lar world-view developed the American image of war and its
relationship to policy.

As the Republic matured, the

colonial sense of escape was transposed into political isolationism and a repudiation of the time honored European system
of Realpolitik.

32

According to the American perception of

the world, only despotic states had power as their goal, and
deceit and secret diplomacy as their means.

Americans

apparently believed the line from Pericles' Funeral Oration
"We alone do good to our neighbors not upon the calculations
of

inte~est,

32

but in the confidence of freedom and in a frank

The question of American idealism and its impact
on American foreign policy was surfaced in the early 1950s
by three major works, Robert E. Osgood, Ideals and SelfInterest in American Foreign Policy (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1953); George Kennan, American Diplomacy:
1900-1950 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952); and
Hans Morgenthau, In Defense of the National Interest (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1950). For a discussion of the
growth of American idealism see Daniel Boorstin, The Americans~
The Colonial Experience (New York: Vintage Books, 1965).
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and fearless spirit."
After rejecting power politics as an acceptable·
approach, it was logical to establish a clear delineation
between war and peace.

Since it was the search for power

that brought on war, America's liberal optimism posited that
democracies would never launch an aggressive war.
wars fought by democracies were, by definition,
and just.

33

Thus all
defensive

War became a holy crusade with good ultimately

triumphing over evil.
policy or even

Since war was rejected as an act of

as a part of the normal political inter-

course or states, it became compartmentalized from diplomacy.
The second factor that led to the bifurcation of
diplomacy from military planning was the nation's image of
the military.

This image, which manifested itself in the

form of civilian supremacy and anti-militarism, resulted
from America's colonial heritage and Anglo-Saxon traditions.
Since England.was not a continental power, it was possible
to base its army on a militia system; while the fear of
another Cromwell made it desirable.

Aside from these tradi-

tions though, there were practical reasons for the successful transplanting of the militia system to the New World.
The communal nature of the early colonies did not allow for
33

Robert Tucker, The Just War (Baltimore:
Hopkins University Press, 1960), 11.

John
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the luxury of a non-productive military, and the omnipresent
Indian threat secured the militia's place in colonial
society.

34
The consequences of this very necessary commitment

to the citizen soldier were great.

First, it contributed to

the myth of the militia's effectiveness and preparedness,
which in turn laid the basis for the nation's mobilization
posture up to World War II.

Second, it obviated the neces-

sity for having a professional standing army.

No matter

how effective or necessary a professional military became,
it was considered a necessary evil that had to be isolated
from the mainstream of American society.
Such isolation did occur, both as a requirement of
mission and as a desire of the society.

The Navy's mode of

operation isolated it during its long cruises, and the Army
became isolated because of its exile to duty on the frontier.
These necessary separations from society conformed to the
desires of many of its members.

Echoing this sentiment,

Albert Gallatin, member of Congress and former Cabinet
official wrote:
The distribution of our little army to distant garrisons
where hardly any other inhabitants are to be found is
the most eligible arrangement of that perhaps necessary
34

Louis Morton, "The Origins of the American Military
Tradition," Military Affairs, Vol. XXII, No. 2 (Summer, 1958);
Boorstin, The Americani, 351.

36
evil that can be contrived. But I never want to see the
face of one rsoldier] in our cities and intermixed with
the people. 35
This isolation was made even worse by the attitudes of the
civilian decision makers.

Inculcated with the concept of

civilian control, they took the idea too literally, and translated civilian control into the absence of military input
into the policy making structure.

This attitude was not just

restricted to the military's involvement in wartime policies.
William Jennings Bryan's famous cry that military officers
"could not be trusted to say what we should or should not do,
till we actually got into war," referred to peacetime foreign
.
d
. .
36
po 1 1cy
ec1s1ons.

That this isolation would have an impact on the selfperceptions of the officer corps was only natural.

Professor

Burton M. Sapin in his study of the military's role in American foreign policy noted that this isolation "was bound to
have some impact on their [the officers'] view of the world,
and more practically, on their ability to consider

35

Henry Adams, The Life of Albert Gallatin (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co., 1879), 304. For a general
overview of the American Public's view_of the military, see
Robert Kimble, The Image of the Army Officer in America:
Background for Current Views, Contributions in Military
History Number 5 (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press,
1973).
36

Louis Morton, "Origins of Pacific Strategy,"
Marine Corps Gazette, Vol. XIL, No. 8 (August, 1957), 42.
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non-military factors in their planning, training, and
operations."

37

Sapin's observation alludes to the growth of

"radical" professionalism among the American officer corps •.
This professionalism restricted the officer from incorporating non-military factors and limited him to looking at the
world exclusively from the military point of view.

If

"radical" professionalism did dominate, it would negate any
chance of the officer corps developing "pragmatism," and
result in the military officer simply being incapable of
supplying the type of advice that the civilian policy maker
needed.

Just as it is "an irrational proceeding to consult

professional soldiers on the plan of war that they give a
purely military opinion "

38

it is equally irrational for the

military to perceive the world in purely military terms.
Within this environment, the American military
developed all the external manifestations of professionalism:
a formalized education system, specialized journals, social
37

Burton Sapin and Richard Snyder, The Role of the
Military in American Foreign Policy (New York: Doubleday,
1954)' 3.
38

clausewitz, On War, III, 126.
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organizations, and so forth.

39

Concomitant with these insti-

tutions were the internal criteria of expertise,
bility and social cohesion.

responsi~

While the latter two criteria

strengthened the individual's internal solidarity with the
group, it was expertise that separated the professional
soldier from his arch competitor--the militiamen.
only natural for the professional,

It was

believing in his own

expertise, to postulate that war had so fundamentally
changed during the second half of the nineteenth century,
that only the expert could deal with it.
amount of

With a certain

justification, the professional looked upon

himself as the sole reservoir of that expertise.

At first

his new self-awareness was directed against the professional's old enemy, the militia, but slowly the civilians
who "controlled" the professionals became a point of focus.
The civilian policy maker was no better prepared to deal
with the complex strategic-military issues of modern war
than the militia was to fight those wars.
This professional perception of the failure of the
American

military system was most effectively articulated
39

west Point was merely the first of the various
institutions that were formed to instill expertise and with
it professionalism.
In 1881 the Command and General Staff
College was formed at Fort Leavenworth, and in 1901 the Army
War College was established. Each school was formed with
~he idea of furthering the professional officer's education
ln his area of military expertise. The Navy went through a
similar experience but slightly earlier, with the Naval War
College being established in 1884.

39

in the writing of one man, General Emory Upton.

A Civil War

general and later an instructor at West Point, Upton was the
author of numerous works on military policy.

He was writing

his most important work, The Military P6licy of the United
states, at the time of his suicide in 1881.
only

40

This work not

reflected a growing sense of professionalism,but helped

proselytize it.

On the surface, it is a polemical attack

on the traditional American assumption of a militia based
military.

It develops a strong argument for a professional

army and an officer corps based upon the criterion of expertise; but the argument implicitly carries beyond the
question of the militia's ability to fight, and questions
the civilian's ability to lead.

The fact that the civilians

continue their infatuation with the

militia is, to Upton,

just a further exhibition of their lack of understanding
of the complex military realities of the day.

For Upton

and many of the professionals, congressional and administration interference during the Civil War epitomized such
civilian incompetence.

"If you want to know who was the

cause of three years of war after we created a disciplined
40

Emory Upton, Military Policy of the United States,
reprint of 1904 edition (New York: Greenwood Press, 1968).
Elihu Root was given a copy of the unpublished draft, and
it was the Secretary of War that promoted its publication
in 1904.

40
armY of 600,000 men, it was Stanton."

41

His solution to the

problem that faced the professionals was encapsulated in ·a
single sentence:
Under our Constitution, Congress has the power to raise
and support armies, and subject to the supervision of
the President, only professional soldiers should command
them. 4 ~
Upton was not actually questioning the principle of civilian
control, because he, like most of the other professionals,
had accepted it as part of their professional dogma.

It is

just that he sought to isolate war time operations from the
non-professionals.

Unfortunately, once expertise became the

criterion for determining control, then civilian control itself
came into question.
The direction in which Upton's arguments would lead
is clearly seen in a somewhat prophetic civil-military conflict that occurred some twenty years after his death.
After the Spanish-American War the pacification of the
Philippine Islands was placed under the direction of General
Arthur MacArthur.

During his tour, he had a confrontation

over powers and prerogatives with the civilian governor of
the islands,

William Howard Taft.

Taft's power was based

upon a set of orders issued by the President of the United
41
(New York:
42

Peter Michie, The Life and Letters of Emory Upton
D. Appleton & Co., 1885), 423.
Upton, Military Policy, xi; emphasis added.
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states.

MacArthur viewed such Presidential instructions

as "an unconstitutional interference with his oreroga- ·
43
tives as Military Commander of these islands."
It is
apparent that the elder MacArthur believed that once a
military officer had been given a mission, the civilian
leadership should allow him to complete it without interference.

Such expertise, if unhindered, would not only

achieve the required defeat of the enemy, but do it quickly
and efficiently.

The insertion of non-military factors can

only detract from this mission.

This example was sympto-

matic of the officer corps• acceptance of "radical"
professionalism.
By the end of the nineteenth century, the American
military professional was exhibiting many of the same traits
as his German counterpart.

Both claimed, by virtue of

their expertise, complete autonomy in military operations,
to the exclusion of political considerations; but the
American professional, because of his heritage and liberal
values, never really threatened civilian control.

Unfor-

tunately, the bifurcation of political considerations from
military planning, which was an offshoot of that same
liberal tradition, destroyed any chance of generating the
43

Ralph Minger, William Howard Taft and United
States Foreign Policy (Chicago: University of Illinois
Press, 1975), 48-49.
See also Rowland T. Berthoff, "Taft
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kind of fusionism that true policy integration demands.
The assumption that fusionism would somehow lead to Prussianization failed to take into consideration the differences
in the political and social structure between the two states.
Despite these impediments to policy integration, the
changing role of the United States during the last part of
the nineteenth century demanded some form of organizational
reform.

These efforts culminated after the Spanish-American

war with the formation of the Army General Staff, the Navy
General Board, and the Joint Board of the Army and Navy.
Of these three organizations, only the Army created something that

resembled the European general staff model.

The other two organizations were essentially coordinating
boards without any institutional staff support, and in the
case of the Joint Board no authority.

44

The Army came out of the Spanish-American War badly
in need of organizational reform.

The War revealed its

internal defects to such an extent that they could not be
ignored.

The selection of poor camp sites in the Southern

part of the United States, the problems in issuing proper
arms and equipment (to include woolen uniforms to troops
going into a tropical climate), the massive confusion in
44

Paul Y. Hammond, Organizing for Defense: The
American Military Establishment in the Twentieth Century
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), 66.
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transporting the U.S. forces to Cuba, and the scandals that
were reported involving the efforts to supply the troops·
(tO include the

imamous embalmed beef scandal), ultimately

reflected coordination and planning difficulties.

These

difficulties in turn highlighted the power struggle between
three competing loci of power:

the Secretary of War, the

commanding General of the Army, and the bureau chiefs.
Although there was no question as to the role of the President as commander-in-'chief, "the difficulty," according to
Major General Otto Nelson, "arose on the level just below
the President where a duality of control existed that had
caused bickering and confusion for more than a century."
Although the Secretary of War was the regularly constituted official through whom the President's wishes
were presumably to be effectuated, the General Commanding the United States Army had come to occupy, through
a long-standing custom aided by Congressional action,
a position which was in some respects coordinate with
that of the Secretary of War.45
The result of this duality of command was that many of the
subordinate elements within the War Department considered
themselves to be under the exclusive control of the Secretary or the Commanding General.

The independence that many

of the bureau chiefs maintained, based upon political ties
to Congress and the tenure of their position, exacerbated
this situation.
45

Thus there was no single agency in a

otto Nelson, National Security and the General
Staff (Washington:
Infantry Journal Press, 1946), 14-15.
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position to coordinate the various organizations.
In order to implement this badly needed reform·,
President McKinley appointed Elihu Root as Secretary of-the
Army.

Root came from a business and legal backgrOU·hd, and

was thus sympathetic to managerial solutions to organizational problems.

He "saw clearly how the muddles

alt

'stem-

med from the failure of the parts of the Army structure to
work in unison, "

46

and offered as a solution the cr·eat-ion of

a brain to coordinate the service's various activities~
The establishment of this brain required two important and
interrelated organizational reforms.

First, he sought to

replace the Commanding General of the Army with a new posi"'tion, Chief of Staff of the Army.

Second, he wanted to

create a general staff to help the new Chief of Staff ful"'fill his duties.

Both of these reforms came about

in 1903.

These reforms eliminated the duality of command
that existed earlier.

Even in the Prussian system, where the

Chief of the German General Staff actually commanded the
army, he did so in the name of the king, who was the commander-in-chief.

In place of command, the new American

Chief of Staff would head the staff and as such would be
the primary advisor to the Secretary of War.

Root explained

this change of title and function as follows:
46

Alvin Brown, The Armor of Organization, 197.
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The title chief of staff---denotes a duty to advise,
inform, and assist a superior officer who has command,
and to represent him, acting in his name and by his .
authority, in carrying out his policies and securing
the execution of his commands. The officer who accepts
the position assumes the highest obligation to be
perfectly loyal to his commander, to exclude all personal interests from his advice and representation, and
to try, in the most wholehearted way, to help him to
right conclusions and to successful execution of his
policies, even though his conclusions may not agree
with the advice given.47
Superficially, it seemed that this completed the organizational restructuring.
Unfortunately, Root's reforms failed to take into
consideration the growing sense of professionalism within
the Army and the bureaucratic imperatives of the institution.
In theory the Chief of Staff is powerless to act on his own
for he is not a commander, but he is still the senior
officer within the Army.

Within the military frame of refer-

ence the senior officer is normally regarded as the commander.
From the officer corps' perspective, the issue at stake was
the unity of responsibility and authority.

The old military

adage, "that a commander is responsible for everything that
his units do or fail to do," reflects the importance of
authority.

This, in turn, led the military professional to

want to keep unified the planning function and the command
function.

The ultimate responsibility for the actions of a

47

war Department, Five Years of the War Department.
!ollowing the war with Spain as shown in the annual Reports
the Secretary of War, 1899-1903 ( 1904), 297-98; quoted in
ammond, Organizing for Defense, 18-19.
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staff falls upon the commander of that staff.

The resuJ.t of

this institutional desire to merge military responsibility
and military authority was that the Army perceived the Chief
of Staff as the Commander.

As the Chief of Staff began to be

considered the senior officer in the service, an issue that
was not fully resolved until after the First World War, and
as he assumed the role of senior spokesman for the professional establishment, the confusion over his command
.
d 48
simply 2ncrease
•

role

This duality of functions between p~an-

ner and commander will be addressed in greater depth in later
chapters.
In order to support the Chief of Staff in his planning and coordinating functions, Root proposed to create a
general staff along the European model.

But the Uptonian

professionalism that inculcated the officer corps forced the
new staff to become overly concerned with operational and
administrative details, to the detriment of its planning
function.
corps.
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This was not exclusively the fault of the officer

For even if they had been prepared to deal with issues

related to policy integration, there was no other agency outside the Army with which to coordinate.
Just as the Army had to initiate reform in order to
accomodate the changing American strategic role, so did the
48

Edward M. Coffman, The War to End All Wars: The
American Military Experience in World War I (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1968), chapter 6.
chapt

49
see Nelson, National Security and the General Staff,
ers 2-4.
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Navy.

The major difference was that the Navy never did

accept the highly centralized notions that were implic:it in
the Root reforms.

Instead, it maintained a decentralized
prof~$-

structure.

The reason was not exclusively narrow

sionalism.

In fact one may argue effectively, as does·'

Richard Challener, that the Navy, because of the nature of
its mission, had a greater understanding of the political
realities of the world than did the Army.

50

This sense· of

pragmatism can be seen in the writings of Alfred T. Mahnh.
Despite this pragmatism, demands for the creation of a Navy
general staff by some of the young turks failed, and the
Navy managed to avoid staff centralization up to World War

II.
Some marginal internal reform was initiated in the
wake of the Spanish-American War.

Although a general staff

was never created, the Navy did establish the General Board
in 1900.

This organization had no executive responsibility

nor authority.

It was primarily a planning agency.

In this

regard, it may actually have been closer to a general staff
than the Army version.

One of the major impediments to

centralization was the clear distinction between support/
administrative aspects of the Navy, and the combat portion.
The former remained under the control of the bureau chiefs
50

Richard D. Challener, Admirals, Generals and
1898-1914 (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1973), 12-45.

~merican Foreign Policy:
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who maintained their autonomy, not only by political power,
but through functional specialization.

One abortive effort

to centralize power in the Navy occured in 1915 with the
formation of the Office of Chief of Naval Operations.

Paul

Hammond in his study of military organizations suggests that
the original intent by Navy reformers was to establish a
position analogous to that of the Army's Commanding General,
a position that would centralize all naval organization.
Unfortunately, through a combination of internal naval disagreements and the desires of the civilian leadership, such
centralization never occured until World War 11.
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The Joint Board of the Army and the Navy, formed the
same year as the General Staff, held out the potential for
becoming an organization for policy integration.

Originally

established in order to facilitate Army-Navy planning, which
was relatively unsuccessful during the Spanish-American War,
the Joint Board's creation was an essential step toward
policy integration, because the services themselves had to
reach agreement on strategic issues before military policy
could be integrated with political policy.

Prior to its

formation, as Lawrence Legere points out, "there never
existed, except in the person of the President himself, any
regular constituted agency to provide coordination of the
51 Hammond Organiz1ng forHDe f ense, c h apter 3.

49

planning and activities of the Army and Navy."

52

Root had

considered the creation of a joint planning structure, the
obvious managerial companion to his own Army General Staff,

53

but the lack of authority and a supporting staff destroyed
whatever value the Board had.

One senior officer was so

disenchanted with the structure that he wrote that what was
accomplished "could have been solved by other means or
placed in a waste basket without seriously affecting either
.
1154
serv1ce.

While such criticism was correct, it failed to consider the impact of traditional bifurcation of political and
military policy and its concomitant introverted military
professionalism.

The Department of State, "jealous of its

legal and historical responsibility for the formulation and
conduct of America's foreign policy," excluded the Joint
Board from its planning process, thus leaving the military in
52

Lawrence J. Legere, "Unification of the Armed
Forces," (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University,
1950)' 2.
53

Elihu Root, The Military and Colonial Policy of the
United States: Addresses and Reports, ed. by Robert Bacon
and James Brown Scott (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1916)' 431.
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Quoted in Legere,"Unification;• 57; also see Vernon
Davis, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in World War II:
Qrganizational Development (Historical Division, Joint
Secretariat, Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1972),
Vol. I covers the development of the Zoint Board up to the
creation of the JCS after the attack on Pearl Harbor.
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a perceived policy vacuum.
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The result of this vacuum was

to leave the Joint Board in a quandary.

They were the pro-

fessional military experts who were to advise the civilian
leadership on military matters, but how could they do so
unless they had some idea of the long range goals the
civilian leaders wanted to achieve?

In 1908 the Joint

Board's President, Admiral George Dewey, succinctly expressed this dilemma:
What may be the facts determining the international
relations only the administration can know, and until
this knowledge is communicated to the Joint Board, it
can not intelligently make recommend~eions as to the
specific disposition of the fleet •••
Later that year this statement was repeated almost verbatim
when the board informed the President that they could make
no specific recommendation on the defense of the Pacific
until "the facts determining international relations" were
given to them and they were told what policies and interests
55

Richard D. Challener, Admirals, Generals, & American Foreign Policy:
1898-1914, 51.
In 1909 the Solicitor
of the State Department responded to the Joint Board's call
for a conference with the following statement, "as the
Department of State is charged with the administration of
foreign affairs, and as this conference ••• falls within the
jurisdiction of this department, it would seem that the
Department of State might well refuse to surrender its prerogatives." Quoted in Challener, Admirals, 53. Later in the
1920's the State Department again rejected coordination with
the Joint Board, see Ernest May, "The Development of PoliticalMilitary Consultation in the United States," Political Science
~uarterly, Vol. LXX, No. 2 (June, 1955), 169-172.
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Quoted in Challener, Admirals, Generals
!oreign Policy: 1898-1914, 51.
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theY were to defend.
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This perceived lack of guidance forced the military
at times to rely on their own assumptions, which were
naturally produced from a service and military perspective.
At times, this resulted in inter-service rivalry which undermined the Joint Board's credibility.

At other times, it

resulted in advice which was opposite that which the civilian
leadership desired.

58

One such example occurred in 1913

during the war scare with Japan.

The Joint Board recommended

the movement of ships into the Eastern Pacific in an effort
to prepare for the worst case.

Secretary of the Navy Josephus

Daniels' response to this recommendation was "nothing could
be more injurious to peaceful negotiations than the movements
recommended and that the Board had exceeded its functions
because what it recommended might precipitate war." 59
Secretary of State Bryan remarked:
While we were discussing how to prevent a threatened war,
these men were busying themselves with plans of how to
57Quoted in Morton, "Origins of Pacific Strategy," 41.
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For a discussion of how inter-service fighting
created havoc on efforts to develop a cohesive plan in regards
to the naval bases in the Philippine Islands, see Morton,
"Origins of Pacific Strategy; " William R. Braisted, "The
Phillipine Naval Base Problem, 1898-1909," The Mississippi
Valley Historical Review, Vol. XXVI, No. 3, (August, 1957).
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Josephus Daniels, The Wilson Era, Years of Peace,
!910-1917 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,
1944), 163; see Morton, "Origins of Pacific Strategy."
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get us in.
It is enough for the Army and Navy to make
plans when the Commander in Chief calls upon them to do
so.60
In this case the President dissolved the Joint Board,
but it merely illustrates the fundamental problem in
integrating American political and military policy.

On the

one hand, the professional military officer feels that he is
not receiving the kind of guidance that is necessary for him
to produce relevant military input; on the other hand, the
civilian leadership perceives that the kind of advice they
do get from the military ignores the broader ramifications
of military operations and thus is essentially useless.

61

During the Naval Conferences of the 1920's and 1930's the
American naval high command was explicitly excluded for this
reason.
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The history of American policy in the Pacific is
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rbid., 165. For a further examination of the civilmilitary problems that occurred during the Wilson Presidency
see Warner R. Schilling, "Civil-Naval Politics in World War I,"
World Politics, Vol VII, No. 4 (July, 1955).
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For an examination of this problem see Fred Green
"The Military View of American National Policy, 1904-1940,"
The American Historical Review, Vol. LXVI, No. 2, (January,
1961); May, "Political Military Consultation;" Louis Morton,
"Interservice Cooperation and Political-Military Collaboration," in Total War and Cold War, Harry S. Coles, ed. (Columbus,
Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1961); Louis Morton, "War
Plan Orange: Evolution of a Strategy," World Politics, Vol. XI,
No. 2 (January, 1959); Albert C. Stillson, "Military Policy
Without Political Guidance: Theodore Roosevelt's Navy,"
Military Affairs, Vol. XXV, No. 1 (Spring, 1961). For the most
detailed study of the pre-World War I period see Challener,
Admirals, Generals and American Foreign Policy: 1898-1914.
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say that the State Department was oblivious to the impo!tance of the military tool, but appreciation did not necessarilY lead to integration.

Furthermore, bureaucratic

acumen was something fundamentally different from pragmatic
.
64
professionalism.
This continued compartmentalization of
the political and military spheres, partially brought about
by an exaggerated sense of civilian control of the military,
and partially by the military's own professionalism, continued
until the Second World War.
As war seemed more likely during the late 1930's, the
United States began to develop organizations to facilitate
policy integration.

The first of these was the Standing

Liaison Committee of the State, War, and Navy Departments
(usually referred to as S.L.C.) formed in April 1938.

Origi-

nally, the Standing Liaison Committee proposed to deal with
the specific problem of German involvement in Latin America,
but it held the potential to become the long missing institutional means of policy integration.

Unfortunately, even
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Morton, "War Plan Orange." Also see Robert J.
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(Birmingham, Alabama: The University of Alabama Press, 1963).
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before its first official meeting the seeds of its destruction
were planted.

President Roosevelt named the military heads

.
of the Army and ·Navy as th e serv1ce
represen t a t"1ves. 65

When

a year later the Joint Board was brought into the executive
office, it was only natural for the military chiefs to look
to the President for guidance and ignore the Standing Liaison
committee as a coordinating agency.

66

Once this happened

s.L.C. •s lack of corporate contact with the White House,
coupled with traditional bifurcation of military and political
planning, emasculated its effectiveness.

67

Aside from the Standing Liaison Committee there were
other efforts at coordinating political and military policy.
For a while, weekly meetings between Hull, Secretary of War
Henry L. Stimson and Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox tried
to fill the void.

In 1940 this unofficial coordination was

replaced by a more formal structure, the War Council.

The

Council, consisting of Hull, Stimson, Knox, Chief of Staff
of the Army George Marshall, and Chief of Naval Operations
Harold Stark, met once a week with the President.

While it

65
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did become in the words of Secretary Hull, "a sort of clearing house for all the information and views we had under.
discussion," it was never fully utilized, partially because
of the unique relationship the military had with the President.

Once the United States entered the war in 1941

politics became secondary and with it the State Department.
Despite Hull's protests, the traditional separation between
military and political planning became standard operating
procedure.

68

As Secretary Stimson recalled, "when Mr.

Roosevelt learned to like the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in 1942,
he allowed himself to dispense with any general meeting on
war policy."

69

It was not until 1943 that the problems of

the future post-war environment forced the necessity for
more coordinated politicallmilitary policy planning.
This lack of high level policy integration had its
impact on the services as they attempted to formulate longrange strategic plans.

The instrumentality for such planning

existed in the service war plans divisions, which in theory
were being coordinated by the Joint Board.

But the Board,

although vastly improved since its conception, was still
hampered by inter-service distrust, a lack of authority, and
a continued perception on the part of its members that they
68
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were receiving insufficient political guidance.

This resulted

in the same kind of policy vacuum that the Joint Board had
complained of some thirty years earlier.

It was on this point

that Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Harold R. Stark,
emphasized in a January 1941 memorandum::
..• the desirability of obtaining at once some light upon
the major decision which the President may make for guiding our future naval efforts in the event of war and in
future immediate preparations for war.70
On the verge of America's entry into the Second World
war, the basic traits of military professionalism:

expertise,

responsibility, and corporateness, had established firm roots
in the United States.

Unfortunately, the American military

had accepted the "radical" definition of professionalism.

By

its nature "radicalism" emphasized the unique character of
military expertise in order to rationalize its claim to
autonomy in military matters.

As the late nineteenth century

world became increasingly dominated by technocratic managers,
the military professionals' claim to be "managers of violence'' seemed appropriate.

But the radical's claim to auto-

nomy ultimately led to a bifurcation of military from
Political matters.

This in turn led to "absolutism" in the

Janowitzian sense.

The result was that military power, which

originally had been one of many means to achieve political
ends, now became an end in itself.
--------~~---------

Victory was the yardstick

70Tracy Kitterage, "U.S. -British Naval Cooperation:
1910-1945" (Joint Chiefs of Staff Historical Monograph),
Chapter XII, pp. 12. (This document was only written in a draft
form in which the chapters were never collated.)
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bY which the professional measured his own competen-cy.

This

type of absolutism was completely compatible with America's
liberal idealistic philosophy.

Since America's domestic con-

sensus on the role of the military, and the officer bdrps'
"radical" professionalism were in congruence, no one :questioned the relationship of "radicalism" and the offi'ce.r corps'
responsibility to the society.

In fact, within the :ribei-al

interpretation, "radicalism" was not only responsible., but
ethically correct.

If nothing else it kept the officer corps

out of the political mainstream and thus guaranteed c-ivil-ian
control.
Ironically the same technological expertise that
fostered "radicalism" also required a coordinating agent ·to
organize and effectively use that expertise.
nization was the general staff model.

Such an orga-

But the staff model

itself was neutral, not emphasizing either form of professionalism.

For the model to work effectively it demanded

both forms of professionalism to be working in concert, with
the radical skills guaranteeing operational efficiency and
the pragmatic skills supporting political/military planning.
However, the dominance of "radicalism" meant that the
operational function of the staff received primacy over the
long-range planning function.

The staff could develop highly

sophisticated operational plans, but the equally important
Political/military plans, which helped develop the goals for
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which military power existed, would only come about if the
officer corps was imbued with "pragmatism.''
The result of the primacy of "radicalism" was that
the Clausewitziart

notion of political/military fusion had

been rejected as a threat to the liberal definition of
civilian control of the military, and the professional
officer's outlook was restricted to the military point of
view.

This "radicalism" led to a failure to utilize the

general staff to its maximum, and appeared to the military
officer to cut him off from the kind of policy guidance that
he thought was necessary to fulfill his planning function.
From the civilian leadership's perspective this "radicalism"
resulted in "useless" input into the policy making process.
Thus they felt they were not getting "responsible" professional advice.

This failure to develop policy integration

would result in fundamental problems in planning the military
aspects of the forthcoming world war.

CHAPTER III
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF AND THE SECOND WORLD WAR
Immediately after the attack on Pearl Harbor it was
apparent to both the British and the American military
leadership that some form of common institution was needed
to facilitate the interchange of information and to generate
a unified military approach to the war.

To begin accomplish-

ing this, a conference code named "Arcadia," took place in
washington, D.C. between 24 December 1941 and 14 January 1942.
"Arcadia's" purpose was to formulate a political/military
blueprint for the early stages of the war, while dealing with
the immediate crisis in the Pacific.

Out of these conversa-

tions came not only a reaffirmation of certain strategic
principles, such as the Germany first decision; but also the
establishment of a supreme U.S.-British military body to
direct the military aspects of the war effort--The Combined
Chiefs of Staff (CCS).

The Combined Chiefs were directly

responsible to the President and the Prime Minister as a
combined executive.

From the very beginning this was exclu-

sively an Anglo-American organization, due in part to the
bureaucratic difficulties entailed in incorporating the
Russians into the CCS, and in part to the establishment of
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spheres of control over the war effort.

71

Acting in the capacity as the military advisors.· to
the Prime Minister, the British Chiefs of Staff (COS) were
in a position to discuss authoritatively the British view on
strategic questions.

The Americans on the other hand had no

equivalent to the COS except the moribound Joint Board •.
Furthermore, the American staff structure had little previous
experience in dealing with inter-nation political/military
policy formulation.

The inadequacy of the American syst.em

was clearly conveyed in a letter from Field Marshal Dill to
71 Lord Alanbrooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff,
acknowledged the fact that the war was to be divided up into
two spheres of control; the Americans running the Pacific War
up to the Asian mainland; while the British ran the war in the
Middle East, India, Burma, and the Indian Ocean. The war in
Europe was apparently going to be controlled by the Combined
Chiefs, although the British seemed to have assumed that they
would have more to say because of their commitment and the
resources that had been allocated. Arthur Bryant, Turn of the
Tide: A History of the War Years Based Upon the Diaries of
Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke, Chief of the Imperial General
Staff (New York: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1957), 254; Vernon
Davis, A History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in World War II:
Organizational Development (Historical Division, Joint Secretariat, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1972), I, 190-200; Grace P.
Hayes, A History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in World War II:
The War Against Japan (Historical Section, Joint Chiefs of
Staff, 1953), I, 119; also see "Brief Statement of the Origin
and Composition of the Joint Chiefs of Staff," (Historical
Division, Joint Secretariat, Joint Chiefs of Staff, November 20, 1969, Mimeographed), hereafter referred to as "Brief
Statement;" John Ehrman, Grand Strategy, October 1944-August
~' Vol. VI of History of the Second World War, United Kingdom Military Series, Grand Strategy, ed. by Sir James Butler
(London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1956), 339.
(Hereafter referred to as United Kingdom Military Series Grand
Strategy. )
'
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Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke:
There are no regular meetings of their Chiefs of Staff,
and if they do meet there is no secretariat to record
their proceedings, they have no joint planners and
executive planning agency ••• then there is great dif~
ficulty of getting the staff over to the President.
He just sees the staff at odd times, and again no
record. The whole organization belongs to the days of
George Washington.72
The creation of the American Joint Chiefs of.S:taff
was a result of the institutional necessity to supplY;
can participation in the

"Arcadia" conversations.

Atneri~

Although,

there was no specific American organizational counterpart to
the British Chiefs of Staff, "there never seemed to ha"Ve been
any uncertainty as to what American officers would provide
authoritative representation vis-a-vis the British within the
Combined Chiefs."

73

The British Chiefs of Staff Committee

consisted of the First Sea Lord (Admiral Sir Dudley Pound),
the Chief of the Air Staff (Air Chief Marshal

Sir Charles

Portal), and the Chief of the Imperial General Staff (then
General, later Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke).

The American

participants were selected by virtue of the fact that they
held positions which corresponded to that of the British
Chiefs, or to use the term of the day, they were the "United
States opposite numbers."

Those officers were U.S. Army

Chief of Staff, General George C. Marshall, Commander-in-Chief
72

Dill to

~f the Tide, 233-34.
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u. S .

Fleet (COMINCH), Admiral Ernest J. King, Chief of the

ArmY Air Forces and Deputy Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army,
Lieutenant General Henry H. (Hap) Arnold, and until March
1942, Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Harold

R. Stark.

74

The immediate problem that needed to be addressed at
"Arcadia" was the deteriorating situation in the Pacific and
southeast Asia.

General Marshall, who had great faith in

unity of command suggested that the appointment of a unified
theater commander might help stabilize the situation:
I am convinced that there must be one man in command of
the entire theater--air, ground, and ships. We cannot
manage by cooperation ••• there should be sup:Leme authority
74

Based upon the "Opposite Number" formula General
Marshall's position was analogous to that of General Alanbrooke's. The American Navy's position was complicated by
the fact there was a dual chain of command. Since 18 December 1941 there had been two official heads of the Navy. On
that date the President, by Executive Order, increased the
significance of the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet, to which
he appointed Admiral King. Stark, the CNO, from then on
concentrated on administrative matters, until his appointment as Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Naval Forces Europe, in
March of 1942. With Stark's departure, King was the sole
Navy representative on the JCS. Arnold's presence was the
result of the fact that the Royal Air Force was an independent entity, and thus the U.S. had to supply an "Opposite
Number." The logical choice was Arnold.
Since he was
junior to all the other U.S. representatives he deferred to
them on strategic issues and was generally recognized as
Marshall's subordinate. As the war progressed and U.S. air
Power played an increasing role, Arnold's power within the
JCS and CCS grew accordingly so that he was promoted to
five star rank with the other members of he JCS. See "Brief
Statement," 1.
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over everyone. Suitable limitations cou~d be imposed to
safeguard the interests of each nation.7
Marshall's remarks were directed only at the Pacific situa~
·tion, where he wanted to create a unified command to direct
the American, British, Dutch, and Australian (ABDA) forces in
the area.

The selection of the ABDA commander was extremely

political because neither the British nor the Americans wanted
to be shackled with the blame for the debacle.

For this

reason, the British Chiefs first opposed such a command structure, and it was not until the intervention of Prime Minister
.
.
. d • 76
Churchi 11 t h at th e Amer1can
posl. t 1on
was sus t a1ne
Marshall had first brought up the discussion of a
unified command on Christmas Day, 1941, but it was not until
75 ABC 4, JCSSs 2, 25 December 1941, "Arcadia" Conference Proceedings, Combined Chiefs of Staff, Eisenhower
Library, Abilene, Kansas (Hereafter referred to as Proceedings, CCS). General Marshall brought up this question again
on 27 December 1941, JCSSs 4, item #5 and inserted a proposed draft of a Unified Command Order, JCSSs 4, annex 1.
On 28 December 1941 Prime Minister Churchill agreed to the
creation of the ABDA command. This partially reflected the
British desire to establish spheres of control. General
Wavell received his orders on 10 January 1942, JCSSs 8.
For a further discussion of the creation of the CCS
a~d the formation of the ABDA Command see Davis, Organizatlonal Development, I. 139-178; Hayes, The War Against Japan,
I~ 45-80; Ray S. Cline, Washington Command Post:
The Operatlons Division (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military
History, Department of the Army, 1951), 87-106; Maurice
Matloff and Edwin Snell, Strategic Planning for Coalition
~are:
1941-42 (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military
History, Department of the Army, 1953), chapter 5; J.M.A.
Gwyer, Grand Strategy, June 1941-August 1942, Vol. III, part 1
of United Kingdom Military Series, Grand Strategy, (London:
Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1964), 375-388.
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the lOth of January that British General Sir Archibald
wavell was appointed Supreme Commander in the ABDA theater.
It was during this interval that the Combined Chiefs of Staff
began to take form.

The necessity far such an "appropriate

joint body" was obvious to the political leadership of both
nations; but the problem was institutionalizing it, without
allowing, in the words of Harry Hopkins, "everybody and his
grandmother" to be a member.

77

While the Combined Chiefs

bad in practice been in operation since the beginning of
"Arcadia," the establishment of a de jure unified commander
demanded the formation of a de jure Combined Chiefs.

The

first official meeting of the CCS took place on the 23rd of
January, 1942.

With the agreement to a combined document

entitled "Post-Arcadian Collaboration," the basis for all
77

Ibid., 469.
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78
.
future Anglo-Amer1can
m1·l•t
1 ary coor d.1na t•1on was se t •
The American desire for a unified commander, wh1le
operational at the theater level, was simply impractical any
higher.

No single individual could possibly control the

complex military operations needed to conduct world-wide
war.

Furthermore, neither principal ally could politically

afford to hand over the supreme command to an officer from
the other nation, especially since the President and the
Prime Minister were political equals.
Chiefs had to remain a committee.

Thus the Combined

But even the CCS could

not meet continuously, because the military leaders of both
nations had to continue to perform their national command
functions.
78

A solution was found in naming Washington, D.C.

obviously, the CCS had been operating in a de facto
manner since the arrival of the British. At the meeting on
13 January 1942, Admiral Pound proposed that arrangements be
made to extend combined collaboration outside the ABDA area,
JCSSs 11, 13 January, "Arcadia" Conference,Proceedings, CCS.
The following day the Chiefs approved the "Post-Arcadian
Collaboration" document which specified the existence of the
CCS, a Combined Secretariat, and Combined Planners, 14 January, JCSSs 12, Proceedings, CCS. The original first draft of
the "Collaboration" was submitted on 10 January, JCSSs 8,
annex ~ Proceedings, CCS, but at that time it was rejected
and reworked for later submission·. The logic of the CCS growing out of the creation of theABDA command was first noticed
in a December 24th paper entitled "Higher Direction of the
War in the ABDA area," Lawrence Legere, "Unification of the
Armed Forces," (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard Univ:rsity, 1950), 237-245. The CCS was first publically mentloned in a press release on 6 February 1942, and the President signed the CCS's charter on 21 April 1942, "Brief Statement;" Cline, Washington Command Post, 100-101.
It was
during this period that the term "combined" began to refer to
two or more nations in collaboration, while the term "joint"
referred to the inter-service collaboration of one nation.
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the permanent seat of the Combined Chiefs and having the
British

post a liaison group there.

commanded by Field Marshal

This liaison group,

Sir John Dill, supplied permanent

British staff counterparts to interface with the growing JCS
bureaucracy.

Dill's placement. in Washington, temporarily

created the fear, that he would become an intermediary body
between the Prime Minister and the CCS, especially since he
would have continual access to the U.S. Chiefs when the full

ccs was not meeting.

After a great deal of discussion it

was decided that there would be no super-war cabinet inserted
between the Anglo-American political leaders and their
.

mi 1 itary a d v1sors.
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While this did eliminate the danger of

imposing another bureaucracy over the Chiefs, it did create
a situation that allowed for a maximum amount of political
guidance as well as interference.
The mere identification of individuals to participate
in the joint discussions did not alleviate the inherent problems that Dill had pointed out to Alanbrooke.

Obviously,

if the CCS was to perform its function and manage the war
effort, it needed staff support to monitor and plan specific
79
By the seventh meeting of "Arcadia" it was clear
that Washington was going to be the permanent seat of the CCS
and that the Americans were not going to allow a military
representative to be placed between the political leadership
and the Chiefs. There was going to be only one Combined
Chiefs of Staff. On this point the British gave in and
appointed Dill the head of the delegation to Washington and
did not make him special representative to the President.
JCSSs 11, 13 January 1942, "Arcadia" Conference, Proceedings,
~·
Also see Davis, Organizational Development, I, 183-88.
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aspects of the conflict.

Such a Combined Staff began to

take form shortly after "Arcadia" began.
committees

combined

Slowly a series of

were established to deal with func-

tional areas such as plans, intelligence, etc.

These com-

mittees had both British and American representation, with
the

u.s.

officers being drawn from the JCS's own parallel

joint committee structure.

Despite Joint Chiefs Historian

vernon Davis' observation that the JCS did not follow any
"large and conscious design"

80

as it formed its committees,

there were certain factors that helped mold its structure.
During the late 1930s the Joint Board began to develop a
series of supporting staff committees, most noticeably in
the areas of plans and intelligence.

These committees were

staffed by officers whose primary assignment was to the service staffs of these related fields.

They worked together

on the Joint Board Committees only as a part-time duty.

Thus

the members of the Joint Planning Committee were full-time
members of the Army General Staff's War Plans Division and
the Chief of Naval Operation's War Plans Division.

Theo-

retically, these officers were to "consider this joint work
as their most important duty," but invariably they had to
devote their primary attention to their own service jobs.
80
81

Davis, Organizational Development, II, 354.
Ibid., I, 30.
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Despite this problem the Joint Board's organizational support
supplied the nucleus for the forthcoming JCS bureaucracy,
which also tended to model itself after the British Chiefs of
staff structure.
Unfortunately, the American staff retained its parttime flavor, as opposed to assigning full-time joint staffers.
While the committee structure and the individuals involved
changed during the war, the basic pattern of U.S. representation on Combined Committees was that the senior U.S. officers
were also the senior service staff specialist in that specific
field.

Thus the senior US members on the Combined Intelli-

gence Committee were the Chiefs of Army and Navy Intelligence.
Similarly, Rear Admiral Richard K. Turner, Assistant Chief of
Staff (Plans), COMINCH, was the U.S. Navy representative to
the Joint Staff Planners (JPS), and along with an Army Counterpart made up the senior U.S. representation to the Combined
Staff Planners (CPS).

For the most part these joint committees

had to rely on service staffs for support, although some of
the committees had permanent sub-committees made up of fulltime staff officers to support them.

82

The part-time relationship between the services and
the joint committee reflected an American commitment that
82

As an example of how the committee structure worked
the JPS consisted of five members, the Assistant Chief of
Staff (Plans of COMINCH) and two assistants; and the Chief of
the Strategy and Policy Group of the War Department's Operations Division (OPD) and the Assistant Chief of Staff (Plans)
of the Army Air Staff.
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planning would not occur in a vacuum.

By having the senior

member of the committee the senior service planner, unity of
purpose was achieved.

But this relationship also fostered a

tendency for the joint planner to support his own service
position.

The British tried to make their staff planners free

agents, whose responsibility was to the committee as a corporate group, and not to the service.

Thus the British fully

anticipated that their planners might go against their services' interest on some issues.

The American officers, on the

other hand were used to responding to the desires of their
superiors, and achieving concurrence at every level.

Thus

the American planners tended to be more of a service advocate
than their British counterpart.

The result was, "not to pro-

duce the best paper possible within a reasonable time, but a
'perfect' paper, in which all differences had been adjusted
.
.
83
. f ac t 1on
.
t o th e sa t 1s
o f th e var1ous
super1ors.
It

The place-

ment of senior staff officers as the U.S. representatives
simply exacerbated this problem, which in turn increased
inter-service conflicts within the staff.

Therefore, the

American staff planners might be split along service lines,
While the British planners always spoke in a single voice.
Following closely behind the establishment of the
Combined Chiefs, was the de jure establishment of the
83D av1s,
.
Organizational Change, II, 384.
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American Joint Chiefs of Staff, who held their first official
meeting on 9 February 1942.

From the very beginning their

functions and duties were never delineated beyond the generalities of coordinating and directing the war effort.

For the

completion of this mission the JCS was directly responsible
to the President.
sources:

The authority of the Chiefs came from two

the members own statutory responsibilities and

functions, and their direct relationship to the President.
"So long as the Joint Chiefs of Staff retained the confidence
of the President," wrote one JCS historian, "the wartime prerogatives of the agency was secure."

84

It was imperative for

the Chiefs to maintain the President's confidence and support
if they were to sustain their viewpoint before the Combined
Chiefs.

In order to enhance this working relationship,

General Marshall became convinced that a fourth member of
the JCS should be designated to preside at the JCS meetings
and to maintain a liaison with the White House.

In order to

placate Admiral King, General Marshall proposed that the new
member be a naval officer.

Thus on 20 July 1942, Admiral

William D. Leahy was appointed to the newly created position
of Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and
the Navy. 85
84
85

"Brief Statement," 5.

Admiral Leahy was a close friend of the President,
and was recalled from his post as Ambassador to Vichy, France.
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The appointment of Admiral Leahy was inextricably
connected to a series of reforms that occurred within the
services.

Both services realized that unity of command was

essential for victory, but too much centralization in the
hands of a chief would strangle the bureaucracy and crush the
chief beneath the weight of trivia.

Thus the goal was to

balance centralization with decentralization so the chief
could concentrate on the broad strategic issues.

The Army

had begun to think about some form of reorganization during
the fall of 1941, when it became apparent that General
Marshall would not be able to command the American Expeditionary Force as doctrine called for.

Such an approach

would only be feasible in a one theater war, as in the case
of World War I.

For a world wide conflict, a new organiza-

tion was required.

Such a reorganization occurred in March

1942, under the direction of Lieutenant General Joseph
McNarney.

It centralized the diverse elements within the

Army into three major commands, Army Air Forces, Army Service
Forces, and Army Ground Forces.

The latter two commands

centralized all non-Army Air Forces logistics and training
functions under their control, while the former paved the way
for Air Force autonomy.

Men and material were then sent from

these commands to the theaters of operation.

In order to

handle the vast planning and operational function incurred

by the war effort, the War Plans Division within the General

72
staff was redesignated the Operations Division (OPD).

It

was through the OPD that General Marshall controlled the Army,
just as a commanding general would have.

This reorganization

guaranteed General Marshall primacy in the military sphere,
vis-a-vis Secretary Stimson, who increasingly became exclu86
sively concerned with administrative matters.
During the same time period the Navy was also going
through a reorganization.

While the Army's effort was at

controlled decentralization in order to free the Chief of
staff for strategic issues, the Navy had to centralize its
organization in order to achieve unity of command.

For a

variety of reasons, the Navy had developed a dual command
structure, with the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) primarily
concerned with administrative and planning matters, and the
Commander-in-Chief U.S. Fleet (COMINCH) acting as the combat
commander.

In December 1941 Admiral King was appointed

COMINCH, explaining the presence of both Stark and King at
the "Arcadia" meetings.

Increasingly, it became apparent

that this duality was dysfunctional and in March 1942 Stark
was relieved of his duties as CNO, thus placing King,

86
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who now assumed both the CNO and COMINCH duties, in a position analogous to that of Marshall.

87

These March reforms tended to supply each service
chief with a great deal of wartime power and thus made them
less interested in the creation of a super agency along the
lines of a chief of a joint general staff.

The insertion of

such an agency would tend to negate the positive effects of
the March reforms.

Still the Chiefs, and in particular

Marshall, felt that the President needed professional staff
assistance to effectively perform the duties of the commanderin-chief.88

In a March 1942 memorandum, General Marshall

explained that his notion of a chief of the joint general
staff would not be that of a supreme military commander above
the services, "but that the office would be established to
provide some one person not at present involved in the War or
Navy Departments who would coordinate and brief information
and opinions,"

89

so that the President could make the neces-

sary policy decisions.
The role of Admiral Leahy has always been an extremely
difficult one to ascertain primarily because, like the
87
Davis, 9rganizational Development, I, 237-8; King's
assumption of both Navy offices meant that the Army outnumbered
the Navy two to one.
88
89

Ibid., I, 239-50.
Ibid., I, 251.
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president's commander-in-chief. power, Leahy was given a title
without a corresponding list of functions.

There is a cer-

tain amount of ambiguity in Marshall's proposal for a chief of
the joint general staff.

Undoubtedly, Marshall never en-

visioned Leahy becoming the commander of all U.S. military
forces.

This could violate the President's constitutional

power, as well as undermine Marshall's own position, that in
effect had been elevated to that of commanding general as a
result of the March 1942 reforms.

Instead Marshall was think-

ing of a typical military chief of staff who acted as coordinator of the staff, an avenue of expression for the commander,
and a means of communication between the commander, the staff,
and the commanders in the field.

This is precisely the kind

of role that Marshall outlined in March 1942.

The ability to

be a neutral arbitrator between the various factions within a
staff is typically one of the chief of staff's primary functions.

This explains Marshall's desire to have a neutral

chairman for the JCS who could arbitrate inter-service conflicts.

This was one of Leahy's strong suits.

Not only would

his appointment equalize the number of army and navy officers
on the JCS, but Marshall "was willing to trust Leahy to be a
neutral chairman •••• " 90
Originally, the President did not see the necessity
for such an individual, maintaining that he was his own chief
90

Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall, Ordeal and
!_.o_p_e_:__~l~9~39-1942 (New York: Viking Press, 1966), 298.
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of staff.

Although, the President was finally persuaded as

to the value of such a position, his own desire never to· I.et
power reside outside his immediate control tended to degrade
the position.

91

General Marshall pointed out that Leahy

increasingly became "the Chief of Staff to the President and
less the chairman of the Chiefs of Staff •••• "

92

The apparent

derogatory tone of Marshall's statement conveys the notion
that Leahy was not allowed to become as involved in the formulation of policy as Marshall thought he should by virtue of
his pOSl. t.10n. 93
The British Official History, while not describing
this transformation, clearly notes that Leahy's role was to
"explain rather than formulate."

94

The President himself

described Leahy's role as "a sort of 'leg man,' who would
help him [Roosevelt] digest, analyze, and summarize a mass of
material with which he had been trying to cope with
91
92

Ibid., 299.
Ibid., 300.

93

The role of General Hastings Ismay, personal Chief
of Staff to the Prime Minister, may have been the model that
Marshall was basing his ideas on. He may also have been
thinking of a role that would be analogous to that of the
Secretary of Defense as the position was first conceived in
1947.
94
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,
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John Ehrman, Grand Strategy, October 1944-August
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singlehan d e d •

,95

In the final analysis Leahy became primarily

an avenue of information and feedback between the President
and his military advisors.

Unfortunately, as Leahy was drawn

into the President's political conversations toward the end
96
of the war, this avenue at times became blocked.
Whatever Admiral Leahy's role, his presence greatly
facilitated the operations of the Joint Chiefs, but the lack
of an official organizational charter continued to be a problem.

In January 1943, the Secretary of the JCS circulated a

proposed charter among the Chiefs, who subsequently sent it
to the President for approval.

The charter specified that

the Chiefs were to act as the military advisors to the President, make joint plans, issue joint directives, and exercise

97
. . d 1c
. t 1on
.
.
JUrls
over s t ra t egy an d opera t 1ons.

L ea h y, wh o

opposed such a document, believed that the Joint Chiefs
functioned effectively without one.

Since the JCS already

had direct access to the President, Leahy believed that such
a document could only constrain their relationship and limit
th e scope o f th e1r
· ac t 1v1
· . t y. 98

Apparen t 1 y, th e P res1. d en t
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william D. Leahy, I Was There (New York: McGrawHill Book Company, 1950), 97-101; after the war Leahy recalled that the relationship of the JCS toward the President was
exactly as a staff to a commander.
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agreed with his Chief of Staff, because he rejected the
charter with the following note:
It is my understanding that the Joint Chiefs of Staff
are encountering no new conditions currently requir-ing
clarification of their status or a new definition OI
their functions.
It seems to me that such an order
would provide no benefits and might in some way impair
flexibility of operations. Consequently, I consider
the issuance of an Executive Order now as superfluous.
If at a latter date an Executive Order seems nec-essa-ry
to meet ~ new situation, the matter can be recon~
sidered. 9
President Roosevelt's refusal to grant the Joint
Chief's a charter suggests something of his administrative
desires and supplies insight into his perceptions ag to

~hat

role the Joint Chiefs of Staff were to play during the war.
It is generally admitted that Roosevelt was a poor aaministrator, who liked to handle things personally.

This personal

control,which maximized his flexibility and allowed him to
utilize his very potent political skills, may help explain
the transition in Leahy's role.

This administrative attitude

is part of four interrelated factors that must be considered
in determining the Joint Chief's war-time role.
factors were:

(1)

These four

Roosevelt's war-time political objectives

and his self-perception as c·ommander-in-chief; ( 2)

the

political objectives of the British and their effective
Political!military planning structure which sought to

247.

99
Quoted in Legere, "Unification of the Armed Forces,"
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guarantee the achievement of those goals; (3)

the Joint

Chiefs' own strategic concepts and self-image as mili tar·y
officers and advisors to the President; (4)

the committee

nature of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
Despite the appearance of unity within the AngloAmerican alliance, there existed profound political and
strategic differences.
the

ccs

To the degree that the membership of

was responsible to the political leadership of their

respective nations, these disagreements permeated the
military discussions.

Due to the committee nature of the

Combined Chiefs, none of the members were capable of forcing
a successful resolution of an issue except by using the age
old political methods of persuasion and compromise.

"The

combined organization ..• " one British Chief wrote, "gives us
the constitutional right to discuss on equal terms."

100

This

equality meant that each Chief had effectively the power to
veto any CCS action.

Since the Chiefs had no organizational

superior other than their political leadership, it was
only from that level that a decision could be imposed.

When

divergent views clashed and compromise failed, the issue had
to be dealt with at the highest level.

In practice this

meant that support by the political leadership determined
one's ability to impose one's views on opposing Chiefs.

100
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Ehrman, Grand Strategy, October 1944-August 1945,
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Under such a system, the British possessed certain
inherent advantages.

In the first place, the British policy

structure optimized politicallmilitary planning and assured
support from the political leadership.

In the second place,

the British unity of purpose combined with their preponderance of military resources in the European Theater led to
their dominance in strategy up until 1943.

101

Finally, the

American Chiefs were split over strategic matters, with the
naval representatives far more concerned with the Pacific
Theater than were their army counterparts.

102

The fact that these inter-service conflicts existed
was partially the fault of the committee nature of the Joint
Chiefs.

Just as it was within the CCS, it was impossible to

impose a decision from within the Joint Chiefs on a recalcitrant member.
101
102

Thus a great deal of "quiet military diplomacy"

Ibid., 332, 338.

Bryant, The Turn of the Tide, 279; H. H. Arnold,
Global Mission (New York: Harper and Row, 1949), 338; Henry
L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and
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was required to "reconcile the diverse service theories •. "

103

In regard to the Pacific area of operations, where the Joint
Chiefs were autonomous, the services negotiated with each
other over strategic issues as if they were sovereign nations.
Despite these internal conflicts the Chiefs were very reluctant to reveal their differences to any outside agency.

To

do so might allow the decision making power to gravitate elsewhere.

Reflecting on this point, Admiral King remarked that

"matters of major import that required presentation to the
President could be counted on the fingers of one hand.
usually found a solution.

"104
.
.
a comprom1se.
S orne t 1mes

We
Under

these circumstances Admiral Leahy performed a vital function,

103Maurice Matloff, "American Leadership in World
War II," Soldiers and Statesmen, Proceedings of the Fourth
Military History Symposium, USAF Academy, 1970 (Washington:
Office of Air Force History, 1973), 94. The individual veto
power of a Chief was exemplified in 1942 when the JCS considered cutting back on the number of capital ships that were
to be ordered so that more landing craft could be built. Only
Admiral King was opposed to this. When Admiral Leahy remarked
that it looked as though "the vote is three to one,n King rePlied that as far as he was concerned the JCS was "not a
voting body on any matter that concerns the Navy." Quoted in
Demetrios Caraley, The Politics of Military Unification: A
Study of Conflict and the Policy Process (New York:
Columbia
University Press, 1966), 18.
104

Quoted in Caraley, The Politics of Military Unification, 19; one example of the conflicts that existed within
the JCS was the issue of British naval reinforcement to the
Pacific late in the war. The President had agreed to the
Royal Navy sending a fleet, but Admiral King was opposed. At
~ CCS meeting King even refuted the President, to which Admiral
eahy remarked, "I don't think we should wash our linen in
~Ublic," Andrew B. Cunningham, A Sailor's Odyssey (London:
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because it was through him that the Chiefs discovered the
president's strategic predilections and thus they were able
to avoid revealing many of their internal differences.

One

knowledgable insider, Captain Tracy Kitterage of the U.S.
Navy maintained that such a process actually enhanced the
President's control over military decisions:
It may be true that the President formally overruled them
[JCS] on a very few occasions, but this was only because
informal discussions of the President with Leahy, Marshall,
King, and Arnold usually led them to know in advance the
President's views. They, no doubt, frequently recognized
the advantages of accepting the President's suggestions
with their own interpretations, rather than of risking an
overruling by presenting formally proposals they knew
would not be accepted.l05
The picture presented of Presidential-JCS interaction
is one of decentralization.

While this reflected the Presi-

dent's desired mode of administrative control, the nature of
such decentralization leads automatically to unstructured
lines of communication.

General Marshall, in particular,

despised such operational methods and complained to British
Field Marshal

Alanbrooke that there were occasions he did

not see the President for four to six weeks at a time. 106
Under these circumstances Marshall was forced to use Admiral
Leahy, Harry Hopkins, and even Field Marshal

Dill to dis-

cover the White House's thoughts on certain matters.
105
106
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other times, though, all the members of the JCS went to the
president and discussed strategic issues.

107

Lawrence Legere

bas correctly observed that since President Roosevelt was not
a skilled administrator, he liked to have "cooperating, but
not highly coordinated subordinates," which resulted in the
JCS being "tailor-made for his taste."

108

This structure

allowed the President to easily impose his desires on the
organization, thus making his attitudes and his role all
important.
Probably no aspect of Roosevelt's Presidency is more
controversial than his wartime role as commander-in-chief and
his impact on military decisions.

The reason is the inextri-

cable relationship between these decisions and the subsequent
development of the Cold War.

Obviously, many of the "military

decisions" made during this period had long term political
consequences and vice versa.

It thus becomes important to

ascertain the extent of the President's impact on such decisions.
There is little doubt that Franklin Roosevelt took
his responsibilities as commander-in-chief very seriously. 109
107
Leahy, I Was There, 103; Washington Command Post,
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108
109

York:

Legere, "Unification of the Armed Forces," 289-90.

cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (New
The MacMillan Co., 1948), IL. 1111.

83

His personal commitment to the President's military function
combined with the 1939 order that brought the Army Chief of
staff and the Chief of Naval Operations into the Executive
Office resulted in a close rapport between the JCS and the
White House.

Even if the President had had no desire to

fulfill his Constitutional role, the very nature of the Combined Chiefs would have thrust him into the military arena.
The extent to which the President controlled military
decisions is difficult to determine, due to conflicting
impressions and interpretations of his actions.

Admiral Leahy

stated in his memoirs that the President "was the real
Commander-in-Chief of our Navy, Army, and Air Force."

110

Some

historians, though, have taken the view advocated by Samuel P.
Huntington in his book The Soldier and the State.

Huntington

maintains that the civilian decision makers unofficially
abdicated their responsibilities and allowed the military to
run the war.

He bases his contention on the belief that the

President rarely overruled his military advisors and defended
their positions at international conferences.

This abdication

forced the military to make crucial decisions of a political
nature. 111
110
111
(New York:

Leahy, I Was There, 345.
samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State
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This thesis does supply a rationale to explain the
failure of American post-war policy, but the record fails to
substantiate it.

In a recent study by Kent Roberts Green-

field, formerly Chief Historian of the United States Army, at
at least twenty-two examples of Presidential decisions made
"against the advice or over the protests of his military
advisors," and another dozen examples of Presidential initiatives in strategic matters were identified.

Significantly,

Greenfield found that the only point of contention between
the President and the JCS after 1943 was over the recall of
General Joseph Stilwell from China.

112

Greenfield's work

paints the portrait of a President deeply involved in the
military progress of the war.
a sudden

But why after 1943 was there

absence of conflict between the President and his

military advisors?

Professor Paul Emerson, in his study of

Roosevelt as commander-in-chief, suggests that the President's
political goals and the military objectives of the Joint
Chiefs coincided near the end of the war, thus abrogating any
need for Presidential intervention:
The political considerations seen by the President and
the logistical and strategic considerations seen by the
Chiefs paralleled one another in 1943 and afterwards.
112

Greenfield, American Strategy, 80. This list by
no means exhausts the number of times the President was
involved in the decision making process.
General Arnold
records that it was the President that suggested the island
hopping strategy used in the Pacific, Arnold, Global Mission,

372.
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The consequence w~s close concurrence of political and
military views. 11
.
If Emerson is correct then the President's political goals
form the basis for determining the role of the Joint Chiefs.
It is generally assumed that the President's primary
wartime goal was victory, possibly even at the expense of
post-war problems.

114

While this is essentially true, it

may be suggested that victory was only a means to a greater
end.

James McGregor Burns, in his biography of Roosevelt,

describes the President as:
.•• both a soldier of the Faith, battling with his warrior comrades for an ideology of peace and freedom, and
a prince of the State) protecting the interests of his
nation in a tumultuous and impioy~ world. His difficulty
lay in the relation of the two.l
The ideological objective that Roosevelt sought was a reformed
world based upon his Four Freedoms, but in order to accomplish
that goal the evil of fascism had to be eradicated.

Within

this framework, unconditional surrender was a concrete manifestation of total war.

It was with this framework in mind
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that Roosevelt could say to Churchill,"the political considerations you mentioned are important factors, but military
operations based thereupon must be secondary to the primary
116
operation of striking at the heart of Germany."
As Burns noted, though, Roosevelt was also a prince
of the state attempting to promote and to protect American
national interest.

Winning the war was not only an ideo-

logical goal, but also a very practical political policy.
central to achieving this goal was keeping the coalition
together.

Roosevelt may have spoken in terms of a world

structured on the Four Freedoms, but he apparently envisaged
a world governed by the Four Policemen; the United States,

.
Eng 1 an d , an d Ch'1na. 117
Russ1a,
Within this overall structure there were stages when
certain policies were more important than others.
son observed three such periods:

Paul Emer-

prior to the attack on

Pearl Harbor, Roosevelt's main policy was to deter aggression; after December 1941, and until the end of 1943, the
main goal was coalition unity; after 1943, it was ending the
war in such a way as to avoid any long term commitments to
Europe.
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Greenfield's study of Presidential military
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decisions tend to support Emerson's theory.
attack on Pearl Harbor the main

po~nts

Prior to the

of contention between

the President and the Chiefs were over the allocation of the
limited American resources to support Britain and the use of
119
American military and economic power to deter Japan.
Once
the United States had entered the war the decisions made by
Roosevelt were aimed at keeping the coalition together.

The

most visable manifestation of this policy was Roosevelt's
support of the invasion of North Africa (Operation "Gymnast/
Torch"), in which he overturned the American commitment to a
.
. 120 an d reJec
. t e d th e JCS' s a d v1ce
.
cross-e h anne 1 1nvas1on
to
concentrate instead in the Pacific.

121

Secretary of War

Stimson wrote after the war that:
The Torch decision was the result of two absolutely
definite and final rulings, one by the British and the
other by the President. Mr. Churchill and his advisors
categorically refused to accept the notion of a crosschannel invasion in 1942. Mr. Roosevelt categorically
insisted that there must be some operation in 1942.12 2
One consequence of Roosevelt's commitment to coalition
unity may have been his neglect for the long term political
119
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questions involved in restructuring the post-war world.

This

is the thesis advanced by Under Secretary of State Sumner
Wells.

Wells believed that this commitment stemmed from the

President's "conviction that as Commander-in-Chief his paramount obligation was to permit nothing to jeopardize the winning of t h e war.

11123

Wells may have been wrong though in

believing that short term unity was the President's only
political goal.

According to Emerson, after 1943, the Presi-

dent was primarily concerned with winning the war as quickly
as possible in order to avoid any long term commitments to
Europe.

Emerson's thesis is based upon a letter from Roose-

velt to Acting Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius, Jr.:
I do not want the United States to have the post-war
burden of reconstructing France, Italy, and the Balkans.
This is not our natural task .••• It is definitely a
British task in which the British are far~·more vi tally
interested than we are ••• our principal objective is not
to take 1 ~~rt in the internal problems of Southern
Europe.
This letter not only reflected Roosevelt's understanding of
the impact of domestic politics on foreign policy, but it
also referred back to his image of the world based on the
Four Policemen.

Such a system would leave Europe to the

English and the Russians.
123
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various and complex political problems in Europe might well
alienate the Russians, whose support was sorely needed to
complete the grand design.
As the war reached its inevitable conclusion, the
necessity for a Russian-American understanding became more
apparent.

In a Joint Chiefs memorandum of July 1944, this

issue was discussed:
After the defeat of Japan, the United States and the
Soviet Union will be the only military powers of first
magnitude ...• The relative strength and geographic positions of these two powers preclude the military defeat
of one of these powers by the other, even if that power
were allied with the British Empire.l25
The memorandum concluded that with the end of the war the
British Empire will have "lost ground both economically and
militarily."

Based on this analysis it made sense that

Roosevelt would want to postpone any confrontation with the
Russians.

Moreover, the faster the war ended the faster the

post-war restructuring of the world could begin, even if
it meant the disruption of the Anglo-American alliance.

It

is within this context that Roosevelt's rejection of
Churchill's Balkan schemes must be analyzed.

As the war came

closer to its conclusion, the military and political goals of
the United States increasingly coincided.

Although there

may have been differences between the President and his
125
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militarY advisors over specifics, there was a real unity in
purpose between them.

Both had as their primary goal the

defeat of the enemy; for the President it was a means; for the
militarY it was an end.

If keeping the coalition together in

19 42 meant that the cross-channel invasion would have to be
cancelled and replaced with an invasion of North Africa, then
that was the way it was to be.

But as the political and

military goals of the JCS and the President coalesced, the
military point of view appeared to become dominant.
From the beginning, the President's political goals
were the guiding factor in the formulation of strategic
policy, and this was enhanced by the close relationship that
existed between the JCS and the White House.

126

It was to

the President and not to the State Department that the Chiefs
looked for guidance.

In fact it was the President who became

the point of coordination for all aspects of policy formulation; much to the dismay of the British:
The Americans have never been accustomed, in consideration of military or quasi-military matters, to link
harmoniously the civil and the military interests. They
have no War Cabinet and they have no Defense Committee at
which requirements, both civil and military can be scrutinized and programs formed with due regard for the merit
of the case. Nor have they any means by which the conflicting views of the several agencies can be harmonized
and the common policy reached. The whole burden of
grouping the extravagant demands of the War Department
and of co-ordinating the action of the many agencies which
126
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have been created fall on one man--the President.

127

While the British criticism succinctly analyzed the
failure of American political/military planning and Roosevelt's mode of administration, it failed to consider that the
committee nature of the Combined Chiefs forced the Chiefs of
staff of both nations to rely upon their political leadership
in order to achieve a successful resolution of issues before
the CCS.

A general study of the major CCS decisions made

during the war reveal an interesting pattern.

When the Pre-

sident failed to support the American Chiefs' position in the
face of British unity, it normally failed; when he did support the American Chiefs, they prevailed.

The decision to

undertake the cross-channel invasion is one case in point.
The American commitment to the cross-channel invasion,
which stemmed from the Germany first decision made at "Areadia," was specifically formulated in March and April of 1942.
Almost immediately the British began to disclaim support for
the operation and proposed instead the North African venture.
The Americans fully realized that implementing Operation
"Torch" would postpone the cross-channel invasion to 1943,
at the earliest.

For this reason General Marshall fought hard

against the African project.

He maintained that the only way

to defeat Germany was to invade the Continent and fight the
127
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decisive battle in Northern France.

128

The President on the

other hand, was far more interested in coalition
and thus rejected Marshall's advice.

politi~s

At the Casablanca Con-

ference, in 1943, Marshall was again put in a position of
advocating the European invasion without Presidential support.
Before the American contingent left for Africa, the President
held a conference with the JCS and inquired whether the Americans should meet the British "unified in advocating a crosschannel operation.''

Roosevelt was well aware that the Brit-

ish would be unified in opposition to such a plan and would
recommend a continuation of the Mediterranean strategy. While
Marshall favored a unified confrontation, the President sought
to postpone it and favored some form of compromise.

In the

end there was no understanding between the military and their
commander-in-chief.

Roosevelt left the Chiefs free to voice

their own views, while remaining uncommitted himself.

In the

face of unified British opposition the invasion was cancelled
until 1944. 129
128
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It was not until the President decided to make a
stand on the invasion that the American position finally prevailed.

Roosevelt first began to support his military ad-

visors during the Washington "Trident" Conference in May of
1943.

Within the Combined Chiefs a confrontation was inevi-

table.

The American Chiefs hoped that "the strength of the

force to be employed in the Mediterranean will be so limited
as not to prejudice the success of a cross-channel operation
in 1944."

130

The British on the other hand maintained "the

attack on Italy must be carried out relentlessly to insure
her elimination from the war and thus opposed weakening allied
' 131
forces below that level."

While this deadlock existed

within the Combined Chiefs, a similar confrontation occurred
in the White House between the President and the Prime Minister.

Although the President's support for the cross-channel

attack was by no means as stringent as the American military
would have liked, a l May 1944 date was agreed upon for the
130
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invasion.

132

Despite this commitment, Marshall was still

unsure of Roosevelt's support.

Not until the first Quebec

"Quadrant" Conference in August 1943 and at the Teheran Conference two months later was the issue fully settled.

133

Obviously, this has been an over simplification of
the Overlord decision.

It bas excluded discussing tactical

feasibility as well as Soviet influence.

Despite these

weaknesses, it is still useful in leading us to some interesting observations.

As long as Marshall failed to have Presi-

dential support he found it simply impossible to force a
successful resolution of the cross-channel issue within the
committee structure of the Combined Chiefs.

This was especi-

ally true as long as the Prime Minister was adamantly opposed
to it.

Churchill insured this by keeping his Chiefs under

very tight control.

According to Lord Portal, Chief of the

Air Staff, Churchill browbeat the CCS "like they were a
bunch of pickpockets."
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With Presidential support though,
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it was possible for the American military's position to prevail.135

This reinforces the contention that the President

was the only point of contact for the coordination of political/military policy.

While he might be able to direct the

American military toward his political goals, there was no
effort made to institutionalize such coordination.

If the

president did not handle it himself, it simply was not done.
At times this resulted in leaving the Joint Chiefs in a
guidance vacuum which put the Americans at a disadvantage
vis-a-vis their British counterparts.

136

This problem was

never more apparent than during the Casablanca Conference in
January 1943.
The main issue at the conference was the direction
of allied strategy during the remainder of the year.

The

main point of contention was the American supported crosschannel invasion versus the British

desire to continue

operations in the Mediterranean Theater.

The leading advo-

cate for the American position, as discussed earlier, was
General Marshall, who maintained that "Germany must be
135
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daylight bombing in the face of British opposition, Arnold,
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defeated by a powerful effort on the continent."

He and the

other American Chiefs were anxious to avoid "interminable
operations in the Mediterranean" that would postpone the
.
. d e f.1n1. t e 1 y. 137
invas1on
1n

Unfortunately, for Marshall and the other American
planners, their effort was doomed from the start.
three factors undermining their position.

There were

The first was not

only the lack of Presidential support, but a lack of political
guidance upon which they could base their arguments.

The

second was that the British military arguments against the
invasion were extremely valid.

The last was that the Ameri-

cans confronted a unified British team supported by its
138
po l 1•t•1ca 1 1 ea d ers h.1p.

This was in marked contrast to the

American delegation, whose military advisors were themselves
divided over strategic questions.
From the very beginning, the British took the Casablanca Conference very seriously.

Arthur Bryant, in his

biography of Lord Alanbrooke, records how the British planned
their confrontation with the Americans with all the care of
a military operation.
137
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Minister told his Chiefs of Staff that "they were not to
hurry or try to force an agreement, but to take plenty of
time, there was to be full discussion and no impatience-the dripping of water on a stone.''

While the British Chiefs

worked on their American counterparts, the Prime Minister
planned to work on the President.

139

Not only were the Brit-

ish better unified for the conference, but they were also
better equipped.

They arrived with a large number of staf-

fers, an effective communications system, and a six thousand
ton ship converted into a floating reference library.

140

In the words of one American planner, General Albert
Wedemeyer, the British:
Swarmed down upon us like locusts with a plentiful supply
of planners and various other assistants with a pyramid
of plans to ensure that they not only accomplished their
purpose but did so in stride and with promise of continuing their ~ole of directing strategically the c0urse of
the war.l 4 l
Wedemeyer went on to note that, "one might say we came, we
listened, and we were conquered."
139
140
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In the end the Americans
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figuratively "lost their shirts" at the conference.

143

The British success at Casablanca was due to several
factors.

Probably, the most important factor was the British

unitY of purpose, which existed from the Prime Minister down
through the staff planners.

The Americans, in contrast, not

only failed to have the President behind them, but they themselves were internally split.

Admiral King at times was

ambivalent, at times sided with the British, but constantly
.
. th e P ac1"f"1c. 144
supported increase d operat1ons
1n

Th e secon d

important factor was the superior British staffing and preparation.

While the British staffers were assigned full time

to strategic planning, most of the American staffers had
primary responsibility within their own services.

This divi-

sion of their time was reflected in their staff work.
In the end the Casablanca Conference was a perfect
example of the type of artificial compartmentalization that
existed between American political and military planning.
The President's political goals (which obviously had military

143

The final destruction of the American effort at
Casablanca is revealed in a pair of cables sent from General
Wedemeyer to General Handy (AGWAR): 17 January 1943, "We still
have our shirts but we have lost a few buttons pd Looks like
HUSKY." On 19 January 1943, Wedemeyer wrote, "The shirt is
gone •.. HUSKY is Next." References 245 and 320, "ANFA Cables:
Outgoing, 14-26 January 1943, Box 1, Military Documents, Beddle Smith Papers, Eisenhower Library, Abiline, Kansas.

144

JCS Meeting, 6 January 1943.
ence, Proceedings, CCS, 239.

Casablanca Confer-

99
aspects) were totally contradictive to the JCS's military
goals (which had an equal amount of political aspects).

The

British on the other hand were fully cognizant of the political ramifications of the military decisions to be made at
casablanca, and acted accordingly.

The problem the

Chiefs faced was one of a lack of guidance.

/~erican

The President

did not support the urgency of the cross-channel invasion,
and the State Department was not involved.

The American

Chiefs were determined that there would never be a repetition
of the Casablanca debacle.

Massive changes were made within

the JCS structure in order to guarantee that American planners would be better prepared for their next confrontation
with the British,

145

but restructuring the Joint Chiefs' staff

system could not substitute for the lack of institutional
political/military coordination.

In a memorandum written in

June 1943 General Wedemeyer addressed this particular problem:
The JCS frequently requires information and advice as to
how the military decisions will effect our foreign and
national policies, or as to whether the decisions are in
conformity with international law, or as to what effect,
if any, their decisions will have on our national
interests.
Some solution will be necessary if we are to
achieve that unity of national effort which is so well
exemplified in the British organization.l46
l45D aVlS,
.
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one month later General Marshall followed up Wedemeyer•s
memorandum with a letter to Mr. James Byrnes, then Director
of War Mobilization:
The U.S. Chiefs of Staff have been aware for a long time
of a serious disadvantage under which they labor in their
dealings with the British Chiefs of Staff. Superficially,
at least, the great advantage on the British side has been
the fact that they are connected up with other branches
of their government through an elaborate but closely knit
Secretariat. On our side there is no such animal and we
suffer accordingly. The British, therefore present a
solid front of all officials and committees. We cannot
muster such strength.l47
It is apparent that the American Joint Chiefs of Staff
were acutely aware of the need for better coordination of
political/military policy.

Hnving the President as the sole

point of coordination bad been a failure.

As the war progres-

sed to its inevitable conclusion, the need for such coordination became increasingly important.

Uufortunately, the

military blamed the breakdown in coordination solely on the
civilian leadership 1 s lack of political guidance.
concern over this problem manifested itself

earl~

The Chiefs•
in a Decem-

ber 1942 Joint Staff Planners memorandum entitled, "A Proposed
National War Planning System."

This system started with a

"determination of the national concept of the war," by the
civilian leadership.

This "national concept of war" included

Political, economic, military, and other factors.

From there

the military determined a strategic policy, upon which plans
147
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and operations were based.

148

The proposal was never offi-

cially acted upon, and the Chiefs never did consider that
this breakdown in communications was a two-way street, stemming from the traditional perceptions of both the civilian
and military leadership.
It must never be forgotten that the members of: the
Joint Chiefs of Staff were a product of an American system
that inculcated a set of perceptions that resulted in the
compartmentalization of political from military policy· ..
They had been brought up to believe in civilian control of
the military, which meant, from their perception, that the
civilians controlled all of the political decisions and the
military were to restrict themselves to "purely military"
matters.

This view of civil-military relations had been

described by one insider as the "strick constructionalist"
approach.

149

This view was manifest from Admiral Leahy

through the members of the JCS and down to the field commanders.

Leahy had exhibited a tendency to think in such

"strict constructionalist" terms during his tenure as Chief
of Naval Operations and continued to do so as the Chief of
Staff to the President.

During the Potsdam Conference the

British suggested that the term unconditional surrender
needed to be explained in greater detail.
148
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was that it was a political issue and thus outside the purview of the Combined Chiefs.

150

General Marshall elaborated

on this theme during an interview in 1957:
I do not think the military authorities should make any
political decisions unless they are instructed acco~d
ingly, because the effects are too wide-reaching,. there
are too many influences involved, and it is quite a
question of how much of !+his would be familiar t~ the
military participants.l5
What is of interest is the implication by Mar-shall
that the military officer should not be effectively schooled
in the political ramifications of his actions.

But what of

supplying input into the political decision making pr.o"G·ess?
We [JCS] probably devoted more time in our discussions,
our intimate discussions, to such matters [political
than] to any one [other] subject, because we were: fearful that we might find our whole campaign upset by some
political gesture.
I frankly was fearful of Mr. Roosevelt introducing political methods, of which he was a
genius, into a military thing which had to be on a fixed
basis.
In expanding this theme General Marshall went on to say:
[Diplomatic matters were] Mr. Roosevelt's [responsibility], and our problem was to be on the guard that the
military picture--Army, Navy and Air--was not completely
disjointed by what I will call some irrelevant political
gestures which were made without due thought to what was
going on at the time •••
As to British criticism that the American Chiefs did not
exhibit any political awareness, Marshall answered that "we
didn't discuss it [political decisions] with them [the British] because we were not in any way putting our necks out as
150
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to political factors which were the business of the head of
state--the President--who also happened to be the Commander. f

in-Chle •

.,152

The portrait of the Joint Chiefs that the Marshall
interview reveals is that of a group of officers who are
highly cognizant of the political ramifications of military
operations, but were equally cognizant of their role within
an international committee structure.

Thus superficially,

the military seemed to be performing their function along the
lines that Clausewitz had originally outlined.
to be the antithesis of the Huntington argument.

It also appears
This posi-

tion is reinforced by Admiral King, who described his role at
Yalta as "advisory in nature."

153

Marshall's explanation,

moreover, of the JCS's role vis-a-vis the British Chiefs may
be an excuse for Leahy's actions on the British query on
unconditional surrender.

But if the JCS were fulfilling the

Clausewitzian perfection of civilian control of the military,
then why was the lack of politicallmilitary coordination
emphasized so extensively by the key members of the wartime
administration?

154

Furthermore, if the Chiefs did have real

input into the political decision making process, then how
is one to explain Admiral King's description of the process
152
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at the Potsdam Conference?
••• the main business of the conference was the affair of
the political heads of state, assisted by the State
Department representatives. This was in no way surprising, for it is a long established government practice to
reach political agreements without reference to the
military forces that must be relied upon to pull the
chestnuts out of the fire when f!~5 political agreements
do not work out as anticipated.
Admiral King's description reflects more than the
traditional
policy.

compartmentalization of politics from military

It appears to be a clear contradiction of General

Marshall's previous statement; or is it?

It would appear·

that the Chiefs were fully aware of the political ramifications of their military actions, but this awareness may have
been only an internal systemic input, and not fully incorporated into the externally transmitted advice consumed by
the civilian decision makers.

Admiral King was not only cri-

ticizing the compartmentalization of policy formulation, but
implicitly legitimizing it by virtue of its traditional
source.

The expectation was that such compartmentalization

was part of the American professional military ethic, despite
its obvious dysfunctional aspects.

This expectation became a

self-fulfilling prophesy, by virtue of the inculcation of
that expectation.

Thus the military officerwasfully aware

of the political ramifications of the military operations he
wasplanning, but he had been socialized to believe that it was
155
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not his role to externalize those opinions.

Furthermore,

the perception of compartmentalization that had been inculcated, led the military officer even to question the value
of integrating political factors into operational decisions.
General Omar Bradley noted that "as soldiers we looked
naively on the British inclination to complicate the war

156
with po 1 1. t.1ca 1 o b.Jec t.1ves.

Mr. Robert Murphy, political

advisor to General Eisenhower's headquarters in Africa, reported not only this naive confusion over the political
aspects of war, but real alienation toward him because of
his role:
One day an American Major General asked me:
"Will you
please tell me what in the hell the State Department has
to do in an active theater of war?" He was asking for
information, so this, in effect, is what I told him:
"War is a projection of policy when other means fail.
The State Department is responsible to the President for
foreign policy ••.•
It was directly concerned in the
political decisions inevitably to be made during the
military operations, and it will have to deal ~~th the
postwar political aspects of this campaign .•• 1
While, internally the Chiefs may have perceived the
need for the integration of political perceptions, externally
they manifested the ethic of compartmentalization.

When

supplying advice to the civilian decision makers, the Chiefs
Prefaced their input with the caveat "from the military point
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of view."

They thus looked at extremely political issues
158 Th"
.
and suppose dl y ana 1 yze d them m1"l"t
1 ar1"1 Y~
1s pro f essionalized· attitude was reinforced by the desires of the
civilians, and in particular the President.

During the Casa-

blanca Conference Roosevelt did not bring any State Department advisors with him primarily because he viewed the conference as "essentially military" in nature.

159

This view

coincided nicely with the military's perception and explains
the lack of State Department involvement in policy formulation all through the war.

Furthermore, the President's

apparent desire to compartmentalize decision making allowed
the military to manifest its tendency to make war absolute.
The Chiefs could analyze issues in terms of missions and
objectives, and rationalize goals toward the achievement of
158

As typical examples of the type of political decisions the JCS dealt with and then cloaked their recommendations in military expertise, see the following taken from
Admiral Leahy's papers at the Naval Operations Archives in
Washington, D.C.
Memo to SecWar, 30 December 1944:
"There are no
military objections to any occupations of Austria by U.S.
Forces," (in file entitled "Correspondence-1944").
Memo to SecWar and SecNav, April 1945; sub: French
Proposal for Zone of Occupation in Germany and Austria.
"The
Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered from the military point
of view the proposals of French Government." The JCS did
not oppose the French getting a zone nor did they oppose the
F~ench return to Vietnam but warned of avoiding American comm1 tmen t, (found in file '~anuary-April, 1945".)
159
Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors, 163; the JCS
Official History of the Second World War goes out of its way
t~ ~mphasize the fact that the Chiefs were only involved in
m1l1tary discussions at Yalta and not any of the political
meetings, Hayes, The War Against Japan, II, 347.
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military success.

Originally, a product of the

marri~ge

of

nineteenth century professional military perceptions and
American moral values, this outlook increasingly became institutionalized in the twentieth century.

This was the view

that was being articulated in 1931 by General Douglas

M~c-

Arthur when he said "decisive victory in the field of battle
invariably results in the attainment of the national purpose
for which t h e appea 1 t o arms was rna d e.
General Marshall

~eaffirmed

11160

During the war

this view when he stated that all

strategic decisions were made subordinate to the defeat of
Germany.

161

If this analysis is

correc~

then the military

considered victory to be the primary goal with political considerations secondary.

In order to test this assumption we

will examine the decision in 1945 not to seize Berlin but to
halt at the Elbe River.
This decision was possibly the most important,
if not the most criticized .ecision of the European War.

As

the role of Berlin became more important in the subsequent
Cold War, this decision took on new importance.
160

The British

walter Millis with Harvey Mansfield and Herold
Stein, Arms and the State: Civil-Military elements in
National Policy (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1958),
113-115. Also see Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier,
Chapter 13; and Chapter II of this dissertation.
161

Pogue, Organizer of Victory, 197.
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in particular have been extremely critical of the American
failure to take this most important "political" objective.
"The Americans," wrote Montgomery, "could not understand that
it was of little avail to win the war strategically if we
lost it politically."

162

Essentially the issue may be

bisected into two sub-questions or issues.

The first deals

with the physical ability of the American's to actually take
Berlin before the Soviets.
Eisenhower and Berlin, 1945:
~;

Stephen E. Ambrose in his book
The Decision to Halt at the

develops a convincing case, based on logistics and

military mobility, that the U.S. forces did not have the
physical capability to take the city.
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While the military

capabilities may well have been an overriding constraint,
the question which is important for our purpose is why was
an attempt not made?

The answer to that question is found in

the military's perception of looking at the world from the
military point of view.
The single most important driving force behind Eisenhower's decision to halt at the Elbe was his belief, shared
by other military officers, that the war should be ended as
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Bernard Montgomery, The Memoirs of Field Marshal
the Viscount Montgomery of Alamein (London: Collins, 1958),
332.
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stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower and Berlin, 1945:
W.W. Norton &
Co., 1960), 88-98.

~he Decision to Halt at the Elbe (New York:
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quickly as possible with as few political complications as
possible.

This perception was reinforced by Eisenhower's

initial directive that ordered him to "undertake operations
aimed at the heart of Germany and the destruction of her
armed forces."

164

As the war wound down there was an in-

creased fear on the part of the Western Allies that the
remnants of the Nazi regime might attempt to continue the war
from an Alpine redoubt.

This would by no means change the

outcome of the war, but would indefinitely lengthen it.

Thus

the overriding imperative was the destruction of the German
Army in the field, whose existence made such a redoubt a
possibility.

For Eisenhower the decision became a choice

between taking Berlin or destroying the German Army.

165

While the fear of the redoubt became the rationalization
for a military decision, Berlin was identified as a political
objective and the military's desire to avoid political cornplications led them to avoid Berlin.

On the llth of April,

the day that General Simpson reached the Elbe River, Eisenhower made this very point most clearly:
164

Forest Pogue, "The Decision to Halt at the Elbe,"
in Command Decisions, ed. by Kent Roberts Greenfield (Washington: Office of Chief of Military History, 1960), 481.
165

see Pogue, "The Decision to Halt at the Elbe,"
480-81; Ambrose, Eisenhower and Berlin, 70-79.
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From a tactical point of view it is highly inadvisable
for the American Army to take Berlin and I hope political
influences won't cause.me to take the city.
It has no
tactical or strategic value ••• l66
But Eisenhower was not alone in analyzing the situation from
a military point of view.

Four days earlier he had appealed

to the Combined Chiefs for guidance on this particular point.
He began by making it very clear that he was basing his plans
on military assumptions; he then went on to discuss the Berlin issue:
I regard it as militarily unsound at this stage of the
proceedings to make Berlin a major objective, particularly in view of the fact that it is only 35 miles from
the Russian lines.
I am the first to admit that a war
is waged in pursuance of political aims, and if the
Combined Chiefs of Staff should decide that the Allied
effort to take Berlin outweighs purely military considerations in this theater, I would cheerfully readjust
my plans and my thinking so as to carry out such an
operation.l6 7
It appears that the CCS never considered Eisenhower's appeal
for guidance, which can only be interpreted as confirmation
.
t '1ons. 168
. m1' l1' t ary assump
o f h 1s
The decision not to consider taking Berlin was an
example of perceiving an issue in purely military terms.

It

is apparent that the military fully understood the "political"
nature of Berlin and for that reason the city was anathema.
166

Quoted in Ambrose, Eisenhower and Berlin, 97.
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Quoted in Pogue, "The Decision to Halt at the
Elbe," 486.
168

Ibid.

lll
ThiS compartmentalization of the political from the military

was not only revealed by Eisenhower's communications and the
lack of guidance from the JCS and the CCS but was also manifested by the civilians.

In mid-April the representatives

of the European and Russian Affairs Division of the State
Department reported that "for governments to direct movements
of troops definitely indicated political action and that
such movements should remain a military consideration at least
until SHAEF is dissolved and the A.C.C. (Allied Control Com•
•
ID1SS10n

)

1' s

set up. "

169

We can thus see that while the mili-

tary did perceive the Berlin decision from a military point
of view, they were conforming to their mandated role.

It is

also clear that the Joint Cheifs considered victory to be
the primary goal, with political considerations secondary.
Within this context the Berlin decision makes sense, as much
sense as the JCS commitment to bring the Soviets into the
Pacific War, despite its obvious political ramifications.

170

The Chiefs supported the President's desire to postpone major
political confrontations with the Soviets until the war was
over.

This point was stressed by former Assistant Secretary

of State Sumner Wells:
It was altogether natural that the Joint Chiefs of Staff
should constantly warn the President that, whatever the
theoretical future advantages of trying to settle
169
170

Ibid., 481, footnote #4; emphasis

in the original.

Pogue, Organizer for Victory, 505-536.
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political and territorial problems during the war, they
were offset by the immediate dangel~ 1 of the controversies
with Russia that might be aroused.
As the war came closer to its conclusion, it became
more and more difficult to postpone dealing with those political controversies.

Moreover, the issues that began to sur-

face were far more political than were the decisions
had had to be dealt with earlier.

that

One issue that was of par-

ticular importance was the resolution of the political/mili- ·
tary questions revolving around the occupation of enemy territories, especially Germany.

In February 1943, the Presi-

dent gave the State Department the proponency for the occupation of enemy countries.

172

Unfortunately, the State Depart-

ment's mission ran directly into
military operations.

the~

Chief's control of

By the beginning of 1944 these two

organizations were working in opposite directions.

The

bureaucratic conflict between these two organizations has
been completely documented in Paul Hammond's study "Directives for the Occupation of Germany:
versy."

The Washington Contro-

Hammond identifies the War Department's opposition

to the State Department's interference in what the War Department considered a military mission:
171
172

wells, Seven Decisions, 133-134.
stimson, On Active Service, 559.
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••• the War Department viewed civil affairs as an intrusion upon its primary responsibilities, both because_these
•non-military'matters seemed to threaten the involvement
of the Army in politics.J. and because they were rivals of
military requirements.l'3
ostensibly, the Chiefs opposed the fusion of civil affairs
planning on the grounds of security problems, the desire to
postpone political decisions until the termination of the conflict, and because they felt that the European Advisory Commission was controlled by the British.

In reality their

opposition probably resulted from their inherent desire to
compartmentalize planning.

At the same time the military was

complaining about the lack of guidance upon which to build
their plans, they were isolating their own plans from the
civilians who needed to coordinate political efforts.

Thus

the State Department was forced to conduct some of its planning in a vacuum.

174

The result of such planning can be seen in the failure
of political/military coordination of key issues and decisions
made toward the end of the war.

The American representative

to the European Advisory Commission, Ambassador John Winant,
was forced to rely on the military to supply him with information on American policy.
--------~~--------173

As a result Ambassador Winant

Paul Hammond, "Directives for the Occupation of
Germany: The Washington Controversy," in American Civil~ilitary Decisions, ed. by Harold Stein (Montgomery: University of Alabama Press, 1963), 325.
174

Ibid., 331.
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ssured by the War Department that there was "no military
was a
175
necessity for an access stipulation" into Berlin.
In conclusion what can we say about the role of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff during the Second World War?

To some

degree Huntington was correct in that the military was given
a freer reign than would normally be acceptable under the
concept of civilian-control of the military.

But Huntington

was wrong in drawing the conclusion that they lost their professionalism by,virtue of having to make political/military
decisions.

On the contrary, the military never did lose their

professional perception and continued to analyze the world
from the military point of view.

When they were allowed to

make politicallmilitary decisions they made them from the
perspective that the civilian leadership wanted them to make.
A case in point was the Berlin decision,when the State Department supported Eisenhower's views.

Obviously, a greater

degree of intellectual fusion and political}military coordination would have eliminated some of the worst of the postwar problems, but probably not all of them.

As the war

neared to its conclusion, the political goals of the President and the military goals of the JCS coincided, thus allowing the military greater impact on the decision making process.

As Roosevelt's political goals became more military
175
Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors, 232.
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in na t ure this tended to confuse even further the efforts at
176
political m1' l1' t ary coor d'1na t'1on.
In the long run what were the lessons to be derived
from our study of the war.

It is apparent that the President

bad greater control over military decisions than he is normally credited with.

The JCS, working within a committee

structure, revealed all the problems and weaknesses that are
normally associated with such systems.

This included the

surfacing of inter-service fighting over numerous issues,
some important and some trivial.

Furthermore, it was apparent

that the President remained the sole point of coordination
of political/military policy.

In this regard the creation

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff had not substantially improved
the structure from the way it operated at the turn of the
century.

One could even argue that the JCS became a focus

for problems that previously were scattered and relatively
benign.

Granted in terms of military operations the JCS had

been successful.

It allowed for effective interface with the

British Chiefs of Staff and its committee staff structure

176

This may well explain Leahy's remark, that the JCS,
in 1945, were under no civilian control, quoted in Huntington,
Soldier and the State, 338. Why should there be when the
civilian and th8 military objectives coincided perfectly?
Apparently Leahy was referring to some form of objective control. This problem became complicated in 1945 with the death
0 ~ Roosevelt.
Truman, coming in somewhat cold to the situatlon, was very wary of asserting himself until he became more
familiar with the military and the international situation.
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marked the beginning of a joint planning structure, but on
the level of political/military planning it had clearly
failed.
What was obviously needed was an institution t·hat
would break down the compartmentalization of political considerations from the military ones.

In such an institution

the JCS would be an important element, but not the only,· one.
While institutional measures were established in 1947 its
success could not hang upon the existence of mere bureaucratic interface.

What was imperative was the destruction

of the mindsets that existed in both the civilian and military communities that lead to that compartmentalizationr 177
For the military to have meaningful input into the new
National Security Council structure created in 1947, the
internalized military perception that demanded analyzing the
world from strictly a military perspective had to be eliminated.

Unfortunately, these kinds of mindsets are difficult
177

The civilians felt that the military had no business interferring into what was considered political decisions. This attitude was reflected by Senator Vandenberg,
who wrote in his diary, "It remains to be seen whether one
of his [N.arshall's] general officers [Wedermeyer], who heretofore has sought a chance to testify, will come and still
say that our military leaders totally disagree with the commitments made by Roosevelt and Churchill at Casablanca-their function being solely to work out the achievement of
the military plans upon which FDR and Churchill agreed."
Arthur Vandenberg, Jr. ed. with the collaboration of Joe
Alex Morris, The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg (Boston!
Houghton Mifflin, 1952), 48-50.
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to eradicate, and would be a major obstacle in the ensuing
efforts during the next decade and a half to develop an
institution to facilitate political/military planning.

CHAPTER IV
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF AND
DEFENSE ORGANIZATION:

1945-1960

Despite the successful outcome of the Second World
war, the American political/military decision making and
coordinating structure was clearly found to be deficient.
The most glaring problem was the lack of an institutional
means short of the President to coordinate policy.

Not that

bureaucratic interface guarantees positive results, but the
organizational linkages established by such interface are
a necessary prerequisite for political/military coordination.
While this defect was minimized during the war by a centrality of purpose and the apparent

compatibility of political

and military goals, the necessity to coordinate the plethora
of post-war political/military problems magnified this flaw.
This point was made emphatically clear by Secretary of War
Henry L. Stimson, who sought the solution in some form of
war cabinet, "which might have done in war diplomacy what the
Joint Chiefs of Staff did in military strategy."

For Secre-

tary Stimson the reasons necessitating such an organization
were obvious:
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Problems like those of China and France were not merely
diplomatic, the State Department could not and would not
take the whole labor of determining in areas where ·the
military interest was so significant.178
From Stimson's perspective, the problem was not a civilian
problem nor a military problem, but one that demanded the
integration of bureaucratic objectives in order to effectively
develop policy.

Unfortunately, since the demise of the Stand-

ing Liaison Committee, no such organization had existed.
Over the next fifteen years, two presidential administrations initiated four major governmental reorganizations
and numerous smaller actions in an effort to achieve policy
integration.

Since the Joint Chiefs would be an integral

part of that structure, an examination of

these organiza-

tional changes would be a useful guage in determining the
effectiveness of the Chiefs as well as identifying any
fundamental flaws.

Understanding this organizational frame-

work is also important for one other reason.

It describes

the theoretical relationships that exist between institutions
and supplies the parameters within which these organizations
define their own roles.
178

Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active
Service in War and Peace (New York: Harper and Brothers,
1948), 562. There did exist two loosely constructed organizations that are referred to as the war council and war
cabinet. Both were essentially improvised and lacked all
forms of staff structuring to support their efforts. U.S.
Congress, Senate, Committee on Naval Affairs, Report to Hon.
James Forrestal, Secretary of the Navy on Unification of the
War and Navy Departments and Postwar Organization for National
Security. Senate Committee Print, 79th Congress, 1st Session,
1945 (Hereafter cited as Eberstadt Report), 54.
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During the summer and fall of 1944, the problems
in~

relating to occupied territories and post-war planning

creased the importance of developing some form of institutional or organizational means of coordination.

Out of

necessity, the State Department "adopted" the procedure of
writing directly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for its
information.

This ad hoc coordination effectively eliminated

the service's civilian secretaries from the decision making
process.

In November 1944, Secretary Stimson, always mind-

ful of his prerogatives, formally objected to Secretary of
state Httll, stating that his responsibilities required that
he " •.. must participate actively in the formulation of
military policy and in the expression of the military point
of view ......

179

This particular point was further raised

in a joint memorandum addressed to the Joint Chiefs from
the Secretaries of Navy and War.

180

This memorandum was not

exclusively concerned with secretarial prerogatives.

It

noted the lack of any "established agency of the Joint
179

Eberstadt Report, 76.
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Memorandurn for the Joint Chiefs of Staff from the
Secretary of War and Secretary of Navy, undated, subject:
Coordination of Political-Military Problems Between the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy and the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, Leahy Papers, folder "JCS Misc. Memos," U.S. Naval
Archives, Washington, D.C. (Hereafter referred to as U.S.
Naval Archives.)
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Chiefs of Staff primarily charged with developing for the
Joint Chiefs of Staff political, economic, and fiscal
policy ..•• ", and it raised the larger question of political/
military planning at the highest levels:
In recent months an increasingly large number.of problems
considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff involve questions
having a political as well as a strictly military aspect.
In the final stages of the war, as well as in the period
immediately following the close of hostilities in the
various theaters political aspects of military events
inevitably are emphasized and matters affecting the
overall defense policy of the nation in the post-war
period emerge. The problems can be of great significance and the full judgment of the Chiefs of Staff and
the respective Secretaries should be made readily
obtainable by the other Agencies of ~he Government, particularly the Department of State.l 8 l
In December 1944, after the retirement of Secretary
Hull, the first steps were initiated to institutionalize
the ideas put forth in the joint memorandum.

Hull's succes-

sor, Edward Stettinius, immediately reinstituted the StateWar-Navy Secretarial Committee and helped establish an interdepartmental organization, the State, War, Navy Coordinating
Committee (SWNCC).

SWNCC was given the responsibility for

the working groups that were so necessary for the coordination of political/military policy.

182

While SWNCC did become

a conduit for the exchange of political/military advice, it
operated at such a low level within the bureaucratic
181
182

Ibid.

Robert G. Albion and Robert H. Connery, Forrestal
the Navy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962),
165-166.

~nd
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hierarchy that it was little "more than a clearing house for
information."

183

It was not until October of the following

year that the respective departmental secretaries designated
it as "the agency to reconcile and coordinate action ••• and
establish policies on political/military questions •••• "

184

In the final analysis, though, the State, War, Navy Coordinating Committee did not have broad enough powers to deal
.
th a t 1. t was con f ron t.1ng. 185
with t h e 1ssues
The formation of SWNCC, despite its failures,
reflected a very real desire on the part of the civilian
leadership to facilitate coordination.

Only six days after

assuming the presidency, Harry S. Truman wrote in a memorandum that "[today I] Authorized State, War and Navy to confer
on matters affecting political and military problems in the
war area."
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Interestingly, the President pointedly

placed at the bottom of the page the following notation,
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Eberstadt Report, 54. Timothy W. Stanley, American Defense and National Security (Washington: Public Affairs,
1956)' 10.
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Stanley, American Defense and National Security, 11,
quoting Department .of State Bulletin, Vol XIII, No. 333 (1945),
745.
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Eberstadt Report, 54.

President's Notations, April 18, 1945, Harry S.
Truman Papers, Personal Secretary File, box 82, folder "Presidential Appointment Daily Sheets: April, 1945," Harry S. Truman
Library, Independence, Missouri.
(Hereafter referred to as
Truman Papers and Truman Library.)
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"Hadn't been done before."

The fact that SWNCC had been

operational for almost six months prior to this notation,
is a fitting evaluation of the organization.

But the Presi-

dent's desire did not materialize in an organizational
structure to expedite planning.

Over a year later, Sec-

retary of the Navy James Forrestal was still echoing the
President's sentiments when he wrote, "what was everywhere
demanded was a far closer coordination of the diplomatic and
military arms, ..• better use of the military/political
instrument we possessed."

187

Thus the civilian leadership was fully aware that the
central problem resided in the coordination of political/
military plans and that in turn revolved around balancing
the nation's commitments (a product of the State Department)
and the nation's military capabilities (a product of the JCS).
They were also aware that existing institutions had failed
to develop the needed integration.

Central to this issue

was that the military had to be involved in some aspect of
the decision making process.

This had been the thrust of the

joint War-Navy memorandum in the fall of 1944.

Inextricably

connected to the solution of inter-departmental coordination
Was the need to elicit unified military advice.

Thus the

Post-war battle over unification was a conflict to solve
187

James Forrestal, Forrestal Diaries, ed. by Walter
Millis (New York: Viking Press, 1951), 187.
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two interconnected problems; the first, service unification;
and the second, inter-departmental politicallmilitary policy
making.

It was in an effort to solve these two problems that

the National Security Act of 1947 was written.
The issue of unifying the military services
means a new one.

wa~by

no

While the military was fully cognizant of

188 th id
. . t p 1 ann1ng,
.
the a d van t ages t o b e accrue d f rom JOln
~
· ea
of political unification was a far different question.
Obviously, the Joint Chiefs had played a pivotal role ih
achieving victory, but inter-service conflicts over everything from strategic policies to Pentagon office space had
permeated the war effort.

189

Secretary Stimson, in particu-

lar, blamed the committee nature of the JCS for aggravating
these differences:
••• the Joint Chiefs of Staff was an imperfect instrument
of top level decision ••••
It remained incapable of
enforcing a decision against the will of its members •.
Any officer, even a minority of one, could employ a
rigorous insistence on unanimity as a means of defending
the interests of his own service .••• Only the President
188

Lawrence Legere, "Unification of the Armed Forces,"
(Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1950),
253.
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stimson, On Active Service, 504-518. One classic
case of competition involved the use of aircraft in an antisubmarine role. For a discussion of the different service
attitudes see Stimson, On Active Service, 504-516; Ernest
King and Walter M. Whitehill, Fleet Admiral King:
A Naval
~ecord (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1952), 451459, 465-471; Henry H. Arnold, Global Mission (New York:
Harper, 1949), 362-364.
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was in a position to settle disagreements by a definite
and final ruling.l90
The Secretary of War felt that unification would eliminate
the worst aspects of these conflicts.
While the nation's civilian leadership was identifying dysfunctional aspects in the command structure, the
military were reassessing their own internal organization.
As early as September 1942, General Marshall asked the Joint
Chiefs to eliminate some of the ambiguities stemming from the
theater concept of unity of command.

The Navy already in-

volved in a series of inter-service controversies, was
suspicious of the War Department's intentions and buried the
issue in joint committee.

But this did not end the desire

on the part of both the civilian and military leadership of
the War Department to unify the whole military establishment
in its own centralized image.

From the spring of 1943 on,

various organizations within the War Department and the JCS
began to study intensively the unification issue.

191

These

studies culminated in a memorandum originating from General
Marshall, entitled "A Single Department of War in the Post
War Period."
190

In this memorandum, Marshall suggested a single

stimson, On Active Service, 515-516; also see

~erstadt Report, 61; Otto Nelson, National Security and the
~neral Staff (Washington:
Infantry Journal Press, 1946),
586 ff.

19lv.lncen t Dav1s,
.
Postwar Defense Policy and the U.S.
~vy:
1943-1946 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
Press, 1966) ' 50-52.
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military agency composed of four functional departments,.
ground, air, naval, and supply.

Each of these departments

would be directed by an under-secretary and a chief of staff.
In place of the present JCS structure, there would be a Chief
of Staff to the President and a United States General Staff.
While such a unified structure was, for General Marshall,.
the necessary response to the increased complexity of future
wars; 192 it also signified the opening shot of a four year
battle over unification.

The War Department's centralized

approach ran counter to the Navy's decentralized management
structure.

These organizational differences were compounded

by the perceived fear by sea power advocates who, in the
words of Lawrence Legere, were "afraid of what might happen
if sea power came to be judged by men ignorant of its
potentialities."

193

Within the JCS the reaction to Marshall's memorandum
was predictably split along service lines.

Despite opposi-

tion from the Naval members of the JCS, the Army continued
its advocacy for a single military department.

In the spring

of 1944, during the House of Representative's investigation
into "Post-War Military Policy," (the Woodrum Committee),
19

~egere, "Unification of the Armed Forces," 250.
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secretary Stimson became the first civilian secretary ever
to openly advocate the unification of the services.

In his

mind, the weaknesses inherent in the JCS committee structure
merely reflected the essential structural weaknesses of the
whole military system.

194

After Secretary Stimson compl.eted

bis statement, the Army's proposal for unification wag
sented by General Joseph T. McNarney of the Army Air

pre-

Force.

His proposal, which reflected Marshall's influence, called
for a single Secretary of the Armed Forces, with three under
secretaries for the Army, Navy and Air Force, a common supply
service and the continued existence of the JCS under a; new
designation, the United States Chiefs of Staff.

This new

Chiefs of Staff organization had four members just as i.ts
predecessor organization did.

Of special interest was the

role McNarney gave the Chiefs in determining the budget.
While they would be involved in the traditional duties of
developing military strategy, they would also make the
"general determination of budgetary needs and the allocations involved in their recommended strategic deployment for
national defense."

The power of the Chiefs in budgetary

matters was such that the Secretary of the Armed Forces could
194

u.s. Congress, House, Proposal to Establish a Single
~~partment of Armed Forces, Hearings before the Select Com~lttee on Post-War Military Policy, 78th Congress, 2nd SesSion, 1944, 31 (hereafter cited as Woodrum Committee). Also
see Stimson, On Active Service, 519.
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onlY communicate the Chiefs' proposals to the President
with his own recommendations attached.
them in any way.

He could not change

195

The Navy correctly perceived that the plan was the
- Army's attempt to force through a fait d'accompli.

From

that time on, it attempted to fight a rear guard actiorr and
196
. .
delay t h e d ec1s1on.

Under Secretary James

Forrestal~

who

became the Navy's chief spokesman following the untimely
death of Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox, attacked the
Army's proposal at its weakest point, the budgetary process.
Forrestal and other Navy witnesses played upon the Congress'
traditional fear of losing civilian control of the military.
In the end, the Woodrum Committee could only recommend postpaning determination of the issue until the war was over.
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While the congressional investigation was in progress,
the Joint Chiefs themselves designated a "Special Committee
for Reorganization of National Defense" to examine the issue.
This committee is usually referred to as the Richardson Committee, after its senior member, Admiral J. 0. Richardson
(Retired).

After five months of investigating the issues

and interviewing key field commanders, the committee
195
U.S. Congress, House, Woodrum Committee, 34-35.
l96Alb.1on, Forrestal and the Navy, 259-260.
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announced its findings on 11 April 1945.

With the exception

of the senior member, the committee was unanimously "in favor
of a single departmental system or organization for the Armed
Forces of the United

States~ 198

The majority of the committee

felt that unification would increase efficiency, eliminate the
worst aspects of inter-service competition, and guarantee civilian control.

In the final analysis, the majority believed that

such unification would lead to better "Correlation of Military
Preparedness and National Policies."

199

Admiral Richardson's

dissent was based upon a dislike for an autonomous Air Force,
fear for the future of the Marine Corps, and a basic abhorrenee of a single military commander.

The Navy rebutted the

majority report with a 160 page document of its own that
attacked every one of the majority's assumptions.

While Mar-

shall himself did not fully concur with the highly centralized
view projected by the report, he advocated that it be forwarded
to the President with a statement of principle supporting a
198

u.s. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Report of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff Special Committee for Reorganization of National
Defense (hereafter cited as the Richardson Report), Leahy Papers,
box 77, folder "Reorganization of the National Defense Structure
and Comments: October and November, 1945," page 1, U.S. Naval
Archives.
199
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a single departmental structure.

200

Internally, the JCS was

so badly split over the report, that it was not forwarded to
President Truman until 16 October 1945, and then it was accompanied by the split opinions of the four chiefs.

201

Although the services' leadership may have agreed on a
superficial level that some form of organizational reform was
needed, service imperatives and fears blocked any consensus on
the format.

For the services, the fight over unification was

a foreshadowing of future inter-service conflicts over strategy, budgets, and resources.

Samuel P. Huntington has sug-

gested that "interservice rivalry was the child of unification,"202 but the wartime inter-service conflicts over the
direction of the war effort, resources, and even trivial matters such as promotions suggest the opposite.

It would in-

stead appear that the rivalry was fostered by the tensions
resulting from increased military commitments being carried
out by comparatively decreased resources.

The Army's desire

for unification was based on the belief that it would foster
200
u. s. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Secretariat,
Historical Division, Major Changes in the Organization of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
1~4~-1969, 23 January, 1970, 11-12.
(Mimeographed) (Hereafter cited as Major Changes).
201

within the same file as the Richardson Report was
also the Navy's 160 page rebuttal, and the Chiefs' written
positions on the Report when it was finally forwarded to the
President. Leahy Papers, box 77, folder "Reorganization of
the National Defense Structure and Corrments: October and
November, 1945," U.S. Naval Archives.
202

samuel P. Huntington, The Common Defense: Strategic
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greater budgetary stability and a more logical and equitable
division of the military budget.

Any division of the military

budget would be based upon need, and need would be determined
by the mission of the service.

The Navy, preferring to main-

tain the status quo, realized that this logic could be used to
rationalize the Marine Corps out of existence, based on the
grounds of duplication of functions;

203

and a similar rationali-

zation could ultimately lead to the absorption of its carrier
fleet into the newly created and autonomous Air Force.
Previously, the Navy had hoped to either postpone
unification, or if that failed, at least to implement it on
its own decentralized terms.

The report of the Richardson

Committee badly undermined that strategy, and the death of
President Roosevelt the day after the report's release destroyed it.

The new President was a strong advocate of unification

believing "that the antiquated defense setup of the United
States had to be organized quickly as a step toward ensuring
.
our f u t ure sa f e t y an d preserv1ng
wor ld peace. 204
In the face of such growing solidarity on the unification issue, Secretary Forrestal realized that the Navy
could no longer postpone reorganization, and that unless it
203

u.s. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Armed Services, Hearings on Department of Defense Reorganization Act
of 1958, 85th Congress, 2nd Session, 1958, 360-365. From this
hearing it is apparent that the Marine Corps still had not lost
its fear of being eliminated.
204

York:
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wanted to be excluded completely as obstructionist, it had
better supply some acceptable alternative to the Army's
centralization plans.

In May 1945, Forrestal stressed this

very point before the Navy's Organization Policy Group:
Having gone before the Woodrum Committee last year and
been a party to their postponing consideration at
that time, I feel that we have got to be very positive
this time in some kind of plan which is a Navy Plan.
I
don't think we can be negative any further as far as
Congress is concerned.
I don't think the reaction of the
public last year was too favorable to our position.
I
don't think we can again say "Let's postpone this, let's
postpone that."205
A week later Senator David Walsh, Chairman of the Naval
Affairs Committee, wrote Forrestal a letter along exactly
the same lines, suggesting that the Navy Department make a
"thorough study of this subject" and propose its own plan for
. t.1on. 206
organ1za
This political necessity prompted Secretary Forrestal
to ask an old personal friend, Ferdinand Eberstadt, to head
a task force to explore the unification issue.

Their friend-

ship had started before the war as members of the prestigious
New York investment firm of Dillon and Read and continued
during the war as members of the Army and Navy Munitions
Board.

Specifically,

For~estal

asked Eberstadt to prepare

a report on the following questions:
205
206

Albion, Forrestal and the Navy, 262.
Eberstadt Report, iii, iv.
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l. Would unification of the War and Navy Departments
under a single head improve our national security? .
2.
If not, what changes in the present relationships
of the military services and departments has our war
experience indicated as desirable to improve our national
security?
3. What form of postwar organization should be established
and maintained to enable the military services and other
Government departments and agencies most effectively to
provide for and protect our national security?207
Eberstadt's report concluded that "unification of the
Army and the Navy under a single head" would not necessarily
improve the nation's security and that a "coordinated system"
based upon decentralization would be more functional.

It

emphasized the vast administrative difficulties connected
with any single secretarial structure, and the dangers to
civilian control of the military.
ture, the Report favored an

As an alternative struc-

independent Army, Navy and Air

Force, each administered by its own civilian secretary of
cabinet rank.

In order to deal with the complicated problem

of political/military coordination within such a confederated
structure, Eberstadt proposed the creation of a National
Security Council and a National Security Resources Board.
These organizations, whose membership included the serv]ce
secretaries, would advise the President on policy and coordinate planning and execution.
207
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The Report found the Joint. Chiefs of Staff to be a
highlY successful organization that should be maintained in
its present form.

Although it reaffirmed the weaknesses con-

comitant to a committee structure, it felt that the "record
does not indicate that they could have performed their duties
better if a supreme military commander had been inserted
between them and the President."

This was clearly a rejec-

tion of McNarney's centralized organization.

The Eberstadt

Report apparently assumed that the Chiefs could work together
in a crisis situation, but that they must be given legal
status to define their duties and responsibilities.

Further-

more, as an organization they must be integrated into all
other aspects of the national planning structure.

To faci-

litate the workings of the JCS, a joint staff was to be
provided.
The plan that Eberstadt proposed corresponded extremely
well to Forrestal's own views of defense organization.

For-

restal, who had fought centralization within the Navy all
through the war, realized that the most important aspect of
an organizational plan was that it must allow for integration
of the various capabilities of all the services.

He fully

appreciated that on some issues there were bound to be
differing professional viewpoints, whether military or
Civilian; but he felt as Secretary of the Navy "that his task
Was to create an organization, in which both views could be
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freely developed and upon which a decision could be made."

208

One week after the Eberstadt Report was released the
Army countered with a new unification proposal put forth by
Deputy Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General J. Lawton Collins.
The Collins plan, which addressed only the organization of
the military hierarchy, envisaged a single Department of the
Armed Forces headed by a single civilian secretary.

The JCS

was to remain essentially as before, except for the addition
of a fifth member, a Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, whose
functions were unspecified.

The plan furthermore recommended

the Joint Chiefs be an advisory body, and as with the McNarney
Plan, they be given the authority to prepare and recommend
to the President the military budget.

The civilian secretary

could comment upon, but not amend these budgetary recommendat

.

lOllS.

209
After the release of the Eberstadt and the Collins

plans, it was apparent that the services had reached an
impasse.

Under these circumstances, the President took the

initiative and on 17 December 1945 submitted his own plan for
unification.

President Truman's interest and attitude toward

unification can be traced back to an article he wrote for
208Alb"lOll, Forrestal and the Navy, 277.
209

u.s. Congress, Senate, Committee on Military Affairs,
~epartment of Armed Forces, Department of Military Security,
~earings, 79th Congress, lst Session, 1945, 157 ff.
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Colliers magazine during the 1944 Presidential campaign.

In

this article, Truman's arguments for unification were based
on economics and the elimination of waste and duplication.
Underpinning this argument was the apparent conviction that
some type of coordinating and planning authority was needed
to deal with defense problems as an interrelated whole.

He

attacked the JCS committee structure and expressed his desire
that "a General Staff in full charge of tactics and strategy,
viewing the nation's offense and defense as an indivisible
whole and totally unconcerned with service rivalries" be
created.

210

These ideas were easily identifiable in the President's
1945 reorganization plan.

As a result of his disenchantment

with the JCS structure, he called for the establishment of a
civilian Secretary of National Defense and a single military
chief of staff.

Furthermore, the plan eliminated the present

Joint Chiefs' structure and substituted a military advisory
body with unspecified duties.
the

Pres~dent's

211

Thus, in December of 1945,

dislike for the JCS led him to the conclusion

210 Harry S. Truman, "Our Armed Forces Must be Unified,"
Colliers. CXIV (~August 1944), 64.
211 u.s. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Armed
Services, National Defense Establishment, Unification of the
Armed Forces, Hearings on S. 758, 80th Congress, 1st Session,
1947, pt. 1, 9-10. (Hereafter cited as National Defense
Establishment).
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that some form of centralization under a single chief of
staff would eliminate the ills of the military organization.
Yet by 22 May 1946, the President had totally reversed himself
and saw a single chief of staff as a threat to civilian control of the military.

212

The explanation for this complete reversal may be
partially found in a memorandum written by Clark Clifford on
18 December 1945.

In this

memorandum, Clifford warned of

the dangers of a single chief of staff and felt that such an
individual would be in a position to "override the civilian
secretaries' views on future controversies."

213

Clifford

argued forcefully that the retention of the present JCS
structure allowed for the continuation of pluralist decision
making and that this in turn permitted diverse views to surface to the attention of the civilian leadership.

Such

pluralism maximized civilian control.
The Clifford memorandum goes a long way toward explaining the change in Truman's attitude, but it also surfaced
212

Harold D. Smith Papers, Box l, Truman Library.
This box contains the diary of Mr. Smith who was director
of the Bureau of the Budget.
In his diary Mr. Smith notes
that the President desired to institute a single chief of
staff on 13 December 1945. This coincides with his own
unification plan. On the 22 May 1946, Mr. Smith records that
the President had come to see a single chief of staff as a
threat to civilian control of the military. There is no
comment on why the change occurred or when it came about.
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18 DecEmber 1945, Clark Clifford Papers, folder, "Post War
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another possible explanation, the administration's concept
of structuring its relationship with the military.

While

Roosevelt had controlled and guided the military by the force
of his personality, Truman looked toward institutions to
accomplish that goal.

214

Clifford was very sympathetic with

Forrestal's belief that foreign policy and military policy
had to be fully integrated, but it was only through institutions that such integration could be optimized.

In a note

written on 13 December 1945, Clifford emphasized that only
in the integration of the nation's "foreign, military, and
economic policies •.• [was there] hope for preventing our
participation in another war."

215

Unification of the ser-

vices was only one aspect of the effort toward total integration.

Within this framework, though, a single chief of

staff held out a potential danger, not only from the point
of view of stifling diverse opinions, but such an individual
could also develop a narrow perspective of the world around
him.

A single chief of staff could potentially be "in no
214

Richard Haynes, The Awesome Power: Harry S. Truman
as Commander in Chief (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University
Press, 1973), 30.
215
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position to view the overall problems of politics, diplomacy,
216
It was thus through the instruand m1' l1' t a ry affairs."
mentality of a pluralistic Joint Chiefs that such a situation
could be avoided.
Conversely, one should not give Clifford total credit
for Truman's transformation, nor mistakenly assume that the
primary motivation for the National Security Act was efficiency.217

If the latter was the case, then a single chief

of staff would have been ideal.

Wilber Hoar, long time chief

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Historical Division, maintains
that the reason for the 1947 legislation was to give guidance
to the military.

218

While this is partially true, it is also

probable that the administration was as much concerned with
controlling the military as directing it.

Truman's own per-

ception of the military was essentially one of distrust and
dislike.

In his later years, the former President described

this in language that was typically Trumanese:

216Memorandum, Clark Clifford to Samuel Rosenman, 18
December 1945, Clark Clifford Papers, folder "Post War Military
Unification, Primary Folder," Truman Library.
.
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y 0 u always have to remember when youTre dealing with
generals and admirals, most of them, they're wrong a
good deal of the time •••• Th~y're most of them just:
like horses with blfgders on, they can't see b~yond the
end of their nose.2

Naturally, this view did not extend to all the military,,
because the President had the greatest respect and confidence
in Leahy, Marshall, and Bradley, but this belief led him to
a total commitment to civilian control, not only in theory,
but in practice.

220

Logically, the President was extremely

protective of his prerogatives as Commander-in-Chief, and
felt that he had to have complete control of the military:;
I took the position that the President, as the Commanderin-Chief, had to know everything that was going on.
I
had just enough experience to know that if you are not
careful, the military will hedge you in.221
The ideas of Presidential prerogatives and civilian control
of the military were deeply intertwined.

This conviction

was never more evident than during the Truman-MacArthur controversy.

222

Whatever President Truman's motivations were, it was
the force of his office that generated the inter-service
compromise that resulted in the National Security Act of
219
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l947. 223

The heart of that compromise was Eberstadt's de-

centralized approach.

Central to the legislation was the

creation of a National Defense Establishment headed by a
civilian secretary.

Conforming to the Eberstadt view of

decentralization, though, the powers vested in this secretary
were very limited.

He was given the power of "general

authority, direction and control," over the three services.
Since the service secretaries were also of cabinet rank, it
meant in a practical sense that the Secretary of Defense's
power was nil.

Moreover, the impotent nature of the Secre-

tary's role was exacerbated by the fact that all three of
the service secretaries were also members of the National
Security Council.

This political reality was legally

reflected in the fact that the National Defense Establishment was not an executive department.

224

This also led to

223

For a full discussion of the political machinations that went into putting the National Security Act
through Congress see Demetrios Caraley, The Politics of
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224
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the criticism of too much military influence in the NSc.
In regard to the JCS, there was a surprising

225

consen~

sus of thought on what role the Chiefs were to take and how
theY were to be structured.

Congress, in particular, had great

confidence in the organization and stated that its duties
should be "substantially as at present and permit functioning in accordance with procedures developed by war experience."226

Similarly, the military themselves had reached a

consensus that whether or not there would be a single chief
of staff, the JCS should structurally continue as it had previously.

Thus, the original proposals relating to the JCS,

developed by the Army and Navy negotiators, Lieutenant General
225

Memorandum for the President, 7 February 1947, subject: Comments of the Secretary of State on Draft of Bill to
promote the National Security (Fourth Draft, dated January 28,
1947), Clark Clifford Papers, box 17, Unification Correspondence, folder "Unification: Congressional Hearings," Truman
Library.
In this memorandum General Marshall notes that the
proposed establishment of the NSC would "give predominance
in the field of foreign relations to a body composed of not
less than six, of which at least four would be the civilian
heads of military establishments.
I think it would be unwise
to vest such a council by statute with broad and detailed
powers and responsibilities in this field." Marshall went on
to say that "there is also a strong feeling that the direction
of policy, foreign or domestic, should be dominated by the nonmilitary branches of government." This point was brought out
, in the interviews conducted by the 1948 Hoover Commission,
Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the
Government, Task Force on National Security Organization
(Appendix G), (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1949), 62.
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Loris Norstad and Vice Admiral Forest Sherman, were accepted
almost in their entirety by Congress.

227

The provisions of the National

S~curity

Act that

established the Joint Chiefs of Staff named the Chiefs of t.he
ArmY, Navy, and Air Force and "the Chief of Staff to the
commander-in-Chief, if there be one," as its members.

228

T.he

incorporation of Leahy's position is somewhat paradoxical in
light of the President's newly acquired dislike for a single
chief of staff.

While it is true that Truman had a great deal

of respect for Roosevelt's Chief of Staff to the Commander-inChief, and thus may have been motivated to continue the
personal relationship, a more plausible explanation may be
found in Truman's faith in institutional control of the military.
Leahy, by virtue of his proximity to the President and his rank,
could serve as a means of control and a conduit of guidance for
the Chiefs.
Aside from specifying the membership of the JCS, the
National Security Act also identified their functions, starting

by naming them the "principal military advisors to the President and the SE':cretary of Defense."

Noticeable by its absence

227M .
aJ or Ch anges, 17 .
228

.
The Commandant of the Marine Corps was not conSidered a member of the JCS in 1947. On 28 June 1952 with passage of Public Law 416 the Commandant was made an equal to the
other chiefs when discussing matters affecting the Marine Corps.
In Practice this has almost always meant the presence of the
Commandant at JCS meet.ings. In 1980 the Commandant was made a
full and equal member of the JCS.
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was the fact that the Cheifs were not made advisors to the
National SE':curity Council.

This apparent anomaly may be

explained by remembering that Truman was deeply concerned
about his prerogatives as Commander-in-Chief.

To make the

JCS advisors to a committee that contained individuals outside the military chain of command might in some way dilUte
this prerogative.

In an agendum written in February

~949,

this relationship between the President and his military
advisors was clearly articulated.

This agendum suggested

that the President speak to the JCS informally on the fact
that:
The Commander-in-Chief and the Secretary of Defense
depend upon the Joint Chiefs of Staff to provide the
professional information, analysis, and decisions upon
which the President must, in turn, make decisions of
great moment to the nation.
(In this essentially stra~
tegic, professional process, no authority other than
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense and
the President can intervene.)229
Such an outside authority would be the National Security
Council.

Moreover, the specific role of the NSC was still

very much in doubt at the time of the passage of the National
Security Act.
229

While its duties were outlined, the nature of

undated "Suggested Agenda" from the Secretary of
Defense to the President, Truman Papers, Personal Secretary
File, box 91, folder "Presidential Appointment Daily Sheets:
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its relationship with the executive was still in question. 230
Aside from this advisory function, the other specific
functions assigned to the Joint Chiefs were:
(l)

to prepare strategic plans and to provide for the
strategic direction of the military forces;

(2)

to prepare joint logistic plans and to assign to the
military services logistic responsibilities in accordance with such plans;

(3)

to establish unified commands in strategic areas when
such unified commands are in the interest of national
security;

(4)

to formulate policies for joint training of the
military forces;

(5)

to formulate policies for coordinating the education
of members of the military forces;

(6)

to review major material and personnel requirements
of the military forces, in accordance with strategic
and logistic plans; and
230

The State Department leadership was opposed to
g1v1ng too much power to the NSC because it attacked their
institutional prerogatives.
In the February 7th Memorandum
to the President, Marshall, noted that "the constitutional and
traditional control of the President in the conduct of foreign
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Secretary of State, is deeply rooted," Memorandum for the President, 7 February 1947, subject: Comments of the Secretary
of State on Draft of Bill to Promote the National Security
(Fourth Draft, dated January 28, 1947), Clark Clifford Papers,
box 17, Unification Correspondence, folder "Unification: Congressional Hearings," Truman Library. The Secretary of State
furthermore said that the envisioned legislation would make the
Secretary "the automaton of the Council." Acheson also had
his doubts about the value of the NSC. Forrestal records that
General Norstad believed that Acheson would "try to castrate
its effectiveness." Forrestal, Diaries, 315. Also see
Chapters VI and VIII for further discussion on Truman's use
Of the NSC.

146

(7) to provide United States representation on the
Military Staff Committee of the United Nations ~n
accordance with the provisions ofthe Charter of the
United Nations.231
. To help accomplish these functions, the statute established a
Joint Staff consisting of one hundred officers supplied
equally from the three services.
The formation of the Joint Staff exemplified the pressures that were at work during the unification process.

It

seems to have been a foregone conclusion that the Staff's
organization would resemble the existing committee structure
that had evolved during World War II.

The Chiefs agreed that

they should name the Joint Staff's director as soon as possible and allow him to recommend the Staff's internal organization since that was not outlined in the statute.

With

that in mind, Major General Alfred M. Gruenther was appointed
on 25 August 1947 and one month later submitted his recommendations for the Joint Staff's organization.
General Gruenther's plan kept the basic outline of the
World War II committee structure, although the internal
agencies were renamed.

He recommended a structure based

around three full-time staff groups that supported three
senior part-time inter-service committees.

As was the case

during World War II, the membership of the committees were
231

Public Law 253, Title II, sect. 2ll(b).
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part-time representatives from the service staffs.

The staff

groups were designated the Joint Intelligence Group, the Joint
strategic Plans Group and the Joint Logistics Plans Group.
These three groups would support the Joint Intelligence Com- mittee, the Joint Strategic Plans Committee, and the Joint
Logistics Committee.

In order to guarantee better coordina-

tion between the joint committee and its supporting group, the
group's director sat in with the senior committee.
The newly created Joint Staff thus consisted of the
Director of the Joint Staff and the three joint groups.
General Gruenther built his recommendations upon the assumption that the JCS was going to remain a "planning, coordinating, and advisory body, and not an operating or implementing group."

But the Joint Staff was not the only organiza-

tion that supported the JCS.

A larger, less distinct institu-

tion, the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS), of
which the Joint Staff was a part, was also available for that
purpose.

Along with the Joint Staff, the OJCS consisted of

the Joint Secretariat and a variety of functional committees,
such as the Joint Strategic Survey Committee.

The specific

Dumber and designation of these other agencies changed during
the 1947-1958 time frame, but the basic organizational structure remained the same.

In October 1947 the JCS approved

General Gruenther's recommendations.
232

Major Changes, 18-20.
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The small size of the Joint Staff guaranteed a continued reliance upon the service staffs for support.

This

was quite acceptable to the services who wanted to maintain
their avenue of expression on service issues and their ability
to influence decisions.

In practice, an issue was sent out

of the Director's office through the Joint Secretariat,, to
the appropriate joint committee.

The joint committee deter-

mined which of the Joint Staff groups would support the project.

It was within these groups that the actual paperwork

was produced, although the service staffs might become involved.

Upon completion, the project was forwarded to the

appropriate joint committee for concurrence.

Before that was

accomplished though, a paper might be returned to the joint
group for revision or be sent to the service staffs for
examination.

Either way, the requirement for service con-

currence guaranteed the protection of service interests before
the project was sent forward to the Joint Chiefs.

233

There was one major deletion from the original statutory provisions that pertained to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
The original version stated that the JCS was to "make recommendations for the integration of the military budget."

This

Was obviously a retention from earlier Army proposals in the
budget area.

While this deletion enhanced civilian control,

233
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it left the JCS without a specific role in the budgetary process.

As a result the Chiefs' role in budget matters varied

during the period of our study.

234

The passage of Public Law 253 (the National Security
Act of 1947) gave the Joint Chiefs legal status for the first
time and identified their place within the policy making
structure.

The reasons for the deliberate specification of

the duties of the Chiefs (as well as other organizations
covered by Public Law 253) were twofold.

The first was to

clearly place the responsibilities of the Joint Chiefs within
the governmental system.

The second was to indicate not only

the extent of the Chiefs' functions, but also their limitations.

For the first time in American history, the act

attempted to create a single system for the development of
political/military planning and policy.

Unfortunately,

the lines within that system were so complex and overlapping
that at times they became totally indiscernible.

Despite

this complexity, there are three fundamental levels within
the system.

At the top is a totally civilian level consist-

ing of the President, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary
of State, and others.
234

The lower level is that of an

The original JCS budgetary function was mentioned
in a 16 January 1945 memorandum from Patterson and Forrestal
to the President.
This memorandum states that the JCS "will
formulate strategic plans, assign logistics responsibilities
to the services in support thereof, integrate the military
requirements and, as directed advise in the integration of
~he military budget." U.S. Congress, Senate, National Defense
~ablishment, 2.
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implementing bureaucracy in charge of any particular function.
In dealing with military questions this level is all military.
In the context of this study, these two levels may be identified as the political and the military levels or, in functional
terms, developing commitments and developing capabilities.

On

defense matters the middle level is made up of mixed civilian
and military agencies such as the National Security Council
and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD).

In theory,

this middle level is the point of contact, or to use contemporary bureaucratic parlance, the 'interface' between the
bureaucracies involved in developing commitments and capabilities.

The Chiefs, as representatives of an implementing

bureaucracy, enter into the system at this point.

It was for

this reason that President Eisenhower considered the Joint
Chiefs the "hinge" between the military establishment and the
. h er c1v1
. "1.1an con t ro l • 235
h 1g

They are positioned at that point

within the system where the nation's commitments and capabilities are meshed and hopefully balanced.
While the Joint Chiefs may have been the hinge between
commitments and capabilities, the National Security Act did
not explain how the various organizations would actually
function.
235
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:ta~f in the National Security Structure," in Issues of

Vat1onal Security in the 1970's, ed. Amos A. Jordon (New
ork: Fredrick A. Praeger, 1967), 229.
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other organization established in 1947.

Obviously, the

Chiefs' advisory function was their reason for being.

The

civilian leadership would look to the JCS to supply expert
military advice on military matters.

But what exactly a

"military" matter was, was never defined.

We can assume, that

given America's traditional compartmentalization of political
from military policy, this implied a "radical" form of professionalism.

All of the other functions specified in the

statute were specifically related either to developing military advice or to maximizing military command and control.
This may partially explain the deletion of the JCS's budgetary function.

In any case, the role that the Chiefs were to

play would have to be worked out between the institutions
involved.
The provisions incorporated into Public Law 253 concerning the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Department of Defense
contained certain inherent difficulties and contradictions.
The elimination of these

inherent problems would be the

subject of three massive reorganizations and several minor
changes in the Defense Department structure during the Truman
and Eisenhower administrations.

The National Security Act

gave the Chiefs dual and sometimes conflicting roles.
the one hand, as a

On

corporate body, they are the principal

military advisors to the President and the Secretary of
Defense; on the other hand, they are the military heads of
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their respective services.

As such, they command a bureau-

cracy that has its own imperatives and vested interests.
virtue of their

adviso~y

function, the Chiefs enter

in~o

By
the

highest mixed civilian-military councils such as the NSC, but
are forced to defend their organizational interests and,
imperatives in those councils.
Historically, it has proved extremely difficult: foT the
Chiefs to divorce themselves from their services.

This·

service connection has probably been the greatest single
criticism leveled against the JCS.

One such critic, retired

Lieutenant General James Gavin writes:
The Chiefs must wear two hats, one as a member of the
JCS, and the other as a member of their own servic.e..
In a larger sense, they should keep the national
interest paramount. But •.• the record will show that
interest in the particular service usually prevails,
although, entirely in a patriotic sense, since their
background, loyalties, and responsibilities all suggest
that in this manner the national interest is best
served.2 3 6
It may be unreasonable to expect a chief, with over thirty
years of service in a particular organization, to take on a
new set of perceptions or world view.

Faultless or not,

this problem must be confronted by each and every chief, as
noted in the following remarks by former Chief of Staff of the

Arnw,

General George Decker:
236

York:

James Gavin, War and Peace in the Space Age (New
Harper & Brothers, 1958), 261.
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As service representative ••. ! had the job of trying to
get for my service as much of the resources available
in the National Defense kitty as I could •••• As a member of the Joint Chiefs ••• ! had the responsibility for
the overall milita~y preparedness of the country.
He went on to say that he reconciled these two roles by
"making as much of the pitch as I could for the Army, at the
same time keeping in mind the requirements of the other services. "237

The inherent weakness of

leaving it up to the

individual to balance between two such powerful sets ol
imperatives is rather apparent.

The Truman administration,

and in particular Clark Clifford, thought that the National
Security Act would help alleviate this problem.

238

Unfor-

tunately, as events were to prove such hope was unfounded,
and this was one of the prime motivations for later reorganization plans.
The problem of the Chiefs' double role is inextricably
connected to another dilemma they face; are they commanders,
are they planners, or both?

If they are to carry out both of

these functions then it is quite logical for them to wear
two hats.
nated.

If not, then one of these roles should be elimi-

It is this command role that motivates the Chiefs to

237 1 t
.
n erv1ew
w1"th Genera 1 George H• Dec k er, J anuary,
1975, Washington, D.C.
238

undated Memorandum on Issues~ Clark Clifford Papers,
box 17, Unification Correspondence, folder "Unification Bill,
Comments and Recommendations," Truman Library.

154
defend their service interests.

This role confusion has

always existed, as indicated earlier, in regard to the Chief
of staff of the Army, who by statute, is prohibited from
being the commander; but the confusion within the JCS is
exacerbated by the command responsibility given the Chief.
of Staff of the Air Force, the Chief of Naval Operations,
and the Commandant of the Marine Corps.

239

The military·

themselves feel very strongly that planning responsibilitY.
and operational control must go hand in hand.

The combi'ning

of the two roles eliminates the development of "ivory t.ower
planning" by individuals who will never have to worry about
actually carrying out their plans.

Former Chief of Staff

of the Army and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
General Lyman L. Lemnitzer made this very clear, "to separate
planning from operational authority is a gross error."

240

239

The National Security Act of 1947 specifically
stated that the Chief of Staff of the Air Force "shall
exercise command over the United States Air Force;" Title II,
sect. 208(b).
As part of the 1958 reorganization command
was changed. to read "supervision." A similar change occurred
in the relationship of the Chief of Naval Operations and
the Marine Corps Commandant to their respective services.
But a degree of ambiguity still remains. According to The
Marine Officers Guide the Chief of Naval Operations commands
the operating forces of the Navy and implies that the Commandant is the actual commander of the Marine Corps. Robert
D. Heinl, Jr., The Marine Officers Guide, 4th edition rev.
(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1977), 46, 81.
240

Interview with General Lyman L. Lemnitzer,
January, 1975, Washington, D.C.
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A second major problem which arose out of the 1947
legislation was the position of the Joint Chiefs within the
chain of command.

According to the statute, they were

"subject to the authority and direction of the President and
the Secretary of Defense," and were the principal military
advisors to both.

241

By virtue of their service responsibi-

lities, they are also under the service secretaries.

The

administrative confusion which can result from having three
bosses is quite obvious.

Furthermore, the mere existence

of the Secretary of Defense created not only a potential
competitor for the role of principal military advisor to the
President, but an official potentially capable of dominating
the Chiefs and usurping their functions.
These then were the problems and contradictions implicit within the 1947 legislation that the ensuing amendments in 1949, 1953, and 1958 attempted to rectify.
speaking, these changes followed three lines.

Generally

The first was

to centralize power into the hands of the Secretary of Defense
and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs.

The second was to

streamline the chain of command in an effort to eliminate the
above mentioned ambiguities.

Finally, these changes tried to

take command responsibility away from the Chiefs and make
them into more of a planning organization.

This last point

Was an essential step in disconnecting the Chiefs from their
service parochialism.
241 National Security Act 1947, Title II, sect.

211 (a).
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The original 1947 legislation conformed to Eberstadt's
vieW of decentralization, by creating a weak Secretary of
Defense with only "general control" over the Military Establishment, and by allowing the military services to be
"separately administered."

This approach was institu..;.;

tionalized by giving the services all powers not specifically
granted to the Secretary of Defense.

At first, this approach

was totally acceptable to Secretary Forrestal, but slowly he
began to appreciate the inherent disadvantages in such a
decentralized system, and he came to realize the Secretary
needed greater control over the Military Establishment.

In

his "First Report" as Secretary of Defense, Forrestal suggested massive reforms designed to enhance and centralize
the power of the Secretary:
The statutory authority of the Secretary of Defense
should be materially strengthened, not only by providing him with an Under Secretary, but also making it
clear that the Secretary of Defense has the responsibility for exercising "direction, authority, and
control" over the agencies of the National Military
Establishment.242
The elimination of the disabling adjective "general" in front
of "direction, authority, and control" was a necessary prerequisite for the centralization of power into the Office of
the Secretary of Defense (OSD).

As a corollary to this

change, Forrestal also suggested that the National Military
242

National Military Establishment, First Report of
.!_he Secretary of Defense (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1948), 3.
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Establishment be converted into an Executive Department,
with a corresponding reduction in the status of the services
and the removal of their representatives from the NSC.

In

a 8 February 1949 memorandum to the President, these changes
were identified as "necessary if

he [the Secretary of

Defense] is to exercise adequate control over the military
243
services."
In order to support the Secretary in his new
centralized role, Forrestal called for an increase in the
size of OSD.
Secretary Forrestal's recommendations were reinforced
shortly afterward by the report of the Military Establishment
Task Force of the Hoover Commission.

This Commission,

officially entitled the Commission on Organization of the
Executive Branch of the Government, was brought into existence
in 1947 to examine all aspects of the executive branch,
especially in terms of economy and efficiency.

Former Presi-

dent Herbert Hoover headed the Commission, while Ferdinand
Eberstadt headed the Military Establishment Task Force.

The

Commission's report identified the positions of the Secretary
of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the two "critical
Points" where problems existed in the National Security structure.

As for the Secretary, the report supported Forrestal

by emphasizing the need to improve the Secretary's "managerial
243 Memorandum Clark Clifford, Frank Pace and
restal to the President, 8 February 1949, subject:
the National Security. Frederick J. Lawton Papers,
folder "Correspondence: Director of Staff," Truman

James ForRevision of
box 7,
Library.

158

instrurnen t • "

This meant centralizing his power and increas-

ing the supporting bureaucracy.

As for the Joint Chiefs,

four major problem areas were identified:
(1) The JCS has remained detached and remote from the
other parts of the.National Security Organization and
have not become involved in the total i·ty of economic,
political and scientific planning. Part of the problem
stemmed from a lack of guidance on the part of the NSC,
"but their [JCS] own attitude has been one of far too
great detachment from the broader tasks of the modern
strategic planner."
(2) The Chiefs are influenced far too much by service
considerations which deter efforts at integrating a
total military policy.
(3) The Chiefs themselves are too heavily burdened by
service functions, at the expense of their JCS role.
(4)

The JCS is burdened by too many minor matters.
Each of these problem areas contributed in their own

way toward diminishing the effectiveness of the JCS in fulfilling their statutory functions.

Consistently, the Task

Force emphasized the dysfunctional nature of inter-service
conflict and the diffusion of energy that resulted from the
Chiefs' involvement in service matters.

It recommended

removing the Chiefs from the chain of command and upgrading
the service's Vice-Chiefs so that they could take over more
of the service responsibilities.

But the Task Force failed

to supply any substantive suggestions for rectifying the
first problem area.

The Task Force criticized the isolated

"aloofness" with which the JCS operated; the fact that the
JCS had substantially failed to "relate their military
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plans" to the nation's economic, industrial, and scientific
capabilities; and that it was difficult to get advice from
the Chiefs.

As a superficial solution to the problem, it

was suggested that the Chiefs should become more involved
in the workings of the NSC, and that they should sit in on
more NSC meetings.

244

Unfortunately, this naive panacea

did not fully deal with the fundamental issue that the Task
Force was addressing.

In reality the Task Force was criti-

cizing the Joint Chiefs for two separate and distinct faults.
The first was their service parochialism, which could be dealt
with through organizational change.

The second was that they

were restricting their outlook to the "military point of view."
The simple solution of more bureaucratic interface and a
larger Joint Staff would have very little effect on such a
narrow "radically" professional outlook.
As a result of the desire for centralization manifested by Forrestal and the Hoover Commission, President Truman
asked for a reorganization of the National Military Establishment along the lines indicated by Forrestal. 245

Congress

244

commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of
the Government, Task Force on National Security Organization
(Appendix G), (Washington: U.S .. Government Printing Office,
1949), 66-70.
(Hereafter cited as the Hoover Commission.)
245

u.s.

President, Public Papers of the Presidents of
.!._he United States (Washington D.C., Office of the Federal
!egister, National Archives and Records Service, 1964), Harry
S. Truman, 1949, 163 and 382.
(Hereafter cited as Public
Papers).

160
supported the President by adopting amendments to the National
security Act that greatly strengthened the power of the Secretary of Defense.

This increase in power corresponded to his

new status as head of an executive department, the Department
of Defense (DoD).

Possibly, in response to the Hoover Com-

mission's criticism of JCS remoteness, the Chiefs were named
the "principal military advisors" to the National Security
council, along with their duties as advisors to the President
and the Secretary of Defense.

246

Another explanation for this

change in function may have been the· President's growing confidence in the NSC, coupled with the administration's increased
awareness of the complexity of national security problems.
As part of the general trend toward

247

centralizat~on

within the Defense Department, the 1949 legislation established the position of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
During the Second World War, the JCS acted primarily as the
President's personal military staff.

This relationship was

246

National Security Act of 1947, Title II, sec. 2ll(a)
as amended in 1949.
247

u.s. Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Organizing for National Defense, Hearings before a Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery, (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1961), I, 573. (Hereafter cited as the
Jackson Committee).
In these hearings Admiral Sidney Souers,
Former Secretary of the National Security Council discussed
how President Truman began to take a more controlling hand in
NSC affairs. While the Admiral did not specifically say so,
it may be suggested that the President simply began to get
used to the structure and no longer feared it.
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described by Admiral Leahy, after the war:
He [FDR] was the Commander-in-Chief. He just appointed
us like he would appoint a staff • • • • We went to the
President. We dealt directly with the President. We
were the staff of the President of the United States.2 4 8
This statement reflected the fact that only the President had
the power to force an issue through the JCS, and partially explained why Leahy was given the title of Chief of Staff to the
commander-in-Chief, as opposed to commander of all American
forces.

Leahy continued to function in this capacity until

illness forced his retirement in 1949.

Before that, however,

his ability to deal with the complex nature of national security problems and to minimize inter-service rivalry had diminished
toward the end of his tenure.

General Bradley noted Leahy's

ill-preparation, in comparison to what he considered to be the
role of the Chairman of the Joint Chief's of Staff.
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As

such, Secretary Forrestal began to look elsewhere for the kind
of independent military advice that Leahy should have supplied.
At first, the Secretary looked to General Alfred Gruenther,
Director of the Joint Staff.

In 1948, he sought to have the

Chief of Staff of the Army, General Omar Bradley, named as his
248

211.
249

U.S. Congress, House, Reorganization Hearings 1953,

U.S. Congress, House. Committee on Armed Services,
F~l~ Committee Hearings on S. 1843, To Convert the National
~l1tary Establishment into an executive department of the
-RVernment, to be known as the Department of Defense, to pro!!§e the Secretary of Defense with appropriate responsibility
~d authority and with civilian and military assistants ade~ate to fulfill his enlarged responsibilities, 81st Congress,
~t Session, 1949, 2912.
(Hereafter cited as House Hearings

1
-!g.)
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special military advisor, but both Bradley and Secretary of the
~he

ArmY Kenneth Royall opposed the change, maintaining that
General was needed in his present capacity.

250

Once Leahy had retired, Forrestal turned to retired
General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower to temporarily fill
By virtue of Eisenhower's age, rank, and experience,

the void.

it was hoped he would be able to exert some pressure to coordinate the Chiefs.

Eisenhower's return to duty was specifically

in response to the difficulty the Chiefs were having developing
budgets and war plans.

As Forrestal wrote to the President:

It is in these circumstances and against this background
that it occurred to me that the talents of Ike, in terms
of the identification of problems and th~ accomodations of
differing views, would be highly useful. 5 1
The Secretary desired to have available to him "some disinterested separate professional advice from an individual
who owned no particular allegiance to one service."
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For a

while, Forrestal thought about creating an independent military
committee outside the JCS, consisting of Eisenhower, General
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Major Changes, 21; Forrestal, Diaries, 496.

251

Letter James Forrestal to Harry S. Truman, 9 November 1948, Truman Papers, Presidential Secretary File, General
File, box 120, folder, "Forrestal General." Truman Library.

252

Memorandum Dwight D. Eisenhower to Walter Kerr,
9 April 1951. Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers, 1916-1952 File,
Box 59, folder "Walter Kerr," Dwight D. Eisenhower Library,
Abilene. Kansas,
(Hereafter referred to as Eisenhower Papers
and Eisenhower Library.)
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Ira Eaker (USAF), and Admiral John Towers; all of whom were
retired.

253

Ultimately, the Secretary returned to the idea of

a chairman of the Joint Chiefs, who could act as a link between
the civilian leadership and the JCS, while abrogating the
worst aspects of inter-service rivalry.

Obviously, such an

individual needed to devote his full time to these goals,

254

but Forrestal was by no means suggesting a single chief of
staff.

It was the individual's duties, not his title, that

was important.

In this regard, the Secretary noted, "the

fundamental question was not whether or not there should be a
single Chief of Staff but what the scope of the single Chief
of Staff's responsibility as agent of the Secretary should
b e.

,255
Forrestal's use of the word "agent" to describe the

relationship between the proposed Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
253

Ibid., The idea of the chairman also being retired
was discussed extensively; even the Hoover Commission considered
using Eisenhower as the model. See U.S. Congress, House,
Hearings, 1949, 2788.
254

u.s. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services,
National Security Act Amendment of 1949: Hearings on S. 1269
and S.l843, 8lst Congress, lst Session, 1949, 10.
(Hereafter
referred to as Senate, Hearings, 1949.)
255

Memorandum to the Director from C. B. Stauffacher,
6 January 1949, Frederick J. Lawton Papers, box 7, folder
"Correspondence, Director Staff," Truman Library.
It should be
emphasized that Forrestal had not lost any of his belief in the
Navy's coordinated approach to administration. The chairman
Would simply facilitate such coordination.
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of staff and the Secretary of Dfdense reflected his desire to
maximize institutional control over the Chiefs.
independence was based on three pillars:

The Chiefs'

their natural

prestige and expertise derived from their position as a chief of
a service; their statutory function as advisors to the President and the Secretary of Defense; and their other statutory
functions enumerated in the National Security Act of 1947.
From the practical point of view, the Chief's statutory functions would have to be eliminated before institutional control
could be optimized.

In a 8 February 1949 memorandum, Forrestal,

along with Clark Clifford and Secretary of the Army Frank Pace,
advocated the elimination of both of these statutory pillars.
They considered it desirable to "delete the specific statutory
duties of the Joint Chiefs of Staff" and to designate the
Chairman as the "principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense.''
Moreover, they thought it desirable to reword the provision
prohibiting the Secretary of Defense from creating a military
staff of his own "in order to make it clear that the Chairman
(or Chief), as well as the Joint Staff, can function as the
.
256
m1litary staff of the Secretary of Defense."

These increases

in the Chairman's functions were a logical extension of Forrestal's plan to use him as an "agent" of the Secretary and
Memorandum, Clifford, P~ce, and Forrestal to the
President, 8 February 1949, subject: Revision of the National
Security, Lawton Papers, box 7, folder "Correspondence, Director of Staff," Truman Library.
256
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make him a "responsible head" of the JCS:
••• the Chairman must be in a position to secure unanimity
from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or, if he fails to secure
such unanimity, he must be able to identify the basis of
the differences of opinion, and he must in such a circumstance have the right to submit to the Secretary of Defense
his recommendations as to the decisions which the Secretary
of Defense should make.257
Along these same lines, Forrestal also wanted the Secretary to
assume the function of appointing the Director of the Joint
Staff.
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The stripping away of the Chiefs' statutory functions

was what Forrestal called the "shadow c.oncept" of control.

The

administration felt that sweeping legislative changes, such as
"abolishing the Joint Chiefs of Staff," would run into political difficulties.

Instead, it opted for the subtler approach

of eroding the Chiefs' functions, and with them their independence, thereby making them more subservient to secretarial control.

Such secretarial control would exist by virtue of lack

of restrictions.

In much the same manner that the elastic

clause of the Constitution paved the way for the expansion of
Federal power, the elimination of the delimitating

statutory

Provisions would allow for the expansion of the Secretary's
Power. 259
257
258
259

u.s.

Congress, Senate, Hearings, 1949, 10.

Major Changes, 24.

Memorandum to the Director from C. B. Stauffacher,
6 January 1949, Frederick J. Lawton Papers, box 7, folder
"C orrespondence, Director Staff," Truman Library.
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Generally speaking, the Chiefs were receptive to Forrestal's desire to establish a full-time institutional moderator within the Joint Chiefs.

This point was made by General

Bradley during the Congressional hearings:
In our experience serving as Joint Chiefs, we have come
to the conclusion that the lack of such a Chairman is a
flagrant shortcoming of the present organization for
security. A senior officer, of competent military background, who devotes his total time to the Joint Chiefs'
prescribed functions, and the Joint Chiefs' agenda is
essential. 260
But a full-time moderator, equal to the other Chiefs, was a
far cry from the "agent" that Forrestal envisioned.

In a 25

March 1949 reply to the Secretary, the Chiefs suggested greater
limitations on the proposed powers of the Secretary of Defense
and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Specifically,

the Chiefs recommended that their previously prescribed duties
be included in any future law.

They reaffirmed this position

before the Senate by recommending the following:

(1) the

Chairman should have no command power; (2) the Chiefs should
keep their statutory functions;

(3)

the advisory function

should be kept with the Chiefs as a corporate entity and that
the chairman should be part of the JCS and not separate from
it; (4) the Joint Staff is the operating body of the JCS and
that the JCS should appoint the Director, not the Secretary

of Defense. 261
260

u.s.

Congress.

House, Hearings, 1949, 2879.
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The Chiefs were fully aware of the effect Forrestal's
proposal would have on their prerogatives.

From the admini-

stration's view, the proposals would be a major step in extracting the Chiefs from the chain of command and their command
function.

This was a crucial step in eliminating service

parochialism.

From the Chiefs' perspective, the legislation

would eliminate them from the decision making process ali
together.

They would, in effect, be relegated to that of the

staff of the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff.

If we can judge from the form of the

final legislation, the Congress appeared to be sympathetic
toward the Chiefs in this power struggle with their civilian
superiors, although, I would suggest for different reasons.
The highly centralized power of the chairman was too close to
the "Prussian" model of a general staff to be acceptable.
This is not to say that Congress was sanctioning inter-service
competition, it is just that Congress felt it was the lesser
of two evils.
The 1949 amendment to the National Security Act maintained the Zoint Chiefs' corporate advisory function and delineated their specific remaining functions.

The chairman

would serve for a maximum of four years, except in time of
war, and while he had precedence over all other military
Officers, he had no command authority.

The question of pre-

Cedence represents an interesting study in semantics.

It was
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clear that nobody, except a few advocates of the centralized
armY approach, wanted to see the chairman become a uniformed
chief of staff.

Clearly, the Chiefs envisioned him as the

first among equals.

The question of his rank, and its rela-

tionshiP to the other services was foremost in the thoughts
of the Chiefs.

262

This ambiguous relationship of rank ma.y

have prompted the administration to promote Bradley, the new
Chairman, to the five star rank of General of the Army,. a
rank comparable to that which was held by both of his predecessors.
The 1949 legislation further specified that the Chairman could not vote in the JCS.

This latter provision had

little real importance, since the Joint Chiefs is not a
democratic institution.

While it is true that they present

their various views on programs and send recommendations to
the Secretary of Defense, all positions are sent forward
whether they are unanimous or not.

Bradley noted during the

hearings that, "I see no reason to give him [the chairman]
the vote as long as it doesn't mean anything."

In fact

Bradley saw a non-voting chairman as advantageous, since it
could mean a greater degree of non-bias if the Chairman did
262

U.S. Congress, Senate, Hearings 1949, 108-125.
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did not have to "commit himself by a formal vote."

263

specifically, the duties of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of staff were enumerated as follows:
(1) To serve as the presiding officer of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff.
(2) To provide agenda for meetings of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff and to assist the .?"oint Chiefs of Staff to prosecute their business as promptly as practicable.
(3) To inform the Secretary of Defense and, when appropriate as determined by the President or Secretary of
Defense, the President, of those issues upon which agreement among the Joint Chiefs of Staff have not been
reached. 264
Tied in with the creation of the chairmanship was an increase
in the size of the Joint Staff to 210 officers.
facilitate the JCS's planning function.

This would

The Director of the

Joint Staff continued to be appointed by the Chiefs, though
not by a secret ballot as Forrestal had desired.
The 1949 amendments to the National Security Act laid
the foundation for future DoD centralization that would ultimately culminate in the McNamara Monarchy of the 1960s.
Despite Forrestal's earlier dislike for centralization, he
was instrumental in what he considered "an additional step
263

u.s. Congress, House, Hearings, 1949, 2903. During
the hearings General Bradley said "He [the Chairman] should
never have to go back to his service to answer for the things
he did as Chairman.", 2996; Ibid., 2896.
264

Major Changes, 26.
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. the evolutionary process."
ln
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It was his exposure to the

fundamental weaknesses within the defense structure that· led
him to modify his attitude.

In particular, it was the budget

proces s , hampered by inter-service rivalry and the lack of
cohesive strategic planning, that made the greatest impact.
From Forrestal's perspective, Clifford's pluralistic JCS had
failed.

He sought a partial solution in the form of an Under

secretary of Defense to help him with the massive amount of
work that he was involved in, but it appears that he became
increasingly convinced toward the end of his tenure that it
was the JCS that needed to be restructured.

A chairman with

increased power to act as the Secretary's "agent" became
Forrestal's panacea.

By promoting Bradley to five star rank,

the general had the formal rank and prestige to become the
"agent" that Forrestal sought.

He also attempted, but never

succeeded in separating the Chiefs from their services.
Since Forrestal understood the political difficulties
in radically restructuring the Joint Chiefs, he opted instead
for his "shadow concept" of control.

By gaining control over

the functions of the JCS, the Secretary would then be in a
Position to remold the institution.

Unfortunately, he was

never in a position to put his ideas into effect.
265

Even before

Memorandum to the Director from C. B. Stauffacher,
6 January 1949, Frederick J. Lawton Papers, box 7, folder
"Correspondence, Director Staff," Trumftn Library.
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the amendments to the National Security Act were implemented,
James Forrestal was dead.

Exhausted by the very factors

that led him to seek reorganization, he committed suicide in
May 1949.
It remained for Harry S. Truman's successor, Dwight
D. Eisenhower, to complete the reorganization effort that
Forrestal began.

Eisenhower's experience as f.upreme Allied

Commander in Europe, as well as temporary Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs, left him convinced of the effectiveness of
certain methods of organizational control.

In the first

place, he brought with him a strong conviction as to the
necessity for unified command, both in terms of administrative control and staff members attitudes.

This belief was

translated into the practical concept of teamwork which for
him was the "essence of all success."

266

Secondly, Eisen-

hower brought from the Army very strong attitudes on proper
organizational and staff procedures.

John Donovan, the Eisen-

hower administration's court historian, observed that the
President "imported from the army a form of the staff system,
in which all functions and responsibilities flow in a more or
less fixed order and sequence from the President down."

267
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Stephen E. Ambrose, The Supreme Commander: The
War Years of General Dwight D. Eisenhower (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1969), 55.
267
(New York:

Robert J. Donovan, Eisenhower: The Inside Story
New York Herald Tribune, Inc., 1956), 69.
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The same staff procedures that had worked so well during the
war under the supervision of General Walter Bedell Smith,
were very much apparent in the person of Governor Sherman
Adams, who handled domestic affairs, and Robert Cutler in the
National Security Council.
the White House

Finally, the President arrived at

a strong advocate of civilian control of the

military, firmly believing that civilians rather than the JCS
should control the Department of Defense.
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With these general attitudes as a backdrop, Eisenhower
developed very specific ideas on how the defense structure
should be organized.

These ideas were enumerated in two memo-

randa written in 1948 and 1949; the former was a response to
a Hoover Commission inquiry, while the latter was written during his tenure as acting Chairman of the JCS.

269

The major

thrust of his recommendations in both memoranda was centralizing decision making power into the hands of the S8cretary
of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Such
authorization would allow the Secretary to deal effectively
with inter-service differences and "to render timely and
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decisive judgments whenever there is a major difference of
opinion among the services and which they themselves cannot
solve." 270

This authority would be of particular value in

the realm of budgetary matters where the Secretary "may be
forced to make specific decisions in numerous cases."

271

In order to help the Secretary of Defense make these
tough decisions, Eisenhower proposed that two new offic±al
positions be created; an Under Secretary of Defense and a
Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense.

The former

foreshadowed the numerous assistant secretaries that came
about as a result of the 1949 legislation and
own Reorganization Plan of 1953.

Eisenhower~s

The latter was just ano·ther

name for the title of Chief of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief
that Admiral Leahy wore and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff position that was created in 1949.

What was unique

about Eisenhower's Military Assistant was the role he recommended for him.

The Military Assistant would have only genera

administrative functions, never be a commander, and would
normally retire after this assignment.
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His primary function

.was to be a coordinator, who "should have no power of formal
decl. s1· on 1· n h1· s own r1· ght. " 273

270
271
272
273

Memorandum, 1949.
Memorandum, 1948.
Memorandum, 1949.
Memorandum, 1948.

I n o th er wor d s, h e wou ld b e a
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chief of staff in the technical military sense.

This state-

ment is also very similar in intent to the non-voting

~rovision

incorporated into the 1949 and 1953 amendments to the National
S€curity Act.

The Chairman-Military Assistant acted essen-

tially as an intermediary between the administration and the
Chiefs.
To General Eisenhower, teamwork was essential bOth in
a military staff and in a presidential administration:
The President should state in unequivocal terms his
determination to produce teamwork in the Security
establishment and should seek a virtual pledge from 'Bach
individual. .• that there will be given to every decision
of the President and the Secretary of Defense complete
loyalty and respect, both as to letter and to spiri~.
He should also invite any subordinate who might feel
him~elf unaB~i to give such a pledge to ask for another
asslgnmen t.
The role of the Military Assistant was central to the creation
of teamwork because it was his job "to make certain that the
Joint Chiefs of Staff thoroughly consider every major problem
that should properly come to their attention," and "assure
that the Joint Chiefs of Staff reach, whenever possible, joint
conclusions and recommendations on these problems."
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The

ability of the Military Assistant to assure that the Chiefs
reach these "joint conclusions" lies beyond the realm of just
coordination and effective administration:
274
275

Memorandum, 1949.
Ibid.
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His mere presence on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, acting
as the trusted assistant of the Secretary of Defense,
should do much to induce, if not compel, the attainment
of unanimous recommendations and conclusions.276
ThiS approach was by no means

ne~

Forrestal had sought to

establish the chairmanship with much the same desire for
unanimity in mind.

If unanimity could not

be reached, then

it was the Military Assistant's job to "present the matter
in all its aspects to the Secretary of Defense asking for a
decision."
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Unquestionably, the right of access to the

secretary and their close relationship would have great impact
upon the outcome of the decision.
Along with desiring to centralize the decision making
process, Eisenhower also wanted to take the Chiefs out of the
service's administrative channels and to have them concentrate
upon strategic planning.

Their JCS work was to take "pre-

cedence over any personal or individual service matter."
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Again, this followed the lead that the Truman administration
had initiated.
It is apparent that during this period, Eisenhower's
thinking was running parallel to that of Secretary Forrestal.
He, like Forrestal,

identified increased centralization as

the solution to the problems brought about by the committee
276
277
278

Ibid.
Memorandum, 1948.
Memorandum, 1949.
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nature of the JCS, but the 1949 legislation did not effectively
eradicate these detrimental tendencies and forced Eisenhower
to face the issue of reorganization upon his assumption of
office in 1953.
Even before Eisenhower's inauguration, certain prominent
individuals, identified with the incumbent administration,
suggested fundamental reform within the Department of Defense.
Both Dr. Vannevar Bush, Chief of the RE:search and Development
Board, and Secretary of Defense Robert Lovett, went on record
advocating a restructured chain of command that reinserted
the civilian service secretaries into a position of prominence,
increased the power of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, and transformed the JCS into more of a planning agency.
Both Bush and Lovett found inter-service rivalry and the
Chiefs' service obligations as the primary source of impairment to the JCS' planning mission.

Bush, far more radical in

his approach, suggested totally separating the JCS from the
chain of command and creating a new organization to deal with
the command functions.

This would allow the Joint Chiefs to

devote full time to planning.

Lovett, somewhat more conser-

vative, merely suggested giving increased power to the serVices' vice chiefs of staff and transferring most of the Joint
Staff to the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

Theoretically,

these changes would result in the Chiefs paying more attention
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to planning, while minimizing the services' impact upon
. .
279
deClSlOnS.
Upon his inauguration, Eisenhower had to deal quickly
with the matter of defense reorganization.

Through Secretary

of Defense Charles Wilson, a special committee, headed by
Nelson A. Rockefeller, was appointed to study the Defense
Department.

This committee, accepting the Lovett-Bush view-

point, sent forward a series of recommendations that were
totally incorporated into the President's Reorganization Plan
#6, outlined on 30 April 1953.
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The President stated that the first objective of the
plan was the "clarification of lines of authority within the
Department of Defense so as to strengthen civilian responsibility."

Civilian control was the constitutional principle

that guided civil-military relations and this meant in organizational terms that:
We must recognize and respect the clear lines of respc·
bility and authority which run from the President, thrc,
the Secretary of Defense and the Secretaries of the
military departments, over the operations of all branches
of the Department of Defense.
279
280
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Eisenhower, Public Papers, 1953, p. 225 ff and U.S.
Committee on Department of Defense Organization, Report of the
Rockefeller Committee on Department of Defense Organization,
ll April 1953 (printed for the use of the Committee on Armed
Services, 83d Congress, lst Session).
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Establishing the chain of command in the above manner,
centralized a great deal of power into the hands of the Secretary of Defense and streamlined the chain of command.

Further-

more, it removed the confusion surrounding the relationship
between a chief, acting as an executive agent, and his service
secretary and the Secretary of Defense.

Prior to 1953, a

chief of service was named as the executive agent over the
unified commands in which his service had a primary interest.
It was through the executive agent that communications and
decisions were transmitted, thus placing the JCS within the
chain of command.

In his capacity as executive agent, a ser-

vice chief did not deal with his service secretary, who felt
that his power was being circumvented.

After 1953, a military

department (i.e., the Department of the Army, Navy, and Air
Force) was named the executive agent as opposed to an individual chief.
This restructuring of the chain of commanc to exclude
the JCS was part of the President's desire to "improve our
machinery for strategic planning for national defense."

Fol-

lowing this approach, the President specifically stated that
the Chiefs "are not a command body, but are the principal
military advisors to the President, the National Security
Council, and the Secretary of Defense."

In order to facilitate

carrying out this advisory mission, the powers of the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs were to be enhanced.

Specifically, the
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Chairman would be made responsible for managing the work of
the Joint Staff and approving the appointment of its members.
It was intended that this would free the Chiefs from administrative details and allow them to concentrate on their planning function.

Moreover, by giving the Chairman control over

the Joint Staff, including the veto power over any appointment,
it was hoped that this would ensure the selection of officers
who were above service interest

281

and who would be able to

.
282
concentrate on the "entire effort" of defense plann1ng.
The President's reorganization plan resurfaced the
decade-old argument over centralization versus decentralization.

Opponents of the bill attacked it for "Prussianizing"

the Joint Staff, transforming the Chairman into a single chief
of staff, and perverting the original intention of the National
Security Act.

Proponents defended the bill in terms of effi-

ciency, necessity, and as the only means of eliminating inter-

.
. l ry. 283
serv1ce
r1va

The administration carefully emphasized

that the Chairman would not be in a position to dominate the
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In summary, the advantages the administration saw in

J Cs •

the bill were:
"better managerial superv1s1on over the Joint Staff and
the relief of the service members of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff of the burden of this managerial function so that
they can devote more of their time to the vital and critical responsibilities they have in the fields of service
readiness and operations in strategic planning and advice.
These advantages will be obtained without the possibility
of a situation where a viewpoint could be completely submerged by any action of the Chairman under the duties
assigned to him by statute and the additional duty
assigned to him in the reorganization plan."284
During the next year, the planning mission of the JCS
was greatly emphasized by a series of directives and memoranda.
The first of these was a Presidential revision of the 1948 Key
West Agreement on the functions of the Joint Chiefs.
revision, issued on 1 October 1953, deleted

This

from the Chiefs'

functions "the direction of all combat operations," and substituted for it "guidance for the operational control of forces
and conduct of combat operations."

While the term "guidance"

was relatively ambiguous, it clearly was less authoritative
than ' 1 direction," which implied command.

This put into effect

the President's view that the Chiefs "are not a command
body."

The rewording of the functions statement was a step

toward achieving the reorganization's objective, namely, to
extract the Chiefs from the chain of command.
284
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Memorandum,l7 June 1953, subject: Purpose and application of Section l(c) and (d) of Reorganization Plan No. 6,
1953, Bruce Harlow Papers, box 19, folder "Reorganization Plan
36," Eisenhower Library.
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secretary of Defense Wilson issued a directive on "Method
of operation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and their relationshiP with other staff agencies of the Office of the Secretary
of Defense."

This directive stated that JCS work was to "take

priority over all other duties," and that the Secretary of
Defense was to be fully informed as to all the deliberations
of the JCS.

It further stated that the Chairman was required

to forward to the Secretary of Defense his own "views, advice,
and recommendations," whenever be was in disagreement with
the other Chiefs.

Finally, on the 19th of October 1954, the

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Arthur Radford,
issued a memorandum on "Joint Chiefs of Staff Organization,
its structure and management," which pursuant

to the Presi-

dent's intentions, consolidated the Chairman's control over the
Joint Staff.

285

The result of these various memoranda and directives
was to decrease the Joint Chiefs' command functions while
correspondingly emphasizing their planning mission.

These

documents also continued the trend toward centralization within the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the consolidation of power into the bands of the Chairman.

After the July

1954 directive, the relationship between the Chairman and the
285 U. S. J o1nt
.
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secretary of Defense began to resemble the one that Eisenhower
had outlined back in 1949.

Despite this increased centra-

lization, the traditional problems of service rivalry and lack
of cohesion in policy formulation continued to be a hindrance.
This point was acknowledged by the President in his January
1958 State of the Union address.

After stressing the impor-

tance of strategic planning and the damage that resulted from
inter-service competition, the President indicated that a
reorganization of the defense structure was in the offing.
The direction of this new plan was disclosed when the President said the "end of interservice disputes requires clear
organization and decisive central direction."

286

Increased

centralization was offered up again as the panacea, just as
it had been in 1949 and 1953.
Following the President's State of the Union address,
a special Advisory Committee was set up by Secretary of
Defense Neil McElroy to study Defense Department organizational problems.

For the remainder of January and through

February, the committee met regularly.

In their endeavor to

analyze the weaknesses of the defense structure, they were
aided by two recently completed staff studies:

the top

secret Gaither Report, produced by the Security Resources
Panel of the Scientific Advisory Committee, and the widely
286E.1s~n h ower, Public Papers, 1958, 2 ff.
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disseminated Rockefeller Brothers Report, International
security:

The Military Aspects.

287

What is of particular

interest is the linkage between the authors of these two
staff studies and the membership of the Advisory Corrmittee.
Both William C. Foster, a former Deputy Secretary of Defense,
who co-chaired the Gaither Committee, and Nelson A. Rockefeller, who headed the 1953 reorganization study, were members
of the Advisory Committee.
Of the two studies, it was the Rockefeller Report
that addressed the problems of the Defense Department in
detail.

It emphasized the necessity for cohesive national

security policy, and it was extremely critical of the DoD
structure.

As in the case of earlier studies, inter-service

rivalry was singled out as the culprit, and increased centralization was offered as the solution.

The Rockefeller Report

recommended making the Chairman the principal military advisor to the Secretary of Defense, an idea that had been
contemplated by Forrestal almost a decade earlier.

In regard

to the chain of command, it recommended placing all forces
under a unified or specified command and excluding the services from the operational control of those commands.
287
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was a reversal of the 1953 Rockefeller position.

With the

services eliminated as executive agents, the chain of command
would run directly from the President and the Secretary of
Defense to the various forces in the field.

With operational

control ·in the hands of the civilian secretary, it was logical, as was suggested, to place the Joint Staff directly
under the control of the Chairman who in turn would work
directly for the Secretary.

288

This would make the Joint.

Chiefs purely a planning agency along

the- lines indicat.ed'

by Dr. Bush and Secretary Lovett in 1952.

The Gaither Report,

completed in November 1957, proposed very similar conclusions
in regard to the chain of command and the services' role as
executive agent.

289

Restructuring the chain_of command along these lines
became the nucleus of the President's reorganization package
presented to Congress in April 1958.

Although the Advisory

Committee did not publish a formal report, the nature of its
advice was a reiteration of the earlier proposals.

In a

February 27th memorandum to the President, Charles Coolidge,
a committee member, wrote:
The concept of executive agency should be abandoned and
unified, etc. commands should be placed directly under
288
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the Secretary of Defense, with the J.C.S. doing the staff
work, supported b9 an integrated operations division of
the Joint Staff.2

°

.

one should not assume that the impetus for the 1958 reorganization was predominately from the outside.

On the contrary,

the evidence seems to indicate that the President was one of
the prime movers in this area.

Before a combined Armed

Forces Policy Council and Advisory Committee meeting, the
President emphatically said, "the use of an executive agency
for strategic orders was crazy," and the service secretaries
"should not be involved in the preparation of strategic planning."

This meeting, occurring on 25 January, a month before

the Coolidge memorandum and very close to the onset of the
Advisory Committee's work, indicates the ultimate impact of
Eisenhower's thinking.
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One thing that is striking is the administration's
reversal from its 1953 position on the organization of the
chain of command.

President Eisenhower attempted to explain

this change to the Congress by stating that the administration had become aware that the executive agency system was
290

Memorandum for the President, 27 February 1958,
Rockefeller Records, box 18, folder "136 ( 1)," Eisenhower
Library. Coolidge had been special advisor to Secretary of
Defense Robert Lovett, thus partially explaining his support
for increased centralization.
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Memorandum for the Rf;ccrd, 25 January 1958, subject:
Meeting on Defense Organization, Rockefeller Records, box 18,
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"cumbersome and unreliable in peace and not usable in time
of war."

He went on to explain that the technological r·evol u-

ti on of the mid-1950s demanded a greater degree of responsiveness from the military.
centralization.
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This of course meant increased

A more plausible explanation for this re-

versal may be sought by examining the total package submitted
by the President, and by analyzing the fundamental changes
that were to be brought about within the Joint Chiefs.
If the President's proposal for reorganizing the
chain of command was accepted, then all major organizational
elements of the military would be incorporated under the
banner of either a unified or specified command, and these
would be directly under the command of the Secretary of
Defense.

Theoretically this would separate the commanders of

these unified and specified commands from their chief of service,

thus achieving an integral part of the President's

overall program:
Because I have often seen the evils of diluted command,
I emphasize that each unified commander must have unquestioned authority over all units in his command ••••
I recommend, therefore, the present law, including certain restrictions relating to combat functions be so
amended as to remove any possible obstacles to the full
unity of our commands and the full command over them by
unified commanders.293
292E.1sen h ower, Public Papers, 1958, 281.
293
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This would finally remove the Chiefs from their command role
and make them into a planning agency.

With the President

echoing the Coolidge memorandum of February 27, he proposed
that in the future the Chiefs should "serve as a staff assisting the Secretary of Defense."

Obviously, for the Chiefs to

accomplish this new and vital mission, the Joint Staff would
have to be enlarged and, in words identical to the Coolidge
memorandum, an "integrated operations division" would have to
be created within the Joint Staff.

In order to maximize the

effectiveness of this newly integrated staff, the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff would be allowed to assign duties to
the Joint Staff and, with the "approval of the Secretary of
Defense, to appoint its Director."

294

Moreover, as part of the

administration's effort to expand and strengthen the power of
the Chairman, the meaningless restriction on his voting within
the JCS was to be removed.
The President's program was fully accepted by the
Congress.

Instrumental in the passage of the bill was the

support it received from the members of the JCS.

Only the

Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Randolph Pate, opposed
the movement· toward centralization.

All of the other Chiefs

actively supported the bill and reiterated that the role of
the JCS had not diminished.

Why the Chiefs gave into

centralization when they had so vociferously opposed it less
294
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than a decade before is difficult to answer.

Undoubtedly,

the prestige of President Eisenhower on military matters was
important, as well as the fact Eisenhower's Chiefs had been
selected with loyalty as a key criterion.

Both of these points

will be addressed in some detail in later chapters.

It is

also possible that the Congress began to feel that efficiency
in military matters was more important than fear of potential
"Prussianization."

The national security structure had been

in existence for over a decade, so many of the early fears had
eroded.

Whatever the actual reason, the legislation was the

culmination of the centralization process that had started
under Forrestal.
Inter-service rivalry and the lack of a cohesively
integrated national security policy was the cause of all four
major post-war reorganizations.
was further centralization.

In each case, the solution

Theoretically, the 1949 amend-

ments gave the Secretary of Defense sufficient power to deal
with the problems that were endemic to his department.

This

was the opinion of the Chief Counsel of the 1953 Rockefeller
Commission:
Subject to the President and certain express prohibitions
••. the power and authority of the Secretary of Defense is
complete and supreme.
It blankets all agencies and all
organizations within the Department of Defense.2~b
Yet in every case, the increased power granted to the Secretary
and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs proved to be insufficient
295
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and merely led to greater centralization in the next reorganization.

The reason for this was that the fundamental prob-

lem within the Department of Defense was never addressed.

A

canvassing of the recommendations of the special task groups
that analyzed the problem reveals a single common denominator, the committee nature of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

As

far as these studies were concerned, it was the committee
.
.
296
nature t h a t promo t e d serv1ce
compe t 1. t 1on.
As part of his 1958 reforms, the President attempted to
deal with the committee issue, not within the JCS but within
the Joint Staff.

Since Eisenhower's failure to address the

committee problem in 1953, the intensification of inter-service
rivalry forced him to reevaluate the situation.

If a truly

integrated staff was to be established, as the President proposed in 1958, then the committee system had to be abolished.
This point was made abundantly clear by the President during
the January 25th Advisory Committee meeting when he asked" ..•
why we should not have the best integrated organization within
the Joint Staff where the best officers would be assigned
rather than a committee system?" 297
296
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The restructuring of the committees fell within. the
executive prerogative, thus all owing the administration· to
implement changes without Congressional concurrence.

Under

the President's and the Secretary of Defense's direction,. the
Chairman announced on 27 May 1958 that the committee system
would be abolished.

In its place, the Joint Staff would be

structured along a traditional staff format that was in normal
operation in other military staffs.
sisted of six directorates:

The new organization con-

J-1 Personnel, J-2 Intelligence,

J-3 Operations, J-4 Logistics, J-5 Plans and Policy, and J-6
Communications-Electronics.

These six directorates, along with

the directors of Military Assistance, Advanced Studies, and
Joint Programs, made up the newly constituted Joint Staff.
One of the primary motivations for changing to this type of
organization was that it allowed the Joint Staff to work
effectively with the similar staff structures of the unified
and specified commands."
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In conjunction with this reorga-

nization, the Secretary of Defense revised the formal statement of the JCS's functions incorporated in DoD Directive
5100.1.

While reiterating some of the traditional functions

of the Joint Chiefs, the revision clearly reflected the thrust
toward transforming them into a planning agency as opposed
298
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to a command group.

It specifically identified the JCS as the

immediate military staff of the Secretary of Defense and as
a corporate group, placed them in the operational chain of communication through which the Secretary of Defense issued orders
to the unified and specified commands.

299

It was also hoped,

that by giving the Chairman more control over the Joint Staff,
the officers selected would be above service interest.
While the President was preparing his reorganization
effort, the Chiefs were in the process of examining their own
organizational structure and that of the Department of Defense.
In December 1957, an Ad Hoc Committee within the JCS was
created, under the direction of Major General Earl G. Wheeler,
to examine DoD organizations in "order to determine if there
are deficiencies" that could be eliminated through reorganization.

The report outlined five areas in which it felt there

were fundamental problems.
l. Problems and delays within the JCS decision making process and "subsequently above their level."
2.
Insufficient coordination between logistics and strategic planning.
3. Complicated channels of authority to commanders in
the field.
4. Confusion as to the internal lines of authority within
the services, DoD, OSD, and the role of the Assistant
Secretaries of Defense.
5.

Service budgets were unduly influenced by non-military
determinants.
299 Ibid. , 38.
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Among those areas identified by the Wl•.eeler Report, those pertaining to internal problems within the JCS and the complicated
channels of authority to field commanders were also addressed
by the President.

At no time did the Ad Hoc Committee mention

inter-service conflict, nor did it consider the committee nature
of the Joint Staff to be a problem; despite the fact it noted
that the Chiefs tended to reach decisions through compromise
and that there were continual divergencies of opinion within the
JCS.

For obvious reasons the Ad Hoc Committee never could

identify the real cause of these problems nor blame the Chiefs
and their structure.
procedural

Instead, they sought the solution through

means by which the JCS would resolve their diver-

gencies, and they advocated greater involvement by the civilian
decision makers on appropriate issues.

In regard to the chain

of command problems·, the Wheeler Report suggested either returning to the executive agency structure or giving operational
responsibility directly to the Chiefs.

In either case this

was completely contrary to the President's desire.

Needless

to say, the President's plan superseded the JCS report, and
.t
1

was never acted on. 300
The Eisenhower administration hoped that the 1958

reforms would eliminate once and for all the problems of
300
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inter-service rivalry and the lack of policy integration.
Unfortunately, as in the case of the three earlier plaris,
increased centralization proved to be ineffective.

The reason

for this failure, as in all the previous efforts, was that it
never did strike at the fundamental issue, the bureaucratic
nature of the JCS.

A 1959 memorandum from the Bureau of the

Budget outlined the continuing nature of this problem:
The high rank of the officers involved, the importance of
the issues with which they deal, the aura of mystery which
surrounds their work, the very title "Joint Chiefs of
Staff"--all have served to obscure the fact that the JCS
is a committee. Originally it was Rn interdepartmental
committee. Now it is an intra-departmental committee.
All intra-governmental committees, whether manned by
civilians or military men, are capable of performing only
limited functions.
Failures have been the inevitable result of attempts to assign to committees duties which they
are organizationally incapable of performing. Past efforts
to strengthen the JCS have involved the provision of a
Chairman, later enlargements of his duties and most recently an expansion of the Joint Staff which serves the
JCS. All of the changes, however, have left the committee character of the JCS essentially intact.
It is
clear that the JCS will remain the main obstacle to sound
staff organization in the Office of the Secretary of
Defense until (1) the committee character of the JCS is
clearly recognized and its duties reduced to those which
can be performed effectively by a committee and (2) the
other dut1of of the JCS are assigned to other OSD staff
elements.
As the memorandum noted, all the efforts at centralization had
left untouched the basic structure of the JCS.

Almost in a

sense of desperation, the memorandum called for the establishment of independent analytic capability in the Office of the

301 Memorandum from the Bureau of the Budget, December
1959, Bruce Harlow Papers, box 19, folder, "Reorganization Plan
No. 1," Eisenhower Library.

194
secretary of Defense.

This had been Secretary Forrestal's

original reason for creating the office of the Chairman, but
in so doing he had left the JCS structure basically unchanged.
Whether Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara read this
memorandum is unknown, but the establishment of the Office of
systems Analysis, and the power which he ultimately vested in
it achieved the kind of independent analysis that the memorandum called for.

In many ways that office fulfilled the role

that the Truman and Eisenhower administrations tried to force
the Joint Chiefs to take.

302

For both the Truman and the Eisenhower administrations,
the crucial issue regarding political/military planning was
the establishment of an organization that could effectively
integrate the nation's commitments and capabilities.

The Joint

Chiefs of Staff was the hinge upon which this policy integration hung.

However, in the eyes of both administrations the

JCS failed to fulfill their primary mission, the development
of usable input into the national security policy making structure.

Without this input, policy integration was doomed from

the start.
As the civilian leadership assessed the policy making
structure in order to determine where the organizational breakdown was occurring, they continually pointed to the JCS as the
culprit.
302

It was for this reason that the JCS became the focal

Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, How Much Is
Enough: Shaping the Defense Program, 1961-1969 (New York: Harper Colophon Books, 1972).
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point of the three major reorganizations that occurred after
1947.

Within the JCS, the committee structure was identified

as the single greatest flaw.

The committee nature of the

Chiefs appeared to precipitate the inter-service conflicts
that destroyed the Chiefs' ability to give unified advice to
the political leadership.

Without an agreement on the nature

and needs of the nation's military capabilities, it was impossible to determine if those capabilities could support the
political commitments that were being considered.

In practice

these differences of opinion stemmed from the twin dilemmas
that haunted the Chiefs:

their corporate role versus their

service role, and their planning function versus their command
function.

From the very beginning, there was confusion as to

which role or function took precedence.

General Gruenther

assumed, when he was organizing the Joint Staff, that the
Chiefs' planning function and hence their corporate role was
the most important.

But the National Security Act of 1947

left the Chiefs a command function,
that planning had primacy.

simply by not identifying

The result was that the three sub-

sequent reorganizations sought to extract the Chiefs from the
chain of command, thereby forcing them into the role of planner.
The heart of all three of these reorganizations was
centralizing power into the hands of the Secretary of Defense
and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Once it had

been determined that a pluralistic JCS resulted in dysfunctional competition, the solution appeared to be centralized
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management from above.

This was the direction that Forrestal

marked in his First Report, but the first Secretary of Defense
also realized that he needed to have military advice from an
expert.

It was for this reason that he wanted to establish a

powerful Chairman so that he could become his "agent" within
the Joint Chiefs.

Based upon his experiences as acting Chair-

man, Eisenhower came to the same conclusion.

A strong Chair-

man, whose rank, prestige, and power was superior to that of
the other Chiefs, would be in a position to eliminate interservice conflicts and force the Chiefs to be responsible.
What is apparent is that the Chiefs sought to maintain their command prerogatives in the face of these organizational changes.

This goal is still very clear when one

examines the Wheeler Report.

If the Chiefs lost their command

function they would be relegated to what Robert Golembiewski
describes as the Neutral and Inferior Instrument (NII) model
of a staff.
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In the NII model the staff is outside the line

of command and is primarily a thought and planning structure,
as opposed to an organization concerned with execution.
reality it becomes purely an advisory body.

In

From an organiza-

tional chart perspective, Eisenhower's 1958 reforms made the
JCS a Neutral and Inferior Instrument.
.

The Chiefs were taken
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Robert T. Golembiewski, Organizing Men and Power:
(Chicago: Rand
McNally & Co, 1967), 11-14.

~atterns of Behavior and Time-Staff Models,
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ou t

of the chain of command, and the Joint Staff became less

a vehicle of the services and more of a planning agency responding to the direction of the Chiefs.

The Secretary of

Defense became, in effect, the commander of the United States
military forces, since he now had the sole ability within the
Defense Department to issue direct orders to the unified and
specified commands.
While the above analysis did lead to massive organizational changes, the internal problems within the JCS remained
untouched.

The reason was that there was not one single prob-

lem, but two separate

problems within the JCS.

The first was

the one that everyone identified--bureaucratic infighting.
Since it was easily identifiable the organizational changes
attempted to deal with it.

The second problem was alluded to

bY some of the outside studies, but never formally identified.
That problem was the nature of the Chiefs' professional outlook.

It caused the Chiefs' "aloofness" when they dealt with

other decision making institutions.

In order to fully under-

stand the impact of both of these flaws and how they interrelate, we must examine each one in turn, always remembering
the organizational structure which supplies the parameters
Within which they operate.

CHAPTER V
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF ·sTAFF AND THE BUREAUCRACY
A description of organizational changes tells us very
little about the actual decision making process.

Vince Davis

correctly noted that trying to discover how a decision is
made by looking at an organizational chart is like trying to
. 304
determine who will win a ball game by buying a score card.
In order to fully appreciate the role of the Joint Chiefs in
policy formulation, it is necessary to understand the JCS's
own internal decision making system.

The product of this

system forms the basis of the Joint Chiefs' input into the
national policy process.

Despite extensive changes within

the organization of the JCS, both in terms of size and
structure, the staffing procedures of the Joint Chiefs have
remained remarkedly stable.

This personification of bureau-

cratization has been described by one author as "The FlimsyBuff-Green-Red Striped Nightmare. 11305 These terms refer to
304 v ·
--:
"Am er1can
.
".
. .
1nce Dav1s,
rul 1.
1 t ary P o 1.1cy: Declslonmaking in the Executive Branch," Naval War College Review,
Vo 1 • XX I I , No • 9 01 a y , 1 9 7 0 ) , 7 •
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stuart Loory, Defeated:
Inside America's Military
Machine (New York: Random House~-1973), see chapter 6. The
following material on the Joint Chiefs bureaucratic process,
Unless otherwise speeifically identified is taken from
Lawrence Tatum, "Tht? Joint.Chit?fs of Staff and Defense Policy
Formulation," in Amf•rican_Q~!~nse Policy (2nd edition), ed.
by Mark E. Smith and Claude J. Jnhns (Baltimore: The Joh~s
198

199

the color coded papers which are used at the different stages
of the process.
The process itself begins when the JCS is asked to
supply input on a subject.

The request may be generated

either inside the Joint Chiefs or from an
it.

agen~y

outside of

If it is externally generated, then the Director of

the Joint Staff will assign a "report for the Joint Chiefs
of Staff" to the Joint Staff agency primarily concerned with
the problem as well as any other agencies with secondary
interest.

This "Green Directive" (usually referred to as a

"Green Bomb") will identify the problem and the action
officer whose function it will be to produce the paper and
to shepherd his product through the bureaucratic maze.
Secondary agencies concerned with the issue are also requested to assign action officers to help produce the final
product.
From the very beginning, the primary action officer
is impeded by the short time which is allocated to him to
produce his product.

Colonel John Harrelson, a former JCS

Hopkins Press, 1968), 377-392. Blue Ribbon Defense Panel,
· Report to the President and the Secretary of Defense on the
Department of Defense, App. N. Staff Report on Joint Chiefs
of Staff Decisionmaking (Washington: G.P.O., 1970). J.S.
Harrelson, "The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Security,"
(Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, American University, 1968).
The process described here uses the JCS structure as it
looked after the 1958 reforms, but the general outline of how
the JCS moved its paperwork from the "flimsy" to the "redstriped green" was relatively constant all through the
Period under investigation.
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staffer, noted that "the importance of a paper is measured
in inverse order to the amount of time allocated to its preparation."306

Since the whole bureaucratic process takes on

the average two to three weeks to complete, the miltiary
strategist is not given sufficient time to produce a quality
product.

307

The first stage of the staffing process is writing the
"flimsy".

308

The action officer normally has only forty-

eight hours to write it.

Its purpose is to serve as a cata-

lyst for further discussion, and may either be a serious
piece of work or a straw man designed to draw out the service's positions.

Once the first draft of the "flimsy" has

been written it is then circulated to the secondary action
officers, who represent the services and other interested
agencies.

These officers normally have only twenty-four

hours to respond.
turns buff, "

309

Once concurrence is reached the "flimsy

which means that it moves up to the next stage

of the process.
306

Harrelson, "The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National
Security," 254.
307

Tatum, "The .?"oint Chiefs of Staff and Defense
Policy Formulation," 389.
308

The term "flimsy" comes from the onion skin paper
Which the first draft is written on.
309

"Buff" refers to the manila-like legal sized paper
that is used.
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The "buff" is then circulated among the agencies concerned.

If major problems arise that are not editorial in

nature, the action officer may call for a planners' meeting
in order to hammer out the differences.

This meeting is

chaired by a Joint Staff planner (flag rank) and is attended
by the agency or service planners concerned with the "buff"
(usually of COL/CAPT rank).

The agency or service positions

are circulated in advance on formal memoranda called "purples."

Surprise is normally rare, although it may be used

if the issue is very important.

The selection of specific

service planners may also reflect the importance of the
issue.
Some military officers have developed wide-spread reputations in the Pentagon for their skill as negotiators.
The assignment of such an officer as a service planner
can mean that the service involved has an ax to grind or
a "hard" position on the subject at hand.310
During the meeting the Joint Staff planner attempts to act
as the mediator between the contending agency views.

The

meeting ends with either concurrence or a continued split
in the positions.

At this point, the head of the Joint Staff

agency concerned may "turn the buff, green."

311

He may

forward the "buff" even though there are still differences
of opinion over it.

This is called a "split green."

310

Harrelson, "The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National
Security," 249.
311

The "green" comes from the coarse legal sized green
sheets upon which the staffing papers are written, since the
Paper is legal sized it usually is referred to as a
"1 ong green".
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The

11

green" is the next to last stage in the JCS

decision making process.

If nonconcurrence continues, the

non-concurring agency can submit a "purple" outlining its
position, which in turn is rebutted by the action officer.
This exchange then becomes part of the "green" as long
as the nonconcurrence exists.

Once the "buff" has turned

"green"," it falls under the jurisdiction of the Director
of the Joint Staff, who can place it on the Operations
Deputies Calendar or the Calendar of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff.

The former organization is made up of the services'

Deputy Chiefs of Staff for Operations.

If the Operations

Deputies fail to reach agreement on the subject, it may be
sent back to the planners for further coordination or it
may be sent forward to the Chiefs for them to work out some
form of agreement.

When the paper is finally accepted, a

red-stripe is placed at the bottom of the "green," denoting
that is has become an official JCS position.
sent forward to the

~ecretary

of Defense.

It is then

A split may also

be sent forward with the service "purples" still attached.
As ponderous as this system seems, it still handles in excess
of a thousand decisions each year.

In response to consist-

ent criticism that the Chiefs are too burdened to deal with
the really important joint issues, alternative methods to
the "flimsy, buff" system have been created.

Unfortunately,

during the Truman and Eisenhower administrations, the
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majoritY of the issues were still decided by the Chiefs
themselves.

312

I

In this description of the JCS decision making process, the requirement to produce consensus at every level
of the process is critical.

This requirement has led not

onlY to the criticism that the system is ponderous, but
that the compromises necessary to produce concurrence
actually dilute the quality of the final product.

This pro-

cess of compromise and consensus building reflects what
Roger Hilsman calls the "politics of decision making."

313

Hilsman maintains that decisions are made by the political
methods of persuasion and bargaining, as contending interest
groups attempt to resolve their conflicts.

Thus, the

rational or authoritative model of decision making rarely
exists.
The necessity for operating in this "political" manner
lies in the structure of the American Constitutional system
and in the nature of the bureaucracy.

Professor Richard

Neustadt, in his seminal study of the American Presidency,
observed that the Constitution did not create a separation
of powers, but instead "created a government of separated
312
313

See Table l for an analysis of the JCS decisions.

Roger Hilsman, The Folitics of Policy Making in
~efense and Foreign Affairs (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1971), 14-15.
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TABLE 1

JCS DOCISION STATISTICS

-

Year
1 951-52
1953-1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969

Total Decisions
1
1628.
No conclusive data
8873
1038
1066
1405
1458
1460
15634
3017
3281
2690

2675
2339

Sp1i ts · (No. %)
2
5 ( .003)
13
24
21
15
13
42
47
40
7
6
6
2

(1.5)
(2.3)
(2.0)
(1.1)
(0.9)
(2.9)
(1.9)
(1.3)
(0.2)
(0.2)
(0.2)
(0.8)

~anorandun for General Bradley, subject: Reorganization of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Record Group 218, box 4, folder 020 JCS (16 Decanber 1951) National Archives.

~ew York Times, 10 January, 1953, p. 4. The Times indicates that
during the time frame 1951-52 (the same as covered by the Bradley Memorandum) that the JCS handled 1650 matters, this figure was only 22 off the
fo:mnl figure given in the manorandun. The Times goes on to state that
there were 5 splits during this time. The Bradley Memorandun notes 4, but
goes out of its way to state that it is not a complete list. It also notes
two "withdrawn splits" which meant that there was Secretarial action
taken before the split was sent forward.
~port to the President and the Secretary of Defense on the Department of Defense, by the Blue Ribbon Panel (Washington, D.C.: July 1970),
Appendix N: Staff Report on Joint Chiefs of Staff Decision-Making, 20,
Qampiles all data on JCS decisions since 1958.
4

In 1965 the JCS instituted a new fo:rm of decision Imking, FM-133.
This authorized the CJCS to take actions for the JCS and info:rm them afterwards on 1) rna tters in which urgency is crucial; 2) rnatters in which a JCS
policy has already been established; 3) matters in which the CJCS knows
the corporate view of the JCS on a slinilar issue; and 4) rnatters not important enough to consult the JCS as a corporate body. Under certain circumstances Directors of Divisions in the Joint Staff are allowed to use FM-133.
Since its institution, PM-133 has accounted for over 50% of the decision
statistics. In 1965 it accounted for 1589 decisions or 52.7%, in 19662037 (62.0%), 1967-1620 (60.2%), 1968-1507 (58.5%), and 1969-1280 (54.7%).
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institutions sharing power."

314

These separated institu-

tions and their representatives proportionally share power
based upon their prestige, expertise, size, and impact on
society.

This power in turn becomes translated into the

ability to influence the outcome of decisions.

An institu-

tion's primary means of achieving the desired outcome is
its ability to persuade and bargain with other institutions.
In such a pluralistic environment, "the power to persuade
is the power to bargain; status and authority yield bargaining advantages."

315

The reason an organization bargains is its ideology
or prevalent belief which forms the basis for its existence.
Some students of bureaucracy have compared organizational
ideology to the territorialism of certain species of animals.
Every large organization is in partial conflict with
every other social agent with which it deals ••• the
basic nature of all social struggle is the same - each
combatant needs to establish a large enough territory
to guarantee his own survival.316
This territory becomes defined by the amount of the budget
an organization receives or the number of functions that it
is given.

In the military, these functions become

314

Richard Neustadt, Presidential Power: The Politics
of Leadership (New York: John Wiley, 1960), 34.
315

Ibid.

316A nt h ony Downs, Inside
~
the Bureaucracy ( New Yor k :
Little, Brown & Co., 1967), 217-226.
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translated into roles and missions, and are inextricably
connected to budget allocations.

Under these circumstances,

an organization will attempt to enhance its essence or
mission by any means necessary.

The greater the importance

of its mission, the greater the influence the organization
has, which in turn translates into higher survivability.
Any encroachment upon a vital mission is a direct threat to
the organization's existence.

Conversely, the organization

will attempt to incorporate new functions within the boundaries of its mission, thereby increasing its own importance.
While all bureaucracies operate in a similar manner, the
military has institutionalized its essence in the form of
.

d oc t r1ne.

317

The service action officer is thus instilled with the
commitment to protect the organizational essence and attempt
through bargaining with his counterparts to achieve the
required consensus.

These action officers, who are an essen-

tial cog in the JCS staffing process, are called the "Indians," because they work for a "Chief."
317

The service "Indians"

For a further discussion of this point see such
works as Morton Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics & Foreign
Policy (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1974);
I.M. Destler, Presidents, Bureaucrats, and Foreign Policy:
The Politics of Organizational Reform (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972); Graham T. Allison, Essence of
Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston:
Little Brown & Co., 1971); and Frank Simonie, "Structure and
Policy: The Evolution of the Military Staff," (Unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, New York University, 1975).
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are usually bright, young Lieutenant Colonels and Colonels
who, in the words of retired Marine Corps Colonel John
Donovan have,
... usually demonstrated their effectiveness as leaders,
planners and organizational managers. They may also
have performed heroically in combat, but most of all,
they must have demonstrated their loyalty as a proponent of their own service doctrine and their dedi§fs
tion to the defense establishment and its policies.
Devotion to the organizational ideology is repaid with promotions and choice assignments while deviation may well
mean the termination of a career.

Thus, the "primary re-

quisite of those engaged in planning at both the service
and joint levels becomes the attainment of a military position which does not injure the vital interest of any ser-

.

VlCe.

,319
This problem is by no means exclusively restricted to

the service representatives sitting on joint committees; it
deeply affects the structure of the Joint Staff system
itself.

In theory the Joint Staff was to consist of officers

detached from their particular service who would develop a
"purple suit" mentality.

A "purple suiter" is an individual

who is truly above service interest.

The color "purple"

comes from the misconception that combining the colors of

318

James Donovan, Militarism, U.S.A.
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1970), 75-79.
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(New York:

Tatum, "The Joint Chiefs of Staff and Defense
Policy Formulation," 386.
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the uniforms of all the services would result in the color
purple.

Thus an officer with this type of outlook would not

be committed to any particular service ideology.

The problem

between practice and theory was that the officers assigned
to the Joint Staff had to, at some point in the future, return to their own services.

Many times their success or

failure within their own service depends upon the positions
they took while on the Joint Staff.

This problem is further

complicated by the fact that all papers produced within the
Joint Staff are passed around at numerous times for service
concurrence.

Thus the Joint Staffer has to walk the tight

rope between service advocacy and joint orientation.

The

fact that the Joint Staffer's boss will probably be from a
different service exacerbates this problem.
320

320

To what extent the members of the Joint Staff maintain a "purple suit" mentality is difficult to document.
A
1955 Dartmouth College study on the attitudes of members of
the Joint Intelligence Group and the Joint Logistics Planning
Group reveal that of those interviewed it was almost unanimously agreed that an officer who was above service interest
helped the organization fulfill its mission more than an
officer who vigorously supported his service. Despite this,
less than half of the officers interviewed felt that being
above service interest would help them in the next promotion
(slightly less than half believed that being a service advocate would help in the next promotion), and the majority
felt that a superior command performance in their own service
carried more weight before promotion boards than a superior
Joint Staff performance. While inconclusive, it does seem
to support the contention that officers worry how their service of origin will perceive their Joint Staff duty and that
service advocacy was somewhat required. Commission on Orga~zation of the Executive Branch of the Government:
Five
~taff Papers Prepared for the Task Force on Procurement,
Volume I, Defense Procurement: The Vital Roles of the
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Since the participants in the decision making process
have an obligation to defend their organizational imperatives, consensus building breaks down and is replaced by such
artificial methods of achieving unanimity as "paperclipping,"
"waffling," and "logrolling."

321

The pressure for unanimity

is a result of two systemic constraints.
action officer's short suspense dates.

The first is the
With consensus a

prerequisite at every stage of the staffing process, it
becomes easier to produce artificial unanimity than it is to
National Security Council and the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
(Washington, D.C.: June 1955), A-63. The issue of attempting to separate the members of the Joint Staff from their
service has been a constant point of analysis in all the DoD
studies conducted since the end of World War II.
In an effort
to accomplish this goal Secretary of Defense Thomas Gates
issued a memorandum in 1959 that made joint duty a prerequisite for selection to flag rank. Unfortunately, his definition of "joint" was too broad and the services were allowed
too many exceptions. One recommendation of the 1978 Steadman Corrmittee was that the Gates memorandum be enforced and
that the Joint Staff be more effectively isolated from their
services. This would seem to indicate that over thirty years
after the creation of the Joint Staff the problem of service
parOchialism still exists.
Report to the Secretary of Defense
on the National Military Command Structure (Washington, D.C.:
July 1978), 63-65.
321

"Waffling" occurs when a paper is written so that
it never actually addresses the important issues and so means
all things to all people.
"Paperclipping" is a means of ameliorating conflicting demands from different institutions or
organizations.
Instead of choosing or prioritizing demands,
all of them are simply combined into a package and sent forward. Thus the different service demands are "paperclipped"
together and sent forward as a "joint" position.
"Logrolling" is the time honored political means of achieving one's
objectives and guaranteeing the passage of pet projects.
Individuals or organizations promise to support one another's
Projects in return for support on their own project.
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attempt the less rewarding conversion of attitudes.

Such

conversions are not only time intensive, which may cause a
missed suspense date, but there is little guarantee of success due to the pressure of organizational imperatives and
career necessities.
The second systemic constraint lies within the nature
of the bureaucracy and the organizational imperatives of the
Joint Chiefs.

The purpose of a bureaucracy is to produce a

. .
322
unified posl. t.1on or a d ec1s1on.

The failure to do so

forces the issue one echelon higher in the structure, bringing into question the rationale for the existence of the
lower levels.

It is the action officer's mission to produce

consensus and relieve his superiors of the ponderous and
difficult task of producing consensus at a higher level.
The failure to achieve unanimity reflects on the action officer's capabilities and thus affects his career potential.
If the issue is vital to the very existence of the service,
it will have to be moved to the highest level of the bureaucracy for reconciliation.

Even at the level of the Joint

Chiefs, the continued existence of a split position is diametrically opposed to the institutional desires of the
organization.

The military, like any organization, desires

to see its advice accepted and its projects supported.

Many

Years ago Max Weber observed that "technical knowledge ••• of
322

Gordon Tullock, The Politics of Bureaucracy (Washington D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1965), 141.
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itself, is sufficient to ensure it [the bureaucratic organi323
zation] a position of extraordinary power."
Obviously,
if the military split on an issue, they fail to take ad~an
tage of their technical expertise, and thus lose a substantial amount of their capability to influence decisions.
However, if the Chiefs present a unified front on a position,
they maximize their ability to influence the final action.
During the early 1960s the Chiefs found that if they sent
split decisions to Secretary McNamara they enhanced his ability to make exactly the decision he wanted to.

In a sense,

the Secretary had divided and conquered the Joint Chiefs,
enhancing even further the civilian domination of military
policy during that time.

By 1965 the Chiefs realized this

-1-.
. .
f orwar d • 324
an d t :-uey
avo1• d e d sen d.1ng sp 1 1. t d ec1s1ons

What the Chiefs and the Secretary were acknowledging
was the fact that there exists a two-way bargaining relationship between the Joint Chiefs and the administration.

On

the one hand, the administration makes every effort to gain
the Chief's support for the various political or military
323

Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organizations, trans. A.M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1947), 379.
324

Lawrence Korb, The Joint Chiefs of Staff: The First
Indiana UniverSity Press, 1976), 116. See Table 1 for a tabulation of JCS
decisions and splits.

~enty-Five Years, 1947-1972 (Bloomington:
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programs that it sends before Congress.

The support of

the JCS adds credibility to the proposals by virtue of their
acknowledged

"expertise."

Conversely, their opposition.to

a program that lies within their sphere of "expertise" may
be enough to destroy the proposal.

325

On the other hand,

the Chiefs need the administration's support to attain the
programs they desire to have implemented.

Af:;

a result,

there occurs a vertical bargaining relationship between the
administration and the Chiefs as corporate groups, while
simultaneously, horizontal bargaining is occurring among the
services.
There is an old Washington adage that says "where you
sit determines where you stand."

An essential part of this

bargaining is the role a Chief takes on as a "front man."
A front man is "a leader of a constituency, the sponsor of
a policy, and the principal builder of a consensus for it."
325

326

Examples of such trade-offs have existed all through
the history of the Joint Chiefs, unfortunately they are difficult to document. One example which is well known was in
regard to the limited test-ban treaty during the Kennedy administration. Certain guarantees were included in order to
gain the support of the JCS.
See Maxwell Taylor, Swords and
Plowshares (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1972~ 282-288. A
more contemporary example is the exchange between the JCS and
the administration over the Chiefs support of the SALT I
agreements. The Navy received a go-ahead on the Trident submarine missile system, and the JCS supported the administration's position on the SALT limitations. John Newhouse, The
~old Down:
The Story of SALT (New York: Holt, Rinehart and
Winston, 1973), 246.
326H.l
l
sman, The Politics of Policy Making, 35-36.
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A Chief's constituency is his own service, and he naturally
sponsors its policies and strives to build a consensus among
the other Chiefs and the civilian administration for the fulfillment of that policy goal.

A front man is more than

simply an advocate for a specific policy, he is the focal
point of communication between his organization below him
and the administration above him.

He must represent and

defend his organizational imperatives to the administration,
while developing support within his own organization for the
administration's policies.

Most simply stated, a Chief has

two constituencies to represent - the President and the civilian administration on one hand, and his service on the other.
If he fails to represent either one of these two groups adequately, he will lose its support.

Once he has lost the sup-

port of either one, he ceases to be capable of fulfilling
his role and must be replaced.

Let us turn our attention to

an example that might help illustrate this point.
The "Revolt of the Admirals" was a unique event in
the history of American civil-military relations.

Essen-

tially, it was a public proclamation by the naval officer
corps that it had lost confidence in the Chief of Naval
Operations, Admiral Louis Denfeld.

At this point in our

study, we will not concern ourselves with the specific
budgetary and strategic aspects of the episode, but only how
it reflects the bureaucratic nature of the Joint Chiefs and
the roles that v~ious constituencies play in the decision
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making process.
The "Revolt" was a product of the unification conflict.
The central issue was the relationship of strategic airpower
to the future of the Navy.

Airpower advocates maintained

that a strategic nuclear bomber force was the nation's only
reliable deterrent.

The Navy countered this by claiming

that carrier-based air power still had a role to play in
national defense and that technological innovations would
allow it to participate as part of the strategic deterrent.
The key innovation the Navy counted on was the building of
a new generation of flush deck aircraft carriers capable of
launching jet nuclear bombers.

In a period marked by de-

creasing defense budgets, each service identified its programs and strategies with the very survival of its organization.

In the Navy's case, this perception was especially

important.
1948

The issue had been temporarily resolved in March

with~e

signing of the Key West Agreement, which gave

the Navy a limited role in strategic bombing.

327

Unfortu-

nately, the agreement did not "solve the impending problem
of whether the flush-deck carrier should be built or whether
327

The Key West Agreement assigned to the Navy as a
collateral function "to be prepared to participate in the
overall air effort as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff."
For a.discussion of the developments of the Navy's effort
to develop a nuclear capability see Vincent Davis, The Poli~ics of Innovation:
Patterns in Navy Cases, Monograph Series
in World Affairs, Volume 4, Monograph No. 3, 1966-67 (Denver,
University of Denver, 1967), 4-17.
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itS construction required approval of the Joint Chiefs of
Staf f •

"328
By statute, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are an advisory

bodY only, thus making their concurrence or nonconcurrence
superfluous.

In the real world, theory is often different

from practice.

Because of the political nature of the

decision making process, prestige, expertise, and so on,
may become as important as legally sanctioned power.

The

Chiefs' approval of any program that has the vast strategic
and financial consequences of a super-carrier costing approximately one-half billion dollars was a necessity.
At Key West, Secretary Forrestal announced to the
Chiefs that he and the President had decided that the carrier
should be built.

Previously, he had put the Chiefs on notice

that if they could not agree on the carrier issue, "I shall
"329
. .
h ave t o rna k e my own d ec1s1on.
ly what the Secretary did.

Apparently that was exact-

The Chiefs responded "that they

would go along with it [the carrier decision] because it was
328

Paul Y. Hammond, "Super Carriers and the B-36 Bomber,n in American Civil-Military Decisions, ed. by Harold
Stein (Montgomery, Alabama: University of Alabama Press,
1963), 74.
329

James Forrestal, The Forrestal Diaries, ed. by Walter Millis (New York: The Viking Press, 1951), 390.
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the President's program."

330

The Chiefs never really dis-

cussed the matter, but merely accepted it.

General Hoyt

Vandenberg, Air Force Chief of Staff, later said, "[the
•
d •..•11331
] nor was 1• t d 1scusse
carrier] was not agree d [ upon,
After this meeting the Chiefs "positive support" for the
carrier was duly reported to the President.

332

The carrier issue remained settled for about six
weeks until it became inextricably connected to the 1949
defense budget.

Admiral Denfeld claimed, before the House

Appropriations Subcommittee, that the Chiefs had approved
the carrier.

333

Air Force General Carl Spaatz denied this,

forcing the issue to be returned to the JCS for resolution.
By a vote of three to one the carrier was approved for the

second time.

Of particular interest to our study is General

Vandenberg's dissent.
General Vandenberg based his dissent on two points.
330

u.s. Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee No. 4, Heavy Munitions, Hearings on H.R. 6049
to authorize the President, in his discretion, to permit
the stoppage of work on certain combat vessels, 80th Congress, 2nd Session, 1948, 6860.
(Hereaftei cited as
Hearings H.R. 6049.)
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332
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Hammond, "Super Carriers and the B-36 Bomber." 475.
Forrestal, Forrestal Diaries, 393.
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Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations,
!earings on the Navy appropriation bill for 1949, 80th Congress, 2nd Session, 1948, 13.
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The first was that the JCS had never had the opportunity to
fullY evaluate the carrier in terms of its impact on the
"over-all military structure," and how it would "carry out
joint plans."

He then went on to deal with the carrier in

relation to the budget problem.

He maintained that he could

not "at this time approve or disapprove one particular part
of the budget of one of the services without the thorough
consideration of the programs and budget requirements of all
three services."

Clearly, Vandenberg was basing his dissent

on a technicality and avoiding presenting his own views on
the carrier.

The reason for his obfuscation is revealed in

the conclusion of his statement.

"Approval by the Joint

Chiefs, as opposed to acceptance of a decision of higher
authority, connotes military judgment based on thorough con• d era t 1ons.
•
11334

Sl

In Vandenberg's mind, the Chiefs were again

merely rubber stamping an administration directive and
supporting an administration policy.

Ten months later,

though, that policy had changed.
In the spring of 1949, budget problems again brought
the carrier issue to the forefront.

Louis Johnson, the new

Secretary of Defense, in an economy move, wanted to reconSider the carrier decision.
334

On the 15th of April 1949, he

Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, 28 May
1948,
subject: Construction of the CA Carrier, Leahy Papers,
J:folder, "JCS Outgoing Correspondence, May-June 1948," u. s.
~aval Archives, Washington, D.C. (ijereafter referred to
as U.S. Naval Archives.)
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asked the Chiefs, for the third time, to give their opinion
on the carrier.

This time the vote was two to one against
. h on 1 y Adm"1ra 1 Den f e ld d"1ssen t·1ng. 335 Re1n·
the carrier, w1t

forced by this negative response, Johnson cancelled the
carrier eight days later.

Outraged, the Secretary of the

Navy, John L. Sullivan, resigned and was replaced by Francis
P. Matthews,whom the Navy officer corps believed to be a
Johnson man.

The cancellation of the carrier was the spark

that ignited the "Revolt," but it was not the cause.

The

real cause was an increasing belief on the part of naval
officers that Admiral Denfeld was not properly defending the
Navy's interests in the matter.

Unfortunately for Denfeld,

he became identified with Matthews and became guilty,
through association, for the cancellation of the carrier.
With the traditional lines of communication apparently eliminated, the officer corps sought alternative expressions
for their grievances.

The result was an outbreak of bureau-

cratic warfare and public statements against the Air Force's
pet project, the B-36 intercontinental bomber.

Admiral Den-

feld had lost credibility with the officer corps and had thus
lost control of the Navy.

Professor Paul Hammond in his

major study of the carrier controversy clearly noted this
335

copies of the Chiefs' written responses and positions on the carrier vote are found in the Eisenhower Papers,
1916-1952 File, box 56, folder "Joint Chiefs of Staff,"
Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas.
(Hereafter
referred to as Eisenhower Library.)
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loss of credibility:
If the professional leader of the Navy, Louis Denfeld,
the Chief of Naval Operations since December,1947, had
ever enjoyed the full confidence of the Navy partisans,
by September 1949, it had been withdrawn from him. His
role as senior member of the Joint Chiefs in the carrier
cancellation recommendations, and in the decision not
to hold a contest between the B-36 and a Navy fighter,
had been misunderstood within.the Navy. He had remained
silently in office when Sullivan resigned in a blaze of
naval glory. And when in the August hearings the Air
Force related the times he, as a member of the Joint
Chief~
had approved the B-36, the misunderstandings
36
grew.
To this list of incriminations must be added the cuts in the
Navy's 1950 budget and Denfeld's own reappointment as Chief
of Naval Operations.

This last act looked all too much like

a reward for services rendered.
Secretary Matthews' reaction to the Navy's media campaign was to order that all statements critical of the
administration's policies must stay within the chain of command.

In accordance with this directive, Vice Admiral Gerald

Bogan, the commanding officer First Task Fleet, sent a letter
to Matthews which reflected the disenchantment of the officer
corps.
The morale of the Navy is lower today than at any time
since I entered the commissioned ranks in 1916 •.••
In
my opinion, this descent, almost to despondency, stems
from complete confusion as to the future role of the
Navy .••.
Bogan's letter was an explicit indictment of unification and
the National Security Act of 1947.
336

The letter was endorsed

Hammond, "Super Carrier and the B-36 Bomber," 507.
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bY the

Comman~r-in-Chief

Radford, who

~rote,

Pacific Fleet, Admiral Arthur

"Rightly or wrongly., the majority of the

officers in t1e Pacific Fleet concur ••• with the ideas expressed by Admiral Bogan .•.. "
Denfeld himseu.

337

It was further endorsed by Ac".miral

The letter became a political bomb when

on 4 October 1949, it was released to the press despite
.338
Matthews' eff<n'ts to keep it pr1vate.
Matthews, realizing
the potential political dangers persuaded Denfeld to state
that his endorsement was a matter of procedure and should not
be construed as approval.

339

By doing so, Denfeld destroyed

what little credibility he had left with the officer corps.
The release of the Bogan letter had exactly the effect
that naval partisans had hoped for;

it brought about a full

337

see Ibid., 509-511 for a reproduction of Bogan's
letter. Part of Denfeld's endorsement reads as follows:
"I concur in the endorsement of the Chief, Pacific Fleet.
Naval officers have faith in the Navy and a knowledge of the
aggressive role it plays in the defense of the country. They
are convinced that a Navy stripped of its offensive power
means a nation stripped of its offensive power."
338

G. F. Bogan, Oral History Transcript, Naval Institute Oral History Program (1970), 122~127. Bogan maintains
that he had nothing to do with the revolt and that his letter
was merely in response to Secretary Matthews' October 1949
invitation to discuss the morale of the officer corps.
Captain John G. Crommlin (USN) one of the leaders of the
Navy's attacks on the B-36 bomber released the letter on his
own. Bogan was later demoted to Rear Admiral and he finally
retired.
He blames Admiral Forrest Sherman and Secretary
Matthews for the demise of his career.
339

New York 'I'imes, 5 October 1949.
In his public
statement, Admiral Dfmfeld stated that "such an endorsement
does not mean approval." He went on to say that he was endorsing Admiral Radford's endorsement, and not the content
of the Bogan letter.
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scale Congressional inquiry into America's strategic policy.
one by one, the Navy's witnesses marched before the Congressional committee and attacked the Air Forces' programs.
Denfeld was the Navy's last witness and although his statement was moderate in nature, it did corroborate the Navy's
position.

340

Instantly Denfeld's credibility with the

officer corps was reestablished, but he had lost his value
as far as the administration was concerned.

A short time

later, on October 27th, Denfeld was dismissed and replaced
by Admiral Forrest Sherman, an officer who was not identified with the revolt and who was an outspoken advocate of
. f.lCa t.lOll. 341

Ulll

This particular case study reveals some very interesting aspects about the Chiefs' perceived relationships with
each other, their own services, and the administration.
There are two sets of issues which must be examined in order
to fully analyze the "Revolt of the Admirals."

The first of

these revolves around the three JCS votes on the carrier and
why the various Chiefs voted the way they did.

There are

several possible explanations as to the Chiefs' voting
340

u.s. Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services,
Hearings, The National Defense Program, Unification and
Strategy, 8lst Congress, lst Session, 1949.
(Hereafter cited
as Hearings, Unification and Strategy.)
341

.
Sherman had been the Navy's representative during
the writing of the National Security Act and had defended
that legislation during the hearings.
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patterns on the carrier issue.
partisan service politics.

One possible explanation is

By this I mean that the votes

reflected service values and bureaucratic interests.

To

some degree, this was obviously true, but it cannot be used
as a total explanation.

While this may explain Admirals

Denfeld's and Leahy's support for the carrier, it surely
does not explain General Vandenberg's concurrence at Key
west; nor General Bradley's support for the carrier during
the first two votes and then his reversal on the third vote.
It is apparent that any analysis of the voting pattern lies
beyond the simple solution of partisan service politics.
One possible solution to the question of the Joint
Chiefs' voting pattern may be found in the realm of psychogroup dynamics, particularly Irving L. Janis' theory of
groupthink.

Groupthink occurs when individuals are:

deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, when the
members strive for unanimity override their motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses
of action ••. [Groupthink] refers to a deterioration
of mental efficiency, reality, and m~~~l judgment
that results from in-group pressure.
The voting pattern of the Joint Chiefs did not reflect the
usual form of groupthink, which is a product of group
dynamics and peer-group pressures.

Instead, it reflected

a variation of groupthink; which was the product of a set
342

Irving Janis, Victims of Groupthink: A Psycho~ogical Study of Foreign Policy Decisions and Fiascoes
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, Co., 1972), 9.
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of social attitudes inculcated by professionalism and reinforced by a rank conscious system.

This variation resulted

in the Chiefs subordinating themselves to the real or the
perceived desires of their superiors.

Admiral Denfeld

acknowledged that this was the prime motivation at Key West
when he said "that they [the Chiefs] would go along with
it [the carrier] because it was the President's program."

343

vandenberg, at the conclusion to his May 1948 dissent,
implied that this was the reason for Bradley's support in
the second vote.

Bradley's own explanation for his reversal

in the third vote refers precisely to this type of subordination.
This apparent agreement by me at that time [the second
vote] was based upon my understanding that it had been
approved by those in authority and I accepted it as a
fact accomplished. Therefore, I was merely noting, in
effect, a ~4~ision that had already been made by higher
authority.
Bradley's subordination was so total that he even rejected
the previous two votes as "a formal decision" by the Joint
Chiefs.

This despite the fact that the May 1948 memorandum

to Secretary Forrestal specifically stated that the Joint
Chiefs had considered the following question, "Do the Joint
Chiefs of Staff approve the construction of the so-called

343
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Congress, House Hearings, H.R. 6049, 6860.
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u.s.
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Strategy, 567.

224

c.

A. carrier?" 345

To this question Leahy, Denfeld and

Bradley "answered in the affirmative."

Apparently, Bradley

not only subordinated himself to Forresta1, but did so to
Johnson as well; thus creating the semantical distinction
of "a formal decision."

It should be pointed out here that

the type of groupthink exhibited during the carrier votes
was not a totally unique situation.

Janis notes that a

similar type of groupthink was demonstrated during the Bay
of Pigs fiasco, and was inextricably connected to America's
.
346
Vietnam po 1 1cy.
In the final analysis the voting pattern on the carrier issue reflected a combination of partisan service
politics and a professionalized groupthink.

The Key West

vote was a clear example of subordination to administration
policy on the part of all members of the JCS.

In General

Bradley's case, this subordination appears to have carried
on into the second vote, in May 1948.

On the other hand,

Denfeld and Vandenberg manifested service interest during
the second vote, and most openly, during the crucial third
vote.

Denfeld's defense of the carrier was based on its
345

Memorandum to the Secretary of Defense, 28 May
1948, subject: Construction of the CA Carrier, Leahy Papers,
folder "JCS Outgoing Correspondence, May-June, 1948," U.S.
Naval Archives.
346J an1s,
.
Groupthink, Chapters 2 and 5.
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abilitY to support the Navy's strategic role as well as its
traditional roles of sea control and anti-submarine warfare.

347

Rather expectedly, Vandenberg based his attack

upon the carrier's potential military value.

He pointed out

that the super-carrier was not the optimal system for antisubmarine warfare and its strategic value against a land
locked power like Russia was questionable at best:
The relative military value of the large carrier, when
compared to other weapons systems procurable with the
same resources, is of a low order. This carrier is
designed for bombardment purposes. The resources required to make it an operational weapon would produce
in land-based aviation capabilities considerably greater
than the capability of the carrier. When it is considered that the carrier inherently exposes its bombing
capability to attack by three entirely separate weapons
systems--the submarine fleet, the surface fleet, and air
forces--whereas land-based bombers are exposed to only
one of these, an even greater disparity between the
relative worth of these two systems is apparent. The
carrier not only exposes itself to multiple forms of
attack, but also exposes to the same dangers its attendant complex of protective vessels. Even when behind
this costly protective screen, I believe the carrier is
today a vulnerable weapon.348
A cost effective analysis like this was definitely designed
to appeal to Secretary Johnson's cost consciousness.
It is General Bradley's reversal of opinion in the
third and final vote that is most illustrative of the
347
Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense from Admiral
Denfeld, 22 April 1949, subject: The; USS United States,
Eisenhower Papers, 1916-1952 File, box 56, folder, "Joint
Chiefs of Staff," Eisenhower Ljbrary.
348

Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense from General
Vandenberg, 23 April 1949, subject: The CVA-58 Project,
Eisenhower Papers, 1916-1952 File, box 56, folder, "Joint
Chiefs of Staff," Eisenhower Library.
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pressures that are on the Chiefs.

It is doubtful that he

was manifesting a specific service position in April of 1949.
As an institution, the Army was merely a spectator in the
debate over strategic delivery systems, since they had none
of their own; although it is true that Bradley realized the
finite nature of the budget pie and that any increase in
expenditures for one service meant a proportional decrease
for the other.

Also Bradley's own war experience in Europe

would have tended to minimize the role of naval airpower.
Since Bradley had admitted subordinating his professional
opinion on the earlier carrier vote, it may be assumed that
Bradley did it again.

This would be true providing Bradl_ey

actually favored the carrier.

It appears though, that

Bradley's true opinion tended to support Vandenberg's position.

In a 14 September 1948 memorandum to the Secretary of

Defense, Bradley assailed a Navy proposal to build three
additional super-carriers as part of a mobilization strategy.
His rejection of the Navy proposal was based on three points.
The first was that the carriers would not be completed in time
to ·have any impact on the war effort.

Secondly, he ques-

tioned the strategic value of the carriers.

He argued that

"the Naval threat of the USSR would be diminished or a relatively minor threat at that time:"
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The CVX's [the super-carrier] cannot be justified
exclusively on the Navy's primary roles and missions and the assignment of such a large proportion
of our industrial effort toward the accomplishment.
of a collateral mission is not acceptable.
Finally, in place of the airpower supplied by the carrier,
General Bradley foresaw the Air Force being fully deployed.
It is true that the General did recommend the continuation
of the experimental super-carrier itself, but then one must
. o ff.1ce. 349
remember t h at S ecretary F orres t a 1 was s t 1.ll 1n
Since Bradley had subordinated himself on two earlier votes,
there is no reason to believe that he would oppose the
carrier at this time.

Once Johnson had replaced Forrestal,

the pressures for subordination apparently shifted.

If we

assume that Bradley was not overly infatuated with the carrier originally, then Johnson merely allowed him to voice
his own feelings.

In his 22 April 1949 memorandum to the

Secretary of Defense, in which Bradley outlined his reasons
for recommending rejection of the carrier, he repeated much
of the same ground covered in his 14 September 1948 memorandum.

The super-carrier was simply not cost efficient to

accomplish the Navy's primary missions, and the collateral
mission of strategic bombardment was covered by the Air
Force "which already has adequate means and capabilities

349
Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, 14 September 1948, subject: Completion of Joint War Plan as basis for
Short Range Mobilization Planning, Leahy Papers, folder,
"JCS, Outgoing September 48," U.S. Naval Archives.
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to perform this function."
carrier

air~wer

While Bradley did admit that

had a role; the land-locked nature of the

Soviet Union and its lack of a navy coupled with the limited
range of carrHr aircraft, minimized that role.

In the final

analysis, the super-carrier's cost simply outweighed its
benefits.

350

Our analysis of the Chiefs' voting pattern leads us
to the second major issue to be discussed, that of the Chiefs'
relationship to their services and the administration.

As

discussed earlier, the Chiefs attempted to play the role of
a "front man."

The "Revolt" occurred when Denfeld's service

constituency, the officer corps, perceived that he was failing to represent them properly to the administration.

Under

such circumstances they, the officer corps, proceeded to
develop alternative means of expressing their grievances.
It was not until Denfeld had visibly manifested support for
the officer corps that his credibility returned along with
his ability to control the officer corps.

Unfortunately

for Denfeld, the situation had reached a stage where any
support for the officer corps was viewed as opposition to
the administration and this meant the loss of that vital
constituency.
350

Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense from
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the Super Carrier U.S.S. United States, Eisenhower Papers,
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It is very difficult to determine the exact point
oenfeld lost the support of Secretary Matthews.

Apparently,

the release of the Bogan letter was the beginning of the
parting of the ways.

On 14 September 1949, Denfeld went

to Matthews to thank him for his reappointment to another
two year term as Chief of Naval Operations.

Matthews was

reported to have responded that "there's nothing I have done
since I have been Secretary that has given me more pleasure
than gettingyou reappointed."

351

Three weeks later, after

the release of the Bogan letter, Matthews told Denfeld that
he was sorry that his endorsement had been put on the letter
and that this might impair his value as Chief of Naval
Operations; but according to Denfeld, Secretary Matthews
immediately added, "I've had worse situations than this confront me, but I'm sure if we work together we can overcome
this one."

352

Matthews' own comment on the meeting does

not include such a conciliatory statement.

353

The confusion over the exact contents of the meeting
may exist because Denfeld felt that he had done nothing to
cause the loss of the Secretary's support.

It appears though

351

Louis Denfeld, "Why I was Fired," Collier's, Vol.
125, No. 11 (18 March 1950), 15.
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Ibid; this meeting took place 4 October 1949.

New York Times, 28 October 1949. Matthews released
a letter in which he said that he told Denfeld that he feared
his usefullness had finished.
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that the administration had decided before Denfeld's testimony

that his value had ended.

According to Admiral Richard

L. Conolly, he was offered the office of Chief of Naval Operations in return for a pro-administration testimony.

Conolly

reported that his pro-Navy stand during the hearings destroyed
his chances for CNO and that Johnson "hit the roof" when he
beard what Conolly had said.

The Admiral went on to note

that Johnson supposedly turned to Steve Early, the Deputy
Secretary of Defense, and said, "There goes your candidate .."

354

Whether or not the administration had decided to replace Denfeld before his testimony became unimportant once he had sided
with the rest of the officer corps.

355

The ''Revolt of the Admirals," demonstrates some crucial
aspects about the interaction of the Joint Chiefs with their
two constituencies, their service and the administration.

To

be an effective "front man," a chief must somehow balance the
demands of these two groups.

Admiral Denfeld found out that

354

Richard L. Conolly, Oral History Transcript, Columbia University Oral History Program, (1960), 397.
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The day after Denfeld testified before the Congress
he met with Matthews and they discussed why the Admiral had
not cleared the testimony with his service secretary. Denfeld said that he didn't think it mattered because he had to
do what he thought was right. Admiral Denfeld reported
that "he had been submitting to the pressure to which he had
been subjected as Chief of Naval Operations and a member of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and that he felt that he could not
Pursue that course any longer; that he had to speak out in
justice to himself and the position that he was taking."
Memorandum of Record of conversations with Denfeld, 14 October 1949, Presidential Secretary File, box 58, folder, "Cabinet-Navy Secretary: Misc.," Truman Library.
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the loss of the support of either one reduced, if not eliminated, his ability to perform this function.

It was also

rather clear that the administration was the more important
of these two constituencies.

Denfeld lost his job only after

he had lost the support of the administration.

The Chiefs

as a group acknowledged the supremacy of the administration
by subordinating their professional opinion to the administration's desires during the three carrier votes.

Even

vandenberg's opposition to the carrier during the second vote
was carefully structured along procedural grounds.

By doing

so, he was able to tread the narrow line between the administration and his service.

In this regard Vandenberg was

far luckier than Denfeld.

The mere act of the Chiefs sub-

ordinating themselves to the civilian leadership raises
questions about their responsibility to the society.

Does

their responsibility lie with their service, which they have
served for thirty or more years; with the administration,
that appointed them; or the society at large, which they
have taken an oath to defend.

In Matthews' letter to the

President, asking for the removal of Denfeld, he emphasized
the importance of loyalty as the important link between a
service secretary and a chief:
A military establishment is not a political democracy.
Integrity of command is indispensable at all times.
There can be no twilight zone in the measure of loyalty
to superiors and respect for authority existing between
various official ranks.
Inability to conform to such
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requirements for military stability would disqualify
any of us for positions subordinate to the Commander
in Chief. 35 b
In the final analysis, the Chiefs apparently understood that
they must give their loyalty to the administration in order
to function in any manner.
The civilian leadership of both administrations were
correct in linking the organizational structure of the Joint
Chiefs to their dysfunctional bureaucratic behavior.

In

essence the various reorganizations were designed to achieve
two goals, eliminate inter-service conflicts and upgrade
the Chief's advisory product.

Both of these problems were

partially the result of the bureaucratic and political manner in which JCS staff papers were written.

Career pressures

tended to force action officers to either defend service
interests or achieve artificial consensus through such means
as paperclipping and waffling.

It was through the process

of consensus building that the bureaucracy flowed smoothly,
and the services tried to avoid open confrontation.

Eisen-

hower was correct in noting that the pre-1958 committee
nature of the Joint Staff allowed the services too much
influence and that this guaranteed the continuation of dysfunctional bureaucratic behavior within the Staff.

What he

failed to address in his 1958 reorganization was that at
356 New York Times, 28 October 1949.
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some point in the future, the Joint Staff action officer
still had to return to his service and that this allowed the
services to continue to influence decisions.
For the Chiefs themselves, the motivations to defend
service interest and achieve artificial consensus are just
as strong as they are for the staff officer, but for different
reasons.

At that point in his career a chief is at the pin-

nacle of his profession, but being there generates different
types of pressures on him.

For one thing after spending

over thirty years in his service it is only natural that he
believes that its mission is essential to the defense of the
nation.

But simple service loyalty does not completely ex-

plain the bureaucratic nature of the Joint Chiefs.

The real

problem for the Chiefs is that they are caught between their
twin constituencies, their services and the administration,
as they attempt to negotiate the complex role of being a
front man.

Denfeld discovered the fate of a chief who loses

the support of either group.

In this regard the "Revolt of

the Admirals" undermines any notion that the military services are a homogenious authoritarian hierarchy.

While the

Navy's bureaucratic revolution was unique by virtue of its
size and impact, it was by no means a unique phenomenon.
General Maxwell Taylor had his "Revolt of the Colonels" during
the late 1950s, when certain army officers perceived that the
Prevailing strategic doctrine was going to destroy the
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Army.

357

Although such upheavals are rare, the fear of them

prompts some chiefs to initiate preventive action.

The

selection several years ago of General John Vessey as the
Vice Chief of Staff U.S. Army, has led some insiders to suggest that it was motivated by a desire on the part of new
Chief of Staff nominee, General Edward "Shy" Meyer, to defuse
internal unrest within the service over his selection and the
rejection of Vessey.

358

In reconsidering the reorganization efforts conducted
during the period of our study, it is apparent that the criticisms levied against the Chiefs were only half right.

Clearly,

there were systemic problems that led to inter-service conflict and the dilution of the JCS product, but these two
flaws were caused as much by external bureaucratic factors
as internai ones.

It was true that the Chiefs engaged in ex-

tensive horizontal bargaining in order to protect service
values and achieve the consensus that a bureaucracy demands,
but both presidential administrations either consciously
or unconsciously ignored the vertical relationships and
pressures that helped magnify these flaws.

The Chiefs'

role as a front man necessitated such vertical bargaining,
but it also resulted in tremendous pressures from above,
especially as centralization increased.

357

Quite openly, both

Interview with General Maxwell Taylor, January
1975, Washington, D.C.

358I n t erv1ew.
.
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administrations opted for centralization in order to create
more consensus, but such consensus would be just as artifical,
and thus just as dysfunctional, as the consensus brought
about by internal staff pressures.

The Chiefs had to defend

service interests in order to keep their own bureaucracies
in check, and the best means to accomplish this was a unified
position that hurt no ones vital interests.

Consensus also

gave the Chiefs bargaining power vis-a-vis the administration which demanded conformity to its views, and was capable
of imposing them through centralized defense management.
This combination of pressures put the Chiefs in an untenable
position.
One subject that never seemed to be addressed was the
nature of the Chiefs' responsibility.

Were they responsible

to their service, the administration, or the nation.
three were not necessarily synonymous.

These

In order to fully

answer that question we must examine it from two perspectives:

the administration's perception of what the role of

the JCS ought to be, and what the Chiefs thought their own
role was.

Once we have determined this we will then be in

a better position to assess the true role of the Chiefs.

CHAPTER VI
THE CIVILIAN'S PERCEIVED ROLE
OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
one of the most important lessons to be derived from
_ the "Revolt of the Admirals," was that the Chiefs had to be
concerned with the desires of their civilian superiors.
This is especially important because, by its nature, the role
of an advisor is vague and relatively unstructured.

This

allows a great deal of flexibility on the part of both the
Chiefs and the political leadership to determine exactly what
role the Joint Chiefs would fulfill.

Because of this flexi-

bility the perceptions of both the civilian leadership and
the Chiefs themselves form the boundaries within which the
Chiefs' ultimate role is decided upon.

Thus in order to

fully understand what role the Chiefs have assumed in policy
formulation it must first be determined what role the civilian
leadership allocated to the Chiefs and desired that they
fulfill.
The role that the Truman administration envisioned for the
Joint Chiefs of Staff was by no means clearly determined at
the time of the passage of the 1947 legislation.

The adminis-

tration's position, like the legislation itself, evolved as
the human and systemic problems inherent within the structure
surfaced.

Secretary Forrestal's reversal on the powers
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of his office reflected such an evolution.

Despite this

evolutionary process, most of the changes revolved around
one basic assumption, that the members of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff were the administration's professional military
advisors.

As such, the institution of the Joint Chiefs of

staff became the reservoir for the military expertise of
the nation.

This represented more than a mere statutory

function; it represented a philosophical conception of
professionalism that ultimately molded the civilian's notion
of what role the JCS should play.
This assumption was derived from several possible
sources.

The first was the President's own lack of military

expertise, but that was a traditional handicap for the
civilian leadership.

The second was the President's own

good working relationship with the Joint Chiefs, which
resulted from his personal high regard for some of its members.

The last, and probably the most important, was the

President's philosophical concurrence with the traditional
compartmentalization of political and military action.

While

Truman did have an understanding of the interrelationship
between war and peace, it tended to be tied to the traditional
ideas of civilian control and the automatonical relationship
between the American military and the civilian policy maker.
This traditional relationship was reaffirmed when the President stated "the policy of the government determines the
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poliCY of the military.
359
to the government."

The military is always subordinate

On the surface, the President clearly supported traditional civilian control of the military, but analyzing it
further, we realize that it also reinforced traditional
American military "radical" professionalism.

Central to this

professional ethic was the belief that once the policy had
been determined by the civilian leadership, it would be up
to the military experts to achieve the appropriate results.
Conversely, this rptonian image of professionalism demanded
that the non-professional (the civilian) exit the scene after
the political decision was made, in order to give full reign
to the expert.

More than once during the Korean War, Presi-

dent Truman articulated his support for such a functional
division of labor.

In the fall of 1950 he stated that "I

am not a desk strategist and don't pretend to be one.
leave that to the military men." 360

I

The following year in

responding to a question on the war effort he stated; "that
is a military matter and the President of the United States
has never interfered with military maneuver in the field and
he doesn't expect to interfere in it now." 361

York:

Such an outlook

359 Harry S. Truman, Memoirs of Harry S. Truman (New
Doubleday & Co., 1956), I, 210.

360 u.s. President, Public Papers of the Presidents of
!!!_e United States (Washington D.C.: Office of the Federal
~egister, National Archives and Records Service, 1965), Harry
S. Truman, 1950, 622.
361

Truman, Public Papers, 1951, 154.
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maY well explain his tolerance of General MacArthur's trans362
gressions during the early stages of the Korean War.
The division of labor outlined above denotes support
for traditional American military professionalism, which was
based on the notion of military expertise and the mutually
shared assumption, by both civilian and military alike, of
the limits of each other's competency.

Since fusionism was

the antithesis of traditional American political/military
bifurcation, the military professional should not and could
not be relied upon to incorporate non-military factors into
his cognitive processes, just as the civilians were not expected to deal with technical military issues.

For the

military to do otherwise would undermine civilian control
while violating their own professional ethic.
From the very beginning, this approach was understood
by the first two Secretaries of Defense, James Forrestal and
Louis Johnson, both of whom perceived themselves primarily
as administrators, attempting to implement strategic decisions
that had already been made in the White House.

363

It may be

suggested that the more the civilian leader perceives himself
as an administrator, the more he feels comfortable with the
362
Truman, Memoirs, II, 377-78.

363

PaulY. Hammond, Organizing for Defense: The American Military Establishment in the Twentieth Century (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1961), 234.
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traditional division of labor due to his own lack of expertise in military matters.

While this hypothesis may appear

valid, we will note shortly that President Eisenhower, a
man of tremendous military knowledge, also opted for the
traditional bifurcation of functions.

Secretary Forrestal,

unlike his successor, had enough experience to realize that
the only possible way to effectively integrate policy was in
some measure to violate this professional ethic.

Unfor-

tunately, he failed totally in his efforts to force the Chiefs
364
to incorporate economic and political factors.
This
effort appears to have been a unilateral attempt on his part
and did not signify any major change in the administration's
attitude.

More typical of the administration's true view

was the comment made by former Secretary of the Air Force,
Stewart Symington, who recalled that during the National
Security Council meetings he attended, he never heard "any
member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or any other military
figure make any voluntary contributions to discussion in the
Council."

Mr. Symington went on to say that "they [the mem-

bers of the JCS] were there to answer questions with respect
364

see my discussion of the FY 50 budget in chapter
VIII, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and Policy Integration.
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to matters that b:a:d to do primarily with the military."

365

From Mr. Symington's comments it is apparent that the Truman
administration approached political/military policy making
in a very traditional manner.
Forrestal's successor, Louis Johnson, was far more
of a manager than the first Secretary of Defense, and tended
to support strict constructionalism to a greater degree.
He became so preoccupied with his managerial function that he
ignored substantive issues and considered political/military
366
coordination outside his purview.
As Professor Lawrence
Korb noted, Johnson "saw himself as the President's representative to the Department of Defense enforcing the administration's will on an avaricious military."

367

Such a narrow

managerial approach led him to totally compartmentalize the
"political" from the "military" and ultimately led him to

365

U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services,
Hearings on Nomination of Arthur William Radford as Chairman·
of Joint Chiefs of Staff, Matthew Bunker Rid~vay as Chief of
Staff, Army, Robert Bostwick Carney as Chief of Naval Operations and Nathan J. Arragut Twining as Chief of Staff, Air
Force, 83d Congress, 1st Session, 1953, 22.
(Hereafter
referred to as Hearings, Nominations 1953).
366

Hammond, Organizing for Defense, 244-47. WE·.l ter
Millis with Harry Mansfield and Harold Stein, Arms and the
State: Civil-Military Elements in National Po~1~i-c-y~(~N~e-w~Y~ork:
The Twentieth Century Fund, 1958), 234-6.
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direct that all

~ontact

with the State Department should be

carried on eL;"elusively through his office.

This acted as a

deterrent to ooordination and totally separated the two
departments,

368

forcing the Chiefs to develop their own

.
369
assump t 10ns.
On the other hand, the civilians did not really believe that the Chiefs were capable of incorporating nonmilitary factors in such a way as to supply the civilians
with usable input.

Apparently belying this assumption,

Secretary of State Dean Acheson recalled that during the
Korean War there was a close working relationship between
the JCS> the Department of Defense, and the Department of
State.

To support this he pointed out that he and General

Bradley made an agreemEm t to exclude the phrases "from a
military point of view" and from a "political point of view"
from their discussions.

He went on to note that each agreed

that they had their own tactical and strategic problems,
but that they "were interconnected, not separate."

370

368 M"ll"
1 1s, Arms and the State, 234; also see Dean
Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State
Department (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1969), 373,
for a discussion of how this bifurcation effected the
development of NSC/68.
369
370

Hammond, Organizing for Defense, 244-47.
Acheson, Present at the Creation, 441

243

superficially, it would appear that Forrestal's goal of
policy integration had been achieved, but on further
nation such a conclusion becomes suspect.

exa~i

Acheson clearly

attributes the good working relationship between the State
Department and the JCS to the presence of George C. Marshall,
the Secretary of Defense.

Furthermore, in his memoirs,

Acheson criticized the Joint Chiefs for maintaining its committee structure and pointed out that because the Chiefs
were "burdened by both staff and command duties," it was
"extremely difficult for civilian
affairs to work with them".

officers engaged in foreign

He went on to say that:

All too often it [the JCS] produces for those looking
for military advice and guidance only oracular utterances.
Since it is a committee and its views are the
results of votes on formal papers prepared for it, it
quite literally is like my favorite old lady who could
not say what she thought until she heard what she said.
Even on the tentative basis, it is hard for high officials to get military advice in our government. When
he does get it, it is apt to be unresponsive to the
problems bothering the civilian official.37I
While it is true that much of the criticism directed at the
JCS was based on its cumbersome organization, and the insertion of a Chairman went a long way toward solving that problem; Acheson was actually addressing the impediments of

371

Ibid., 243 (underline added).
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professionalism.

Since professional values fostered compart-

mentalization, it is doubtful that the mere elimination of
odious and constrictive terminology would suddenly liberate
the Chiefs and allow them to articulate non-military perceptions.
Such a strict-constructionalist approach actually
enhanced the perception that the Chiefs were experts within
their narrow professional arena.

Since they were the Pre-

sident's professional military advisors, he desired to have
free communication with them and sought their honest and
open advice on military matters.

This was precisely the

goal that Clifford had in mind when he recommended, in
December 1946, that a pluralistic JCS be created.
it was only through open and

Similarly,

frank discussion that the

National Security advisory system could work.

This did not

mean, however, that the President was willing to abdicate
any

of his prerogatives.

that

11

In his memoirs, Truman recalled

I used the council INSC] only as a place for recommen-

dations to be worked out.

The policy has to come down from

the President, as all final decisions have to be made by
372
him. 11
The President also understood that these recommendations needed to grow out of an unconstrained environment; thus he absented himself frequently from the NSC's
372

Truman, Memoirs, II, 59.
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meetings, in order not to prejudice its advice.
openness

373

Such

though, demanded some form of institutional linkage

between the President and his advisors, or chaos could
result.

Admiral Leahy had performed such a function for

Roosevelt, and Truman continued to use him in the same manner until the Admiral's retirement in 1949.

General Eisen-

bower was brought in to temporarily fill the void, but
expediency gave way to institutionalization with the appointment of General Bradley to the chairmanship in 1949.

During

his tenure as Chairman, Bradley scrupulously avoided imposing his
views on the other Chiefs, and attempted to present their
opinions faithfully to the President.

During the Korean War,

Bradley attempted, as Leahy had done in the last war, to
act as the bridge between the White House and the JCS.

The

General's White House briefings and frequent conversations
with the Fresident "kept the JCS constantly informed of what
was in the mind of the President." 374
Unfortunately, the same inter-service competition that
led to the institutionalization of the chairmanship, eroded
373
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dministration's confidence in its military experts, and
the a
with it the commitment to pluralistic decision making. AF:
the military experts exhibited an increasing amount of ser~ice

parochialism, the civilian managers became hard pressed

to choose between expert testimony.

In this regard Admiral

Charles D. Griffin, former special assistant to Admiral
Radford observed:
I always felt that the Secretary of Defense always had
enough power to do darn near anything he wanted to do.
It was a question of not having the knowledge to make a
determination between contradictory recommendations that
were coming up from the various services. 3 75
These differences of opinion increased the administration's
difficulty in dealing with congressional opposition to particular segments of the defense program.

Dissent within the

JCS became even more counter-productive when the experts
were needed to rationalize these programs before the Congress.
Since the civilian leadership could not receive unified
military advice, even on matters that were "purely military
in nature," they began to make decisions based on non-military
factors, such as the economy.

Where dissent did exist a

skillful civilian administrator could use it to· his advantage,
as Secretary Johnson did, when he scrapped the super-carrier
United States.

375

Charles D. Griffin, Oral History Transcript, U.S.
Naval Institute, Oral History Program (1973), 395.
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Ultimately, these inter-service conflicts lead the
administration to believe that a greater degree of unanimity
was required, not just to facilitate internal policy formulation, but also to optimize external policy implementation.
Even before the passage of the National Security Act, President Truman began to realize the impact disunity could have
and warned the Chiefs:
... when the President of the United States, the Commanderin-Chief of the Army and the Navy, sets out a policy, that
policy should be supported by the Army and the War Department and the Navy Department.376
Unanimity would relieve the administration of the difficult
task of selecting among expert witnesses and would mend the
walls against the administration's opponents.

Inherent within

this solution, though, is a dilemma that the civilian leadership has yet to solve.

The imposition of unanimity on the

Chiefs destroys open and honest military advice; yet the lack
of it destroys unification.
Experience showed the Truman administration that a
decision at the executive level did not necessarily end thE:
debate, but at times even exacerbated it, thus making unanimity even more desirable.

Slowly and incrementally disunity

among the Chiefs became synonymous with opposition to the
administration's policy.

Initially, the presence of a Chair-

man and specifically General Bradley's promotion to five star
37

~ruman,

Public Papers, 1946, 194-5.
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rank held out the hope that the dilemma could be solved
through internal controls.

This would result in what Presi-

dent Truman called "Objective Agreements--a true meeting. of
. d

professiona 1 m1n s.

"377

Such internal controls would not

mitigate the Chiefs' advisory function, for they would still
be free to debate openly and honestly the pressing issues of
the day.

What was "objective," though, would probably be

determined by the administration.

By 1949, the administra-

tion had come to the conclusion that persuasion was an ineffective means of dealing with the problem, thus the decision
to opt for the implementation of Forrestal's "Shadow Concept"
of concentrating power via the amendments to the National
Security Act.
The civilian leadership made no secret of the fact that
it expected the Chiefs to be loyal members of the administratio~s

gress.

team,

especiall~

in regard to their relatiQns with _Con-

Secretary Forrestal informed them that if they could

not support the President's program they could resign.

378

Truman himself informed the Chiefs in May of 1948 that he
expected them to support his program "in good spirit and
without mental reservations."

He emphasized that the time

377

"Suggested Agenda," Personal Secretary's File, box
91, Daily Sheets, Feb. 1-15, 1949, Harry s. Truman Library,
Independence, Missouri.
(Hereafter referred to as Truman
Library. )
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James Forrestal, The Forrestal Diaries, ed. by
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for debate ceased once a program became official and that he
expected "every member of the administration to support it
379
fully, both in public and in private."
Despite this
directive, less than a year later, in February 1949, the
President had to remind the JCS that "complete, undivided
loyalty to all such decisions will be demanded at all times
and at all places."

380

The fate of Admiral Denfeld was a

clear example of the requirement for loyalty.

In the final

analysis these controls would only be as effective as the men
who would implement them.

It was with this in mind that

James Forrestal "liked to insist that he was not as much
interested in the diagram of an organization as he was in
381
the names in the little boxes."
It was for this reason that the dual problem of lack
of unanimity and public debate on national security issues
became inextricably connected to the JCS appointment process.
While in theory the President as

CoF.~ander

in Chief can

appoint anyone he wishes, reality limits his options.

The

Chiefs themselves are chosen from a small pool of available
flag officers.

Lawrence Korb notes in his study of the JCS,

the President's "choice is usually limited to a few top men
379

Ibid. , 437.

380
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Richard BPtts, Soldiers Statesman and Cold War
£.!:.ises (Cambridge, Massachusetts, B::arvard University- Press,
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in each branch of the Armed Forces, whose promotion into
this elite is rigidly controlled by the individual service.

,382

True, the President can reach down into the ranks

of more junior flag rank officers for a Chief, but he will

383
have to do so over the protests of the service bureaucracy.
Furthermore, the President must remain cognizant of the fact
that the Chief maintains a "front man" relationship between
the administration that appoints him and the service he
represents.

Denfeld discovered that the loss of the latter's

support may make it impossible for him to carry on his job.
Reaching too far down into the ranks may well result in such
a degree of animosity being directed against a Chief that
384
it would be counter-productive to appoint him.
While tbese factors tend to limit the President's
choice of potential appointees to the Joint Chiefs, his
appointment ability could potentially solve the dual problem
presented above.
082

If the balance between the Chiefs' two

·---

Korb, The Joint Chiefs of Staff, 31.
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The promotion of General Harold Johnson and Admiral
Elmo Zumwalt over many senior officers reflected the administration's desire to accomplish specific things. MacNamara
wanted an Army Chief of Staff who was attuned to the systems
analysis that he advocated; while Zumwalt was brought in to
deal with many of the social problems that the Navy was confronting.
See Korb, The Joint Chiefs of Staff, 44, 64.

384

An example of such a promotion was Major General
Alexander Haig's promotion by President Nixon over 250 other
Ge~rals to Vice Chief of Staff of the Army. It resulted in
a great deal of animosity toward him and those associated
With him.
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constituencies was sufficiently disrupted so that the preponderance of loyalty resided toward the administration then
unanimity of opinion and loyalty would be achieved.

Granted

the cost would be the destruction of Clifford's pluralistic
JCS, but such pluralism was increasingly perceived as being
dysfunctional anyway.

At what point the administration

realized the advantages of using the selection process to
its full advantage is unknown, but an examination of the
process may give us some insights.
The membership of the Joint Chiefs during the Truman
administration goes through two distinct phases with the
"Revolt of the Ar'.mirals' acting as a convenient watershed.
Up until 1949 the selection tended to conform to Richard
Betts' model of a "Routine-Professional" appointment.

385

By this Betts' means that the officer selected was considered
to have the highest professional stature within his service,
or a least was one of a select group of competitors.

Compat-

ibility with the administrations' policies appears to have
been of little or no concern, although personality compatibility was still an important criteron.

Almost immediately upon

the conclusion of the Second World War, Marshall, King, and
Arnold retired to be succeeded by the major theater commander
from each service, General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower,
385

Betts, Cold War Crises, 53ff.
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Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz

386

and General Carl Spaatz.

Each had immense public prestige and was clearly perceived
as the expert in his respective field.

With the passage of

the National Security Act in 1947 this group turned over
command to officers who, while well qualified, lacked the
_ personal prestige of their predecessors.

The one exception

to this was Chief of Staff of the Army, General Omar Bradley.
The new Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Louis Denfeld,
had spent the majority of the war in personnel management,
although after the conflict he was posted to the prestigious
billet of Commander in Chief Pacific (CINCPAC), a position
that Admiral Nimitz previously held.
Staff, General Hoyt Vandenberg,

h~d

The Air Force Chief of
been primarily a tactical

commander during the war (commanding the IX Tactical Air Force)
and afterwards was named the first head of the Central Intelligence Agency.

In June of 1947, Vandenberg was named Vice

Chief of Staff and thus began a tradition that the Air Force
maintained for over two decades-appointing a future Chief of
Staff first to the position of Vice Chief.

Later, when

Bradley was appointed Chairman, his Vice Chief, General

3-8

E. B. Potter, Nimitz (Annopolis:
Naval Institute
Press:
1976), 401. Potter in a footnote discusses Forrestal's
opposition to Nimitz.
Forrestal had a difficult time dealing
With the strong willed King and he did not want to continue
t~e difficulties with a strong willed Nimitz.
King forced
h1s hand and went to the President with the recommendation
!ha~ Nimitz succeed him. It is possible that Forrestal wanted
CNdm1ral Marc Mitscher, who supposedly declined the offer of
0.
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J. Lawton Collins, was named his successor.

Collins also had

been a major tactical commander during the war (commanding
the VII Corps in F.urope).

In each case the Chief designee

had served his apprenticeship and was among the logical
choices for selection.
It is within this framework that the firing of Admiral
Louis Denfeld becomes important.

As discussed earlier, the

administration hoped that internal controls and organizational
reform would mitigate the worst aspects of inter-service conflict.

When Denfeld became too great a political liability

he was removed from office and replaced by Vice Admiral Forrest Sherman.

On the surface, Sherman's appointment seems

to follow Bf:tts' routine professional model.

During the war

Sherman had been Nimitz's Chief of Staff and afterwards he
had held important fleet commands.

He was universally admired

within the service, specifically recommended by Nimitz, and
despite his apparent junior three star rank was still the 11th
ranking officer in the Navy.

But behind Sherman's obvious

military qualifications there were other credentials that
were of equal, if not greater, importance.

Admiral Sherman

was acknowledged as a pro-unification officer, who had helped
write the 1947 legislation.

He thus was politically attuned

to the desires of the administration.
this when he recommended Sherman.

Nimitz acknowledged

After narrowing the field

to Sherman and Adroiral Richard Connolly, Nimitz told the
President "Sherman is younger and even less involved in
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politics.

,387

Furthermore, since Sherman was probably the

Navy's foremost aviator, his selection would heal some. of
the wounds caused by the cancellation of the United States.
1 think it can safely be asserted that these non-professional

qualifications guaranteed his appointment over other qualified naval officers such as Admirals Connolly or Blandy •.
It would appear that the administration decided to
reinforce the notion of loyalty that had been explicitly
articulated and implicitly contained within the 1949 amendments to the National Security Act.

While Truman had pre-

viously appointed officers on a routine professional basis,
the appointment of Sherman may easily be interpreted as a
step toward the politicization of the Chiefs, or to borrow
Betts' label, a "professional-political" appointment.
is not politicization in the most crass terms.

This

Instead it

is the selection of an officer based upon professional
qualifications,but with an appreciation to the political
potential of the individual, especially in regard to the
notion of loyalty to the administration's policies.
It was not accidental that upon the death of Admiral
Sherman in 1951, his successor was the Commander-in-Chief
387
.
448 • S h erman originally was against
Potter, Nim1tz,
Unification and argued, as did Leahy and other Navy officers
that unification already existed in the form of the President
as Commander-in-Chief. Unfortunately, we cannot document the
source of his transformation to a unification advocate.
Haynes, Awesome Power, 96.
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of the Atlantic, Admiral William Fechteler.

To replace the

verY able Sherman was a difficult task and Truman deferred
the choice to his newly appointed Secretary of the Navy Dan
A. Kimball, under the assumption that Kimball would have to
be able to work with the new CNO.

Among the pool of senior

admirals only Fechteler had been untainted by the "Revolt."
Admiral Arthur Radford, the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific,
was allegedly Sherman's own choice as his successor, but he
took himself out of contention "for the good of the service."
Kimball himself recalled that this, among other things, had
been crucial in determing his choice of Fechteler.

388

Shortly

after Fechteler's nomination he met with the President who
emphasized the necessity for the "success of unification of
the Armed Forces."

389

Clearly the correct selection of the

Chiefs, combined with the 1949 amendments to the National
Security Act, would guarantee that success.
The requirement of loyalty to the administration became increasingly important during the last years of the
Truman administration and changed the role of the Joint Chiefs
substantially.

As the Democratic administration was attacked

for its foreign policy decisions, it was forced to rely more

38
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and more on the JCS to rationalize and defend its programs.
Bradley, more than any of the other Chiefs, became a stalking
horse for the administration's policies, especially as its
civilian policy makers, such as Acheson, lost all credibility
.
390
The role of the Chairman, because
with t h e Republ 1cans.
of his theoretical lack of service affiliation and his close
ties to the administration, seems to have developed a collateral function to support the administration's policies.
Forrestal may have been alluding to this function when he
used the word "agent" to describe the relationship between
the Chairman and the Secretary.

Unfortunately, even General

Bradley could only trade on his prestige for a short time.

In the end he also lost credibility.

Senator Taft pointed

this out in 1951:
I have come to the point where I do not accept them [the
JCS] as experts, particularly when General Bradley makes
a foreign policy speech. I suggest that the Joint Chiefs
of Staff are absolutely under the control of the administration.3~1

Under such circumstances it was impossible to keep the illusion of traditional professionalism.
The role the Chiefs were playing in 1953 was a far cry
from the pluralistic model of traditional professionalism
that Truman, Clifford and Forrestal originally envisioned, but
390
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pluralism had failed in the face of inter-service conflict
and the new demands of the post-war world.

The administra-

tion's reaction was to opt for more centralization and to
demand greater unanimity.

This unanimity would result in

"objective agreements" to support the administration's
policies.

The firing of Denfeld, followed by the appoint-

ments of Sherman and Fechteler, and the relief of MacArthur,
reminded the Chiefs that civilian control of the military
was becoming a euphemism for administration control of the
military.

But the Truman administration had not completely

forgotten the ideal of the pluralistic structure.

Bradley

carefully played the honest broker in his dealings with the
other Chiefs.

This was undoubtedly the intention of the

President, but the administration was caught between the
ideal and the realities of the bureaucratic and political
world.

The changing of the nature of the JCS had begun and

would continue into the next administration.
The Eisenhower administration's perception of the
role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff differed fundamentally
from that of its predecessor, primarily due to a differing
perception of the Chiefs' advisory function and with it the
concept and limitations of what "military expertise" entailed.
Since Eisenhower's own military experience and prestige far
overshadowed that of his Chiefs, he was in a very real sense
his own military expert.

As Sherman Adams wrote:
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In fact, Eisenhower's personal experience as a professional soldier and as the wartime commander of the
greatest expeditionary force that the world has ever
seen made him if anything harder to deal 3 ~~th when ~ear
inspired pressures came from Congress •••
With the President as the administration's resident military
expert, it was only natural that the Defense Department's
civilian leadership tended to be resource managers as opposed
to military planners.

Eisenhower's first two selections for

the office of Secretary of Defense, Charles E. (Engine Charlie)
Wilson and Neil McElroy, respectively the presidents of General
Motors and Proctor & Gamble, enhanced this perspective.
Although neither had any experience in defense decision making,
the administration believed that the management skills they
possessed were readily transferable.

One White House insider

was reported to have said, "anyone who can run General Motors
can run anything."393

Wilson himself described his role in

that light:
Actually the current trend in all big enterprises--private
business as well as the Department of Defense--is to
decentralize actual operations thus leaving top management free to establish and clarify policy and follow up
on performance.394
392 sherman Adams, First Hand Report: The Story of the
Eisenhower Administration (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1961),
396.
393 c.w. Borklund, The DE~partment of Defense (New York:
Frederick Praeger, 1968), 137.
394 summary of Secretary Wilson's letter of June 17, 1957
regarding the O'Mahoney amendment to the FY 58 appropriations
bill. Harlow Papers, box 7, folder "DoD Budget 1958," Dwight
D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas.
(Hereafter referred
to as Eisenhower Library.)
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The fact that the Eisenhower ·administration did not
have to rely on the Joint Chiefs for military expertise also
bad a profound impact on their role.
ticized the Chiefs in order to offset

While Truman had ·policriticism of his adminis-

tration, Eisenhower neither needed nor desired such support.
Instead he "desired only their agreement as members of a
team." 39 5

In fact, shortly after Eisenhower assumed office

Robert Cutler, the President's advisor on national security
affairs, informed the JCS that the President did not like
uniformed

military officers publicly discussing policy.

Cutler quoted the President as saying "I don't like it a damn
bit.

If it doesn't stop I know what to do about it."

396

Cutler was obviously conveying the President's dislike of
Bradley voicing his support for Truman's policy.
The President was committed to the team concept as
the backbone of any organization, especially the military,
since he felt that unification could never be achieved without
it.

Eisenhower believed that the Chiefs had to cease being

service spokesmen and that they had to rise above service
parochialism, but as a former Chief he fully understood the
service commitment.

In August of 1953 he called for an

independent examination of the service roles and missions,
395 James A. Donovan, Militarism, U.S.A. (New York:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1970), 117.
396 Memorandum of Conversation between General Cutler
anct General Matthews, 5 February 1953, Record Group 218, box 5,
folder "091, China," National Archives, Washington, D.C.
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and their relationship to atomic war.

Sadly, he lamented,

"such a study cannot be accomplished in a truly objectiv:e way
bY the Joint Chiefs of Staff because of the understandable
inclination of military men to protect the prerogatives of
their respective services."

397

Eisenhower feared that if the

Chiefs failed to rise above their service interests, the JCS
would become "little more than an agency for eliminating from
398
proposals and projects unconsequential differences."
As
long as the Chiefs continued to represent their services they
could never be molded into the team that the President wanted.
such a team concept was the nucleus of the staff model that
Eisenhower was familiar with.
The President endeavored to achieve the team concept
through several media.

One was to require the Chiefs to

consider non-military factors while developing their advisory
input.

This requirement was levied on the Chiefs in a direc-

tive from Secretary Wilson during the summer of 1954.

Wilson

called on the Chiefs to "avail themselves of the most competent and considered thinking that can be obtained representing every pertinent point of view, including military,
397

Dwight D. Eisenhower to Carl Heinshaw, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 1 August 1953, Central File,
folder 'OF 108-8 ( 1) ;' Eisenhower library.
398F.1na l Report to the Secretary of Defense, 8 February
1948 1916-1952 File, box 38, folder "Forrestal ( 2 ), " Eisenbower' Library.
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scientific, industrial and economic."

399

Ostensibly, this

directive seemed to institutionalize the key recommendations
of the 1953 Rockefeller Report, that called for the Chiefs
to draw upon a broader base of knowledge while developing
their war plans; although the Report acknowledged that those
plans should be "based primarily on military factors." 40 0
The Wilson Directive seemed to reject traditional military
professionalism and to demand a higher degree of fusion than
previously had been espoused, but it is questionable whether
the President actually wanted such fusion.

His own background

seemed to indicate a preference for traditionalism.

He

manifested this in his criticism of Bradley's actions and in
his campaign promise to limit the JCS to "purely military
401
decisions."
In a 1958 staff meeting he reaffirmed this
position by stating that "it is necessary [that the JCS supply] purely military advice and real agreements on the implementation of strategy, planning and forces." 402
399
. Quoted in Huntington, The Soldier and the State,
395.
400

Report of the Rockefeller Committee on Department
of Defense Organization, 11 April 1953 (printed for use of
the Committee on Armed Services, 83rd Congress, 1st S6sEion),
4.
401

New YorkTimes, 23 April 1953, 16; for a further discussion of Eisenhower's traditionalism see Chapter VII, The
Joint Chiefs' Own Perceived Role.
402

Memorandum for Record, Meeting on Defense Organization, 25 January 1958, Rockefeller Committee Records, box 18,
folder "136 ( 3)," Eisenhower Library, (Emphasis added).
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Given this general outlook by the President, the real
intention of Wilson's directive seems a bit confusing.

I

would suggest that it was an effort to get the Chiefs to
leave their service parochialism behind and take a broader
perspective.

Adwiral Radford's observation, "these damn

so and so's, why can't they look at the broad picture,"
seems to support the contention that the Chiefs were viewed
as being overly narrow in their outlook.

403

Forcing the

Chiefs to take such a broad perspective had inherent advantages.

If the Chiefs could be forced to take the same per-

spective as the administration, then it was probable that the
Chiefs would come to the same conclusions as the administration on strategic and economic matters.

If that occurred,

it could also be anticipated that all the Chiefs would support the "New Look" proposals.

This hypothesis seems to be

supported by General Maxwell Taylor's recollection that the
Chiefs were told to consider the views of their superiors
404
and not submit contentious recommendations.
Thus the
directive's issuance shortly after the administration's first
year in office may well have been one effort to achieve
unanimity.

This approach only differs in degree from Truman's

demand for unanimity on the part of his Chiefs.

Truman

allowed the Chiefs to differ with the administration prior to

403

Griffin, Oral History, 343.

404
Maxwell D. Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet (New York:
Rarper & Brothers, 1959), 106.
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the final decision.

It was only after the decision had been

reached that the administration sought to enforce loyality.
one can argue that the creation of the chairmanship was ·a
definite move by the Truman administration to require the
Chiefs to consider the views of their civilian superiors prior
to their giving official advice, this had been one of Leahy's
main functions during the war, but that approach was never
institutionalized afterwards in the form of a directive until
the Eisenhower administration.
A second method of guaranteeing that the team concept
permeated the Joint Chiefs was to demand that they submit
unified positions.

This was what the President meant when

he said "real agreements on the implementation of strategy,
planning and forces."

He specifically forbade the Chiefs
405
to serid split decisions forward,
apparently believing that

the elimination of split decisions would also eliminate
inter-service rivalry.

Unfortunately, this demand merely

increased the Chiefs' natural inclination to compromise.

As

Admiral Arleigh Burke, Chief of Naval Operations from 1955
to 1961, pointed out, "if you compromise, you compromise to
406
get something that is not very good."
However, the motivation of the President went further than merely the elimination of service rivalries; it was aimed at the idea of the
405
Arleigh A. Burke, Oral History Transcript, Columbia University Oral History Project, 53-56.

406

Ibid.
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responsibility of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to supply militarY advice.

The President accurately understood that when

the Chiefs split on an issue, the decision was thrust up one
level higher in the bureaucracy--in this case to the civilian
secretary of Defense.

With the experts split, the Secretary

can make any decision he wants, and the Chiefs have effectively taken themselves out of the decision making process.
Moreover, it is probable that the Secretary will make the
decision from a position of relative ignorance, because he
has no other "military" experts to advise him.

This was the

position that Forrestal found himself in prior to 1949.
Admiral Burke recalled that the President was afraid that
if the Chiefs could not make up their minds "somebody else
will make theirs up who doesn't know as much about the
military requirements as the Chiefs do." 407
Responsibility, though, was only part of Eisenhower's
rationale for unanimity.

Implicitly, the idea of being a

member of the team was foremost in the President's mind.

Like

Truman, the importance of loyalty was also very prevalent,
but for different reasons.

His military experience left an

indelible impression upon him as to the proper mode of
decision making and the relationship of the commander to his
staff.

There is little doubt that the President perceived

the Joint Chiefs as his, the Commander-in-Chief's, military

407

Ibid.
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staff.

This would explain his expectation of loyalty.

This

was pointed out by Secretary McElroy when he said, "they
[the JCS] should have their opportunity to say to the President what they think ..• ," but once the decision has been made
408
then all discussion must cease.
The cessation of discussion did not simply mean compliance through silence, but
whole-hearted support for the program.

Any form of dissent

was not only dysfunctional, but disloyal as well.

It follow-

ed from this that when there were differences of opinion
within the DE!fense Department team, those differences should
remain within the confines of the team and not be publicized.
This included the Chiefs' requirement to go before Congressional Committees, which usually resulted in bringing any
differences out into the open.

This was a phenomenon that

Eisenhower characteristically labeled "legalized insubordination."

Secretary McElroy expressed the administration's

dislike for this form of legislative appeal, when he said,
"the right is contrary to the normal relationship between
the executive and the legislative branches of the government,
it creates a divisive situation not found in any other
executive department." 409
408 Neil McElroy, Oral History Transcript, Columbia
University Oral History Project, 84-85.
409

us. Congress, Senate, Committee on .A.rwed Services,
~epartment of Defense Reorganization Act, 1958: Hearings on
1L R. 12541, 85th Congress, 2nd s~ssion, 1958, 11.
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Eisenhower had never liked the existence of this type
of appeal arrangement and had noted so in his 1948 memorandum· 410

Later when he became President its continued ex-ist-

ence countered"his idea of a defense team making policy in
unity.

In an effort to halt such "insubordination" he

orde.red that differences within the defense team should not
be made public, even to Congress.

As he once told Admiral

Burke, "once I approve a budget I don't want you people [the
Chiefs] going up there [to Congress] and undercutting my
411
budget."
He never did understand why the Chiefs could not
simply acknowledge support for the President's program with412
out allowing the differences to surface.
His dislike for
such "legalized insubordination" was such that he even considered legislation that would have negated the Chiefs'
413
requirement to go before Congress.

410 Dwight D. Eisenhower to Ferdinand Eberstadt, 20
September 1948, 1916-1952 File, box 34, folder "Eberstadt,"
Eisenhower Library.
Specifically Eisenhower wrote "what is
important under this point is the practice of the separate
services going individually to Congressional Committees.
Until we get firmly established the intent of Congress to
act, in matters of basic legislation and the budget, on the
recommendations of the Secretary of Defense, as opposed to
~ny partisan recommendations of any of the Services, trouble
1s bound to exist."
411

Burke, Oral History, 53-56.

412

n.c. ,

Arleigh A. Burke, private interview, Washington,
January 1975.

413

Korb, The Joint Chiefs of Staff, 109.
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Another method by which the administration sought to'
achieve unanimity was through the Joint Chiefs of Staff
appointment process.

In his 1949 memorandum Eisenhower·

had recommended to President Truman that he use such a process to facilitate unification:
While the Law of 1947 was expected to relieve the President of the necessity of giving personal attention
to the details of national security problems, yet we are
now facing, not a detail of organization, but the problem
of energizing the whole system so that it will start to
move effectively.
In my opinion, this cannot now be done
without a certain amount of Presidential intervention, for
the reason that inter-service struggles have been carried
to the point where only the official who has the appointive
and assignment power can sufficiently f~phasize his
and your determination to secure teamwork. 4
By the time Eisenhower took office in January 1953, the
attacks upon the Joint Chiefs by the Republican leadership had
reached such proportions that .it was doubtful that the new
President could have kept the incumbents in office even if he
had wanted to.

415

As luck would have it, three of the four

Chiefs, Bradley, Collins, and Vandenberg, were completing
their four year term that summer; and the remaining Chief,
414

Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, 4 February
1949, 1916-1952 File, box 38 folder "Forrestal (2)," Eisenhower Library (referred hereafter as 1949 Memorandum).
Eisenhower selected his cabinet in much the same manner, he
even did it without senatorial courtesy under the assumption
that a staff should be loyal members of his administration,
individuals that he could work with, and that he was the only
one who should make the final decision; see Adams, First Hand
_Beport, 59.
415

Aside from the pressure from the Republicans,
Secretary designee Wilson also wanted a new team of Chiefs;
New York Times, 13 May 1953, 1; Newsweek, 25 May 1953.
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Admiral Fechteler, would complete his first two year term
during the same time period.

Thus the opportunity presented

itself to change completely the membership of the JCS.
In selecting the new Chiefs the President appears to
have used three criteria.

First, the new Chiefs had to have

greater global perspective than their predecessors.

If

nothing else the incumbents were primarily European in orientation; while the Republicans perceived Asia as a focal point
.
for Am er1can
po 1"1cy. 416

Secondly, the nominee had to bE;

acceptable to key members of the administration and to the
Republican Party leadership.

This criterion was based on

political reality and the President's notion of the staff
model.

Finally, the President desired to have loyal Chiefs,

who not only had a global perspective, but who would work
effectively in the joint arena.

His 1949 recommendation that

"joint work take precedence over any personal or individual
service matter,"

417

encapsulated his ideas on the subject.

With these three criteria as a gauge the selection process
began.
The four officers whom the President nominated for
membership on the Joint Chiefs of Staff were Admiral Arthur

116

see Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A
Social and Political Portrait (Glencoe, Ill: The Free Press,
1960), 303 ff, for a discussion of the impact of the geographical mind set of the Chiefs and how this impacted on
their approach to war and its interrelationship to politics.

417

1949 Memorandum.
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Radford as Chairman, and General Matthew Ridgway, General
Nathan Twining, and Admiral Robert Carney as Chief of Staff
of the Army, Chief of Staff of the Air Force, and Chief of
Naval Operations, respectively.
wealth of

Each brought with him a

military experience in different theaters of

operations, and all had commanded one of the unified commands,
which theoretically better prepared them for their joint
duties.

418
The new Chairman was Admiral Arthur W. Radford, a

central figure in the "Revolt of the Admirals" and the Comrnander-in-Chief of the Pacific.

His previous record of ser-

vice parochialism would appear to have removed him from contention.

In fact, while Eisenhower was Chief of Staff, he

had such a dislike for Radford that he told Admiral Nimitz
that if he "brings along that so-and-so Radford" again to a
419
JCS meeting he, Eisenhower, would refuse to attend.
But
the President's personal feelings were mitigated by the fact
that Radford fit all the administration's criteria.

His

experience in the Pacific, as well as his strategic outlook,
was totally compatible with the Republican's asian orientation and the doctrine of massive retaliation..

As John Donovan

noted:

418

Glenn H. Snyder, "The 'New Look' of 1953," in
§!rategy, Politics and Defense Budgets, ed. by Warner Schil~i~g, Paul Hammond, and Glenn Snyder (New York: Columbia
n1versity Press, 1962), 412-413.

419

New York Times, 18 August 1973, 24.
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His view was that American military power was overextended, with too many forces committed, notably in Asia,
to positions in which the Communists could pin them
down.
Instead of such scattered deployment, Radford
favored concentrating American power in a strategic
reserve in or near North America.
Under this arrangement the main reliance for holding the front lines would
rest on the indigenous forces being built up in noncommunist c?untrie~, wh!1n the mobile power of the United
States rema1ned po1sed.
such strategic thinking made Radford completely acceptable
to the Republican leadership, especially Senator Robert Taft
of Ohio,

421

who was becoming very sympathetic to the notion

that air and sea power could replace American ground forces. 422
Taft even suggested that the new Chiefs be appointed immediately so that they could begin their reappraisal of American
strategic posture before they officially took over.

After

the adrrinistration's bitter fight over the confirmation of
Secretary of Labor, the desires of the Ohio Senator were taken
. t o cons1. d era t.1on. 423
very muc h 1n

When the final list of

nominees for the Joint Chiefs was decided upon it was given to
Taft for his approval.
420
(New York:

424

In regard to the selection of

Robert J. Donovan, Eisenhower:
The Inside Story
Harper & Brothers, 1956), 18.

421 New York Times, 25 April 1953, 8.
422 N

ew York Times, 22 April, 1953, l.

423 New York Times, 13 May 1953, 10.
424

Donovan, Inside Story, 325.
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Radford, Taft said " I am glad to have for Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff a man who has said we are capable of
425
fighting an aggressive war in the· Pacific."
While it was undoubtedly the Republican connection
that made Radford attractive for the chairmanship, it was
secretary of Defense nominee Wilson who guaranteed his
nomination.

Eisenhower's commitment to the staff model

meant that the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff had to
be totally acceptable to Mr. Wilson, since they were his
military advisors as well as the President's. 426

During

Eisenhower's pre-inaugural trip to Korea, he and Wilson
met with Radford aboard his flagship, the U.S.S. Helena.

427

Both men were very impressed with the Commander-in-Chief of
the Pacific, and as soon as Admiral Radford had repented
for his earlier transgressions against unification the way
. nom1na
. t.1on. 428
was pave d f or h 1s
425

New York Times, 15 May 1953, 3.

426

Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change (New York:
Doubleday, 1963), 96.
427

Admiral Fechteler claims that he arranged the
Helena meeting and that Eisenhower had not planned to meet
Radford. Fechteler, Oral History, 117.
428

Adams, First Hand Report, 403-4. See Wilson's
letter to Eisenhower recommending Radford for the Chairmanship, 12 May 1953, Central File/Official File, box 100,
folder"OF 3G-JCS, 5 January-March 1955,n Eisenhower-Library.
Also see Life magazine, 25 May 1953; Life correspondent
Richard MacMillan reported that the key point was Radford's
Presentation during a dinner on Iwo Jima, on the Asian
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The rest of Eisenhower's new Chiefs were all equally
acceptable under the various criteria that the administration
established.

All had vast experience as unified commanders-

Ridgway as the United Nations Commander in Korea and then
as Eisenhower's own successor as Supreme Allied Commander
Europe (SACEUR), Twining was Commander-in-Chief, Alaska,
and Carney was Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces Southern
Europe (CINCAFSOUTH).

Carney, in particular, had Eisenhower's

respect, having gone with him to Europe, in 1951, as his
deputy and having been given the Mediterranean command by
Eisenhower shortly before the General retired to run for the
Presidency.

While Carney was CINCAFSOUTH he began to embrace

the strategic ideas that would eventually be the basis for
429
the New Look.
Until Radford's name was announced as the
new Chairman, Carney was considered the leading candidate.
Eisenhower may well have promised the job to him, only to
find out that Wilson wanted Radford.

Thus the only compen-

sation the President could offer Carney was that of Chief
of Naval Operations.

430

In due course Carney was nominated

situation. Secretary Wilson was deeply impressed and Radford was asked to 2.ccompany the group to Korea.
According
to MacMillan, Eisenhower asked his aide, "Is there room on
our airplane for Admiral Radford?" "No Sir," was the
response. Eisenhower then said "then see who can be left
behind."

York:

429
James Gavin, War and Peace in the Space Age (New
Harper, 1958), 136.
430

Fechteler, Oral History, 124.
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for CNO and the incumbent, Admiral Fechteler, replaced him
in the Mediterranean command.
General Ridgway's selection as Army Chief of Staff
was by no means as clear cut as Carney's selection for Chief
of Naval Operations.

Aside from Ridgway, the two other

officers considered to have the best chance to be Collins'
successor were General Mark Clark, the United Nations Commander in Korea, and General Alfred Gruenther, Ridgway's
own Chief of Staff in Europe.

Clark's name was also promi-

nently mentioned as a possible Chairman, but his appointment
431
for any position was opposed by Texas Republicans.
Their
opposition to Clark stemmed from the annihilation of the
36th Infantry Division during the crossing of the Rapido
River during the Italian Campaign.

The 36th was a Texas

National Guard Division, and the Texans blamed Clark who,
432
as 5th Army Commander, ordered the attack.
Given the
importance of the Texas delegation at the Republican Convention it is not surprising that Clark was passed over. 433
General Gruenther's non-selection is a far different and
more complicated matter.
431

Undoubtedly, one of the most

New York Times, 10 May 1953, 31.

432

Martin Blumenson, Salerno to Cassino (Washington:
Office of the Chief of Military History, 1969), 322-352.
433

Herbert S. Parmet, Eisenhower and the American
Crusades (New York: MacMj_llian Co., 1972), 83-101.

274

capable officers in the Army, he had been the first Director
of the Joint Staff and had gone with Eisenhower to Europe in
1951 as his Chief of Staff.

He continued in that capacity

when Ridgway succeeded Eisenhower in 1952.

Ridgway's own

appointment to SACEUR is clouded by the rumor that the State
Department wanted him out of Tokyo while the Japanese Peace
434
Treaty was being negotiated.
If that is true, then what
does one do with a successful army commander?
was

unquestionably

very

qualified

to

Gruenther,

succeed

Eisenhower in Europe, but his identification with his former
commander resulted in disfavor among Democrats.

I would

suggest that a temporary solution may have been found with
the appointment of Ridgway to SACEUR.

Eisenhower still con-

sidered Gruenther "the best qualified man in the service of
435
the United States for the post,"
and may well have seen
the nomination of Ridgway to Chief of Staff as a means of
elevating Gruether to the post of the NATO commander, which
he did upon Ridgway's return to \I,Tashington.
The final member of Eisenhower's new team of Chiefs
was Air Force Chief of Staff Nathan S. Twining.

His selec-

tion appears to be free of the political machinations that
Proceeded the selections of Carney, Ridgway, and Radford.
4 j4Betts, Cold War Crises, 243, citing C.L. Saltzenberger, A Long Row of Candles (New York: MacMillian, 1969),
748.
435E.1sen h ower, Mandate for Change, 449.
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Twining had been Air Force Vice Chief of Staff since 1950
and was acting Chief of Staff during the last months of the
Truman administration due to Vandenberg's ill health.
Despite his presence on the JCS, he seems to have escaped
unscathed from the political controversy that surrounded
the Joint Chiefs.

He was even considered a non-controver-

sial figure within the Air Force and managed to avoid the
.
. d • 436 Desp1. t e h.1s 1 ow
intra-service con fl 1cts
o f th e per1o
profile, there is little doubt that the Air Force was sympathetic to the new administration's strategic outlook.

All

of these factors seem to have combined to gain the favor of
437
Secretary Wilson and Air Force Secretary Harold Talbott.
In the final analysis the "new" Chiefs were selected
because they fit the administration's criteria of joint
experience, global outlook and acceptability.
natural that such a

It was only

wholesale replacement of the Joint

Chiefs would raise cries of politicization of the military.
Admiral Fechteler later charged that the "Eisenhower administration deliberately injected the Joint Chiefs of Staff into
the political arena," 438 but one must place this action in

436 New York Times, 8 May 1953, 1.
437New York Times, 29 April 1953, 13. Twining's only
Possible competitor was General Loris Norstadt who at this
time was assigned in Europe where he would eventually succeed Gruenther as the Supreme Allied Commander.
438

Fechteler, Oral History, 124.
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the context of the historical evolution of the JCS as an
institution.

President Truman had moved away from routine

professional appointments after 1949 as one component of
his program to create greater unanimity among the Chiefs;
the other component being the 1949 amendments to the National
Security Act.

During Eisenhower's tour as acting Chairman

of the Joint Chiefs, he had also emphasized the need for
unanimity, so it was only natural that as President he would
use whatever means were at his disposal to eliminate dysfunctional competition.

The President's rejection of split

decisions, the demandthat the Chiefs take into account their
superiors' views, and the administration's selection criteria were all part of the President's program to implement
the unanimity that he desired.

In 1953, it was merely a

difference in degree, not in intent.

In this regard former

Commandant of the Marine Corps, General David Shoup recalled:
••.• both Ike and succeeding Presidents have always felt
that they wanted to appoint the Chief of service for a
period of two years.
In that way, they would get a
chance to take a look at them and throw them out on the
street if they didn't like them and get somebody else
in their own administration.439
During the Eisenhower administration onH does not
find examples of the dramatic firing of a Chief as in the
case of Denfeld; instead the President carefully examined
his options before renominating an incumbent.

By 1955, two

439 Genf!ral David Shoup, Oral History, Columbia Oral
History Project, 2.
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of the "new" Chiefs, Carney and Ridgway, had failed their
first two year loyalty test.
sions were three in number.

Admiral Carney's transgresFirst, he was not getting along

with the Secretary of the Navy and the Marine Corps Commandant, General Lemuel Shepherd.

Second, at times he sided

with General Ridgway in criticizing the New Look.

Finally,

the Admira.l made some off-the-record remarks about the
likelihood of a Red Chinese invasion of the off-shore islands.
Unfortunately for Carney, those remarks made their way into
the press, causing the administration considerable embarrassmen t.

440

According to former Secretary of Defer., se Thomas

Gates, Carney was removed because of his problems with
Navy's civilian leadership and the China speech.

As Gates

put it, "the question of his loyalty to the administration
was involved."

441

Ridgway, on the other hand, had a history of opposition to the administration's programs.

In 1958 the President

was reported to have remarked to Representative John McCormick that "I have never been rough with a service Chief of
Staff, with the pc,ssible exception of one man whom I told,
when he served out his time, that his usefulness was

":140

New York Times, 1 June 1955, 16; also see Adams,
First Hand Rf~port, 133 and Eisenhower, Mandate for Change,
478, for a further discussion of Carney's remarks and their
impact.
441

Thomas Gates, Oral History TranE;cript' Columbia
University Oral History Project, 24.
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over. "442

Since the only two Chiefs the President

fail~d

to renominate were Ridgway and Carney he probably had to
be referring to one of them.

Sherman Adams reports tha:t

the conflict between the President and the Army Chief of
staff "had personal overtones to it."

Adams goes on to

recall that "Ridgway had been the President's successor in
the command of NATO forces and Eisenhower's comments about
Ridgway's service in that assignment had been less than
glowing." 443

If that is true, then why did not Eisenhower

simply fire Ridgway, or even Carney, for their obvious disloyal actions?

The answer is Presidential style:

Before I [Sherman Adams] worked for him, I assumed
Eisenhower would be a hard taskmaster. He did have a
penchant for orderly thinking and procedures and particularly, for careful follow-through on his assignments.
But he seldom called anybody down when he was displeased
with his work and I never knew him to punish anybody.
When General Matthew Ridgway split with him on the question of armed forces manpower levels and when General
Maxwell Taylor questioned the government's anti-missile
program, the President was deeply embarrassed but did
little more tha~ ~rovide for the early retirement of
these officers. 4
In order to replace Carney, Ridgway, and all subsequent Chiefs, the Eisenhower administration used to varying
degree the same careful methodology that it had used in 1953.
The criteria used in selecting the "new" Chiefs had not only
442
443

Adams, First Hand Report, 421.
Ibid. , 399-400.
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Ad ams 1s
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remained valid, but the requirement to have a joint outlook
had increased in importance.

The onecriterion that seems to

have diminished in importance, if not completely disappeared,
was the requirement to be accepted by the Republican Party
leadership.

Whether this was the result of the President's

increased confidence, the death of Robert Taft, or the
decline in the power of Senator Joseph McCarthy is difficult
to say, but it did cease to be an important ingredient in
the selection process.

Replacing it as the most important

criterion was being a loyal team player.
Robert

C~rney's

successor as Chief of Naval Operations

was the only two star flag officer ever appointed to the
Joint Chiefs, Rear Admiral Arleigh A. (31 Knot) Burke.
Burke's nickname, acquired during the Second World War,
reflected the drive and intensity of this officer.

Despite

his ability and high standing within the service, his junior
rank and earlier involvement in the "Revolt of the
Admirals 11445 probably would have excluded him from
445

Burke received his nickname while commanding
Destroyer Squadron 23, the "Little Beavers," during the
Solomons campaign. During one particular action he radioed
ahead to some transports to stand aside "I'm coming through
at 31 knots. 11 Admiral Halsey then gave him that nickname.
During the "Revolt of the Admirals" Captain Burke was a
special assistant to Denfeld and head of the Organizational
Research and Policy Division, known as OP-23.
Its purpose
was to prepare the Navy's case for the hearings. As a result of his activities, Burke's name was removed from the
Promotion list to Rear Admiral, until pressures from House
Republicans got it reinstated.
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consideration if he had not been supported by the Navy's
c~vilian

.
446
1 ea d ers h 1p.

Matthew Ridgway's successor, Maxwell D. Taylor, had
a brilliant combat record, was a charter member of the
"airborne club," commander of the, 101 st Airborne Division,
and later commander of the 8th Army.

Subsequently, he was

given command of all United Nations Forces in Korea.

Aside

from his combat commands, Taylor had been the Superintendent
of West Point, the Commandant of Berlin, and the Army's
Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations.

Taylor was obviously

well qualified for the position of Chief of Staff, but
appointments to the JCS had ceased to be of the routineprofessional variety since 1949.

Despite Eisenbower's

efforts to eliminate inter-service fighting through tbe
selection process, it continued to plague his administration.

Ridgway had been the key source of disharmony by his

attacks upon the administration's New Look proposals.
In essence the

administratio~'s

New Look posture was

based upon a ree\'aluation of American military capabilities
and commitments.

This evaluation in turn was based upon

certain assumptions as to the nature of the threat.

In the

first place, the administration believed that the possibility of economic destruct1on, through overspending, was as
446

Thomas Gates, Oral History, 26.

281
dangerous as the military threat itself.

Thus the Republi-

cans sought to balance the budget, which meant that military
appropriations had to be cut or at least not substantially
increased.

Secondly, the administration rejected the hypc•-

thesis that there was a year of maximum danger in which the
United States must prepare to repel a Russian attack.
Instead the President felt that the nation must prepare for
a long period of potential danger, and that instead of maximizing expenditures in response to the year of maximum
danger, the nation should spread its military expenditures
out over the "long haul."

Finally, the administration

perceived that there were certain lessons to be learned from
the Korean War.

Most noticeable was that such a war was

extremely expensive in terms of money, manpower, and domestic politics.

The kind of mid-range war in the third world

that Korea represented must be avoided because it drained
the nation's military strength and detracted from its primary missions, the defense of the Continental United States
and Europe.

InstE·ad, indigenous populations would supply

the ground combat power for such future wars, while the
United States supplied high technology and if necessary
nuclear firepower.

Technology would be a substitute for

manpower both in the third world and in Europe.

Under this

"bigger-bang for the buck" philosophy the P..rmy found itself
at a disadvantage in competing for resources with the Air
Force and the Navy.

As a result the Army was continually
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cut in size during this period, primarily due to fiscal
restraints and the lack of a mission.
Whether Ridgway's attacks were motivated by service
parochialism or patriotic fear of the weaknesses of the
strategy, the results were the same perceived dysfunctional
behavior.

The President may well have felt that he had made

a mistake by selecting Ridgway and he was not going to let
it happen again.

With this in mind, prior to his nomination,

General Taylor was recalled from the Far East for an interview with the President and Secretary Wilson.

This process

was not unfamiliar to Taylor, who had been interviewed in
1953 prior to his original assignment to command the 8th
Army.

At that time the discussion was conducted in the

shadow of the Truman-MacArthur controversy and had concentrated on Taylor's willingness to carry out his civilian
leaders' directives and follow the prevailing defensive
strategy.

After that experience General Taylor wrote,

"having apparently passed the tests in Washington, I departed for the Far East." 447
The issues were now much broader than whether General
Taylor was going to be a loyal theater commander.

The selec-

tion of the right Chief of Staff was as important to the
Army as it was for the administration.
447
Norton

Maxwell Taylor,

The Eisenhower-

Swords and Plowshares (New York:

& Co., Inc., 1972), 138.
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Ridgway conflict had created a deep rift between the Commander-in-Chief and his former service.

It would be up to

the new Chief of Staff to bridge that gap.

Taylor's own

recollection of the interview was as follows:
During the two years as Chief of Staff, General Ridgway
had had a very difficult time in the atmosphere of the
new administration with its commitment to the strategy
of massive retaliation. Although I admired his staunch
opposition to this strategic fallacy and doubted that
my attitude would be significantly different from his,
I had no difficulty with the questions addressed to me
by the President and Wilson. Oddly, they were not
interested in my views on world strategy, but wished to
be assured of my willingness to acce~t and carry out the
orders of my civilian superiors •••• 4 4 8
The President's lack of interest in General Taylor's strategic views is not all that surprising when one goes into a
detailed analysis of the contents of the interview.

The

memorandum for record written afterwards reveals that the
President wanted more than mere assurances that Taylor's
Constitutional oath would be kept.

First, Taylor was told

that he had to "understand and wholeheartedly accept that
his primary responsibility related to his joint duties."
Second, his strategic views must be "in accord with those of
the President."

Finally, the Presjdent informed him that

"loyalty in spirit as well as letter was necessary."
448

449

Ibid., 156.

449
nouglas Kinnard, President Eisenhower and Strategy
Management: A Study in Defense Politics (Lexington, Kentucky: University of Kentucky Press, 1977), 41-42.
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These precepts reflected the President's efforts to
institutionalize the ideas he had been advocating since
1948.

In his 1949 memorandum to Forrestal, Eisenhower·

felt that loyalty should bE; required "both as to letter and
to spirit."

450

Admiral Burke recalled a series of meetings

with the President, shortly before he assumed the office of
Chief of Naval Operations, in which the Fresident emphasized
the Chief's joint responsibilities and he told Burke that
his primary job as a Chief was not to present the Navy's
point of view, but to be a member of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff.

451
While loyalty was by no means a new requirement for

a Chief, concurrence with the administration's strategic
view was.

Previously, the Chiefs were required to support

the administration's position after it had been decided
upon; now that would be obviated by the fact that both
the administration and the Chiefs approached strategic
problems from a mutually agreed upon perspective.

Under

these circumstances, it was only natural that Eisenhower wr. s
unconcerned about Taylor's strategic views, because he expected them to be the same as his.

The unanimity the Presi-

dent sought would finally be achieved, but the penalty would

450
451

1949 Memorandum.
turke, Oral History, 20.
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be the Chief's objectivity.

It was explicit, as Hanson

Baldwin suggested, that the Chiefs maintain the party line
in order to keep their jobs. 452

One is reminded of Admiral

carney's admonition to General Taylor upon the latter's
assumption of office, "You're one of the good new Chiefs
now but you'll be surprised how soon you become one of the
bad old Chiefs."

453

Loyalty continued to be a crucial prerequisite for
nomination to the Joint Chiefs all through the Eisenhower
period.

When General Taylor retired after two terms in

office his Vice-Chief, General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, succeeded
him.

Lemnitzer was almost 60 years old at the time of his

appointment and was the oldest man ever to be nominated
for the JCS.

A very effective officer who had built a

reputation as a planner, Lemnitzer had held numerous high
level assignments to include the Far East command in the
wake of Ridgway and Taylor.

Furthermore, his background

indicated a broad joint outlook.

As one Pentagon insider

noted:
Lemnitzer isn't a yes-man, but you won't see him bucking
Ike on policy. He will present his requirements effectively, btt he'll accept higher decisi~%~ as the final
word. He's a team worker all the way.
45

2New y or k T 1mes,
·
1 J une 1955 , 16 •

453
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In 1960 when Lemnitzer was promoted to the chairmanship, his Vice-Chief, General George Decker was nominated
Chief of Staff of the Army.
to be an anomaly.

Decker's whole career appears

An ROTC product who fought in the Pacific

during the Second World War, Decker madehis fame primarily
as a logistics and fiscal specialist rather than as a troop
commander, although he did have the appropriate troop commands, which included succeeding Lemnitzer in the Far East.
Later when Lemnitzer became Chief, Decker moved to Washington as Vice-Chief.

Decker was a classic case of the com-

petent journeyman officer who methodically punched all the
right tickets and moved up through the hierarchy.

He was

not a member of the "airborne club," nor was he a Marshall
protege, an apparent requirement for all the preceding postwar Chiefs of Staff of the Army.

The only other Chief to be

appointed during the remainder of the Eisenhower administration was Air Force General Thomas White, Chief of Staff of
the Air Force when General Twining became Chairman in 1957.
In the case of both White and Decker the administration appears to have reverted to something along the line of
a routine-professional appointment.

Part of the reason may

lie in the fact that both officers were Vice-Chiefs.

This

Position allowed the administration the advantage of seeing
th em ln
. opera t lOn
.
b e f ore nomlna
. t lng
.
th em. 4 55

secon dl y, t h ere

455General George Decker, Private Interview, Washington, D.C., January 1975.
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appears to have been a lessening of tension between the Army
and the administration during Lemnitzer's tour as Chief.
While the President was obviously very careful in the selection of Taylor following on the hee]s of Ridgway, the relatively good experience with Lemnitzer may have paved the we.y
for Decker.

On the other hand, the Air Force, which gained

the most from the New Look posture, was not a problem during
this period, thus making White's promotion even more natural.
While loyalty was important for a member of the Joint
Chiefs, it was absolutely essential for the Chairman.

This

perspective was not unj_que to the Eisenhower presidency.
Bradley showed great loyalty to the Truman administration,
even to the point of risking his own professionalism.

Eisen-

hower expected his Chairmen to make sure that the JCS not
only considered the problems that were brought to their
attention, but that he should insure that the Chiefs "reach,
whenever possible, joint conclusions and recommendations."
Furthermore, it would be up to the Chairman to make sure that
the Secretary was provided with sufficient information to
.

make a decision if the Chiefs split on an 1.ssue.

456

While Admiral Radford personified these expectations,
they generally applied to all the Chairmen after 1949.

As

the power of the Chairman increased, it became apparent that

456

1949 Memorandum.
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he was the administration's man within the Joint Chiefs.

457

Since the Chairman had no service constituency to worry about,
unlike the other members of the JCS, he could play the role
of the civilian leadership's front man.

During his nomina-

tion hearing Admiral Radford pointed out that " ••• the Chajrman, as an individual, is expected to divorce himself completely from any service affiliation.

He is supposed to be

a member of the defense team under the Secretary of
Defense."

458

The requirement to be above service interest is essential if the Chairman is to represent the administration
before the Chiefs.

Furthermore, it supported EiEenhower's

view of the primacy of the Chiefs' joint orientation.

But

this requirement brought about some strange transformations
as indicated by the following testimony by General Lemnitzer:
As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff I would have no
service affiliation, Senator.
I would deal with all the
services in exactly the same way and apply my best judgement to the problems as they arise.
As Chief of the Army and throughout my service, I have
been an ardent advocate of the role of the Army and the
importance of the mission of the Army and naturally I
still feel that way today.
But as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I would not
457
For a further discussion of this relationship see
Peter F.. Wi tteried, "The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff: An Evolving Instituion," unpublished M.A. Thesis,
University of ViJginia, 1964.
458
.
Hear1ngs Nomination, 1953, 5.
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advocate any one service position over any other service
position.
I would like to make that clear. 459
General Lemnitzer's testimony reflects the transformation
that must occur within an officer when he ceases being a service spokesman and becomes a neutral Chairman.

It may be

suggested, though, that such a sudden change is only a matter
of self-delusion and that it would be impossible for the
Chairman to forget the values he had acquired over a whole
career.

Despite this problem, the Chairman must attempt to

maintain at least the facade of neutrality in order to expedite
his relations with the other Chiefs.
With loyalty and joint orientation the prime requisites, the President selected his Chairman with the same care
that went into the selection of the Chiefs.

The chairmanship

was first filled by Radford who was followed successively by
Twining and then Lemnitzer.

The fact the chairmanship rotated

among the services was more of an accident than a plan.
the President recalled in his memoirs:
I had not felt any strong obligation to adhere to any
unwritten understanding that the position of Chairman be
rotated among the services--Army, Navy, Air--but I felt
that such rotation, all other things being equal, was
desirable. Happily, I felt that each individual appointed
45

%.s.

Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services,
Hearings on Nomination of General Lyman L. Lemnitzer for
Appointment as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and
General Ge~e--Henry Decker for Appointment as Chief of Staff,
United States Army, 86th Congress,2nd Session, 1960, p. 12.
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during my administrations to the Chairman's position-Radford, Twining, and Lemnitzer~-was tb~ best qualified
men available in any of the services.460
What was left unsaid by the President was that all of his
Chairman were loyal team players.

Twining was the only one

of the original service Chiefs to be renominated in 1955,
which alone is convincing evidence of his loyalty.

The Air

Force was hurt least by the administration's New Look proposals, thus Twining did not have to fight for his service
like Ridgway did.

Furthermore, Twining's anti-communist

attitudes paralleled those of Radford.

In 1960 when illness

forced him to retire, the President appointed General Lemnitzer to succeed him.

The same qualifications that made

Lemnitzer a desirable Chief of Staff held him in good stead
for the Chairman's position.

He had a relatively tranquil

tour as Army Chief, especially in the wake of Ridgway and
Taylor; and he was a leader in promoting unity within the
JCS.

When asked about the differences that existed between

the Chiefs during this time, he remarked that there were no
substantial problems.461

This is indicative of his emphasis

on the team approach to defense matters.
Another factor that seemed to impact upon the selection of a Chairman was the correlation of his service to the
460Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 255.

D.c.,

461Lyman L. Lemnitzer, private interview, Washington,
January 1975.
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prevailing strategy of the administration.

During periods of

time when the administration's strategy relied most heavily
on nuclear retaliation, the Chairman was either an Air Force
or a Navy officer.

The reason was that these two services

were directly involved in that mission.

When tt:e prevailing

strategy called for the introduction of ground forces as it
did during the period of flexible response, the Chairman was
an Army officer.

Thus Lemnitzer's selection as Chairman not

only indicated tis loyalty to Eisenhower's defense team, but
the slow movement toward the acceptance of a posture of
flexible response.462
The selection of the Chairman was important to the
administration because of the vast power that resided within
that office.

Since the position was created in 1949, there

had been no substantive increase in the Chairman's power. Even
the acquisition of tte right to vote was a meaningless gesture, since the Joint Chiefs of Staff is not a democracy,
but that right did symbolize the fulfillment of Forrestal's
belief that the Chairman should act as the administration's
"agent
phrase

11

within the Joint Chiefs or to use Maxwell Taylor's
11

a sort of party whip.

11

463

462
see Table 2 for a matrix correlating the appointment of the chairman to the national strategy.
46

~aylor, Uncertain Trumpet, 110.
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TABLE 2:

CORRELATION OF SELECTION OF CJCS, SERVICE OF
ORIGIN AND NATIONAL STRATEGIC POSTURE

Name (Service)

Primary Geographic or
Military Concern of the
Aclministra tion

Administration's 1
Strategic Posture

Bradley

(USA)

Europe

F.R.

Radford

(USN)

Asia

M.R.

Twining

(USAF)

Europe/Nuclear

M.R.

Lemnitzer

(USA)

Europe/Third World

toward F.R. 2

Taylor

(USA)

Asia/Third World

F.R.

Wheeler

(USA)

Asia

F.R.

Moorer

(USN)

Brown

(USAF)

Europe/SALT

M.R.

Jones

(USAF)

Europe/SALT

M.R.

Asia/Europe/Strategic
Nuclear

F.R.-M.R.

3

4
Vessey
(USA)
1F .R. refers to a flexible response type strategy, while M.R. refers to
a massive retaliation type strategy.
%uring General L€mnitzer' s term as Chairman the Eisenhower
tion began to move in the direction of flexible response and away
massive retaliation posture of earlier years. Lemnitzer was also
rmn during the first two years of the Kennedy administration when
response became the prevailing strategy.

administrafran the
the Chairflexible

3
The first Nixon actninistratian was marked by a movement away fran
flexible response and a return to massive retaliation. This was the basis
of the so called Nixon Doctrine.

~he Reagan Aclninistratian does not sean to be marked by a specific
geographic concern, but instead a desire to meet Soviet expansianien where
ever it presents itself. This includes both the nuclear and conventional
arenas.
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The source of the Chairman's power is two distinct,
but inextricably connected, factors.

The first is the fact

that, for the most part, Secretaries of Defense have been
managers and not military planners.

Secretary Wilson, in

particular, came into office ignorant of defense matters.
Lieutenant General James Gavin reports that one Chief of
staff described him as "the most uninformed man and the most
determined to remain so that has ever been Secretary." 4 6 4
The second factor is the nature of the bureaucratic system.
Since the Chairman is the Secretary's primary advisor on
defense matters, the Secretary's inexperience will naturally
force him to rely upon the Chairman for advice.

This

natural tendency is exacerbated by conflicting opinions among
the Chiefs.

As Admiral Radford noted before Congress:

I think the responsibility and the authority of the
Chairman is greater than appears in law.
I have often
pointed out to the Chiefs that the mor£ they disagree the
more power they hand to the Chairman. 405
In a case of a split decision, the Chairman is in a
position to articulate his views to the Secretary or the
President, either personally or through a written memorandum.
464 Gavin, War and Peace in the Space Age, 155.
465u.s. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services,
Study of Air Power, Hearings before the subcommittee on the
Air Force, 84th Congress, 2nd Session, 1956, 1457.
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The latter was the style of Admiral Radford. 466

Because the

Chairman is the administration's representative to the JCS,
his opinion will have far greater impact than that of a
single Chief.

This phenomenon was observed by Robert Bowie,

President Eisenhower's Special Advisor for National Security
Affairs:
.•• Admiral Radford •.. held a very influencial position.
In part the differences of opjnion among the Chiefs
enhanced the influence of the Chairman as spokesman for
the military point of view. And since Admiral Radford
attended the NSC meetings, th~t75ave him an opportunity
really to exercise that role.
Bowie's analysis of Radford's power validates the bureaucratic theory that power increases in proportion to a
player's access to the decision maker.

Eisenhower understood

this clearly in 1949 when he wrote:
His [the Chairman's] mere presence on tte Joint Chiefs of
Staff, acting as the trusted assistant of the Secretary
of Defense, should do much to induce, if not compel, the
attainment of unanimous recommendations and conclusions. 46 8
This is not to say that the Chiefs did not have access
to the Secretary of Defense or to the President.

On the con-

trary, the Chiefs apparently had all the access they wanted,
though some by virtue of their commitment to vertical loyalty
466

Taylor, P.ncertain Trumpet, 106.

467

.
0 ra 1 II"1story T ranscript, Columbia
Ro b ert Bow1e,
University Oral History Project, 10.

468

1949 Memcrandum.
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did not avail themselves of this opportunity as much as
others. 469

In the end though, it was the constant and insti-

tutionalized contact that gave the Chairman the advantage.
Radford, himself, pointed out to the President that.because
the Chairman sees the President and the Secretary of Defense
regularly, he generally has a "closer association with these
officials than the other Chiefs."

470

This combination of factors led the Chairrr.an to become
the administration's "party whip."

He was in a position not

only to attempt to achieve unanimity, but to enforce it, by
virtue of his "clout" with the administration.

In his book

The Uncertain Trumpet, General Taylor described how the
Chairman's position prevailed in 18 out of 21 split decisions
471
sent forward to tile Secretary of· Defense.
Clark and
Legere, in their study of national security management, suggest that the increasing power of the Chairman was only
partially attributable to the desires of the civilian

469
During the private interviews both Admiral Burke
and General Lemnitzer said they had as much access to the
President as they desired. General Decker, while admitting
that he had access felt that he should not go directly to the
President, especially to fight for an issue that had already
been decided upon by the Secretary of Defense.
470

"Memorandum for the Record," Meetings on Defense
Organization, 25 January 1958, Rockefeller Records, box 18,
folder"l36 ( 3) ;• Eisenhower Library.
471

Taylor, Uncertain Trumpet, 110.
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leadership, but that the Chiefs were also to blame by defer472
.
ring power to t h e Ch a1rman.

The historical evidence seems

to indicate that the Chiefs had no real choice in the matter
and that the gravitation of power into the hands of the Chairman was the result of civilian directives and bureaucratic
realities.

Granted some Chairmen have been more even handed

in their use of power than others, but this evaluation
473
appears to depend on whose ox is being gored.
We have
very little data on whether or not the Chairmen have truly
divested themselves of their service affiliation, though
Taylor supplies us with some evidence that indicates that
.
t en d e d t o supper t
the Ch
. a1rmen

th e1r
. serv1ce
.
. . 4 74
o f or1g1n.

Unfortunately, since Taylor's data only covers the 1955-1959
period more research is needed in order to develop any
hypothesis.
47

~eith C. Clark and Laurence J. Legere, The Presi-

dent and the Management of National s~curity:
A Report by
the Institute of Defense Analysis (New York: Fredrick A.
Praeger, 1969), 183-184.
473
Navy officers familiar with the working of Admiral
Radford maintain that he was more than fair and that he was,
if anything, tougher on the Navy than on the other services;
Burke, interview; Griffin, Oral History. Admiral George
Anderson who was Radford's special assistant, feels that
Radford was exactly what the Chairman was supposed to be,
Anderson, interview. For the opposite view see Gavin, War
~Peace, 260-61 or Taylor, Uncertain Trumpet, 106-110-.-47

~aylor,

Uncertain Trumpet, 107.
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Ironically, the unanimity the President sought came
about toward the end of his administratior: through the return
to a more pluralistic JCS.

The vehicle for this transfor-

mation was a 29 December 1959 memorandum from Secretary of
Defense Thomas Gates to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

This

document, .called the Gates-JCS Memorandum announced that the
secretary of Defense would attend all JCS meetings in which
.
.
d"1scusse d • 475
split 1ssues
were b e1ng

It rejected the notion

that all differences of opinion within the Joint Chiefs were
necessarily dysfunctional and considered instead that many
of them were "understandable."
unanimity was rejected.

Unanimity, for the sake of

Gates discovered that attending JCS

meetings was so advantageous that he institutionalized weekly
meetings.

He thus was the first Secretary of Defense to

meet with the Joint Chiefs on a regular basis.

This resulted

in far less tension between the administration and the Joint
Chiefs, and less dramatic public displays of disunity.
had vast

eA~enence

Gates

in the Department of Defense, at both the

OSD level and within the services.

This apparently gave him

confidence that he could make the hard decisions within a
pluralistic environment.

As such, he approached the Chiefs,

not as competitors as Wilson had, but more like partners.

He

attempted to maintain the image of the honest broker, and he
475

J.D. Hittle, The Military Staff:
Its History and
The Stackpole
Company, 1961), 302.
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fullY understood the pressures that were playing on the Chiefs:
I saw to it that everyone, particularly the Chiefs, had
their innings. They have leaderEhip problems of ~heir
own. They cannot afford to lose face with their own
people.
It's worth taking the time to listen before you
do something, eveo when you know at the onset what you
are going to do. 476
In the final analysis the role the Eisenhower administration envisioned for the JCS was surprisingly congruent
with the role envisioned by its predecessor.

Eisenhower,

like Truman before him, sought unanimity among the Chiefs in
order to facilitate the dectsion making process; and like
Forrestal, came to look upon the Chairman as a means of
expediting this unanimity.

The reason for the requirement

for unanimity was several fold.

First, it was perceived to

be the key to eliminating inter-service conflicts.

Secondly,

because senior civilian defense managers did not have the
expertise to choose rationally between alternative advice, it
was felt that a consensus JCS position was better than a
pluralistic one.

Eisenhower, in particular, was aware of the

dangers inherent in allowing the non-experts free reign over
defense

matters.

Finally, unanimity was a political asset,

especially in the administration's dealings with Congress.
Thus in terms of the Chiefs' external input into the policy
Process, both administrations wantedunified military advice.

476

Quoted in Borklund, The Department of Defense, 118.
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The notion of unanimity among the Chiefs led directly
to the question of how it would be imposed.

After 1948

both Truman and Eisenhower believed that the Chiefs should
be in total concurrence with the administration's position
on defense matters.

The only difference was the degree con-

currence would be forced.

Since allowing the Chiefs to

generate their own positions had only spawned more divisiveness, the easy solution was to make the major decisions at
the top.
a

con~ept

This guaranteed the integrity of the defense team,
that was prevalent among the civilian leadership

all through the period of our study.

By a strange kind of

irresponsible logic it was assumed that the administration's
position on defense matters was the best possible position,
simply because it was not distorted by service parochialism.
The result was the belief, that if the Chiefs could rise
above their service interests, they would see the correctness
of the administration's approach.

This was what President

Truman meant when he called for "Objective Agreements--A true
meeting of professional minds" and what President Eisenhower
was attempting to achieve by requiring that the Chiefs incorporate "non-military" factors.

President Eisenhower's direc-

tive that the Chiefs consider the views of their superiors
encapsulated this notion of democratic centralism that was
accepted by both administrations.
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In order to achieve this unanimity of ideas two
vehicles were used.

The first was the centralization of

power into the hands of the Secretary of Defense and the
Chairman.

The latter was the crucial means by which the

Chiefs were forced into unanimity.

The second vehicle was

the selection of the Chiefs themselves.

At about the same

time that Truman and Eisenhower came to the conclusion that
centralization and unanimity were important, the selection of
Chiefs changed from the "Routine-Professional" model to the
"Professional-Political" model.

Aside from this transforma-

tion it is difficult to identify any clear cut pattern in
the selection process.

Truman had the luxury of maintaining

the "Routine-Professional" model during most of his administration.

The only major exception was the selection of the

Chief of Naval Operations, where loyalty to the concept of
unification was paramount.

Eisenhower seems to have been

primarily concerned with selecting Chiefs who were loyal team
players.

Despite this requirement, Eisenhower never did move

in the direction of a purely political appointment.

Even

Admiral Radford, who was undoubtedly the most political of
his Chiefs, was still a very senior four star admiral and
held probably the most important field command in the Navy.
Furthermore, the President's prior experience with the
military staff model led him simply to assume that loyalty
Would automatically be forthcoming from the members of the
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Joint Chiefs of Staff--whom he believed were his staff.

The

establishment of this commander-staff relationship was the
heart of Eisenhower's 1958 reforms.
It was in the external role of the Chiefs that the
Republicans differed fundamentally from their Democratic
predecessors.

While the political realities in Washington

had forced Truman to use the Chiefs to rationalize his
policies, Eisenhower sought only internal concurrence from
the Chiefs.

Although his familiarity with the military staff

model led him to expect vertical loyalty from his Chiefs
which translated into public concurrence with the administration's policies, he did not seek the kind of overt advocacy
that Bradley was involved in.

To have done so would have

been a violation of the military ethic that the President,
as a former professional soldier, adhered to.
Ironically, the more the civilian defense managers
subordinated the Chiefs to the administration's views the
more they destroyed any chance for the professional military
to show responsibility.

One can appreciate

leadership's perspective on the issue.

the civilian

Their experience had

shown that the Chiefs were incapable of fulfilling their
advisory role.

Instead of unified and usable advice which

could guide the civilian leadership, they received split
decisions, fostered by service parochialism; diluted,
"waffled," and "paperclipped" position papers; and useless
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exaggerated demands that were politically or economically
impracticable.

From the civilian's view point the Chiefs had

excluded themselves from the decision making process.

This

was why Eisenhower so desperately wanted the Chiefs to show
unanimity.

Unfortunately, in his desire to make the Chiefs

a responsible and integral part of the defense team, he was
destroying the very independence which was the basis of
objective advice.

Making the Chiefs into a series of "yes"

men removed a vital source of expertise that was an essential
part of the policy process.
Part of the problem was an inability on the part of
the civilian leadership to understand what the real source
of the trouble was.

They kept looking for organizational

solutions to an organizational problem, when in fact the
problem was not completely organizational.

A great deal of

the trouble lay in the Chiefs own interpretation of what
their role was to be and how they should act as professionals.
If the organizational structure of the national security
policy making system and the nature of the bureaucra.cy outlined two of the parameters within which the civilian leadership and the Joint Chiefs defined their relationship with
each other, the civilian's perceptions of the Chiefs' proper
role and the Chiefs' own self-perceptions completed the
framework.

With this in mind we now turn our attention to

thE last of these parameters, the Chiefs' self-perception of
their role and their view of professionalism.

CHAPTER VII
THE JOINT CHIEFS' OWN PERCEIVED ROLE
In attempting to ascertain the Chiefs' perception of
their role one must first attempt to separate their bureaucratic role from their normative ethical values.

While such

methodology will help supply empirical data on various perceptual components, such compartmentalization is for heuristic reasons only.

In reality a Chief's bureaucratic role and

his ethical norms constantly interact.

The former is a

result of his placement within the hierarchical structure,
while the latter is a product of over thirty years of assimilated values.

They become inextricably connected through

the Chiefs' perception of themselves as military staff
officers.
In our earlier analysis of defense organizations we
noted the relationship of a Chief's bureaucratic role with
his dual function as the military head of a service and a
member of the corporate body of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
This duality was assessed by most outside analysis as the
primary cause for conflict within the JCS with the separation
477
of the Chiefs from their services deemed the solution.
477 c omm1ss1on
· · on 0 rgan1za
. t•1on o f th e Execu t·1ve Branc h
of the Government, Task Force Report on National Security
Organization (Appendix G) (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1949), 66-70; Committee on the Defense
Establishment, A Report to S<-nntor Kennedy, Washington, D.C.,
1960 (~iimeographed), 6; U.S. Committee on Department of Defense
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The Chiefs, however, perceive this duality as not only
inherent within their role, but functional.

The basis for

this is their belief that the planning and the operational
command functions should be combined in the same person.
For the Chiefs, the planning function is a corollary of their
corporate role and the command function is a corollary of
their service role.

As a group, the Chiefs have a great

fear of "ivory tower" planning if the plans are developed by
nonresponsible staffs, who do not have to be concerned with
implementing them.

In a secret 1958 Joint Chiefs of Staff

self-study conducted under the leadership of Major General
Earl Wheeler, the following points were listed as disadvantages to be incurred if the Chiefs were separated from their
services:
l.

Tends to remove the members of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff from current intimate knowledge of the capabilities of their service.

2.

Would make the Joint Chiefs of Staff responsible for
planning and execution of joint operations without
the concomitant authority and responsibility to
budget for and control all the means required.

Organization, Repcrt of the Rockefeller Committee on Department of Defense Organization, ll April 1953 (printed for the
use of the Committee on Armed Services, 83d Congress, 1st
Session), 4-10; Commission on Organization of the Executive
Branch of the Government, Five Staff Papers prepared for the
Task Force on Procurement, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1955), I, The Vital Roles of the
National Security Council and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, A-54,
A-74; The Blue Ribbon Defense Panel (Fitzhugh Commission).
Report to the President and the Secretary of Defense on the
Department of Defense (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1970), Appendix N, Staff Report on Joint
Chiefs of Staff Decisionmaking, 5-11; and Rockefeller Brothers Fund, International Security: The Military Aspects,
America at Mid-Century Series, (New York: Doubleday & Co.,
Inc., 1958), 29.
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2.

Would make the Joint Chiefs of Staff responsible for
planning and execution of joint operations without
the concomitant authority and responsibility to
budget for and control all the means required.

3.

Would reduce the responsibility, authority and prerogatives of the Service Chiefs to the functional
areas of administration, logistics and training.

Even though the report pointed out that separation would
allow the Chiefs to devote full time to their JCS duties and
increase their knowledge about the capabilities of other
services, the Wheeler Report concluded that "the separation
of the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from their
service affiliations and command responsibilities would be
478
unwise."
While the Joint Chiefs of Staff never officially
commented on the study, their private views tended to corroborate

the Wheeler Report's position.

The one exception was

General Maxwell Taylor, who advocated separation in his
book The Uncertain Trumpet.

479

A-corollary to the unification of planning and command
was a tendency on the part of the Chiefs to minimize the
actual conflict resulting from these dual roles.

Admiral

Burke saw them as basically two aspects of the same role:
478

Report by the Ad Hoc Committee to the Joint Chiefs
of Staff on Organization of the DepartMent of Defense, 24
January 1958.
(Hereafter referred to as the Wheeler Report).
479
Harper

Maxwell D. Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet (New York:

& Brothers, 1959), 165-180.
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How do you handle a wife and yourself, it's no more
complicated than that. What would he [the Chief]
represent if he didn't represent his service ••• the
ability
a Joint Chief is dependent on his back-·
ground. 4

gd

General Lemnitzer went even further and rejected the notion
481
that the two functions were even separable.
While most
of the Chiefs admit that the duality exists, they feel that
they have reconciled any conflict to the point that one role
does not impinge on the other.

General R.idgway in his Fare-

well Report to the Secretary of Defense

e~pressed

the rela-

tionship in symbiotic terms:
As Chief of Staff, United States Army, it has been my
duty to seek to maintain the capability of the Army to
fulfill the Army's assigned commitments. However, both
as Chief of Staff of the Army and as a member of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, it has also been my duty to
advance the primary interests of ~gited States security
over and above Service interests.
General George Decker expressed similar views in an interview:
As service representative .•• ! had the job of trying to
get my service as much of the resources available in
the National Defense kitty as I could .•.• As a member of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff ..• I had the responsibility 483
for the overall military preparedness of the country.
480

Interview with Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, Washington, D.C., January 1975.
481

Interview with General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Washington, D.C., January 1975.
482 Matthew B. Ridgway, Soldier, The Memoirs of Matthew B.
Ridgway (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1956), 131.
483 Interview with General George H. Decker, Washington, D.C., January 1975.
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Generals Ridgway's and Decker's explanation of responsibility
to the nation is similar to our earlier discussion of General
Lemnitzer's account of his transformation upon being appointed
Chairman of the JCS.
The almost mystical manner in which the Chiefs look
upon their command function is more than just the result of
their desire to combine authority and responsibility. It is
a product of the social values of the military services.
Command is considered the ultimate achievement and epitomizes the true soldier.

Furthermore, it is a requirement

for further promotion.

Among the post-World War II Chiefs

only Army Chief of Staff, Harold K. Johnson (1964-1968),
did not command at the flag rank.

Command is considered so

important that one Chief even took a demotion from a three
star billet to a two star billet in order to command at the
484
appropriate level.
Within this atmosphere it is easy
to see how a Chief, who is the senior officer in his service
and its spokesman, could look upon his role as analogous to
that of command.

This situation is complicated by the

statutory confusion that designated some service Chiefs as
commanders.

4g4

In 1858 Admiral George Anderson, Chief of Naval
Operations, 1961-63, reverted back to the rank of rear
admiral from vice admiral in order to command Cr,.rrier Di vision 6. He needed command at that level in the hierarchy.
See Lawrence Korb, The Joint Chiefs of Staff: The First
Twenty-five Years (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press,
1976), 60-61.
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If a Chief has problems identifying his own role,
the officer corps of his service has even greater difficulty
understanding his role.

They look toward their Chief as

the defender of their interests and the head of their professional organization.
mander.

He is, in their mind, their com-

Admiral Denfeld's greatest failing was that he

failed as the commander in the eyes of the Navy's officer
corps.

The combination of bureaucratic imperatives to re-

present the service and socialized values lead the Chiefs to
act as commanders and defend their prerogatives.
Closely related to the Chiefs' perception that their
dual role is f-cnctional is a concomitant diminution of the
dysfunctional nature of inter-service conflict.

This is

not to say that the Chiefs consider divergence of opinion to
be a positive good.

The Wheeler Report identified it as a

485
. l area o f d e f.1c1ency.
.
po t en t 1a

Bu t f rom t h e Ch.1e f s

I

per-

spective such divergence can result in a pluralistic

485

.

Wheeler Report; General Bradley also real1zed the
potential area involved in split decisions based primarily
on service parochialism. Jn this regard he had a special
study made '·~to document cases where individual Chiefs of
Staff took positions which were obviously dictated by prejudicial Service views." The study concluded that "There
Will continue to be disagreement as long as:
(l) There are
separate Services with differing opinions on tl:.e philosophy
of war, and; (2) The Chiefs of'those Services are charged
collectively with the function of exercising strategic
direction of the Armed Forces." Memorandum for General
Bradley, 16 December 1952, subject: Reorganization of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Record Group 218, box 4, folder "020
JCS ''. National Archives.
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decision making structure.

Even the most critical of the

former Chiefs, General Taylor, maintained "that while each
Chief had unavoidably a 'cast' in favor of his service, it
could not be fairly called a 'bias' and that the advantages
of that 'cast' outweighed the disad~antages." 486

General

Taylor was articulating the belief that each Chief comes
into office with specialized service related expertise and
that this will naturally lead to differing solutions to
problems.

The interaction of these differences, however,

can ultimately result in the best advice surfacing.
each Chief attempts to translate into

h~

Thus

own terms Admiral

King's adage that what is good for the Navy is good for the
United States.

Admiral Burke amply described the phenomenon

when he said "I was responsible for doing my best with my
background for the security of the United States and every
Chief knew this ..• they were chosen because of their knowledge
487
in a certain type of war."
This expertise was the basis
of Clark Clifford's advocacy of a pluralistic Joint Chiefs
of Staff back in 1946.
in such systemic

It appears, though, that this faith

rationalism is in direct proportion to the

success that one's service has in achieving its goals.

It

486 Memorandum to Nelson A. Rockefeller from Charles
A. Coolidge, 7 March 1958, Rockefeller Records, box 18,
folder "136(1)", Eisenhower Library.
487 Burke, Interview.
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iS not accidental that the most vocal critics of the JCS
system are former Army generals Ridgway, Taylor and Gavin.
As long as the Chiefs failed to realize that bureaucratic imperatives resulted in inter-service conflict, they
never could understand the motivation of the civilian leadership.

While both the Truman and Eisenhower administrations

perceived dysfunctional behavior, the Chiefs seemed to believe
that their actions were not only to be expected but were
actually beneficial.

Whether or not this was the actual view

of the Chiefs or merely a means of rationalizing bureaucratic realities is impossible to determine, but as long as
they believed this, the various organizational reforms would
have no results.

Taking the Chiefs out of the chain-of-

command would not change their services nor their own view
that they were commanders.
The admonition that differences of opinion were not
intrinsically bad did not lead the Chiefs to the conclusion
that artificial unanimity was to be avoided.

On the con-

trary, for two good reasons, unanimity was still a goal to
be attained.

The first was the bureaucratic reality that

when the JCS split they effectively lost any control they
had over the decision.

Not that unanimity means contrcl

over a decision--though it is rare for the civilian leadership to completely disregard it--but unanimity does allow the
Chiefs a degree of leverage in dealing with the administration.
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Tbis harkens back to Admiral Radford's statement that the
more the Chiefs differed, the greater his power as Chairman
became.

The same was applicable to the increase in the

administration's power.

This led the Chiefs at times to

project the image of unanimity even though there may be
deep seated differences.

In 1956 after the so-called "Re-

volt of the Colonels," in which army officers leaked information about major disagreements within the JCS, the Chiefs
beld a news conference that was designed to dispel any doubt
as to the Chiefs'collegiality.

According to one Chief, the

news conference was self-generated, with the sole purpose
of projecting an image of unanimity and destroying the image
of divisiveness that the' Revolt" created. 488

The second

was that the Chiefs clearly perceived themselves as military
professionals.

How these two factors become interconnected

is revealed in the following response by Air Force Chief of
Staff, Thomas D. White, to the charge that split decisions
and inter-service rivalry is dysfunctional.
Split decisions, though rare, occur whenever a basic
principle or procedure is involved on which the Chiefs
are unable to agree. This results in passing upward
responsibility for decision. On strategic and military
operations, however, the Service Chiefs are the experts.
It is therefore a disadvantage for the Chiefs to seek
others to make decdsions: on such matters. The advantage
of a split decision is that a view or a principle is not
submerged and hidden merely because a numerical majority
488

Interview with General Maxwell D. Taylor, Washington D. C., January 1975.
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may oppose it.
I feel that numbers do not necessarily
make for correct decisions. There can be good results
from JCS splits provided higher authority resolves the
issue with unequivocal decision .••• There is always tremendous self-imposed pressure to do the best job possible because agreement among the Chiefs on military
matters ought ordinarily to result in the best solution
of the problem. Based on past experience, I consider
that a compromise solution of a military ~roblem arrived
at by the Joint Chiefs of Staff is usually better than
a compromise decision made by civilian authority, Moreover, it has been apparent to me that when the Joint
Chiefs of Staff forward split views there is a tendency
to regard such action as a manifestation of "inter-service rivalry" although such is definitely not the fundamental basis for the action.489
The fact that General White described the Joint Chiefs
as "experts" is essential in understanding their perception
of their role.

As professional experts, the Chiefs seek

autonomy within their sphere of expertise.

Thus the belief

that a compromise arrived at by the JCS is better than one
arrived at by the civilian leadership.

White very clearly

denotes the disadvantage of forcing an issue higher in
bureaucracy and thus outside the control of the experts.

A

similar desire is indicated by the following 1953 statement
by General Vandenberg, when he asserted "judgment of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff as to the strength of the military
forces the country is to maintain must have overriding importance. "4 90

Likewise, President Eisenhower sought unanimity

489
Letter, White to Lyndon B. Johnson, 7 January 1958,
Rockefeller Records, box 18, folder "136(3)", Eisenhower
Library.
490
New York Times, 9 June 1953, 10.
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among his chiefs because he perceived them as having the
military expertise while the civilian managers did not.49l
The Chiefs' desire to achieve professional autonomy is also
reflected in the Wheeler Report.

As part of the study the

report examined various organizational options for the
Defense Department.

One particular option gave the Joint

Chiefs direct operational responsibility of military forces.
The advantage of this option was that it would "raise the
stature" of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and thus impedes undesirable civilian encroachment into the field of strictly
.
492
ml"l"ltary operatlons.

This option was not only the

opposite of the President's 1958 plan, but it reflected the
Chiefs growing concern for their loss of autonomy, in the
face of ever increasing centralization.
White's statement also directs us to another salient
issue within the Chiefs' self-perceptions.

As military pro-

fessionals they automatically embraced those traditional
values that required them to limit their view to those
"purely military" aspects of any issue.

This demand for

autonomy in military matters was the corollary to this
restrictive caveat.

It was not only the Chiefs' rationaliza-

tion to combat the domination of military matters by the
491

Arleigh A. Burke, Oral History, Transcript, Columbia University Oral History Project, 53-56.
492

Wheeler Report, (underline added).
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civilian managers, but it was also as much a part of their
world view as the love of their service.
The American military leader before the Second World
war, could and did for the most part, live in a world that
bifurcated the political from the military.

With the con-

elusion of the Second World War and the advent of the semiwar, semi-peace environment of the Cold War, that traditional value was strained to the limit.

The civilians were

the first to break with traditionalism by attempting to
institutionalize political/military planning; unfortunately
they never could go all the way and opt completely for fusion.
Even their half-way efforts, however, put great pressures on
the traditional ethics of the Chiefs.

Ostensibly, the Chiefs

gave the appearance of attempting to surmount the dilemma
involved in making their traditional professionalism compatible with the new realities of the Cold War.

On the one

hand, the national security system forced them to become
involved in the budget and foreign policy process, while on
the other hand, they had been inculcated over a thirty-year
career with a set of professional values that traced its
lineage back to Upton.

The nature of the dilemma was arti-

culated by General Omar Bradley in an article written for
~

magazine in 1952:
In these next trying years, I predict that as emergencies arise, the military will be called upon for advice
and perhaps initially to take charge of problems.
I also
am sure that as soon as civilian agencies are organized to
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take over such civilian problems, the military will
gladly withdraw to its purely professional duties.493
such an apologetic position explicitly identified the fact
that the boundaries in which a professional officer should
operate had been transgressed and that, as good professionals,
the Chiefs sought the return to their restricted role.
But what were those "purely professional duties" that
General Bradley alluded to?

To fit into the traditionalist

mold, they should emphasize the automatonical nature of the
military profession, the bifurcation of the political from
the military point of view, and ultimately maintain that as
professionals they should restrict their advice to that
which is "purely military" in nature, to the exclusion of
other factors.

Such an approach would be totally compatible

with a narrow perception of civilian control that characterized any appreciation of non-military factors by the professional officer as undermining that American value.
As good traditionalists, they exhibited all of these
traits to varying degrees.

The notional bifurcation of vari-

ous power factors, most noticeably the political from the
military, is a pillar of traditionalism.

Theoretically, such

compartmentalization stems from the lack of expertise in
these areas.

Practically, it will result in misunderstanding,

if not outright antagonism, toward the use of those
493 omar N. Bradley, The Collected Writings of General
Omar N. Bradley, (Washington, D.C.:
1967), Vol. III, 181.
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non-military determinants.

General J. Lawton Collins'

sympathy for the problems of General MacArthur and his own
difficulty in identifying the main threads in US policy in
Asia exemplified such compartmentalization.

494

General

Twining's resentment over political restrictions on the use
of airpower in Korea is another.

495

But a

hlfurcated or com-

partmentalized approach does not always have to lead to conflict; it can lead to a simple division of labor along
functional lines based on expertise.

Earlier we noted

General Bradley posited such a functional division with his
suggestion that there were "civil ian problems" that should
be solved by "civilian agencies."

Bradley elaborated on

this approach in an article he wrote in 1950:
As a soldier, I have no desire to invade the
field of foreign policy. The conduct of foreign affairs
is a civilian responsibility. Military policy in our
democratic America must always remain the servant of
national aims.496
Despite compartmentalization, it is the exclusion of
non-military factors that form the philosophical underpinning of traditionalism.

Institutionally, the Chiefs pro-

jected this by placing the restrictive caveat "from the military point of view" on almost all their documents; and institutional philosophy that was reinforced by the personal
4 9 4J. Lawton Collins, War in Peacetime (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1969), 248.
York:

495 Nathan F. Twining, Neither Liberty Ncr Safety (New
Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1966), 117.
496 Bradley, Collected Writings, Vol. III, 40.
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perceptions of the Chiefs.

In 1953 Bradley reaffirmed the

idea that traditionalism was the only way for a professional
to act:
Generally ..• we should confine our part to pointing out
the military implications and military capabilities .••
Perhaps some people might feel that the Joint Chiefs
should stand up and resolutely and strongly recommend a
national policy which we would prefer, but to date, I
have not yet been convinced that this is the proper role
for the military leader.497
During the Eisenhower administration, the Chiefs continued
to project the perception that this was the proper role.
Admiral Arthur Radford, Eisenhower's first Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs, specifically stated that the Chiefs gave only
498
military advice.
This point was further emphasized by
GeneraliJatthew Ridgway in his retirement letter:
I view the military advisory role of a member of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff as follows:
he should give
his competent professional advice on the military aspects
of the problem referred to him, based on his fearless,
honest, objective estimate of the national interest and
regardless of administration policy at any particular
time. He should confine his advice to essentially the
military aspects.499
According to the traditionalist interpretation, the
basis for exclusion lies in the realm of expertise.

This was

pointed out very clearly by General Eisenhower in a statement
before Congress in 1947:

497
498
499

Quoted in

Rid~vay,

Soldier, 330.

U.S. News and World Report, 25 February 1955, 45.
Ridgway, Soldier, 330 (Underline added).
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I appear before you only as a professional soldier,
to give you a soldier's advice regarding the national
defense.
I am not qualified to procee%beyond that.
field; and I do not intend to do so .•.. 00
It should be noted that he did not change his views upon
entering the White House.

Despite the fact that publicly

the Chiefs were supposed to incorporate economic factors into
their military analysis, the President privately informed
them they were to give him "purely military advice. ,,SOl
Ostensibly, it would appear that the Chiefs manifested
all the attributes of traditionalism; yet there are certain
contradictions that haunt us.

While some of the Chiefs appear

to manifest a bifurcated approach to policy formulation
others fully appreciated the interrelationship of the political and military arenas.

Rather incongruently, Admiral

Radford said in the same paragraph, that although the JCS
gave only advice from the military point of view:
There is often no clear line of demarcation between
foreign and military policy.
Instead, there is an
overlap. There are military implications in foreign
policy and conversely, political implications in military
policy.502
500

Quoted in Ridgway, Soldier, 331.

501

Memorandum for Record, 25 January 1958, subject:
Meeting on Defense Organizatmon, Rockefeller Records, box 18,
folder, "136(2)", Eisenhower library.
502

u.s. News and World Report, 25 February 1955, 45.
Admiral Burke also noted the interaction between military
and political factors.
See Admiral Burke's opening statement to the Seminar on Foreign Affairs, U.S. Naval Academy,
8 January 1975.
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one must question the feasibility of bifurcating political/
military policy when their interrelationship is so well
understood.

Bradley's actions as Chairman as well as his

earlier quoted apology attests to this.

The complicated

nature of the dilemma is revealed by General Ridgway in his
memoirs.
If the objective the statesman wishes to achieve
is a costly one, that is not the soldier's business.
If it is greater than the political leaders wish to
support, or think the economy of the country can bear,
that is not his business.
It is the constitutional
responsibility of the civilian authority to decide these
questions.
If, of course, on first inspection, the cost
is obviously fantastic, the soldier should make that
point clear. But within the broad area of reasonable
appropriations--within the bracket of what a reasonable
man would say the country could afford--he should scrupulously eschew any opinion as to whether the cost is
beyond the reach of the national purse or not. He is
without competence in that field.
If civilian authority
finds the cost to be greater than the country can bear,
then either the objectives themselves should be modified
or the responsibility for the risks involved should be
forthrightly accepted. Under no circumstances, regardless of pressures from whatever source or motive,
should the professional military man yield, or compromise
his judgment for other than convincing military reage&s·
To do otherwise would be to destroy his usefulness.
The nature of the dilemma outlined by General Ridgway
appears to be the incompatibility of a Chief's perceived
normative role with the

reality of his job.

He decidedly

projected an image of traditionalism which demanded he
restrict his attention to purely military matters and exclude
non-military factors.
503

In reality, though, the "traditionalist"

.
Ridgway, Soldler, 272.
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realized that this was impossible.

Whether or not they were

projecting this image as a result of a professional ethic
or in order to be congruent with the desires of their civilian
leadership is impossible to say.
tion of both.

Probably it was a combina-

Undoubtedly, the concept of civilian control

played a decisive role.

This facet of the professional ethic,

was in the words of General Ridgway, "so universally accepted
throughout the officer corps that it needed no elaboration;"

504

yet the incorporation of non-military factors seemed somehow
to undermine this value system.

What is apparent is that

the traditionalists were not as pure in their traditionalism
as had been supposed.

They understood the importance of

non-military factors and this led them at least to consider
their incorporation.

The source of the dilution of their

purity has not been explored, but by examining the professional perceptions of General Maxwell D. Taylor we may well
find the answer.
Upon assuming the office of Chief of Staff of the Army
in 1955, General Taylor perceived his role in very traditional terms.

He recalled that he was the product of a

socialized professional view that he should restrict his
interests to that which was "predominately military" in nature
and as such he should "stick to his native" when dealing
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with the civilian leadership.

He believed that this was

also the prevalent view of his two immediate predecessors,
Generals Collins and Ridgway.

This traditionalist view

eroded, however, as General Taylor became exposed to the
political/military realities of his office.

Later when he

came back as Military Advisor to the President it eroded
further.

He became an advocate of the view that the profes-

sional officer had to have a broader appreciation of nonmilitary factors than had previously

bee~

proposed.

It

should be made clear that this broadening was in addition
to the traditional military expertise, not a replacement
for it.

Essential to Taylor's conversion to the "new pro-

fessionalism" lay in his redefinition of the word "military."
While he still believed that his primary mission was to
articulate effectively the military aspects of a particular
problem, the term "military" took on a broader meaning, to
include the economic, social, and political aspects.

In his

mind, for the Chiefs to give a "purely military" opinion
on a matter was intellectually dishonest. 505

It may also

be suggested that Taylor's advocacy for the "new professionalism" had a bureaucratic origin.

While Eisenhower

hoped that the Chiefs would come to the same conclusions as
the administration did on economic and political issues if
they examined them from the same perspective; Taylor may

sm:;

Taylor, Interview.
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have seen the incorporation of these non-military factors
as a tool to increase his bargaining position vis-a-vis.
the administration.

Furthermore, there was an ironic and

possibly unrealized implication in his advocacy for the
incorporation of non-military factors.

If successful, the

military officer would achieve a higher degree of autonomy
in the military field than ever before.

While previously

bifurcation enforced limits on the military professional,
the elimination of that bifurcation would also break down
those limits.

The fusionist officer could claim complete

autonomy based on his analysis of all possible factors.
Such a breakdown would necessitate a restructuring of the
traditional American approach to civilian control of the
military, if not completely destroy it.
While we do not have the data base, we can extrapolate from Taylor's experience that a similar evolutionary
process may have led other Chiefs to gain an appreciation
for the importance of non-military factors and to a varying
degree to internalize them.

Forsaking the danger of belabor-

ing the point, there appears to be a subtle, but very distinct difference in the minds of former Chiefs between understanding the importance of non-military factors and actually
inc0rporating them into their intellectual process.
former implies a continued version of traditionalism.

The
The
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officer somehow manages to keep the military aspect of the
issue separate, he understands that non-military factors
maY affect his plans, and he may even be willing to comment
on those non-military factors if pressed on the matter.
Unfortunately, the exact nature of this distinction becomes
muddied when we attempt to examine it.

However, this dis-

tinction is evident in the ideas of many former Chiefs as
exemplified by General Lemnitzer:
Their [the Chiefs'] job is to look at it from the military point of view, but recognizing, and not being
oblivious of economic, psychological, political, and
other aspects, but it's not their primary business to
trim their estimates of requirements based upon whether
there is going to be this amount of money available ••• 506
By gaining an appreciation for the importance of nonmilitary factors and their interrelationship, the professional
is better prepared to deal with the inevitable reevaluation
of his plans and to integrate them into a policy package by
interfacing with non-military agencies.

Yet the Chiefs

attempted with a high degree of regularity to maintain their
traditionalism.

In the final analysis how could they claim

professional autonomy if they advocated expertise outside
their professional sphere?

This was one of the main themes

of the Wheeler Report, which cited civilian encroachment and
the use of non-military determinants as areas of deficiency.
Aside from their traditional values, another reason

----------------------506Lemnitzer,

Interview.
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for the Chiefs' continuing grasp of traditionalism was their
own perception of themselves as military staff officers.
For the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the
role of a staff officer was by no means a new experience.
The preponderance of their careers from the rank of Major/
L,T. Sommander had been in that role, rather than in the more
glamorous role of the commander.

During these assignments

they acquired a set of norms as to what a good staff officer
does and does not do, and how he should operate.

Staff

officers are functional experts who develop plans, give advice, and carry out the decisions of the commander.

Loyalty

to the commander is implicit within the staff officer's role.
In fact this vertical loyalty is the very foundation upon
which the feudal nature of military society rests.

The self-

perception of the Chiefs as staff officers goes back to the
very origin of the organization during the Second World War,
when Admiral Leahy said "we [the JCS] were the staff of the
President of the United States."

507

General Eisenhower

alluded to the same kind of relationship in 1949 when he
referred to his role in the development of the FY 51 budget
as that of "the carpenter and someone else was
507

u.s. Congress, House, Committee on Government
Operations, Reorganization Plan No. 6 of 1953 (Department of
Defense: Hearings on H.J. RES. 264, 83d Congress, 1st Session, 1953, 211.
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the arc hi teet." 50S But it is probably General Taylor who
most explicitly explained this aspect of the Chiefs' rqle
when he

noted "as staff officers, we do what we are accus-

tomed to in the military service.
to the commanding general.

We give our best advice

Then he makes the decision." 509

For the members of the JCS the commanding general is the
Commander-in-Chief.
What General Taylor left unsaid was that a good staff
officer not only carries out the orders of the commander,
but does so without question. This explains why the Chiefs
tended to support the administration's programs in the public
forum.

As General Ridgway said upon the assumption of his

office, "Now loyalty-loyalty is a state or condition like
pregnancy, it either does exist or does not exist."

He then

went on to say how that relates to his own staff:
I shall expect the officers of this staff to present
their own honest views fearlessly, forthrightly, but
objectively in light of their own conclusions as to what
best serves the Army's overall interests. The most dangerous advisor to have around is the yes-man, and the
most useless is one who thinks of self instead of service.
I shall also expect, at all levels, that having once
expressed his opinions and having heard the decision, the
508

u.s. Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriation,
HParings, Fiscal 1951, 81Et Congress, 1st Session, 1949, 609.
509

U.S.Congress, Senate, Preparedness Investigating
Subcommittee of the Committee on the Armed Services and the
Committee on Aeronautical and Space Services, Hearings, Missile and Space Activity, 86th Congress, 1st Session, 1959,
107.
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officer's entire support will then be put behind tbe
execution of that decision regardless of what his views
had been. 510
While Ridgway was referring to his own Army staff,
the ideal of vertical loyalty can easily be extrapolated and
placed within the context of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Ridgway, himself, combined the factors of professionalism
and loyalty in his Farewell Report:
If the military ad~isor's unrestricted advice is
solicited, he should give his considered opinion, for in
today's climate national security planning is broad and
encompasses many aspects ...• However, in my opinion,
the military advisor should be neither expected nor required to give public endorsement to military courses
of action against which he previously recommended. His
responsibility should be solely that of loyal vigorous
execution of decisions by proper authority.5ll
It was undoubtedly this notion of loyalty that
prompted Truman's Chiefs to come very close to violating
their professionalism by defending the administration.

It

was apparently this concept of loyalty that was so prevalent
during the votes on the super-carrier.

Furthermore, it is

this notion of loyalty that tends to keep the Chief's from
politicizing their differences with the administration and
making them public.

For some Chiefs even the idea of going

to the President to fight a Secretarial decision was considered "kicking over the traces." 512

510
511
512

.
Ridgway, Sold1er, 350-51.
Ibid~,
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.
Decker, Interv1ew.

General Twining
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felt that once a decision had been made then discussion of
it had ended, even within the confines of the National
Security Council.

513

General Decker was exhibiting vertical

loyalty when he said that when the Chiefs go before a Congressional Committee they are not about to volunteer any
information.

514

As for carrying the fight outside the halls

of the Pentagon, General White's comment before Congress
seems to reflect the

norm~

I think it would be wrong for me to step out of line as
a member of the team, in defiance you might say of my
legally constituted superiors and raise an issu~ •••• I
might resign and then carry it to the Congress.515
Loyalty precluded an open attack upon the commander
in chief at least while the chief was in uniform.

In a

feudal hierarchical system like the military, in which fealty
is all important, the staff officer has two choices,
513.__

-u.s. Congress, Senate, Corrmittee on Armed Services,
Hearings on Nomination on Arthur William Radford as Chairman
of Joint Chiefs of S':aff, Matthew Bunker Ridgway as Chief of
Staff, Army, Robert Bostwick Carney as Chief of Naval Operations and Nathan J. Arragut Twining as Chief of Staff, Air
Force, 83n Congress, 1st Session, 1953, 30.
51

4becker, Interview.
General Taylor indicated that
the Chiefs got together after President Eisenhower's heart
attack and decided to minimize the number of split decisions
they would send forward so as not to task the ailing commanderin-chief; Taylor, Interview.

9u.s.

51
Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services,
Department of Defense Reorganization Act 1958, Hearings on H.R.
12541, 85th Congress, 2nd s~ssion, 1958, 100.
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capitulation or resignation.
fer is impossible.

For a chief of staff, trans-

This explains why Ridgway and Taylor

waited until they had retired before they launched their
attacks upon the administration.

Why did they not use re-

signation though, as a means of attracting public attention
to the issues under debate?

When specifically asked this

question, General Taylor responded that "a Chief does not
.
h e re t.1res. " 516
res1gn,

I would suggest that this is not

merely a semantical distinction, but reflected a fundamental
ethical value which is part of the staff officer's commitment to loyalty.

Just as a loyal staff officer should

expedite the commander's decisions, so he should refrain from
politicizing his differences with the commander until he has
gracefully retired.

Then, as General White noted he would

be free to carry them to the public.

This perception is part

of what General Taylor called the "ethics of behavior in the
.
..517
m1"l"t
1 ary serv1ce.
This ethic of military behavior creates a great deal
of strain on a Chief, especially if his service has been on
the losing side of disagreements with the administration.
Since open capitulation would not only result in his service's animosity, but would be a rejection of his professional belief as to what is in the best interest of the

516
5)7

Taylor, Interview.
Senate, Hearings, Missile and Space Activity, 107.
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nation, and sjnce resignation or open opposition is simply
not considered, the Chief is forced to express his disfavor
in such a manner as to prevent an open break with the
administration.

General Vandenberg's dissent on the second

super-carrier vote is illustrative of this process.

He

could not openly attack the administration's program, yet
he had to defend his service's interests.

His use of a pro-

cedural means to reject the carrier accomplished both goals
and appeared to support both of his constituencies.

Such

waffling on issues is not unknown among the Chiefs.

One of

the best examples occurredin December 1958 during the
development of the Fiscal Year 1960 Defense Budget.

The

Chiefs opposed the budget levels that the administration
thought appropriate.

Before the National Security Council

only the Chairman, General Twining, endorsed the budget.
Secretary of Defense McElroy continued to press the Chiefs
for a unanimous endorsement.

The result was the following

statement:
The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider the FY 1960 proposed expenditure figure of $40,945,000,000 is adequate
to provide for the essential programs necessary for the
defense of the nation for the period under consideration.
They find no serious gaps in the key elements of the
budget in its present form, but all have reservations
with respect to the funding of some segments of their
respective service programs.518
While such waffles allow the Chiefs to display
directly a certain amount of dissatisfaction with an
518

Taylor, Uncertain Trumpet, 72.
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administration policy, they also use indirect means to
achieve their goals.

One such indirect means is the widely

used "leak," either to the press or to the Congress.

A so-

called leak in 1956 undercut Admiral Radford's efforts to
substantially cut American ground forces.

When it was

published· in the New York Times, the West German government
reacted quickly to this threat to lower the number of United
States forces in Europe and forced the Eisenhower administration to drop the proposa1. 519

Congress is a particularly

fertile ground for a leak to be planted, and may be inextricably linked to an indirect means of expressing dissatisfactiop
through Congressional testimony.

While it may be true that

a Chief will not volunteer information to the Congress, he
will happily respond to direct-questions that will allow him
an opportunity to discuss his dissenting views.

It is not

difficult to guarantee that the appropriate questions are
asked.

In most cases a leak is not even needed because the

members of the congressional committee know full well the
major points of disagreement between the Chiefs and the
administration.

This was the reason President Eisenhower

sought to eliminate the Chiefs' requirement to go before
congressional committees.

During the debate over the rearma-

ment of Germany, the Chiefs used their testimony to put
Pressure on the State Department to support their

519
Ibid., 72.
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.

pro-rearmanen t v1ew.

520

A third means of expressing dis-

satisfaction is through private pressure groups and former
members of the JCS.

These individuals and groups are in a

position to convey to the public the views of the JCS, without the Chiefs formally announcing their position.

In

either case these indirect means allow the Chiefs to avoid
direct confrontation with the administration.
The idea of staff loyalty also helps explain the
metamorphosis that occurs when an individual is appointed
Chairman.

The role model upon which the chairmanship is

built is that of a chief of staff of any large military
organization.

The chief of staff's primary responsibility

is representing the commander to the various subordinate
staff agencies and coordinating their actions.

In that

position he mitigates conflict between the various agencies.
Only when the issues are irreconcilable does it go to the
commander for him to choose between alternatives.

Normally,

if the staff work has been done effectively, the decision
paper will have only one recommendation on it.

In practice,

the Chairman is the President's chief of staff, which was
Admiral Leahy's formal title; but fear of

11

Prussianization"

effectively eliminated the possibility of using that title.

S20 Laurence W. Mar t.1n, "The Amer1can
.
Dec1s1on
. ..
to
Rearm Germany," in American Civil-Military Decisions, ed.
by Harold Stein (Montgomery, Alabama: University of Alabama
Press, 1963), 621.
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The role model of the chief of staff as

thE~

commander's

representative also explains General Bradley's politiGization in support of the Truman administration.
Over the decade and a half that covered the Truman
and Eisenhower administrations, the Chiefs exhibited a surprising consistency in the way they perceived their role.
This was true both in regards to their bureaucratic position
as well as their normative values.
In terms of the bureaucracy, all the Chiefs acknowledged that there were inherent problems and strains placed
on them by dual and conflicting functions.

While the

civilian leadership saw the conflict between the Chiefs'
corporate and service roles, and their planning and command
functions as a source of dysfunctional behavior, the Chiefs'
perceived them as an integral part of their role.

The

Chiefs rationalized their inextricability based upon the
belief that responsibility and authority should go hand in
hand.
The source of this rationalization, though, goes
deeper than an organizational relationship between responsibility and authority.

Part of it stems from the Chiefs own

belief that they are both commanders of their services and
a staff officer to the commander-in-chief.

This is the

crucial dichotomy upon which the other conflicts are built.
Unfortunately, it was the more superficial dualities, such
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as planning versus commanding, that caught the attention of
the organizational reformers.

In the role of the commander,

the service chief is forced to defend his service's interests.
Ironically, this leads the Chiefs to accept a certain amount
of inter-service conflict as at least theoretically functional.

The Chief's staff officer role motivates him to

defend the administration's programs.

This is, in reality,

just another manifestation of the Chiefs' front man role.
Another source of this rationalization comes from
the Chiefs' perception of themselves as professionals.

For

them, the concept of professionalism and its relationship
to the client society was similar to that of other professionals.

Most of all they perceived themselves as the

military experts and, as such, they demanded autonomy within
their sphere of expertise.

The Wheeler Report's linkage of

ending civilian encroachment in "strictly military operations" to regaining the Chiefs operational responsibility is
illustrative of the relationship of professionalism to the
Chiefs' perceived role.

Clearly, the Chiefs were opposed to

the process of centralization that had been occurring since
1949.

Such centralization made them into automatons and

destroyed their cherished command roles, but more importantly the very nature of their professionalism was under
attack.
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These attitudes, especially the requirement for
autonomy in military matters, were the central themes in
their traditional world view.

Despite the fact they reali-

zed the importance of non-military factors, they simply
could not let themselves consider them.

This retention of

traditional compartmentalization of the political from the
military was the non-organizational flaw within the Chiefs.
This had nothing to do with their place within the formal
chain of command.

The continuing claim that the JCS pro-

duct was not as useful to the civilian leadership as it
should be, was directly tied to the Chiefs' professionalism.
While inter-service competition did result in a diluted
product, the inability to consider non-military factors
resulted in the production of a potentially useless product.
Pragmatism was the means of eliminating this flaw, but both
the civilian and the military leadership opposed it.

The

former, out of a fear for civilian control, and the latter,
out of a fear for their professionalism.

The Chairmen of

the Joint Chiefs of Staff by virtue of their status as the
administration's "agent" appeared to have been less stringent
in maintaining a purely "radical" approach, but even then
Pragmatism was not fully embraced.

Merely mouthing foreign

Policy statements, as Bradley did, did not represent a shift
to pragmatism.

Instead even he, as well as the other Chair-

men, retained his radical philosophy.
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In the final analysis the Chiefs were caught between
bureaucratic imperatives and ethical norms.

Their dual role

as commander of a service and staff officer to the President
resulted in tremendous tensions.

The development of informal

means of affecting decisions, while allowing the Chiefs
some flexibility, would only achieve marginal or incidental
success.

In the end they had to deal with their own con-

science and their own professional notion of responsibility.
Responsibility to the nation was the founGation upon which
their professionalism rested.

That responsibility became

intertwined with the belief that their service was essential
to the defense of the nation.

By a convoluted logic, what

appeared to the civilians to be service parochialism was to
the Chiefs the fulfillment of their obligation.

Furthermore,

that sense of responsibility ledthemto bifurcate war and
politics which had disastrous

results on the JCS product.

Since the civilians were not getting the product that they
felt they needed, they began to make the decisions without
the advantage of integrated input that would lead to an
integrated policy.

The nature of that integrated policy is

the subject of the next chapter.

CHAPTER VIII
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF AND
POLICY INTEGRATION
Up to this point in our study we have examined the
Chiefs' self-perception of their role and those of their
civilian superiors.

We have also seen how the various re-

organization efforts within the Department of Defense received their impetus from the civilian manager's desire to more
effectively integrate political/military policy planning.
But effective integration is more than a mere manifestation
of interface on an organization chart; it is the merging
of the organizational structure and the individual player's
roles.

In short, it is as Clausewi tz noted "where all the

other threads meet."
Policy integration in its simplest form guarantees
the balancing of the state's capabilities and the state's
commitments, which for our purpose means that the state
has sufficient military power, not only in size, but in
composition, to achieve its political goals.

The passage

of the 1947 legislation was predicated upon the desire to
optimize such policy integration and to create an institutional framework to achieve that goal.

That framework pre-

supposed a nexus between the nation's foreign policy, the
military planning process, and tlw devPl opment of the defense
33G
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budget.

Each of these factors in turn become inextricably

related stages in the policy integration process.
the National

s~curity

Although

Act never outlined in specific detail

how this nexus would be achieved, the formation of the
National Security Council and the Joint Chiefs of Staff
were requisite elements in a process that would ultimately
result in the maintenance of a military establishment that
could support the nation's political goals.
From the practical viewpoint, the balance between
commitments and capabilities occurs during the budget process, since "planning can be useless and operations impossible if the necessary funds are not authorized and allocated.

II

521

In the final analysis the budget is a fiscal expre3-

sion of those forces and plans which are deemed necessary
for the security of the nation.

The structure of those

military forces represents a constraint upon the foreign
policy planner that he ignores only at his nation's peril.
The defense budget process thus contains all the major elements to be found in the integration of national security
policy, and as such may be used as a heuristic tool to examine the process and determine its effectiveness.
Examining the problem of policy integration from a
total systems approach, the first step in a hypothetical

521

Lawrenee Korb, "The Dr·fense Budget Process in
the United States, 1953-1970: An Examination and Evaluation,"
Unpublished paper presented at the lmerican Political Science
Association National Conference, 1971, Chicago, IL, 2.
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model is the establishment of foreign policy goals, which
will act as a catalyst for the subsequent development of
the military's operations plans and finally the defense
budget.

On a superficial level, these three stages--

national policy, military plans, and the defense budget-appear to flow in a logical sequential pattern, but such
an assumption fails to make the transition from the ideal
model to the real world.

Our hypothetical model ignores

the reality of bureaucratic conflict and the necessity for
fiscal feasibility.

The defense budget in an unconstrained

ideal environment becomes merely tbe conversion of military
force postures into monetary amounts.

In the real world,

though, defense dollars are in direct competition with other
national priorities, forcing budget considerations to be
addressed at the offset of the policy process.

Furthermore,

in order to effectively determine a viable foreign policy
the nation's commitments and capabilities must be assessed.
Likewise, military operations plans are not based solely
on combat effectiveness, but on technical, fiscal, political,
and bureaucratic realities.

This model also fails to con-

sider post-executive phases of the budget process, such
as

congressional review, that are part of the American

Political system, but beyond the purview of this study.
The result is that when our nicely structured hypothetical model is placed in reality, it becomes a complex
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process in which the theoretically sequential stages become
so inextricably connected that it is difficult to separate
one stage from the next.

The linear nature of the model·

is replaced by a cyclical one in which the budgetary process
becomes an integral part of the balancing of capabilities
and commitments.

This, as we noted from our earlier discus-

sion of Clausewitz, requires the fusion of the political
and the military aspects of national policy, which presupposes an intellectual fusion on the part of the decision
maker, not merely bureaucratic interface.

Although such

interface is an essential part of the policy making process,
it can only help facilitate and not replace fusion.

Despite

these difficulties, a .hypothetical model is heuristically
useful in examining the process of policy integration.
With this ideal model in mind we will examine historically how the policy integration process developed during
the Truman administration and how the budget process became
the means of achieving integration.

Particular attention

will be given to how the military professionals perceived
the process in comparison to their civilian superiors.

The

traditional difficulty of bifurcating political from military
Policy is an essential aspect of these perceptual differences,
and they clearly surfaced during the first effort at formulating an integrated budget for fiscal year 1950.

As such

FY 50 is an especially useful vehicle for examining these
Problems.

The lessons learned from FY 50 resulted in massive
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structural changes within the NSC and the JCS, as both organizations developed planning systems that more effectively
fulfilled their missions and enhanced, at least theoretically,
their ability to work with each other.

These changes will

be traced as the effectiveness of the policy integration
process is evaluated during the Eisenhower administration.
Organizationally, it was the movement toward unification that acted as a catalyst for policy integration.

The

Army based its advocacy for unification on the advantages
to be gained through unity of command, which theoretically
would maximize the efficient management of resources.

Im-

plicit within this argument was the assumption that as war
became more complex, the management of resources became
more critical and thus needed to be more effectively
rationalized.

In peacetime, unification would result in

a more equitable distribution of resources, as well as greater
stability in total allocations.

This was the basis of Root's

reforms in 1903, which created the General Staff to eliminate
the more dysfunctional elements of the bureau system.

The

correctness of this organizational approach was reinforced
by the War Department's reforms in March 1942, that created

the Operations Division.

After the war, polemical studies

like Major General Otto Nelson's National Security and the
General Staff seemed to prove the necessity for staff centralization and the "need for an improved General Staff
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organization with more effective techniques of control."

522

one of the central functions of such an improved General
staff would be to facilitate political/military integration
to include the budget process.

Nelson was harkening back

to the increased efficiency of the restructured General
Staff during both world wars and its coordination with the
War Industries Board during World War I and the War Production
Board during World War I I.
The history of the unification controversy is essentially a history of conflicting approaches to policy integration.

Whatever difficulties existed between the services,

the civilian leadership definitely wanted legislation that
would bring about policy integration, and do it in such
a

manner as to make the Joint Chiefs active participants.

It was with this in mind that the service secretaries bemoaned, in 1944, the lack of any "established agency of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff primarily charged with developing
for the Joint Chiefs of Staff political, economic and fiscal

522 Otto Nelso~ National Security and the General
Staff (Washington, D.C.:
Infantrv Journal Press, 1946)·, 601;
ifSO-see::Lawrence J. Legere,. "Unification of the Armed Forces"
(Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1950).
Both were dissertations by army officers on leave at Harvard
University, Nelson finished his Ph.D. in 1940~
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policy ... " 523

The service proposals for unification offered

differing solutions to this problem, but for the most part
those differences flowed along service lines, with the Navy
apparently more cognizant of the nature of policy integration than the Army.

Specifically, the Army's proposals

tended to reflect confidence in a vertical, highly centralized
structure, which exhibited traditional compartmentalization
of civilian from military functions.
detracted from the total integration

While this approach
effor~,

it supported

the Army's own perception of its professionalism.
It is the nature of this professionalism that helps
explain the primacy of the Army's position, dominating even
the JCS's own Richardson Plan, written in April 1945.

524

Ironically, one of the Plan's primary conclusions was that
greater policy integration was needed, especially between
the military services and the State Department.

I would

suggest that this particular recommendation was a result
523

Memorandum for the Joint Chiefs of Staff from
the Secretary of War and Secretary of Navy, undated, subject:
Coordination of Political-Military Problems Between the
Secretary of War and the Secretary of Navy and the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, William B. Leahy Papers, folder "JCS Misc.
Memos, " U.S. Naval Archives, Washington, D.C .. (Hereafter
referred to as U.S. Naval Archives).
524

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, Report of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff Special Committee for Reorganization of
National Defense (Hereafter referred to as the Richardson
Report), Leahy Papers, box 77, folder "Reorganization of
~tional Defense Structure and Comments: October and
November, 1945;' U.S. Naval Archives.
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of the Chiefs' percention that there was a

l~ck

of political

guidance forthcoming from the civilian leadership.

Although

the Richardson Report recommended policy integration, it
did not specifically link the commitments generated through
political/military consultation to a force structure upon
which the budget would be based.

In a rather convoluted

manner, the Report did point out that the President would
be concerned with budgetary matters and that "the nation
should maintain in time of peace, military forces adequate
to support its foreign policy,"

525

but how that would be

translated into dollars and cents was not very clear.

A

partial solution was suggested in the formation of a U.S.
Chiefs of Staff who would advise the President on the overall
budget requirements for each service.

This advice would

be transmitted to the President by the Commander of the
Armed Forces, who would double as the Chief of Staff to
the Commander-in-Chief.

Concurrently, the request would

also be transmitted by the civilian Secretary of the Armed
Forces, who sat with the Chiefs during their deliberations.
Although, the Secretary sat in with the Chiefs, his primary
function was not as an arbitrator of competing resource
demands, but as a cabinet level advocate for the military
budget.

525

Ibid., 21.
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The crucial issues of procurement and mobilization
planning also were discussed in the Richardson Report.

These

functions were placed under the purview of a civilian Under
Secretary of the Armed Forces, who was to guarantee the
compatibility of the Chiefs' military plans to civilian
industrial mobilization.

Unfortunately, there was built

into the system a degree of compartmentalization that mere
bureaucratic coordination could not easily rectify.

This

point was revealed in the observation that the military
would be the only agency really concerned with military
matters, while the Under Secretary would take care of the
526
.
civl"l.lan or b uslness
rna tt ers.
On the issue of balancing requirements and resources,
the Richardson Report naively stated that this was only a
wartime problem.

It was presumed that "in peacetime re527
sources will normally be adequate."
This statement re-

fleeted more than a naive approach to peacetime policy integration, it was based on the assumption that military requirements would drive the budget process.

If this was correct,

then the Chiefs could safely assume that peacetime resources
would be adequate.

Furthermore, given the Chiefs' view

of professionalism, they probably also assumed that

526

rbid., 23-24.
Specifically the Report said "the
Under Secretary of his office will initiate action on business matters and that the commander of the Armed Forces
on the military matters."

527

.
Ibld., 26.
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theY themselves would establish those requirements and that
theY would be based exclusively upon military imperatives.
It seemed logical to the Chiefs, as military experts, to
generate their own budget requests and forward them to the
president, unaltered by either the civilian Under Secretary
or Secretary of the Armed Forces.
This organizational assumption was incorporated into
both the McNarney and the Collins plans.

Both of these

Army proposals gave the budgetary responsibility to the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, while the civilian secretary acted
merely as a conduit of the budget estimates to the President.
Although, both plans emphasized the elimination of waste
and duplication through unification, neither plan considered
the relationship of political/military planning to the budget
process.

In defending the Collins Plan, Secretary of War

Patterson testified that its objective was "to establish
an integrated program of national security," and that this
would best be accomplished by allowing the military experts
to formulate the strategic options upon which this program
would be based. 528

In practice this would mean that the

military experts, the JCS, would formulate the defense budget.
General Collins went even further than Patterson in outlining the nature of military autonomy in budgetary matters:
528

u. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Military Affairs,
Department of Armed Forces, Department of Military Security,
Hearings.
79th Cong., 1st Sess., 1945, 12.
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One of the most valuable functions that the United etates
Chiefs of Staff should perform in time of peace is the
development of a balanced military program with which
budgetary requirements are thoroughly integrated. ·After
the President has approved the over-all military policy,
thE' budget requirements to implement this policy would
be initiated by the three components, the Air, Army
and Navy, essentially as at present. These individual
requirements would be reviewed and integrated by the
United States Chiefs of Staff. Each Chief of Staff
of a major component would be expected to present his
case to the United States Chiefs of Staff with full
freedom and vigor. The U.S. Chiefs would have to weigh
any conflicting demands and finally come out with an
integrated program of requirements to submit to the President.
It is believed that legislation should require
that these recommendations be submitted through the
Secretary of the Armed Forces, who should be required
to transmit them without modificatig~ to the President,
9
together with his comments thereon.
Clearly, both the JCS's Richardson Report and the Army's
unification plans manifested traditional bifurcation of
political and military functions, and used professionalism
and expertise as the basis for the military's assertion
of autonomy.
The reason for the similarity among the various plans
was that their central ideas appear to have had a common
source, Brigadier General John McAuley Palmer.

Palmer,

who was George C. Marshall's mentor, had been intimately
involved in planning a War Department reorganization immediately after World War I.

Although retired, he was brought

back on active duty in November 1941 to help with the
nationalization of the National Guard.
529 Ibid., 157-8.

With the outbreak
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of war, he turned his attention to the dual problems of
demobilization and post-war military organization.

In .1943,

the Special Planning Division (SPD) was created to coordinate
the planning efforts on both of these issues, and Palmer
was named advisor to its director.

The SPD became the focal

point for the Army's reorganization effort and its director,
Major General W.F. Tompkins, was the lrmy's representative
on the Richardson Committee.

Because of Palmer's elder

statesmen status, he was in a position to intellectually
530
dominate the SPD.
The key component of all the plans
so far discussed was

the compartmentalization and the iso-

lation of military and civilian functions from one another.
This compartmentalization was an essential part of the organization plans that Palmer helped write after the First
World War; one of which was for a unified military.

In

these plans industrial mobilization and procurement was
under the control of civilian managers, while war plans

530

For a detailed study of the role of the SPD see
Michael S. Sherry, Preparing for the Next War: American
Plans for Post War Defense, 1941-1945 (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1977); Nelson, National Security and the
Staff, 548-551; Legere, "Unification of the Armed Forces,"
235-240; and "History of the Special Planning Division,"
file No. 2-3.12, Office of the Chief of Military History;
a microfilm copy is held in the U.S. Army Command & General
Staff College Library.
As for Palmer's role in the SPD,
Professor I.B. Holly of Duke University, who is preparing
a biography of Palmer, claims that Palmer's ideas "infected"
the young officers around him.
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were generated solely by the military staffs.

The incor-

poration of this approach in the National Defense Act of
1920 led to the development of military plans without regard
531
to their industrial feasibility.
Despite organizational shortcomings and structural
flaws, the Army's unification plans conformed to that service's traditional sense of professionalism.

The effect

of this traditionalism is substantiated by an executive
branch analysis of the views of such Army unification proponents as Secretary of War Patterson, and Generals Marshall,
Collins, Arnold, McNarney, and Eisenhower.

Of particular

importance was the analysis' evaluation of these individuals'
views on two specific points:

the military's need for

"specific integration with foreign policy" and whether or
not "control of [the] budget [should be in the hands of
a] civilian secretary."

With the noticeable exception of

General McNarney, all of those listed were identified as opposing
the specific integration of military policy with foreign
policy and all, including McNarney, were identified as unanimously opposing a civilian exercising control over the

~arvin A. Kreidberg and Morton A. Henry, History
of Military Mobilization in the United States Army:
1775~·
Department of Army Pamphlet No. 20-212 (Washington,
D.C.: Department of the Army, 1955), 692.
53
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military budget.

532

A further example of the impact of such traditional

values is illustrated in a memorandum written by Forrestal
to Clark Clifford on 7 September 1946.

In this memorandum,

Forrestal conveyed his impressions of a dinner meeting with
patterson, Eberstadt, Under Secretary of the Navy John Kenney,
and Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army, General John Handy.
The purpose of the meeting was to reduce the points of service disagreement over unification.
of the

discu~:sion

In his description

that ensued, the Secretary of the Navy

reported that the Army was "still wedded to the concept
that a chart and 'straight-line of command' will solve all
problems."

This of course ran counter to Forrestal's own be-

lief in a decentralized structure and that an organization
was only as good as the men who made it up.

However, the

Army's fascination in a "straight-line of command" reflected
more than an organizational preference; Forrestal realized
that it reflected the very nature of Arwy professionalism:
The Army's real purpose is to draw a sharp black
and white line between civilian and military functions.
It is my view, and nobody can shake it, that the operation must be a mixed one; that there is no black and
white line because diplomacy and military power are
inextricably associated.
Both Patterson and Handy took
the view that the civilian secretaries should not sit
532 chart entitled "Proposals for Unification Differs
in Opinion," undated paper, Samuel Rosenman Papers, box 4,
folder "Unification folder #2," Harry S. Truman Library,
Independence, Missouri.
(Hereafter referred to as Truman
Library)
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with the Joint Chiefs of Staff to which I responded,
"how otherwise can military policy be tied in with
national policy?"
Forrestal went on to write that he had great apprehension
for the unification bill if it followed the "army thinking
on these lines," because such an approach would fail to
achieve the true integration of "the whole complex of our
national, economic, military, and political power." 533
Secretary Forrestal had hoped that the Eberstadt
Plan would eliminate or at least avoid some of these organizational problems.

The National Security Council offered

a means to "ensure that there was a balance between our
foreign commitments and (military) forces."

534

As the

National Security Act began to take form it became more
apparent to the administration that it was the budget process
that guaranteed this balance.

535

However, if integration

was to occur, it required a mitigation of the military's
autonomy in budget matters, and the appointment of a civilian
superior to act as an arbitrator between conflicting
533

Memorandum Forrestal to Clifford, 7 September
1946, Clark Clifford Papers, box 16, folder "Unification
Correspondence-General," Truman Library.
534

u.s. Congress, Senate, Committee on Naval Affairs,
Report to Hon. James Forrestal, Secretary of the Navy on
Unification of the War and Navy Departments and Postwar
Organization for the National Security.
79th Congress,
lst session, 1945.
(Hereafter referred to as the Eberstadt
Plan), 55.
535

National Defense Memorandum for the President,
22 July 1947, subject: S.758 "National Security Act 1947,"
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demands for resources.
While there seems to have been a general agreement
that the budget was the crucial aspect of unification, it
was not at all clear how the budget would be developed,
or what role, if any, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would play.
On the surface, it appears that the Navy had a greater understanding of policy integration than the Army, but that may be
more attributable to the attitude of James Forrestal than
to the attitude of the Navy's officer corps.

We can gain

some insight into the perceptions of Navy professionals by
examining the ideas of Admiral Forrest Sherman, the Navy
officer most closely connected with the writing of the
National Security Act.

In January 1947, just prior to the

drafting of the legislation, Sherman sent a memorandum to
his Army counterpart, Lieutenant General Loris Norstad,
expressing his views on how an ideal integrated budget
could be developed:
(l) Based on a study of the broad factors involved,
the War Council would determine the national policies
under which the Armed Forces would expect to function;
Truman Papers, Presidential Secretary File, Subject File,
box 156, folder "Cabinet Defense Secretary", Truman Library.
Clifford noted that the budget issue was one "of the major
purposes of the bill." Earlier President Truman had noted
that unification "will help the budget to a large extent,"
Memo for Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Department, 20 April 1946, Truman Papers, Presidential Secretary
File, Subject File, box 145, folder, "Agencies-Military,
Army, Navy Unification," Truman Library.
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(2) In light of these policies and their military estimate of the strategic situation, the Joint Chiefs of
Staff would formulate strategic requirements for the
Armed Forces.
In the event of disagreement among the
Joint Chiefs of Staff the Secretary of the Armed Forces
would exercise such powers of decision as may be delegated
to him by the President;
(3) The above strategic requirements would then be translated into terms of men, supplies and money by the three
military departments;
(4) The translated requirements of the military departments would then be reviewed and integrated by the War
Council under the supervision of the Secretary of the
Armed Forces, who would have powers of decision in the
event of disagreement. The facilities of the budget
officers of the military departments would be utilized
for this if necessary;
(5) The military budgets
the Bureau of the Budget
Forces and their details
Secretaries of the Army,

would then be presented to
by the Secretary of the Armed
directly to that body by the
Navy, and Air Force;

(6) After action on the integrated military budgets is
taken by the Bureau of the Budget and the President,
their broader aspects would, if necessary, be justified
before the Congress by the Secretary of the Armed
Forces and their details directly536 the Secretaries
of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.
Although the power that Sherman was willing to invest
in the civilian Secretary of the Armed Forces was the very
antithesis of the Army's demand for autonomy, one should
not assume that Sherman was being motivated by a totally
different set of professional imperatives than his army
counterparts.

A careful examination of the process outlined

536 Memorandum for General Norstadt, 27 January 1947,
subject: Formation of Integrated Military Budget, Clifford
Papers, box 17, folder "Unification-Correspondence, Bill
Comments and Recommendations, "Truman Library.

353

by Sherman, reveals that the Joint Chiefs would take the
civilian leadership's guidance and develop the strategic
plans that would ultimately be converted into "men, supplies,
and money by the three services."

Only after these plans

had been developed would they be measured against fiscal
feasibility.
The model that Sherman apparently used when he developed this budget process was that of the military operations
plan.

Within the military planning system an organization

is first given a mission.

The commander will then take

that mission and make what is known as the estimate of the
situation.

This is the thought process by which the commander

analyzes his mission, evaluates both enemy and friendly
forces, considers alternative courses of action, and finally
reaches a decision on how to proceed.

Once this decision

has been made, an operations plan is drawn up detailing
the execution of the mission, which in turn becomes the
basis of mission statements directed to subordinate units.
Within Sherman's budget process the original mission statement was the political guidance provided to the Joint Chiefs
by the civilian leadership.

The Chiefs then would proceed

to make their estimate of the situation and develop an operations plan.
This approach was structurally identical to the
"National War Planning System," the JCS considered in

354

l942.

537

The first step in that system was the determina-

tion by the political leadership of the nation's strategy or
concept of war, followed by the military's structuring of
a strategy and operations plan to accomplish those goals.
Since this type of planning process was universally accepted
within the services, it was only natural that senior military
leaders would apply it to the problem of policy integration
and budget development.

The application of this mode of

reasoning was seen in a 1949 statement before Congress by
General George C. Marshall.

He stated that "the estimate

of the situation" should determine the formulation of the
budget, and that such an estimate should be made once a
year "entirely outside of .•. civilian control."

The demand

that the generation of the estimate of the situation be
exclusively a military function should not be looked upon
as an attack upon civilian control, but instead a call for
autonomy within a professional sphere of expertise.

Obvi-

ously, this estimate would be linked to the political mission
statement so that the Chiefs would have a framework within
which to develop their force lists.

While Marshall never

did discuss the relationship of that mission statement to
the estimate of the situation, the military staff logic
537vernon Davis, A History of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff in World War II: Organizational Development (Historical Division: Joint Secretariat, Joint Chiefs of Staff,
1972), II,380.
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process presupposes a mission statement from some higher
h ea d quar t ers or au th or1. t y. 538
The methodology incorporated in Sherman's approach
to policy integration was nothing more than a simplified
version of what would later be called program budgeting.
Forrestal was also enamored with this approach and felt
that it ought to be the basis of a "new principle" that would
govern the Military Establishment's budgetary structure.

In

his First Report of the Secretary of Defense, Forrestal
outlined a budget system that was very similar to that of
Sherman's:
The National Security Council will "assess and appraise
the objectives, commitments and risks of the United
States in relation to our actual and potential military
power." The Joint Chiefs of Staff, on the basis of
these evaluations, will maintain long-range strategic
plans and correlate these with an "annual operating
plan," indicating such matters as the composition, size,
organization, and general deployment of the forces,
the gPneral requirements of the material programs and
the required levels of operations, training, mairttenance,
construction, and other major programs.
Initially
such plans should be based solely upon military considerations.539
Forrestal's assumption that the operation plans would be
based exclusively on military considerations reveals a
538

U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Armed Service,
The National Defense Program, Unification and Strategy
Hearings, 8lst Congress, 1st Session, 1949, 603-605.
(Hereafter referred to as Unification and Strategy Hearings).
539

NatioP.al Military Establishment, First Report of
the Secretary of Defense (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1948), 41 (Emphasis Added)
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surprising degree of traditionalism on the part of the great
advocate of policy integration.

This paradox is explained

when one realizes that Forrestal viewed policy integration
as a continual process that would occur during the development of guidance and later during the balancing process.
The Secretary's commitment to military autonomy during the
actual planning phase indicates a faith in the military
and an understanding that the military had unique expertise
in certain areas.

The Joint Chiefs had a crucial role in

the development of the budget because they were the only
ones who could make the analysis of military considerations.
As Senator Edward V. Robertson said during the 1947 hearings,
540
"the Joint Chiefs are the key to the whole thing."
The early drafts of the National Security Act specifically named the Chiefs as advisors "in the integration
of the military budget."

Rather inexplicably, this function
541
was expunged from the final draft.
Nevertheless, the
Chiefs remained an integral part of the budget process because they were the ones that actually prepared the strategic
and logistics plans.

Possibly realizing the confusion that

could result from this omission, Forrestal had a budget
540

U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Armed
Services, National Defense Establishment, Unification of
the Armed Forces, Hearings on S.758, 80th Congress, 1st
Session, 1947, pt. 2, 330. (Hereafter referred to as National
Military Establishment Hearings).
541
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function inserted along with the various other service and
JCS functions enumerated in the Key West Agreement of 1948.
This was the nature of that budget function:
Prepare and submit to the Secretary of Defense, for
his information and consideration in furnishing guidance
to the Departments for preparation of their annual
budgetary estimates and in coordinating these budgets,
a statement of military requirements which is based
upon agreed strategic considerations, joint outline 542
war plans, and current national security commitments.
Simply assumed by both Forrestal and Sherman was
the existence of coherent policy guidance emanating from
the civilian leadership.

This was the crucial step in our

hypothetical model and was the reason the National Security
Council was established.

Without such guidance the Joint

Chiefs would have nothing upon which to base their strategic
plans.

Unfortunately, the format in which that guidance

would be disseminated was never covered in the National
Security Act.

This external communications problem reflected

internal organizational and perceptual problems on· the part
of the National Security Council.
Prior to the Kcrean War, the National Security Council
was viewed as having a narrow advisory role with no operational or implementation mission.

The complex NSC infra-

structure that we now take for granted simply did not exist,
542 The text of the Key West agreement is published
in Timothy W. Stanley, American Security and National Defense
(Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1956), 176.
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because the Council was not charged with following up on
decisions.

Only as the demands upon the organization in-

creased during the Korean War did the staff of the National
Security Council begin to take form.

One consequence of

this organizational and functional problem was the lack
of systematic and continuous guidance.

Another, was that

the analyses that were produced tended to be overly narrow
in focus, dealing only with a specific issue.

It was not

until November 1948 that "the first paper of a broad overall character dealing with the basic national security problems facing the United States," was adopted by the NSC and
543
could be used as guidance for the JCS.
That document,
NSC 20/4 "U.S. Objectives with Respect to the USSR to Counter
Soviet Threats to U.S. Security," would be the major source
544
of policy guidance until the Korean War.
These problems
exacerbated the Chiefs' perception that they were forced
to work within a policy vacuum and that plans had to be
made based upon their own assumptions.

54

U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Government
Operations, Subcommittee on National Policy Making, Organizing
for National Security (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1961), Vol II, Studies and Background
Material, 426.
(Hereafter referred to as Jackson Committee).

544

Memorandum for the National Security Council,
16 November 1948, subject: US Objectives with Respect to
the USSR to Counter Soviet Threats to U.S. Security, Truman
Papers, Presidential Secretary File, Subject File, NSC,
box 204, folder "Meeting #27," Truman Library. This folder
actually contains an earlier draft NSC 20/3, which with
only minor r8visions was formally accepted as 20/4.
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Was there any validity to the Chiefs' perception?
Instead of being produced as a routine matter, NSC papers
tended to be reactive documents, promulgated by perceived
changes in the politicallmilitary environment.

Furthermore,

there was no JCS representation on the Council's staff during
this early period.

This situation, according to the National

Security Council Organizational History;

'~ade

it difficult

to anticipate and take into account probable JCS views on
a subject under discussion in advance of receipt of their
formal written views.'' 545 Thus the lack of institutional
linkages meant a total breakdown in communication.

This

was exemplified during the Berlin Blockade when the JCS
advice was not sought until it was too late for them to
have any substantial influence.

546

Part of this problem

urdoubtedly was the result of the Chiefs not being named
tbe principle military advisors to the NSC, a problem that
was alleviated by the 1949 amendment to the National Security
Act.
Unfortunately for Secretary Forrestal, his model
of policy integration was predicated upon institutional
interface that could only occur if there was continual

545
546

Jackson Committee, II, 432.

Kenneth W. Condit, The History of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy:
Vol II 1947-1949 (Historical Division, Joint Secretariat,
Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1978), 154.
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bureaucratic linkages.

In place of these formal linkages,

the Secretary of Defense sought the Chiefs' advice informally
based upon their statutory relationship to him.

These in-

formal efforts apparently did not remove the belief, on
the part of the Chiefs, that there was a policy vacuum in
existence.

The 1948 Hoover Commission study reaffirmed

the Chiefs' fears in this regard when it noted that "the
want of firm and clear top level national policy direction
on which to base strategic plans leave the Joint Chiefs
of Staff to do their planning in something of a vacuum."

547

This situation presented a real problem for Forrestal
since his integration model was built upon the assumption
that the military would take the NSC's guidance and convert

At this stage of the process the

it into strategic plans.

military would develop their plans completely unconstrained
by resource limitations or other mitigating factors.

In

other words, the Chiefs would base their plans solely on
"military considerations."
Sherman had advocated.

This was the same approach that

After the plans were developed,

they would be measured against fiscal feasibility.

Only

then would changes be made to balance plans against available
547 The Commission on Organization of the Executive
Branch of the Government; Task Force on National Security
Organization (Appendix G), (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1949), 37.
(Hereafter referred to
as the Hoover Commission.)
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resources.

It was essential though, that the original policy

statement should not be developed exclusive of military
considerations.
As noted earlier, the logic of Forrestal's model
paralleled that of the military's concept of plans being
driven by the mission statement.

The problem was that the

mission statement could only be derived from the National
Security Council's guidance, and that agency was remiss
in producing it.

Since regularized guidance was not forth-

coming, the Chiefs began to generate their own assumptions
upon which to base their plans.

The Hoover Commission,

although appreciating that the Chiefs were working within
a policy vacuum, criticized them for these self-generated
assumptions because they did not always have any correlation
with reality.

The Commission's Eberstadt Task Group pointed

out that many of the JCS's strategic plans "are based upon
incomplete and unrealistic assumptions," and that:
The JCS have not done enough to relate their military
plans to the national productive capacity in terms of
manpower, materials, power, transportation, and facilities. These vital elements of modern strategy appear
to be too l~~tly considered in the strategic planning
of the JCS.
In other words, the Chiefs were not incorporating crucial
non-military factors into their planning process.

Naturally,

548 Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, 28 January
1949, subject: Comments contained in Detailed Studies of
the Eberstadt Committee, Chapter VI, The Joint Chiefs of
Staff, USACGSC Library C-17073, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas.
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Eberstadt laid much of the blame upon the lack of guidance
from the NSC, probably because this was an easily identifiable cause.

What Eberstadt and his task group failed to

understand was that the Chiefs' professionalism was as much
a cause as the organizational problems.

Thus Forrestal

was confronted with a total organizational breakdown as
he prepared to implement his "new principle."
There was one preliminary problem that had to be
dealt with before any headway could be achieved in the budget arena.

That problem was getting the Chrefs to agree on

the services' various roles and missions.

Until this was

accomplished the "deep-seated disagreements," between the
services "made effective planning extremely difficult if
not impossible." 549 The National Security Act of 1947 and
its implementing Executive Orcer 9877 had merely allocated
to the services missions based on environmental primacy.
Thus the Army was concerned with land operations, the Navy
conducted operations that were at sea, and the Air Force
operated in the air.

Such an environmental division did

not address those areas where missions clashed.

In particu-

lar the role of the Marine Corps and the Navy's carrierbased air arm became points of contention.

In an effort to

eliminate these and other problem areas Forrestal called
the Chiefs together for a meeting at the Key West Naval Base
in March, 1948.

The ensuing memorandum of agreement, called

549c on d"t
1 , The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy,
157.

3G3

the "Functions Paper," was issued by the President on 21
550
April 1948 as a replacement for E.O. 9877.
While the "Functions Paper" did eliminate some of
the points of service antagonism, it unfortunately defined
the services' primary and collateral missions only in general
terms, le.aving the actual implementation open to interpretation and technological feasibility.

Thus while the Navy

was given the collateral mission, "to be prepared to participate in the over-all air effort as directed by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff," how this would be accomplished was left
unspecified.

During the pre-missile era, the only means

available to the Navy to participate in a nuclear retaliation operation was the carrier-based aircraft; but the Navy
lacked a plane with the requisite range and payload capability to deliver the nuclear weapons of the period, as well
as a carrier that was large enough to launch such a plane
if it were developed.

The U.S.S. United StaTes was designed

to be such an aircraft carrier, which explains why its can551
cellation caused thE> "Revolt of the Admirals."
Some
550

Ibid., 157-183, for a full discussion of the formulation of the Functions Papers.
551

s ee my d 1scuss1on
·
·
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o f t1e
'Revolt' in Chapter V,
also see Paul Y. Hammond, "Super Carriers and the B-36 Bomber!" in American Civil-Military Decisions, ed. by Harold
Ste1n (Montgomery, Alabama: University of Alabama Press,
1963), and Vincent ravis, The Politics of Innovation:
Patterns in Navy Cnses, Monograph SC'riC's in World Affairs,
Volume 4, Monograph No. 3, l9GG-67 (DE>nver: University
of [enver, 1967).
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of the remaining problems were solved at a follow-up conference held at the United States Naval War College, Newport,
Rhode Island.

Still the over-all issue of roles and missions

continued to be one of the major causes for inter-service
rivalry.

Despite, his failure to completely solve the roles

and missions issue, Forrestal was correct in believing that
service roles and missions had to be defined before the
budget process could proceed.

Only after the services had

determined their relationship with one another could they
begin to translate the political mission statement into
a cohesive and unified military plan.

The fact that there

were still unresolved aspects of the issue remaining was
one of the primary reasons that Forrestal's "new principle"
failed.
With the roles and missions issue behind him, Forrestal proceeded to bring the Chiefs into the budget process.
On 30 March 1948, the Secretary of Defense asked the Chiefs
to express themselves on the allocation of a three billion
dollar supplement to the fiscal year 1949 defense budget.
The Chiefs responded with varying force levels and a total
fiscal requirement of over nine billion dollars.

The ad-

ministration simply would not accept this three fold increase
and held fast to a ceiling of three billion.

552

552

This first

Condit, The Joint Chiefs of Staff und National
Policy, 183-205.
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effort at implementing the "new principle" not only had
failed, but foreshadowed the problems that would follow.
Within weeks after the administration decided to
hold the line on the FY 49 supplemental budget, planning
began for the

FY 50 defense budget.

This would be the

first budget that the Chiefs would be involved in from its
553
inception.
Again the administration began with a preconceived budgetary ceiling, this time at 14.4 billion dollars.

Although the Chiefs were now part of the budget pro-

cess, they had not yet developed a systematic approach to
formulate their budget advice, this, despite the fact that
they had always claimed that they should be the ones to
develop the actual figures.

The result was that the Chiefs

sent forward a compilation of all three services' unilateral
budget estimates, without any integration.

This "paperclip-

ped" budget totaled almost 30 billion dollars, a figure
twice the amount the administration was willing to spend.

554

553

For the official JCS analysis of the events surrounding the development of the FY 50 budget see Condit,
The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 205-248;
also see Warner R. Schilling, "The Politics of National
Defense: Fiscal 1950," in Warner A. Schilling, Paul Y. Hammond, Glen H. Snyder, StrQtSgy, Politics, and Defense Budgets
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Condit, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National
Policy, 219-224.
In October 1947 General Gruenther suggested
that the Chiefs develop a strategic plan upon which the
budget would be based.
Unfortunately, this effort had not
come to fruition when the Chiefs were asked for their input
into the FY 50 budget.
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on June 23 1948, Forrestal reacted to this situation by
asking the Chiefs to set up a special board of senior officers to help develop the budget.

This board of budgetary

advisors, chaired by Air Force General Joseph T. McNarney,

555

had by August managed to cut the total requirement down
to 23.6 billion dollars, but at that level the services
appeared to be stalemated.

From that point until early

October, attempts to break the impasse met with little
556
success.
Despite these problems, Forrestal was still convinced
that the Chiefs had to take it upon themselves to divide
the monies.

On 4 October he verbally informed the Chiefs

that they were to "recommend a subdivision of a 14.4 billion
dollar appropriation for the fiscal year 1950."

557

He fol-

lowed up this verbal guidance with a memorandum to the same
558
effect two days later.
The Chiefs responded on the 7th
555
James Forrestal, Forrestal Diaries, ed. by Walter
Millis (New York: Viking Press, 1951), 450. The other
members of the board were Major General George J. Richards,
U.S.A., and Vice Admiral Robert B. Carney, U.S.N.

556c on d.1 t , The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National
Policy, 224-225.
557
Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, 6 October
1948, subject: Budget for Fiscal Year 1950, Leahy Papers,
folder, "Budget and Estimates - 1946-1950," U.S. Naval
Archives.
For a detailed discussion of the 4 October conversation see Condit, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National
Policy, 231-2.
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of October that they "found it impossible to reach an agreement on the recommendation as to the allocation of the funds
to the respective services."

The political machinations

surrounding the Chiefs' October 7th response brought into
sharp focus all of the inter-service problems that had haunted
the JCS during the previous months of negotiations.

The

split recommendation that was forwarded to the Secretary
of Defense revealed a newly formed alliance between the
Air Force and the Army against the Navy.

Vlhile the former

two services recommended the division of funds to be along
the following lines:

4.9 billion to the Army, 4.4 to the

Navy, and 5.1 to the Air Force; the Navy recommended figures
of 4.9 billion, 4.9 billion, and 4.6 billion to each service
respectively.

Leahy recommended either dividing the 14.4

billion dollarsequally among all three services, or simply
taking the .5 billion dollar increase over the FY 49 budget
.
559
. . d.2ng t h at equa ll y among t h e servlces.
an d d lVl
559Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, 7 October
1948, subject
Memorandum dated 6 October 1948 from the
Secretary of Defense to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 19491950 Budget, Leahy Papers, folder "JCS outgoing correspondence, October 1948- January 1949," U.S. Naval Archives.
Enclosed were copies of the individual Chief's recommendations. Although Leahy went along with Bradley and Vandenberg, he also recommended equally dividing up the .5 billion
dollar increase which would mean the Army would get 4.467
billion, the Navy 5.067 billion, and the Air Force 4.867.
Leahy may well have gone along with the Army and the Air
Force in order not to appear to be siding with the Navy.
According to the official JCS history the sug~estion to
merely divide up the 14.4 billion dollars equally was made
by LeahY and rejected on 5 October 1948, yet in a working

3G8

The djfferences in the budv.Pt figures reflected more
than service bureaucratic imperatives; they also reflected
fundamental differences over the strategic approach to the
next war.

All three services agreed that the ceiling resulted

in insufficient forces to "meet the D-day demands on the
560
Services in a war with Russia,"
and all three services
tended to agree that the next war would in its general strategic aspects resemble the Second World War.

None of the

services seriously thought in terms of defending Western
Europe by becoming involved in a land campaign with Russia.
The forces available in the West were simply insufficient
for this purpose.
be

Instead, those forces that existeo would

concentrated on protecting Great Britain and the Mediter-

ranean Littoral.

During the early stages of the war the

allies would retreat across the Channel to England and across
the Mediterranean to North Africa, returning to the continent only after they had sufficiently built up their strength.
While the allies and particularly the United States were
mobilizing their forces, the enemy would be subjected to
draft of the 6 October Memorandum, this division is mentioned
again and is annotated with the notation "proposed by Navy."
This would suggest that it was not totally dropped by the Navy
at least as of 6 October. Leahy Papers, folder "Budget and
Estimates 1946-1950," U.S. Naval Archives. Also see Condit,
The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 233-236.
560 Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, 6 October
1948, subject: Budget for Fiscal Year 1950, Leahy Papers,
folder "Budget and Estimates- 1946-1950," U.S. Naval Archives.
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a devastating air attack consisting of both conventional
and nuclear weapons.

How much money each service received

was inextricably connected to its role in the short range
561
Joint Emergency War Plan "HALF-MOON/FLEETWOOD."
Under "FLEETWOOD" the Navy's two primary missions
were to protect the lines of communication (LOC) between
North America and Great Britain and to maintain access through
the Mediterranean Sea and the Suez Canal, just as the Royal
Navy had done during the Second World War.

As part of the

Navy's Mediterranean mission, carrier-based airpower would
attempt to cut the enemy's lines of communication, thus
impeding his advance.

Besides these two specific missions,

the Navy retained its collateral mission to support the
Air Force's offensive air operations against the Russian
homeland.

According to "FLEETWOOD;' "carrier task groups

will supplement and support the air offensive to the extent
practically consistent with their (the Navy's) primary
t as k . " 562

In reality, that task was to protect allied logis-

tics and communications lines and not to be in direct contact
with enemy forces.
5 g 1 JCS 1844/13, 21 July 1948, File CCS 381-USSR 3/2/46,
National Archives, Washington, D.C. For a discussion of
the evolution of the war plan nALFMOONJFLEETWOOD/DOUBLESTAR,
see Condit, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy,
224-231, 275-301.
562

JCS 1844/13, 21 July 1948, File CCS 381-USSR3/2/46, appendix "A", p. 123, National Archives.
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From the Navy's perspective, retaining and

acco~plish-

ing both its primary and collateral missions under "FLEETWOOD"
were not only essential to the defense of the nation, but
a matter of bureaucratic survival.

The Navy's force

were predicated upon those missions.

levels

If its nuclear retali-

ation mission was eliminated or its role in the Mediterranean
minimized, then its force levels and in particular the number
of carrier task groups that were to accomplish those missions
would be appropriately lowered.

Thus the !ssues that surround-

ed the development of the FY 50 budget were the same ones
that caused the "Revolt of the Admirals" almost a year later.
Once Forrestal had ordered the Chiefs to produce a
14.4 billion dollar budget, the Chiefs were forced to reconsider their estimate of the situation.

The heart of the

Army-Air Force alliance was the elimination of the Navy's
Mediterranean mission.

As part of the 7 October budget

debate General Bradley attacked the viability of this aspect
of the "FLEETWOOD" plan:
It is my opinion that to place a fleet in the Mediterranean without taking in ground troops to hold a
base, or bases, makes no significant contribution to
our initial offensive effort.
It is my contention that
the idea that Navy Air can stop any ground troop advance
is contrary to all previous experiences.
I believe that the Navy should have whatever air
force is necessary to carry out its naval mission, but
when there is a limited amount of money available, I
think we must consider primary missions first.
The
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Navy concept of a carrier task force in the Mediterranean
by itself is primarily designed to fight an air battle
and stop any Army movement. Both of these functig~~
have been assigned to the Air Force and the Army.
If the Army-Air Force position was sustained then the United
States would have to rely, at least in the short term, solely
on an atomic air attack based out of Great Britain.

Hope-

fully, this would buy enough time for the Army to mobilize
a force capable of invading the continent.
be relegated to protecting the lines of

The Navy would

co~unication

between

England and North America, the role it had played in the
European Theater of Operations during the Second World War.
Why Bradley sided with the Air Force on this crucial
issue is not difficult to determine.

Undoubtedly, his experi-

ence in Europe during the war had something to do with it.
More importantly, it was clear to everyone, that "FLEETWOOD"
could not be conducted within the constraints of the administration's ceiling.

Looking at it realistically, the forces

the Navy needed to operate in the Mediterranean would have
to come at the expense of the Air Force's atomic capability
564
or the Army's mobilization posture.
These same arguments
563
Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, 7 October
1948, subject: Budget for the Fiscal Year 1950, Army view,
Leahy Papers, folder "JCS Outgoing Correspondence, October
1948-January 1949," U.S. Naval Archives.
56

4:rms view is substantia ted by General Bradley's
comments during the 5 October 1948 meeting of the JCS.
"I
think it is up to us to make a recommendation to the Secretary of Defense of the 14.4 [billion dollars] based on what
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were advanced by Bradley at other times to explain his anticarrier recommendations.565
Whatever the reasons behind the service's

action~,

the political machinations emanating from the Joint Chiefs
completely exasperated Forrestal.

It was during this time

that he became convinced that the Military Establishment
needed to be completely restructured.

On October 5th, he

wrote in his diary that he was going to recommend to the
Hoover Commission that the powers of the Secretary of Defense
needed to be strengthened.

He also added that he was think-

ing of making General Alfred Gruenther "my principle military
a

.
,.566
d VlSOr ••••

His request that the JCS establish the

McNarney Board was just another example of his desire to
find alternative sources of military advice.

The fact that

he requested the formation of the McNarney Board as early
as June, reveals that he might have already been having
second thoughts about the effectiveness of the JCS.

As

part of his desire to develop alternative sources of advice,
the Secretary wrote Eisenhower on October 8th and asked
him to come to a meeting in which they would "talk fundamentals:

policy, budget and our whole military-diplomatic

we consider the relative importance of the three Services
in fighting the war against Russia." Condit, The Joint Chiefs
of Staff and National Policy, 234. Also see Schilling. "The
Politics of National Defense: Fiscal 1950," 171.
565

see my discussion of Bradley's rationale in his vote
against the U.S.S. United States in Chapter V.
566
Forrestal, Diaries, 497.
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posl•t•lons. .. 567

This request laid the groundwork for Eisen-

hower's temporary assignment as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff.

As we noted in Chapter

IV, Forrestal's disen-

chantment with the JCS reached such proportions that he
even considered abolishing it.
Aside from looking for alternative sources of military
advice, Forrestal also realized that his original approach
to the budget

process was now bankrupt.

Still he was opposed

to imposing a division of funds upon the Chiefs because
he agreed with their contention that the 14.4 billion dollar
ceiling was insufficient.

He also disliked having to accept

a strategy based exclusively upon a British based Air Force
atomic assault.

Since it was apparent, though, that the

Chiefs had reached a total impasse on the division of the
funds, Forrestal realized that he needed a whole new approach.
On 5 October 1948, he met with President Truman and outlined
his plan to ask the Chiefs to draw up an alternative force
structure based upon a figure in the 18.5 billion dollar
range.

This would allow the administration the opportunity

to choose between alternative force postures. 568
This new approach was revealed to the Chiefs in a
memorandum dated 8 October 1948.
56

568

Ibid., 500.
Ibid., 498.

This same memorandum also
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revealed just how far his disenchantment with the Chiefs
had gone.

The secretary began by outlining the two tasks

that he had placed before the Chiefs:
1. State the forces which, in your judgment, should
be maintained during the fiscal year 1950.
2.
State the forces which, in your judgment, should
be maintained during the fiscal year 1950 in light
of probable fiscal limitations.
Contained within these two tasks was the essence of the
JCS's role under Forrestal's "new principle."

The first

task called for the development of an unconstrained budget,
while the second task outlined the Chiefs'obligation in
the balancing of commitments and capabilities.

In regard

to this latter point Forrestal added that the Chiefs should
have supplied an assessment as to the impact the budget
ceiling would have on their strategic plans.

Such an

assessment was necessary in order to make the balancing
of capabilities and commitments a rational process.
Specifically, the Secretary of Defense pointed out that
he was satisfied with the Chiefs' efforts to perform the
first task, but that he felt they had failed in their
second task:
The results of your work in carrying out the second
phase of your inStructions has been inadequate, appar~
ently because there has been a departure from the primary
JCS task of developing a statement of 'lesser force requirements, within fiscal limitations, which would still
provide for relative readiness of the-forces to be
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maintained for the fiscal year 1950. By not pursuing
the primary initial objective in this second stage it
would appear that our efforts have degenerated into
a competition for dollars.
Forrestal went on to inform the Chiefs that they were to
begin work on "force requirements that can be supported
569
in the general area of 14.4 billion."
It was atthis point that Forrestal offered the Chiefs
an opportunity to develop a force posture at a higher funding
level, but he was not going to let them evade their responsibilities.

He told the Chiefs that he wanted a "statement

of force requirements on a basis of military necessity."
In essence the Chiefs were still to produce a plan based
on their best analysis of military requirements, but the
plan had to be within the President's ceiling.

Even though

alternative force postures could be considered, the President's ceiling was still the goal to be strived for.

The

following week he called in the Chiefs to outline the specifics of his new proposal.

He started by emphasizing the

importance of the Chiefs' credibility and its relation to
the budget process:
It is vitally important that the concept of the JCS
not lose face with the country •.•• I think it is a dangerous thing for the country if it does. You accept, to
some extent, a confession of inability to get away from
569
Memorandum for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 8 October
1948, no subject, Leahy Papers, folder "Budget and Estimates
1946-1950," U.S. Naval Archives.
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service interests and look at the whole business in
the light of what national interest is. That will
be the public interpretation of it.570
On the surface, Forrestal was suggesting that the Chiefs
return a budget within the President's ceiling, even if
it meant accepting a "very minimum" atomic air assault force
stationed in Great Britain.

Forrestal wanted the Chiefs

to point out the "absurdity" of such a posture, so that
he could argue for raising the ceiling.

On a deeper level,

though, Forrestal seemed to be asking the Chiefs to consider
non-military factors, such as the nation's financial stability, when they prepared their force analysis.

By doing

so they would be conducting themselves in a responsible
manner and producing a budget that would be in the national
interest.
On the 3rd of November, the Chiefs met to decide
how to respond to Forrestal.

The Secretary had imposed

upon them an 8 November deadline, and warned them that if
they could not divide the funds themselves, he would impose
a division upon them.

571

Since the October 15 meeting in

Forrestal's office, the JCS had been trying to come to some
kind of compromise on the budget issue.

They had returned

the budget to the McNarney Board with the twin goals of
producing a budget within the Presidential guidelines and
57

~orrestal Diaries, 504 ff.

57

~ondi t, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National

Policy, 238.
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producing an al terna ti ve budget as outlined by For.restal.
In regard to the Board 1 s first goal, no substantial improvement had been made since the 7th of October.

According

to the Army•s representative, Major General George Richards,
there was "no material change in the views previously held by
(the services]."

In an effort seemingly to substantiate

this statement, Richards recommended a budget distribution
that was identical to the Army•s position on October 7th.
He freely acknowledged that such a division of funds would
result in an exclusive reliance on a Great Britain or North
African based Air Force atomic assault, and that it would
eliminate the Navy•s ability to implement the Mediterranean
portion of "FLEETWOOD."

In terms of force structuring,

this lack of a mission could lead to the reduction in the
size of the Navy•s carrier task groups. 572

The basic stra-

tegic differences that had inhibited the budget process
from the start were still very much in evidence.
With the budget assistants still stalemated over
the October figures, the Chiefs themselves moved to formulate a compromise position.
572

Sometime between the 3rd

Memorandum for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2 November 1948, subject: Force and Fund Allocations under the
14.4 billion Program, Leahy Papers, folder "Budget and
Estimates 1946-1950," U.S. Naval Archives; for General McNarney•s view, which was similar to Richards•, see Memorandum
for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2 November 1948, subject:
Analyses of Force Rf:quirements for Budget Estimates, Truman
Papers, Presidential Secretary File, General File, box 114,
folder "Bradley," Truman Library.
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and the 8th of November, the Chiefs realized that since
they could not come to an agreement on a rational division
of the monies based on an integrated strategy, that the
best alternative was simply to scale down their requests
so that they fell under the ceiling.

This kind of simple

quick fix solution was exactly the opposite of what Forrestal
wanted.

Warner Schilling, in his study of the development

of the FY 50 budget, points out that neither the Army nor
the Navy were tempted by Forrestal's suggestion to accept
an unbalanced strategy with the hope of increased service
allocations.

They did not believe that the Secretary of

Defense could prove the "absurdity" of the 14.4 billion
dollar strategy to the President; but that once the Chiefs
had agreed to the strategy, they would have to live with
it.

573

The Air Force also apparently came to the conclusion

that without the support of the other services, no JCS sponsored budget would be accepted at all.

It is probable that

the Chiefs realized that if they did not act quickly, they
might be cut out of the budget process altogether, and possibly permanently.

On the 8th of November, the Chiefs sent

a memorandum to Forrestal outlining a division of funds
within the ceiling's requirements.

The Army would receive

4.8 billion, the Navy 4.6 billion, and the Air Force 5.0
Schilling, "The Politics of National Defense:
Fiscal 1950," 196.
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billion.

Despite this agreement on the general breakdown

of the monies, the memorandum pointed out that there still
remained a difference of opinion as to the number of aircraft carriers the Navy needed.

The Army recommended six,

the Navy wanted nine, and the Air Force felt that four was
sufficient.

Without some kind of agreement on an integrated

strategy the division of FY 50 funds had not really solved
anything, and the Chiefs were no closer to being prepared
to truly participate in the budget process than they were
574
before.
Shortly afterwards, the Chiefs submitted a 16.9 billion
575
dollar alternative budget.
As they probably expected
the administration kept within its ceiling, thus negating
the value of the alternative budget.
The development of the FY 50 budget reflected most
of the problems that would continue to hamper efforts at
effective policy integration during the remainder of the
period of our study.
574__

From the very beginning, the Chiefs

~emurandum for the Secretary of Defense, 8 November 1948, subject: Allocation of Funds for 1950 Budget,
Leahy Papers, folder "Budget and Estimates 1946-1950," U.S.
Naval Archives. The fact that this was somewhat of a pyrrhic
victory for Forrestal is indicated in a 9 November letter
to Truman in which he outlined his problems with the Chiefs
and that he wanted Eisenhower's help in the future, Truman
Papers, Presidential Secretary File, General File, box 120,
folder "Forrestal- General," Truman Library.
575
-Letter, Forrestal to Truman, 1 December 1948,
Clifford Papers, box 17, folder, "Unification - Secretary
of Defense," Truman Library.
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were workingunder the twin handicaps of lacking a systematic
means of developing their own unified plans, and working
within a policy vacuum.

The political mission statement,

which was the essential first step in Forrestal's "new principle,'' was not forthcoming.

Early in the FY 50 process,

Forrestal had asked the National Security Council for guidance
upon which the Joint Chiefs could base their budget assumptions:
I believe that it is imperative that a comprehensive
statement of national policy be prepared, particularly
as it relates to Soviet Russia, and that this statement
specify and evaluate the risks, state our objectives,
and outline the measures to be followed in achieving
them ..•. such a statement is needed to guide the National
Military Establishment in determining the level and
character of armament which it should seek and, I believe,
to assist the President in determining the proportion
of our resources which should be dedicated to military
purposes.
I also believe that it is fundamental to
decisions concerning the size of, and relative emphasis
in, our national budget.
While Forrestal's request may be construed as a ploy to
raise the budget ceiling, it also clearly was an effort
to refocus the budget process in the direction that he originally envisioned it.

Although the NSC began to work on

a response, the President informed his Secretary of Defense
that it was his responsibility to "establish a program within
the budget limits which have beeri allowed," and that the
~~6

effort should not wait on the NSC.J'

576

Memorandum for the Executive Secretary National
Security Council, 10 July 1948, subject: Appraisal of the
Degree and Character of Military Preparedness Required
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Forrestal's failure to elicit specific guidance from
the NSC forced the Chiefs, as individuals and as a corporate
group, to generate their own assumptions and to determine
certain strategic priorities which were reflected in their
war plans.

Ultimately, however, the Chiefs did have an

opportunity to become involved in the NSC policy integration
process, when they were asked to comment on a draft of NSC
20/3.

On May 25,1948, the JCS were formally asked to develop

a catalog of American commitments "involvi'lg the use or
possible use of Armed Forces."

Such a list would be an

integral part in the development of the political mission
statement.

In putting together the catalog, the Chiefs

interpreted the term "commitments" in its broadest context
"to include not only actual assignments of force, ..• but
also commitments of a iess tangible nature, such as those
implicit in pledges, pacts, contingent military actions
and our foreign policies."

The conclusion drawn from this

study was to be expected:
It is clear from the above summary of commitments and
their implications and from the attitude and capabilities
of the USSR, together with the determination of the
United States to resist communist aggression, an
over-all commitment which in itself is all-inclusive
of the World Situation, Truman Papers, Presidential' Secretary
File, box 156, folder "Def. Sec. of -Mise folder #1," Truman
Library. The President's response was a memorandum dated
13 July, 1948, same folder.
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and with which the Joint Chiefs of Staff are firmly
in agreement, that it is essential to our national
security to bring our military strength to a level
commensurate with the distinct possibility of global
warfare.577
The obvious solution to the imbalance between national
capabilities and national commitments was to increase the
size of the military.

Thus the catalog supplied the Chiefs

with a perfect weapon with which to attack the budget ceiling.
The trouble with this approach, was that the Chiefs waited
too long before releasing the document.

It was not sent

to Forrestal until 2 November 1948, and was referred to
in their formal comments on NSC 20/3 two weeks later.

Again,

the Chiefs pointed out "the dangers inherent in undue disparity between the nation's capabilities and commitments."

578

In effect the Chiefs were charging the civilian leadership
to carefully point out exactly what they wanted to accomplish
with America's military forces.

On the one hand, this would

allow the military to shift the blame to the civilians for
an inadequate force posture, and reinforce the Chiefs' claim
to autonomy in the budget process.

On the other hand, if

577

Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, 2 November
1948, subject: Existing International Commitments Involving
the Possible Use of Armed Forces, Leahy Papers, folder "JCS
Outgoing Correspondence October 1948-January 1949," U.S.
Naval Archives.
578

Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, 15 November
1948, subject: U.S. Objectives with Respect to the U.S.S.R.
to counter Soviet Threats to U.S. Security, Truman Papers,
Presidential Secretary File, Subject File, National Security
Council, Box 204, folder, "Meeting #27," Truman Library.
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the administration failed to effectively outline their military goals, then the Chiefs would again be in a position
to claim autonomy.

This was the reverse of what appeared

to be the PresidenVs approach in which the Chiefs were asked
to define what they could accomplish within the budget
.

.

celllng.

G~9

If the Chiefs actually intended to use their

catalog and NSC 20/3 as a means of changing the budget ceiling, it failed primarily due to the fact that the document
was issued too late in the process to have any effect.

By

then Forrestal had already issued his ultimatum to the Chiefs
and whatever

credibility they may have had as a corporate

entity had been lost.

Had it been available earlier, it

might have forced the administration into rethinking the
rationale behind the ceiling, or at least would have served
as a focus for Forrestal's desire to restructure the budget
process in the way he originally envisioned.

A collateral factor that impeded the effective formulation of FY 50 was Forrestal's desire that the Chiefs develop
their proposals based solely upon military requirements.
This was made very specific in his October 8th memorandum
to the Chiefs, in which he outlined his goal of an alternative
budget:
In carrying out this assignment, I do not feel that
it is necessary for you to consider such matters as

579c on d"t
l
, The Joint Chiefs of Staff in National
Policy, 232.
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political complications, possible commitments made in
earlier Congressional testimony, etc.
In other words,
I want from you a statement of force requirements on
a basis of military necessity. Other considerations
will, of course, be taken into account in the making
of final decisions, but in the final analysis the responsibility for taking such considerations into account
will be that of the President, assisted to the extent
he.deems necessary by the suggestions of his political
advisers .580
There is an apparent paradox in the Secretary's desire on
the one hand to have the Chiefs retain their traditionalism,
while on the other hand, understand the budget limitations
and work within them.
recalls

This paradox is explained when one

Forrestal's original outline of his "new principle."

The Chiefs would take the administration's policy guidance
and convert it into an integrated military plan initially

.
"581
b ase d " so l e l y on m1. 1.1 t ary cons1. d erat1ons.

Once that

had been accomplished it would then be evaluated against
fiscal and political feasibility.

The result would be a

force structure that would achieve the greatest degree of
military security within the limits of those constraints.
As important as it was to have the Chiefs involved in this
stage of the process, it was even more important that they
be involved during the firststage, the formulation of the
political mission statement.

If the Chiefs' military advice

58
9Memorandum for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 8 October
1948, no subject, Leahy Papers, folder "Budget and Estimates
1946-1950," U.S. Naval Archives.
58

~irst

Report of the Secretary of Defense, 41.
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was effectively integrated into the system during the first
stage, then it made sense to restrict the Chiefs to solely
military considerations at the later stage.

The evaluation

of fiscal and political feasibility would be merely a check
stage to guarantee that the JCS's military plans did in
fact support the political goals that were agreed upon earlier
and were within the fiscal limitations also agreed to.
Ultimately, the problem of the stage at which the
Chiefs should be participants was the cause of Forrestal's
efforts being ruined.

The first stage of the process, that

of developing an integrated and balanced policy never did
occur.

The formulation of NSC 20/3 and the JCS's catalog

of commitments were never directly connected with the budget
process, despite Forrestal's and the Chief's efforts.

These

two documents should have been an integral part in determining
the political mission statement.

Instead the Chiefs were

brought into the process much later, after the parameters
of that mission statement had been established.

Thus the

Chiefs lacked an understanding of the rationale behind the
setting of priorities that led to the ceiling.

Without

this understanding, this requirement that they develop their
military plans "based solely on military considerations,"
had a different meaning than Forrestal envisioned.
Chiefs' analysis of the situation from the military

The
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perspective naturally resulted in a budget in excess of
the administration's ceiling.

Expecting the Chiefs to some-

how remain within their professional limits, yet conscious
of the non-military issues, when they had not participated
in the decision making process, resulted in a high degree
of organizational frustration.

The Chiefs believed that

they were expected to give their professional imprimatur
to a force posture that had been arrived at without any
professional input.
The fact that the Chiefs could not "objectively"
arrive at the administration's

budget ceiling for both

the FY 49 supplement and the FY 50 budget pointed out to
the administration the dangers of allowing the Chiefs budgetary
autonomy.

From that time on, during the remainder of the

Truman administration and during the Eisenhower administration, the Chiefs would have to endure budget ceilings at
the onset of the planning cycle.

Professor Lawrence Kerb's

research into the budget process clearly substantiates the
Chiefs' own view that as a result of these ceilings, they
had "virtually no impact upon determining the actual size
582
of the military budget."
While individual Chiefs such
as Ridgway and Taylor voiced their disapproval of this mode

582
Lawrence Korb, The Joint Chiefs of Staff: The
First Twenty-Five Years, 1947-1972 (Bloomington:
Indiana
University Press, 1976), 128.
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of operation, it was the Wheeler Report that captured the
JCS's institutional dissidence on this matter:
The manner and timing in which the Services' budgets
are justified, appropriated, and apportioned sometimes
unduly determine military policy and strategy on the
basis of peacetime economy and management rather than
the readiness for war.
Determinations which are essentially military have been
affected by means of fiscal controls and adjustments
so that the resulting military funds, as finally apportioned, are often askew from the military requirements
upon which the budget was originally predicated.
The end result of the use of these non-military determinants
and the imposition of the budget ceilings was to prevent
"the objective determination of requirements based upon
directed roles, missions and plans followed by a tayloring
583
to fit a feasible financial plan."
Clearly, the Chiefs appeared to be calling for a
return to Forrestal's original concept of the budget process
which they assumed would allow them a greater degree of
autonomy over matters they considered "essentially military."
But a careful examination of the Wheeler Report's attack
upon imposed budget ceilings reveal fundamental differences
between the Forrestal model of policy integration and the
military's model.

Forrestal presupposed the Chief's par-

ticipation during the early stages of the process, when

583

u.s. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Report by the Ad
Hoc Committee to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Organization
of the Department of Defense, 24 January 1958 (Hereafter
referred to as the Wheeler Report), 13-14.
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political and fiscal guidelines would be established.

This

was the basis of his criticism of the Army's "straightline of command" and its sharp black and white distinctions
584
between military and civilian functions.
Those guidelines,
which were the result of integrating political and military
policy, would become the mission statement which would drive
the remainder of the process.

The military's integration

process as outlined in the Wheeler Report assumes that there
would be no consideration of fiscal feasibility until the
Chiefs' had submitted their requirements statement.

The

notion of tayloring the force structure at that point implies
that the Chiefs were not involved at an earlier stage when
fiscal limitations of a non-military variety would naturally
be discussed.

They, in essence, were expecting the civilians

to develop political guidance without fiscal considerations,
while they themselves would develop their military requirements in a similar vacuum.

Ironically, this was precisely

the pattern that was exhibited during FY 50, with the one
exception, that the civilians did consider financial matters
from the start.

Under the military's integration process

model, the Chiefs would constantly be producing military
plans that were divorced from reality, as they did in FY 50.
It was this very inability to develop plans that was in
tune with reality that resulted in their exclusion from
584

Memorandum Forrestal to Clifford, 7 September
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the budget process.

The only other option would have been

for the Chiefs to have considered non-military factors when
they developed their force requirements, but this may have
been impossible given their professionalism and the civilian's
fear of subverting civilian control of the military.
The only other time the Chiefs were allowed the opportunity to redeem themselves occurred a decade later during
the formulation of the Fiscal Year 1959 budget.

Again the

Chiefs based their requirements on their professional analysis of the situation, excluded non-military factors, and
produced a budgetary requirement 10 billion dollars in excess
of the administration's

.
585
des1res.

Ironically, the Wheeler

Report attacked the FY 59 budget as an example of an imposed
budget ceiling, claiming that it was "contrary to accepted
budgetary practices. 586

Ignoring the fact that budget ceil-

ings had been the norm for a decade, the sequencing of events
actually conformed to the Chiefs' process model, in that
after the Chiefs had developed their requirements, they
were measured against "financial feasibility."
The primary lesson learned from the formulation of
FY 50, and reinforced during the development of FY 59, was
that the Chiefs' desire for budgetary autonomy was incompatible with the civilian leadership's obligation to consider

585K or b , The Joint Chiefs of Staff, 106-7.
586

Wheeler Report, 13.
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a broad spectrum of factors influencing national security.
The Chiefs' concept of professionalism demanded autonomy
and any attenuation of their estimates meant an affront
to their professional capability and a violation of traditionalism.

In an effort to get around this traditional

professionalism, the Truman and the Eisenhower administrations reorganized the Department of Defense.

It was hoped

that if the Chiefs achieved unanimity, the kinds of dysfunctional inter-service rivalry that took place during the
formulation of the first budget would be eliminated.
establishment of budgetary ceilings was

The

simply one approach

to dealing with the unrealistic estimates that were being
produced by the JCS.

While it is true that "realism" is

relative, in this case the lack of it had the effect of
removing the Joint Chiefs from any meaningful role in the
budgetary process.

The fact that the Chiefs, themselves,

were at least partially at fault was never understood by
the military professionals.
While the lessons of FY 50 had a negative effect,
at least in terms of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's future
role in the formulation of the defense budget, they also
had a positive effect on the political and the military
planning systems.

After the failure of the budget, the

civilian leadership and the Joint Chiefs apparently agreed
that it was necessary for both the NSC and the JCS to
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develop cohesive planning systems within their own structures
and that these newly formed systems would merge their products together to form a unified integrated political/military
plan.

This would remove the twin handicaps that had faced

the Chiefs during the formulation of FY 50:

the lack of

policy guidance, and the lack of a unified military plan.
In an effort to fill the vacuum in policy direction
a process of codifying national security policy began during
the Korean War and continued on vigorously during the Eisenbower administration. This process had two facets.

First,

the National Security Council Staff expanded into a more
structured system in order to process guidance.
the NSC formalized and regularized its guidance.

Second,
This move-

ment culminated, during the Eisenhower administration, in
the publication of an annual document entitled Basic National
Security Policy (BNSP).

According to Lawrence Legere, the

BNSP "broadly defined U.S.interests and objectives, analyzed
the major trends in world affairs that might affect them,
and set forth a national strategy for achieving them, covering political, economic, and military elements thereof." 587
The BNSP was the result of the President's own inclination
to structure things in a military staff manner.

Maxwell

587 Keith C. Clark and Lawrence J. Legere, editors,
The President and the Management of National Security: A
Report by the Institute for Defense Analysis (New York:
Fredrick A. Praeger, 1969), 218.
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Taylor recalled that "it was just like his [Eisenhower's]
old staff at SHAEF; all the committees of the NSC were like
588
his general staff divisions."
Undoubtedly, Eisenhower
looked upon the BNSP as the operations order upon which
the JCS would base its planning.
As the National Security Council began to codify
its own product and establish communication with other governmental agencies, it was apparent that the JCS would have
to do likewise.

In 1950, a representative of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff was added to the NSC staff, but still the
communications problems remained. 589

Until the Joint Chiefs

of Staff developed a system that produced a unified military
plan it would be almost impossible for them to supply useful
advice to the NSC.

The lack of such a system had contributed

significantly toward the failure of the FY 50 budget.

It

was with this in mind that the Joint Chiefs of Staff established their "program for planning!! in July 1952.
This concept was first outlined by Vice Admiral Arthur
Davis, the Director of the Joint Staff, in 1949.

Rather

58

\axwell D. Taylor, !!Reflections on the American
Military Establishment,!! in Evolution of the American Military
Establishment Since World War II, ed. by Paul Schratz (Lexington, Virginia: George C. Marshall Research Foundation,
1978), 9.
58

~ackson Committee, 432; for a discussion of how
the JCS and NSC ultimately developed very effective linkages
during the Viet Nam War see William Shawcross, Sideshow:
Kissinger, Nixon and the Destruction of Cambodia (New York:
Simon & Schuster, 1979).
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inexplicably, although the Korean War had to have had some
impact, the program was not put into effect until almost
three years later.

In its final form, the Joint Chiefs

of Staff Memorandum of Policy (MOP) #84 outlined the formulation of three basic policy planning documents, the short
range Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), the midranged Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP), and the longranged Joint Long Range Strategic Estimate (JLRSE).

The

JSCP was the successor to the short range Joint Emergency
War Plans that were the only integrated planning documents
prior to the Kcrean War.

The JSCP dealt with the contemporary

world situation, outlined the services'capabilities and
described how they would react to certain contingencies.
The JLRSE (at times identified as the Joint Long Range Strategic Study, JLRSS) is a long range study, ten years or
more in advance, which emphasized broad trends rather than
attempting to outline specific operational plans.

the JLRSE

was particularly valuable in the area of research and development where lead times of a decade or more are normally
required.
While both of these documents are important in the
planning precess, it is the JSOP that is the focal point
of the JCS interface with the budget process.

According

to the official definition, the Joint Strategic Objectives
Plan is:
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A mid-range objectives plan which translates

u.s .

. national objectives and policies from the time frame
5-8 years in the future into terms of military objectives and strategic concepts and defines basic unde-rtakings for cold, limited, and general war which may
be accomplished with the objective force levels. 5 ~U
The JSOP filled the crucial void in the Forrestal/Sherman
approach to the budget process.

It was this document that

translated the NSC's political mission statement into a
military force posture.

The JSOP was exactly the type of

document that Forrestal wanted the JCS to develop during
the formulation of FY 50, and as such it should be the central
document in the policy integration effort.
The JSOP, however, can only be as good as the guidance
the Joint Chiefs received from the National Security Council.
Despite the Council's vigorous_ efforts, the Chiefs all through
the Eisenhower administration felt that the NSC's guidance
was still insufficient.

This view was reinforced by indepen-

dent analysis such as the Task Force on Procurement of the
Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the
Government which conducted its study in 1955.

591

This con-

tinued criticism of the political guidance is central to
590
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understanding why the Chiefs continued to believe that the
policy integration process was a failure and that they were
operating in a policy vacuum.

Probably, the foremost military

critic of the BNSP was General Maxwell Taylor.

General

Taylor described that the BNSP "should be the blueprint
for the security programs of all departments of the government and provide the JCS with a firm point of departure
for their strategic planning:"
Unfortunately, such is not the case. The end product .•.
has thus far been a document so broad in nature and
so general in language as to provide limited guidance
in nr~ctical appljcation.
In the course of its development, the sharp issues in national defense which confront
our leaders have been blurred in conference and in
negotiation. The final text thus permits many different
interpretations. The protagonists of Massive Retaliation
or of Flexible Response, the partisans of the importance
of air power or of limited war, as well as the defenders
of other shades of military opinion, we are able to
find language supporting their divergent points of view.
The "Basic National Security Policy" document means
all things to all people and settles nothing.5~~
Since the Chiefs perceived that the BNSP failed to supply
them with appropriate guidance, they, according to Generals
Taylor and Decker, were forced to generate their own assump593
tions upon which they based the JSOP.
In a cyclical
kind of scenario, this resulted in the Chiefs supplying
useless advice to the civilians.

While the Task Force on

Procurement was criticizing the NSC for its guidance, it
592
York:

Maxwell D. Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet (New
Harper & Brothers, 1959), 82-83.
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Interview with Generals Taylor and Decker, January
1975, Washington, D.C.
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was also pointing out that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had
failed to develop a coordinated and integrated war plan
and that "efforts to bring non-military·advice into the
.
.
594
process had been relat1vely unfru1tful."
The fact that the Chiefs had to generate their own
assumptions when they wrote their first Joint Emergency
595
War Plans, "BROLIER/FROLIC", in 1946, was explicable;
but once the NSC became operational it was dysfunctional.
This was partially the cause of the continual disparity
between the JCS generated force requirements and the fiscal
constraints outlined by the civilian leadership.

Granted,

the JCS did supply input during the writing of the BNSP,
but from the Chiefs perception it was simply "feeding the
596
paper mill over at the NSC."
· Conversely, one can get
a sense of what Eisenhower thought of the JCS input by
recalling that in 1958 he not only restructured the Department
of Defense, but specifically reorganized the internal staffing structure of the Joint Chiefs.
The failure of the policy integration program that
General Taylor noted was reflected in the continual existence
of the budget ceilings, which in turn meant that the JSOP

594c

.
.
omm1ss1on on the Organization of the Executive
Branch of the Government, Task Force on Procurement, A-44.
595c d"
on 1t, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National
Policy, 276-77.
5961 t
.
n erv1ew with General Taylor, January 1975,
Washington, D.C.
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was not being considered in the generation of a force posture.

Forrestal realized that a JSOP type document was

essential to the budget process, because it would translate
the political mission statement into forces, missions, and
dollars; but the budget ceilings superceded the political
mission statement and reversed the process by which force
levels were determined.

This reversal effectively took

the Chiefs out of the decision making process, and led General
Taylor to write that "nowhere in the machinery of government
is there a procedure for checking military capabilities
597
an d po l 1. t.1ca l comm1. t men t s.
With the Chiefs' efforts at attaining autonomy in
the budget process blocked by the imposition of budget ceilings, they apparently tried the next best thing; to influence
the formulation of the political mission statement in such
a manner that it would allow for the force levels the Chiefs'
sought.

This effort met with mixed success in regards to

the three major policy statements written during the period,
NSC 20/3, NSC 68 (written in 1949-50), and NSC 162/2 (written
in 1953).

In all three cases the Chiefs attempted to create

the image of a disjuncture between the nation's strategic
commitments and its military capabilities.

59

This was obviously

Taylor, Uncertain Trumpet, 83.
General Taylor
tried to get Secretary of State Dulles to meet regularly
with the Chiefs. While he did meet with the Secretary
informally, there never were established regular meetings.
Taylor, interview.
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the intention of the Chiefs in their use of the catalog
of commitments to criticize NSC 20/3.

While their efforts

failed in 1943, they met with greater success the following
year during the writing of NSC 63.

This documents was written

in response to the shocks of the Russian explosion of an
atomic bomb and the fall of China, and was designed to lay
the foundation for future American mobilization.

Although

the Chiefs remained conspicuously aloof from the document's
actual development, a representative of the Joint Staff's
Joint Strategic Survey Committee, Major General Truman H.
Landon, was deeply involved in its writing.

When the stra-

tegic implications of NSC 68 were translated into dollars
and cents it came surprisingly close to the Chiefs' original
recommendations for FY 50.

598

NSC 68 was never put into

effect because of the advent of the Korean War.
While the Chiefs met with mixed success in their
first two efforts to substantially influence policy, they
were far more successful during the formulation of the NSC 162/2.
Shortly after his election, President Eisenhower called
his new Chiefs together and asked them to examine America's
strategic posture and generate supporting budget estimates.
Their first efforts resulted in estimates that were six
to seven billion dollars in excess of the administration's
598
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figures.

The Chiefs argued through their spokesman, Admiral

Radford, that since the military had not been notified of
an official administration position on the use of nuclear
weapons, they had to plan for every possible contingency
across the whole spectrum of war.

According to policy analyst

Glenn Snyder, Admiral Radford maintained that if the Chiefs
"were told what kind [of war] they were to prepare for,
and, in particular, if they were given permission to use
nuclear weapons whenever it was

tec~nically

advantageous

to do so, then the costs of defense would be lower." 599
Radford's position that nuclear firepower could substitute
for manpower became one of the pillars of the New Look.
These three examples seem to indicate, at least superficially, that the Chiefs were being drawn into the policy
process and were capable of influencing the formulation
of strategic guidance, but the Chiefs were successful only
when their goals were in congruence with the goals of the
administration.

In 1949 the Truman administration and especi-

ally the State Department was very interested in redeveloping
the military option.

This created the situation for a re-

evaluation of the whole strategic force structure in NSC
68.

In 1953 Radford's arguments for replacing expensive

_,mm
Glenn Snyder, "The New Look," in Strategy Politics,
and Defense Budgets, 427
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manpower with firepower was supported by Secretary of State
John Foster Dulles, who was already committed to the U$e
600
of nuclear weapons.
When there was a lack of congruence,
as in the case of the development of NSC 20/3, the JCS had
little impact.
The essence of a process to produce an integrated
political/military policy was to achieve a nexus between
the nation's political goals, the military planning process,
and the development of the defense budget.

As management

specialist Fredrick Mosher pointed out in his 1954 study
of the defense budget process, "military plans are ineffective unless they are supported by the budget; and the budgets
are meaningless unless they are based upon sound military
planning, itself built upon approved objectives in foreign
601
policy."
It was in an effort to achieve this nexus that
the rationalism of program budgeting was first introduced.
The problem was that this logical and rational process broke
down with each side blaming the other for the failure to
produce an integrated political/military policy with neither

~1952 Dulles published an article in Life Magazine
entitled "A policy of Boldness," in which he advocated a
massive retaliation type strategy. Eisenhower pointed out
toTiulles that such an approach lacked flexibility. Townsend
Hoopes, The Df!Vil and John Foster Dulles (Boston: Little
Brown & Co., 1973), 126-28.
60
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Fredrick Mosher, Program Budgeting: Theory and
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of the Army (Chicago: Public Administrative Service, 1954),
56.
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side fully understanding why the breakdown occurred.

The

civilian leadership's experience, first during FY 50 and
later with FY 59, convinced them that the Chiefs could never
be allowed the budget autonomy that they demanded.

The

constant interse warfare over weapons systems acquisition
reinforced this assumption.

602

Thus both the Truman and

the Eisenhower administrations established budget ceilings,
which seemed to substantiate the Chief's contention that
the nation's capabilities and commitments were not being
effectively analyzed and balanced.
a

Unfortunately, such

superficial examination of the breakdown fails to tell

us actually what happened.

In order to understand what

did happen we must go through the process and analytically
compare it to our hypothetical model.
First let us examine the nature of the political
mission statement that starts the budget process.

The Chiefs

claimed that these statarents were ineffectual, forcing them
to operate in a policy vacuum.

While such a perception

is quite understandable when there was a lack of institutional
linkage between the JCS and the NSC, the creation of the
602For a discussion of the debates over weapons systems see Michael Armacost, The Politics of Weapons Innovation:
The Thor-Jupiter Controversy (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1969); Edmund Beard, Developing the ICBM: A Study
in Bureaucratic Politics (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1976); John Me~aris, Countdown for Decision (New
York: G. P. Putman's Sons, 1960); James Baar and William
E. Howard, Polaris: The Concept and Creation of a New and
Mighty Weapon (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1960);
Richard Hewlett and Francis Duncan, Nuclear Navy: 1946l962(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974).
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BNSP should have changed that.

One possible explanation

for the continuation of this perception may have been the
Chief's own experience with the military's mission statement.
Within

the military logic process, the mission statement

is the essential ingredient, since the commander's "estimate
of the situation" cannot begin without it.

Only after he

has received the mission statement is it possible to begin
to look at the enemy situation, the forces available to
him, the terrain, and so forth.

The primacy of the mission

statement is clearly noted in the following extract from
the 1940 edition of the United Stat€s Army Staff Officer's
Field Manual:
Every military operation should have a definite aim.
All missions assigned incident to an operation are contributory to that end.
A commander's mission as conveyed
in orders or instructions from higher authority should
require the adoption of a definite course of action 603
in meeting the situation which confronts his command.
It is essential that the mission statement define with great
precision the exact objective of the operation.

Conversely,

according to one military commentator, "a complex and vaguely
604
worded objective induces inefficiency and ineffectiveness."
Compared to the specificity of the typical military mission
statement, the NSC's general policy statements epitomized
603
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vagueness and complexity.

This represented a problem when

one realizes that the Chiefs apparently were looking to
the leadership of the Defense Department or to the NSC to
supply them with a military-like mission statement upon
which they could base their planning.

In the formulation

of both NSC 20/3 and NSC 162/2 the Chiefs went back to the
administration and asked for greater precision in what was
desired of the military forces.

This explains why the Chiefs

opposed the use of ceilings which in effect asked them what
they could accomplish within certain budgetary limitations.
Their opposition to budget ceilings loses credibility, though,
in the face of further examination of the mission statement
model.

One of the normal elements of the mission statement

is the allocation of forces to accomplish the mission.

If

the commander feels that the forces given to him are insufficient he can request more, but if that fails he must attempt
to carry out the mission with the forces at his disposal.
The budget ceiling may be viewed as merely the allocation
of forces to the military, and thus fits perfectly within
the mission statement model.

Since the Chiefs were opposed

to it, there must have been another reason.

Most likely

it was the fact it was developed by non-military professionals
and based upon non-military factors.
It is the use of the military mission statement model
that clarifies the differences between the military's
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approach to policy integration from that of Forrestal's.
The military wanted to receive a political mission statement
from the civilians that would be specific enough for the
development of supporting military plans, but not too specific
as to infringe upon their professional prerogative.

The

Chiefs would proceed to generate technical military plans
in an economically unconstrained environment with the only
yardstick of effectiveness being the achievement of the
political goals.

Most likely, those goals would have to

be framed in geopolitical terms (e.g., the containment of
communism or the defense of Europe) in order to facilitate
their translation into military operations orders.

Only

then would they be measured against economic feasibilitY.
In practice this balancing stage would have no meaningful
affect on the_process, since the plans were professionally
developed.

If the costs proved unrealistic, then the fault

lay in the original mission statement, which required that
too much be accomplished.

It would be the original mission

that would have to be rewritten, either excluding certain
items or becoming more specific (e.g., allowing the use
of

nuclear weapons as in the case of NSC 162/2).
Forrestal's approach was fundamentally different,

especially in the first stage.

For the first Secretary

of Defense, it was the development of the political mission
statement that was the heart of the policy integration process.
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It could not and would not be made exclusively by civilians
without military considerations being included.

Thus the

Chiefs had to be involved in writing their own mission order.
Such a process would include consideration of all determinants to include economic and budget factors.

Once the

mission statement had been written, the Chiefs would then
apply their expertise and develop a strategic program to
support that mission.

The development of this plan would

be unconstrained, except for the constraints that were already
included in the mission statement.

Under this approach,

Forrestal was as against the establishment of budget ceilings
without military input, as the Chiefs were, but for obviously
different reasons.
The perceptual difference about the first stage of
the integration process was the tragic fJaw that ruined
the best efforts at making the system work.

Since the Chiefs

apparently could not work within the framework supplied
by the vague and clearly non-military political mission
statements, they generated their own assumptions upon which
to start the planning process.

Naturally, these assumptions

were laced with service perspectives.

One example of this

occurred during the writing of NSC 162/2.

Radford had built

his argument for the freedom to use nuclear weapons upon
a dysjuncture between commitments and capabilities.

This

of course had been the approach taken by the Chiefs in 1948,
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but Radford and his supporters defined commitments very
narrowly to mean only agreements in which military force
was actually committed.

This would allow for a much smaller

force structure than if the definition would include all
possible commitments as the Chiefs used in their 1948 catalog
and Ridgway argued for in 1953.

This broader definition

would allow for a larger force structure, especially for
605
the Army.
It was differences like this that resulted
in paperclipped budgets that far exceeded the civilian's
expectations.

Although the Chiefs may have differed on

service matters, they all agreed that the budget should
only consider military expediency.

The Chiefs did not con-

sider this to be dysfunctional because this was the way
their professional and organizational ethic was structured.
Autonomy in the budget process meant the exclusion of nonmilitary considerations.
The Truman and Eisenhower administrations tried to
bridge this gap between the Chief's military requirements
and reality by requiring that the Chiefs take economic factors
into consideration.

ForrEstal tried this in his 8 October

memorandum, and Wilson tried it wih his I9M Directive, but
this only created a potentially greater problem and a major
dilemma for the Chiefs.

If the military professionals

605 Snyder, "The New Look," 427.
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began to take into account non-military factors, then the
foundation of American civilian-control of the military
would be undermined.

Only a truely integrated and fusionist

approach during the first stage of the process could solve
this problem.

Fusionism, if understoood correctly by both

the civilians and the professional military would not endanger civilian control, and possibly would reinforce it.

From

the Chiefs' perspective, mo submit to the administration's
desires and incorporate economic factors net only violated
their professionalism, but also made them vulnerable to
attack since they lacked the expertise to generate economic
assumptions.

Furthermore, any conclusion that differed

from the administration's would be deemed wrong and further
weaken their credibility.

Another factor that the Chiefs

undoubtedly considered was that the development of alternative
force structures would allow the civilians to make crucial
military decisions.

In the bifurcated world of the military

professional, only the expert should be allowed to make
those decisions.

The Chiefs did not seem to understand

that their rejection of fusionism allowed the civilians
to exclude them totally from the budget process, leaving
the non-military leaders of the administration to make the
important military decisions anyway.

Given their professional
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ethic, it was only natural for the Chiefs to posit these
non-experts could never adequately balance the nation's
capabilities and commitments.

While the placement of blame

might be at least partially wrong, the Chiefs were right
that policy integration had failed.

CHAPTER IX
CONCLUSION
In January 19ol, a new Democratic administration came
into office, and like his two predecessors, President Kennedy
understood the necessity of having an effectively managed
defense structure.

With this in mind, Kennedy asked former

Secretary of the Air Force, Senator Stuart Symington, to
form a committee to examine restructuring the Department
of Defense.

The Symington Committee reported that the re-

organizations of 1949, 1953, and 1958 had not fundamentally
altered the original 1947 structure and that these reorganizations had "failed to bring the organizational structure
of the Department [of Defense] into line with the require.
,606
men t s o f t o d ay ' s m1. 1.1 t ary con d.1t1ons.

The fundamental structural problem the Committee
pointed out was the confusion that arose from having both
a service and a Department of Defense chain of command.
The solution to this duality was to eliminate the service
secretaries.

Their functions would be absorbed by two new

super-directorates that would be formed within the Defense
Department:

one for Weapons Systems, and the other for

60
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Administration.
of Defense.

Each would be headed by an Under Secretary

This same duality was also pointed out as im-

peding the effectiveness of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
because it forced the Chiefs to assume a "two-hatted character" which resulted in inter-service rivalry.

The solution

was to eliminate the JCS as it was then configured and to
replace it with a new Military Advisory Council consisting
of senior officers, possibly retired, who would have no
service responsibility.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs

of Staff would be redesignated the Chairman of the Joint
Staff (which would be expanded in size) and named the
principal military advisor to the President and the Secretary
of Defense.

While the chiefs of service would still exist

they would not be a member of the expanded Joint Staff nor
on the fdvisory Council, and their precise role was left
rather unclear.

In regard to the defense budget, the pro-

fessional military's role was never mentioned, forshadowing
Rdbert McNamara's total assumption of this responsibility
when he came into office.

The logic of this further concen-

tration of power was reaffirmed by Secretary McNamara who
discovered upon assuming office "that the three military
departments had been establishing their requirements independently of each other" and that these "so-called requirements bore almost no relation to the real world."

607
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The problems that both the Symington Committee and
Secretary McNamara described were by no means new ones.
Every staff analysis since Forrestal's First Report of the
Secretary of Defense had repeatedly pointed out that the
JCS was not effectively coordinating its plans with other
agencies and that their plans tended to be divorced from
reality.

Furthermore, these studies had continually

main~

tained that there was a relationship between dysfunctional
inter-service rivalry and the fact that th9 Chiefs had to
assume both the role of a service commander and a planner
within the corporate structure of the JCS.

Yet, three re-

organizations later, these problems still remained and the
panacea of earlier reorganizations, greater centralization
into the hands of the civilian defense managers, was again
offered as the solution.
The reason for this constant reinvention of the organizational wheel was that the civilian leaders did not understand that there were two
and not just one.

root causes to these problems

The first cause, which was more readily

identifiable, was organizational and bureaucratic.

It was

manifested symptomatically by inter-service rivalry and
became the primary target for reform.

Furthermore, concen-

trating on the organizational and bureaucratic causes had
the advantage of dealing exclusively with structural matters
and avoiding having to address the more complex and
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controversial fundamental values and relationships that
existed between the civilian leadership and the military
professional.

The second cause, which was less apparent,

but inextricably related to those values and relationships
that were untouched by organizational reform, was the nature
of military professionalism.

The civilian defense managers

never did understand that they could not totally solve the
first problem without understanding the second.
It was the issue of inter-service rivalry that captured
the attention of critics of the defense planning system.
Unfortunately, that rivalry was all too easily attributed
to the Chiefs having a "two-hatted" role.

Once it became

dogma that there was a cause and effect relationship between
the Chief's placement within the chain of command and interservice rivalry, it was axiomatic that the removal of the
former would eliminate the latter.

This explains why exclud-

ing the Chiefs from the chain of command became the organizational panacea for both the Truman and the Eisenhower administrations.

But this over-concentration on the chain of

command issue merely obfuscated the fact that it

~as

the

services that were in conflict, not just the Chiefs.
The military services, like any large bureaucratic
organization, had vital interests to protect.

Those interests

were generally outlined in the service's roles and missions,
and were more specifically identified in the allocation
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of combat missions under the various war plans.

Any change

in one of these missions had far-reaching fiscal and organizational consequences.

The protection of these vital interests

led the Chiefs to engage in the same type of bureaucratic
decision making that was occurring all over Washington.
While considered quite acceptable behavior when conducted
by civilian decision

makers, it was looked upon as dysfunc-

tional when exhibited by the professional military.
This double standard also ignored the reality that
inter-service rivalry was not just the result of petty
bureaucrats fighting among themselves for a larger slice
of the budget.

The Chiefs, as representatives of military

services that had totally different approaches to waging
war, honestly belieYed that their service was essential
to the nation's defense.

Since the military budget was

a reflection of the problems associated with inter-service
rivalry, any objective evaluation of service representation
was impossible.

It was forgotten that the Chiefs were

appointed because of their service experience and their
ability to advise based on experience.

From the Chief's

perspective, that advisory ability was directly tied to
their command function.

One is reminded of Admiral Burke's

statement that "if the Chiefs didn't represent their services
who were they to represent."
Most of the Chiefs saw divergencies of opinion,
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resulting from service representation, in a positive light.
The Truman administration, plagued with service conflict,
rejected such pluralism almost from the start.

Furthermore,

the civilian leadership did not seem to appreciate the fact
that the Chiefs performed a valuable function while playing
the service "front man" for the administration.

They not

only added authoritative support to the administration's
position, they also channeled service discontent.

Admiral

Denfeld lost control of his service's officer corps when
it was felt that he could no longer be trusted to defend
the Navy's vital interests.

As a result, the officer corps

believed that it had no choice but to seek alternate means
of expression, such as the Congress or the press.

Thus

a certain amount of rivalry was necessary, if for nothing
more than constituent consumption.
A related organizational problem was that of the
bureaucratic nature of the Joint Staff.

Within the Joint

Staff the problem of service bureaucratic imperatives was
exacerbated by its interconnection with individual career
enhancement.

During both the Truman and the Eisenhower

administrations, there were organizational efforts to elevate
the Joint Staff above service interests.

The expansion

of the Armed Forces Staff College and the creation of the
National War College was designed to broaden the base of
understanding by America's future military leaders, and
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to minimize service parochialism.

This latter goal was

the rationale behind Secretary Gates' requirement that all
officers serve a tour at the joint level prior to promotion
to flag rank.

President Eisenhower's reorganization of

the Joint Staff in 1958 was also aimed at limiting the service's impact on the Joint Staff, by eliminating the committee
system.

Unfortunately, none of these efforts had the desired

results.
What the civilian defense managers really wanted
was the independence and analytic skills of a professional
general staff.

Such an institution would not only be com-

patible with their management styles, but would also be
theoretically above service interests.

Fear of Prussianiza-

tion made such a military general staff anathama to the
civilian leadership, so they proceeded to create a civilian
general staff within the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
Once the decision had been reached by Forrestal and
Truman to abandon the notion of a pluralistic Joint Chiefs,
because it apparently led to conflict, the basic pattern
for defense reorganization was set.

In the place of pluralis-

tic divergency, the Chiefs would be required to supply only
unanimous advice.

In order to guarantee this unanimity,

the power of the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff was increased, the politicization
of the selection process occurred, and the chain of command
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was restructured to make the JCS into more of a planning
agency.

This latter reform was all important because it

directly related to the Chief's advisory function which
was the real reason for the creation of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff.

Forrestal knew he had to have sound military

advice on political/military matters.

The failure of the

Chiefs to agree forced Forrestal to consider disbanding
the JCS, just as the Symington Committee recommended, and
ultimately to decide upon making the Chairman his "agent"
within the institution.
Complicating this problem even further, was the
Chiefs' desire not to abdicate their advisory function simply because they could not come to an agreement.

Fully

understanding the realities of the bureaucracy, they tried
to use artificial means to facilitate agreement.
exasperated the civilian leadership further.

This only

In a parodox

of logic, the civilian managers thought that unanimity would
eliminate all this dysfunctional behavior.

What they failed

to realize was that while such unanimity did present a solid
front to Congress, the more it was forced, the more the
Chiefs' advisory function dissipated.
Despite these massive organizational efforts, the
reforms failed to address the other fundamental problem,
military professionalism, that plagued the Chiefs' effectivene~s.

Of the three elements of professionalism:

corporateness,
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responsibility, and expertise; it was the latter one that
had the greatest impact.

There is little doubt that the

Chiefs perceived themselves to be the administration's
military experts, a role that the administration normally
granted them.

Such a perception impacted on the Chiefs'

effectiveness in two ways.

First, the nature of a profes-

sion required that the professional demand autonomy within
his area of expertise.

Second, the demand for autonomy

meant that the expert could not consider factors that were
outside his expertise in the development of professional
advice.

Thus, expertise clearly defined the parameters

within which the Chiefs could operate and excluded the
incorporation of non-military factors in the process of
developing advice for their civilian superiors.

The result

was the domination of the Huntington/absolutist model.

One

hundred and fifty years ago Clausewitz suggested that it
was absurd to ask that the military professional limit his
advice to the military point of view.

The advent of nuclear

weapons and the cold war have made it all the more absurd.
The problem was that pragmatism or fusionism appeared to
be incompatible with America's traditional notions of
civilian control.
This apparent incompatibility is at the heart of
the failure of the policy integration process.

The assump-

tion that fusionism was somehow anti-American was taken
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for granted by both the civilian leadership and the military
professionals.

Furthermore, the parameters determined by

professional expertise were also accepted by all the parties
concerned.

Even Forrestal seemed to accept the notion that

the Chiefs were to look at things only from the military
point of view.

The difficulties confronting both groups

were more than semantical, they were based on fundamental,
historical, social, and professional beliefs.
Aside from the demand for unanimity and the politicization of the selection process, the ultimate result of
the constant disunity among the Chiefs was to impede, if
not eliminate, their ability to have any meaningful impact
upon such important defense matters as the budget.

Without

effective military participation, the administration's
imposed budget ceilings became the main means of molding
defense policy.

This is not to say that the amounts allocated

were insufficient, just that the process by which they were
derived was divorced from professional military input.

From

the Chief's perspective, this use of non-military determinators failed to analyze and balance capabilities and commitments in a meaningful way, forcing the Chiefs to tailor
their force levels and war plans to fit fiscal criteria,
and increasing their institutional frustration.
While technically the Chief's criticism of the budget
process was correct, it failed to take into consideration
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the fact that their own actions had, to a great extent,
led to their exclusion.

Instead, the

Chiefs blamed the

civilians for the flaws within the NSC structure and vague
policy directives.

To be sure, there was substance to their

claims, but a more fundamental cause for the breakdown of
communication was a lack of understanding on the part of
the Chief's civilian superiors about the nature of military
professionalism.
As military professionals the Chiefs sought autonomy
within their sphere of professional competency.

Based upon

the concept of expertise they claimed exclusive control
over military matters, and conversely excluded non-military
considerations.

This striving for autonomy, as well as

their own career experiences, led the Chiefs to expect that
the budget process would follow the steps of the operations
plan model; a model that both Admiral Sherman and Secretary
Forrestal advanced.

Under this model the political leader-

ship would determine the long-range political goals of the
state, while the military determined the most effective
military means of attaining those goals.

The major point

of contention occurred when fiscal reality was balanced
against military effectiveness.

The creation of ceilings

meant that the administration had determined the level of
the balance prior to the military's involvement.
Another problem that emanated from the military's
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professional experience was the relationship of specific
mission statements to the operations plan model.

Within

the military such mission statements were quite specific
in order to facilitate planning.

Structural flaws and the

natural tendency of political statements to be general,
led to vague and imprecise directions being given the
military.

From the Chiefs' point of view, they were opera-

ting within a policy vacuum that they were forced to fill
themselves.

It was only natural that as they generated

their own assumptions upon which to base their planning,
those assumptions would be based exclusively on military
factors.

This, of course, led to what the civilians charac-

terized as unrealistic plans and programs.

Thus, each side

blamed the other for the breakdown in political-military
planning.
To achieve real policy integration required a reinterpretation of the liberal definition of civilian control,
and the military's perception of the nature of professionalism
which relegated the soldier to that of an automaton, and
demanded the exclusion of all non-military factors from
consideration.

Instead the traditional interpretations

of both civilian control and military professionalism prevailed, creating an obstacle to policy integration.

The

more the soldier strove for the type of autonomy in policy
formulation that his professionalism demanded,

421
the more he produced highly professional, but dysfunctional
advice.

This advice not only excluded many of the non-

military factors that the civilian leadership considered
important, but it also excluded many factors that were critical to military planning.

This undermined the Chiefs'

credibility and forced the civilian leadership to seek alternative sources of military advice.

The more these alterna-

tive sources of advice became dominant, the more the Chiefs
became alienated from the policy system, and the more they
attacked the system for not considering their professional input.
As each side simply blamed the other, they proceeded
to offer new organizational structures that merely papered
over the problem.

The civilians were afraid to upset the

traditional soldier-client relationship that was the basis
for the American version of civilian control.

The military

was equally reluctant to break down the delimitating barriers of traditionalism.

The soldier's whole ethical back-

ground had instilled in him a reverence for those barriers,
and his whole career had prepared him for his place within
the staff structure.

He would fulfill his role as the

Le Grande Brut, and await for the issuance of the political
mission statement.
This is not to say that both sides were unaware of
the real cause of the policy bifurcation.

The professional

soldier was fully aware of the political, social, and
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economic consequences of his actions, but to articulate
that understanding or project the image that those factors
were taken into consideration might be interpretated as
a challenge to civilian control.

Maxwell Taylor's "new

professionalism" came precariously close to such a pronouncement, but even he stayed within the pale.

The civilians

also understood the problem or at least diagnosed the symptoms.

One after another of the independent DoD studies

came up with the same conclusions in regard to the JCS;
but like a doctor who has no theoretical foundation behind
his medical knowledge, they merely treated the symptoms
hoping that it would cure the disease.

All of these studies

recommended new organizational panaceas that led to further
centralization, and all called for better coordination between
the national command authority and its military advisors.
Never once did they address the issue of coordination outside
the context of an organizational chart.

It was as if they

had never heard of Secretary Forrestal's admonition on the
importance of the men who make up that organizational chart.
Coordination and policy integration was viewed only in
bureaucratic and managerial terms.

They never addressed

the necessity for both the civilians and the military to
have mutually shared values, and an appreciation for the
complete spectrum of the military, political, social, and
economic issues at stake.
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While the scope of this study ends with_the ·completion of President Eisenhower's second term, the problems
that have been discussed continued to exist.

During the

1970s, two major studies of the Defense Department were
completed and they confirmed the hypothesis that treating
the symptoms would not cure the disease.

The first of these

studies was the 1970 Blue Ribbon Defense Panel.

While the

Panel's report identified the recurring problems of interservice rivalry, the committee nature of the JCS, and the
Chiefs' dual and conflicting role as planner and commander,
this study, unlike its predecessors delved deep enough to
actually find the source of the disease.
Ideally, the JCS must be fully prepared to provide
competent professional technical military advice, while
recognizing and giving full due weight to non-military
considerations, the political, economic, and social
realities of national security affairs. They should
accept the fact that professional military advice must
be balanced and tempered by higher authority with fuller
cognizance of those other factors. Nevertheless, the
prime mission of the JCS, in their view, is to point
up the hard military risks which may arise from decisions
weighted more heavily, as will happen, toward non-military
factors. The JCS, in short, must be ready to make
clear the national security consequences of alternative
top-level decisions. Their deep conviction, born of
their professionalism and their statutory responsibilities, is that military viewpoints and security risk
assessments should not become submerged at the point
of decision by political or economic factors; overweighed, perhaps, but not submerged.608
Surprisingly, the Blue Ribbon.Panel offered no organizational
608

s1ue Ribbon Defense Panel, Report to the President
and the Secretary of Defense on the Department of Defense,
Appendix N, Staff Report on Joint Chiefs of Si.aff Decision
Making (Washington, D.C.: July 1970), 23.
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solutions.

Instead, it seemed to have faith that the Chiefs

were evolving toward the ideal.

How this evolution would

occur or how it could be facilitated was rather unclear,
but the Panel indicated that the

11

new professionalism" and

total policy integration was at hand.
A second major study conducted during the 1970s was

the Steadman Report, published in 1978 under the direction
of President Carter.

Generally speaking, this report showed

that the Blue Ribbon Panel's optimistic view was unwarranted.
The same problems that had been observed since the passage
of the National Security Act remained unchanged, despite
thirty years of structural efforts to eliminate them.

Although

the Blue Ribbon Panel had been unduly optimistic, it at
least had identified the narrow military point of view as an
obstacle to policy integration.

Unfortunately, the Stead-

man Report, while implicitly substantiating this contention,
never followed through with an analysis and offered no solution other than traditional procedural panaceas:

changing

the make up of the Joint Staff, changing the method by which
the JCS produce their paperwork, and creating a separate
group of national military advisors composed of former chiefs
609
or Cines.
This is almost identical to the ideas that
Forrestal flirted with.

609

Report to the Secretary of Defense on the National
Military Command Structure (Washington, D.C.: July 1978),
48-65.
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After examining the various organizational recommendations, as well as the underlying factors that led to the
breakdown in effective policy integration, the obvious question is what is the solution.

I find unpersuasive the more

radical solutions that would replace the Chiefs with a committee of senior military advisors who would have no command
responsibility.

While removing the duality that exists

within the JCS, I believe the cure can be just as bad as
the disease.

In the first place, there is no guarantee

that senior advisors, whether retired or simply relieved
of command responsibility, would be immune from service
parochialism.

As we noted earlier, inter-service rivalry

is at least partially derived from a real commitment to
ones service and a belief in the importance of that mode
of fighting wars.

After nearly forty years in a single

service, it is doubtful that such loyalty would be eliminated
by virtue of retirement.

The real drawback to this sugges-

tion though is the separation of planning from command
responsibility.

The dangers that can result from irrational

ivory tower planning is every bit as dangerous, if not more
so, than an over-concentration on purely operational realities.

The total elimination of the Chiefs would remove

a valuable counter-balance in the planning process.

This

is not to say that there are not a number of major changes
that could be implemented that would increase the Joint
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Chiefs effectiveness.

Among those possible

ch~nges

the

following would be my recommendations.

1)

Give the Chairman a fifth star and make him the

Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief.

This would give

him the status and the leverage to more effectively deal
with inter-service rivalry, as well as be in a better position to articulate the Chief's views to the civilian leadership.

A strong argument can be made for making him a full

member of the NSC or at least its sole military advisor.
Obviously, the selection of the Chairman is important in
order to guarantee that he is above service interests.

In

order that he understands the internal workings of the JCS,
he should formerly have been e"i ther a Chief, the Director of
the Joint Staff, of the Assistant to the Chairman.

Historically,

with the exception of Admiral Radford, all of the Chairman
have had experience somewhere within the JCS.

The Chairman

should be looked upon as an objective professional and not
a creature of the administration.

If the JCS staffing pro-

cess becomes more responsive to the goals of the administration and the Chiefs input more usable, then the motivation
behind making the Chairman the administration's "agent"
will have ended.

Thus I would oppose having the Chairman's

term expire automatically upon the advent of a new administration.

Such a policy would totally politicize the position
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and erode his credibility as a professional advisor.
2)

The procedures by which the Joint Staff generates

its product need to be totally revamped, eliminating the
"flimsy, buff, green, red striped nightmare."

The key ele-

ment that made it such a nightmare was the requirement for
service concurrence at every level, which if removed short
of the green stage, would minimize the waffled positions
that have become the hallmark of the JCS.

Obviously, some

service input is required at the initial filmsy stage; but
between then and the final Joint Staff product, the Joint
Staff should work apart from the service staffs.

While

this will probably result in more split decisions being
forwarded, it will be positive in the sense that the issues
will be clarified and the opportunity to choose between
real alternatives will be at hand.

This had been the Truman

administration's original intent until inter-service rivalry
forced it to replace pluralism with unanimity.

This recom-

mendation will only work if the civilian leadership is willing to accept more split decisions and not seek unanimity
as a means of escaping their constitutional obligations.
3)

With the implementation of the previous recommen-

dation, the role of the Joint Staff will have been enhanced
and reliance upon the service staffs minimized; nevertheless,
two internal structural changes are needed to increase its
effectiveness.

First, the Joint Staff needs to develop
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its own analytical capabilities, especially in the budget
and costing areas.

It was the lack of this capability that

cost the JCS its influence during the McNamara period.

Since

the services have developed their own capability, the Chiefs
are forced to rely to a great extent on that self-serving
data.
Secondly, since the JCS plans are criticized for
being divorced from non-military reality, I would suggest
the establishment of a small independent think tank designed
to develop military positions that incorporate non-military
perspectives.

Such a think tank would be staffed by bright

young officers selected for their ability to bridge the
gap between the military and the non-military points of
view.

Their independence would be guaranteed by making

the assignment permanent, along the lines used by the permanent faculty at the military academies.

The members of

this think tank would have given up the opportunity for
higher command within their service in exchange for the
opportunity to analyze complex political-military issues
and have an impact on policy formulation.

Since, they would

never return to their service of origin, the pressure to
conform to a service viewpoint would be eliminated.

They

would, in effect, be a mini-General Staff along the Prussian
model.

Two factors would work to mitigate the danger of

ivory tower planLing.

First, new officers would periodically
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be brought in so that the group would not stagnate.
the staff would have no command function.

Second,

The sole purpose

of the think tank would be to develop alternative analysis
on the issues the Chiefs examine.

By having such analysis

the Chiefs might be better able to impact effectively on
policy development.
4)

Aside from the major changes within the Joint

Staff outlined above, there are several minor changes that
would enhance the Staff's effectiveness.

One would be to

increase the length of time an officer can stay on the staff.
This would increase the
nization.

institutional memory of the orga-

Second, assign a small number of civilians to

the Joint Staff.

While their number should remain small

so as not to become dominant, they would form a permanent
nucleus of the staff and broaden the base of the Joint Staff's
experience.

Some of the civilians could be rotated from

other agencies within DoD, State or the CIA, thus increasing
the institutional linkages between those organizations and
the JCS.

Such a procedure would go a long way toward eroding

the isolation that the Joint Chiefs have been so correctly
criticized for.

It is axiomatic to say that the officers

assigned to the Joint Staff should exhibit a "purple suit
mentality'' and that such an approach should be rewarded
in the officers' next assignment.

Promotion above the rank

of colonel/captain should be predicated upon assignment
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on a joint staff.

Such mandatory exposure to the joint

arena and the problems related to other services will do
much to minimize service parochialism.
5)

The Director of the Joint Staff should be given

a fourth star and made a full member of the JCS.

This would

reflect the increased responsibilities of the Joint Staff,
and allow him to more effectively argue for the Joint Staff's
product, especially since concurrence would not be sought
during the product's development.

He

sho~ld

also serve

as acting chairman if the incumbant is not available.

Under

the present structure the senior Chief takes over and
naturally brings with him his service biases at possibly
crucial times.

It is essential that the Director be con-

sidered an honest broker and that the job not simply be
a ticket to be punched for higher command.

To preclude

the Director protecting his ties to his own service, he
should not be considered for the position of a Chief after
leaving the Joint Staff.

Given his joint experience and

the prominence of his former position, the only realistic
position that would be available to a former Director would
be that of Chairman or a commander in chief of a unified
command.

His background should emphasize joint planning

with at least one prior tour on the Joint Staff and some
experience at the unified command level.
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6)

Consideration should be given to the creation

of a joint general staff.

Such a staff would consist of

a small number of officers, who upon graduation from their
service staff colleges and the Armed Forces Staff College
would be permanently assigned to the joint general staff.
Such officers would make up a substantial portion of the
Joint Staff and the joint staffs of the various unified
commands.

They would have their own promotion system, with

the goal being the Director of the Joint Staff.

There would

be fundamental differences between this organization and
the basic Prussian model.

First of all, the members of

the joint general staff would not all be working for the
Director of the Joint Staff.

Those that were assigned to

unified commands would be working for that commander in
chief.

The reason for their assignment to the unified com-

mands would not be to guarantee continuity of implementation,
but to bring joint staffing expertise.
of

Second, members,

the joint general staff are not expected under any cir-

cumstances to command, nor would they be assigned at echelons
lower than the unified commands.

Finally, the continued

existence of the service chiefs and their own staff would
act as a check against the joint general staff becoming
too dominate and act to counter-balance any ivory tower
planning.

While this is obviously, the most radical of

my recommendations, in the long run it may be the most
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necessay.
The above recommendations have totally focused on
the organizational aspect of the problem, despite the fact
that the major thesis of this study is that it is the narrow
perceptual basis of professionalism that led the Chiefs
to exclude non-military factors from their planning process.
The reason is that value transformation does not lend itself
to the same type of itemized recommendations that organizational changes do.

Since this aspect of the problem focuses

on the value system of the officer corps, the only effective
way to deal with it is to change that value system.

It

needs to be carefully pointed out that the incorporation
of non-military factors does not destroy the experts knowledge.

On the contrary, fusionism is simply the use of

differing data to develop the most useful military advice.
The officer must always remember that an overconcentration
on any one factor will be as dysfunctional as the compartmentalization that has plagued the national security system
since the end of World War II. To say that fusionistic
balancing would be easy is to totally underestimate the
problem.
Clearly, the attainment of a new value system is
easier said than done.

A value system is acquired slowly

over time as a result of role modeling, peer pressure, and
value inculcation.

Despite the problems, there are several
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ways it can be accomplished.

First, the curriculum of the

service schools offers an invaluable tool in fostering_ prag610
Second, role modeling by senior officers would
matism.
have a great effect on junior and middle-grade officers,
especially if they realize the relationship between promotion, and maintaining a joint perspective and incorporating
non-military factors.

Finally, the belief on the part of

the civilian leadership that such an approach is in the
national interest is essential to its success.

In this

regard Forrestal's plan of asking the Chiefs to develop
an unconstrained and then a constrained budget, can serve
as a model for future administrations.

The breakdown in

Forrestal's system occurred when the Chiefs failed to handle
the second assignment.
Mere acceptance of fusionism would have little or
no value if the Chiefs' input was ignored or the institutional
linkages non-existent.

The civilian leaders must bring

the Chiefs into the policy process at the earliest possible
stage.

The administration must carefully outline its politi-

cal goals so that the Chiefs can generate a strategy and
a force structure to achieve those goals.

6i 6 For a discussion of the absolutist position in
the service staff college curriculum see John Binkley and
Donald Vought, "Fort Apache or Executive Suite: The United
States Army Enters the 1980s," Parameters, Journal of the
United States Army War College, 8 (June 1978).
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That force structure then must be balanced against
fiscal and political realities.

As part of this balancing

the original assumptions and goals must be reexamined and
all alternatives fully and rationally explored.

It is at

this stage that a pluralistic JCS is essential because it
will supply viable alternatives from which the administration can choose.

At every stage it must be a joint effort

or dysfunctional compartmentalization will occur.
Without such an approach the American government
will continue as it has for over thirty-five years, attempting to resolve through structural means a problem that is
essentially intellectual and perceptual.

True policy integra-

tion will never be attained until it is finally agreed that
"indeed it is an irrational proceeding to consult professional soldiers on the plan of war that they give a purely
military opinion upon what the Cabinet ought to do."
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